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SECTION A

A.

Revenue Reconciliation Act of 1993
1.

Income Tax.

The income tax rate brackets for trusts and estates are
as follows for tax years beginning after December 31, 1993:
15 percent
28 percent
31 percent
36 percent
39.6 percent

Up to $1,500
$1,500 - 3,600
$3,600 - 5,500
$5,500 - 7,500
Above $7,500

The election to pay additional 1993 taxes attributable to the
rate increases in the 1993 Act in three installments, available to
many taxpayers, is not available to trusts and estates.
Rate compression creates an incentive not to accumulate income
in a

trust or estate.

problem for estates,

Timely distributions

and for trusts.

can eliminate the

However,

this presents a

problem with respect to exemption equivalent trusts,
skipping tax trusts, and trusts for disabled individuals.
trusts,

other

considerations

suggest

that

income

generation
In those
should

be

accumulated.
2.

Estimated Taxes.

The estimated tax payment rules have been changed.

For

taxable years beginning after December 31, 1993, a trust or estate
with adjusted gross income (HAGI H) of not more than $150,000 will
avoid underpayment penalties by making estimated payments equal to
the lesser of (i) 90 percent of the tax shown as due on the return
~

for the current year or (ii)

100 percent of the tax shown on the

return for the preceding year.

For trusts or estates with AGI of

A-I

$150,000 or more, 110 percent of the preceding year's tax must be
paid.
3.

Estate and Gift Tax Rates.

The reduction in rates was eliminated, retroactively to
December 31,

1992.

Thus,

the highest rate is 55%, plus the 5%

surcharge for amounts between $10,000,000 and $21,040,000.
4.

Medicaid Rules.

The rules concerning Medicaid eligibility were changed
with respect to transfers of assets and

th~

treatment of trusts.

The look-back period has been changed to 36 months, which runs from
the

date

later.

of

application

or

institutionalization,

whichever

is

The number of months of delay in eligibility is equal to

the total, cumulative uncompensated value of all assets transfeTred
after the look-back date, divided by the average monthly cost to a
private patient of nursing facilities in the state.

The period of

delay begins with the first month during which the assets were
disposed of.
Transfers by co-owners are considered made by the applicant if
the transfer reduces the applicant's interest in the asset.
The

term "Medicaid qualifying trust"

has been eliminated.

There is a 60-month look back rule for payments from trusts, rather
than 36 months.
a

That is probably an error.

clear reason why a

different

There does not appear

time period would be used for

A-2

transfers
--~-l
~

from

revocable

trusts,

versus

property

transferred

directly by the grantor.

='
Importantly,
9

supplemental needs

trusts

created by persons

other than the person applying for Medicaid are not taken into
account for eligibility purposes.

Thus,

gifts

from parent to

child, with child creating a trust for parent, would seem usefUl.
Presumably,
helpful.
tax

a lapse of time between the two transfers would be

The child's transfer would need to be incomplete for gift
by

purposes

the

child

appointment, for instance.

retaining

a

special

power

of

An interesting issue is the effect of

powers of withdrawal for Medicaid;

the creation and lapse of a

power would seem to transfer grantor status to the powerholder,
even if protected by the "5 x 5" power of section 2514(e).
another way,

for

state

law purposes

general power of appointment

(i.e.,

Put

does. the person having a
a power of withdrawal,

as

above) become the grantor of the trust?
Revocable trust assets are considered resources available to
the

individual,

and

payments

from

the

trust

to

others

are

considered assets disposed of by the individual.
With respect to irrevocable trusts created by the individual,
the rules are stringent.

The rules provide that if there are any

circumstances under which payment from the trust could be made to
or for the benefit of the individual, the portion of the corpus

~

from which, or the income on the corpus from which, payment to the

""='
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individual could be made shall be considered resources available to
the individual,

and payments from that portion of the corpus or

income to someone else will be a disposition.
The provisions apply without regard to the purposes for which
a trust is established, whether the trustees have or exercise any
discretion under the trust,

any restrictions on when or whether

distributions may be made from the trust, or any restrictions on
the use of distributions from the trust.
Three

types

of

trusts

containing

the

individuals are not subject to these rules.
in which after the beneficiary dies,

assets

of

disabled

The first is a trust

the state will receive all

amounts remaining in the trust upon the death of such individual up
to an amount equal to the total medical assistance paid on behalf
of the individual under a state plan under this title.
The second is for a trust, if the trust is comprised only of
pension, Social Security, and other income to the individual (and
accumulated income in the trust),

if the state will receive all

amounts remaining in the trust upon the death of such individual up
to an amount equal to the total medical ass:i.stance paid on behalf
of the individual under a State plan under this title,

and the

state makes medical assistance available to individuals (with some
limitations) .
The third exception is for a trust established and managed by
a non-profit association, where a separate account is maintained

A- 4

,

_0

for each beneficiary of the trust, but, for purposes of investment
and

management

of

funds,

the

trust

pools

these

accounts,

if

accounts in the trust are established solely for the benefit of
individuals by the parent, grandparent, or legal guardian of such
individuals, by such individuals, or by a court, and to the extent
that amounts remaining in the beneficiary's account upon the death
of the beneficiary are not retained by the trust, the trust pays to
the state from such remaining amounts in the account an amount
equal to the total amount of medical assistance paid on behalf of
the beneficiary under the state plan under this title.
An important issue is the effect on ef·fective transfers under
prior law.
for

Arguably, a trust established under prior law which,

example,

provides

for

the

donor-now-Medicaid-recipient

receive all the income, is not grandfathered.

A-5

to

B.

Section 61 - Gross Income
~

(D.C. S.D. 1994) considered

Healy v. Jones,
the

meaning of

standard risks,"

"published"

rates

and

rates

"available

to

~'
==;

all

as used in Revenue Ruling 66-110 and Revenue

Ruling 67-154, 1967-1 C.B ..
one of first impression.

The issue was said by the court to be

The controversy arose from a split-dollar

insurance plan which was described by the court in this way:
This policy was acquired pursuant to a splitdollar insurance agreement between Patrick and
his employer.
The split-dollar arrangement'
involves the employer purchasing an insurance
policy, containing a substantial investment
element, on the employee's life.
Rev. Rul.
64-328,
1964-2 C.B. 11.
The particular
agreement at issue is referred to as a
collateral assignment arrangement. Id. Under
the agreement at issue, the employee is
required to pay the annual premiums on the
policy.
Id.
However, the employer is
required to loan him the .' amount of the
premiums.
Id.
The employee assigns the
policy to the employer as collateral security
for the annual premium loans.
Id.
Upon
Patrick's death, the employer receives the
full amount of the premiums paid by it and the
beneficiary, Carolyn,' receives the remainder.
If Patrick's employment is terminated or the
policy is terminated, the employer receives
the cash surrender value of the pdlicy.
From the employee's perspective, a splitdollar arrangement converts a whole life
policy into a term policy at no cost to the
employee.
Id.
The employee receives an
economic benefit in "an amount equal to the 1year term cost of the declining life insurance
protection" which the employee receives as a
result of the arrangement. Id. The employee
must then include this amount as gross income
on his tax return.

A- 6

~

3

---1

:;

~-=t

In their 1985 tax return, Plaintiffs reported
the
economic benefit using
rate
tables
provided by the IRS for valuing ~plit-dollar
life
insurance
policies.
Plaintiffs
subsequently sought to amend their 1985 return
using
a
substantially
lower
rate
table
provided by Great West Life Assurance Company.
Plaintiffs also used this lower rate table in
computing their 1986 through 1988 tax returns.
The lower rate table used by Plaintiffs
provides a 2% commission on the first-year
premium to the agent selling the policy. Most
policies provide at 50% commission on the
first year premium to the agent.
(Emphasis added.)
In pertinent part,

Revenue Ruling 66-:-110,

1966-1 .C.B.

12,

provides that:
In that case where the current published
premiums
rates
per
$1,000
of. insurance
protection
charged
by
an
insurer
for
. individual
1-year
term
life
insurance
available to all standard risks are lower than
those set forth in Revenue Ruling 55-747, such
published rates may be used in place of the
rates set forth in that Revenue Ruling for
determining
the
cost
of
insurance
in
connection with individual policies issued by
the same insurer and used for "split dollar
arrangements."
The IRS contended the rates were not published because they
were "not made known to the public through general circulation
publications such as in Best's Flitcraft

Co~pend

premium rates of various insurance companies."

which reports the
The court rejected

the contention because a representative of the company testified
~

that "the rate on the particular policy at issue is published in

~

Best's Flitcraft,

as well as in a rate book sent to agents and

A-7

branch managers."
available.
The

He also testified that the rates were generally

The IRS presented no contrary evidence.
case

is

important

because

standard

term

rates

are

typically used today instead of the P.S. 58 rates (for single life
insurance) or the P.S. 38 rates (for survivorship insurance).

It

remains to be seen whether this is a unique attack by the IRS, or
part of a larger effort.
[With respect to the application of section 7872 to splitdollar insurance, see F(2).]

A -8
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C.

~

Sections 170 and 664 -- Charitable Transfers
1.

New Substantiation Requirements.

OBRA '93 added new section 170(f) (8)

----:

to the Code which

disallows a charitable deduction for any contribution of $250 or
more that is not substantiated by a written acknowledgement from
the charity stating the money or other property contributed and any
goods

or

services

consideration

provided

for

the

to

the

donor

contribution.

The

by

the

charity

provision

has

in

been

interpreted by the IRS in News Release 93-121 (December 21, 1993)
and

in

proposed

regulations

issued

on

May

26,

1994.

The

regulations deal primarily with payroll deduction contributions;
the News R,elease is more general.
2.
Transfer of
Remainder Unitrust.

Both are attached as Appendix A.

Farm and Cattle Operation

to

Charitable

In PLR 9413020, the Service issued a number of favorable
rulings

in the context of the transfer of cattle ranching and

farming operations to a charitable remainder unitrust
over a 2 year period.

("CRUT"),

The trustee was the charitable beneficiary.

The key elements to the rUling were representations that the CRUT
would not carryon the business of ranching or farming, but would
liquidate the assets (e.g., cattle would be fed to keep them alive
but not the fatten them for market), and that the trustee had no
obligation to

]
=

sell

any of

the

transferred assets.

The

first

representation would be important because a CRUT which has any
unrelated business income for a tax year is not tax-exempt for that

A- 9

year.

The second representation would be needed to prevent the IRS

from asserting that the transferred assets were, in effect, sold by

d

the donor and then the proceeds contributed to the trust.
3.

Options.
In PLR 9417005 the IRS revoked PLR 9240017 dealing with

the transfer of an option to purchase real estate to a CRT.

This

ruling makes an already risky series of transactions. more suspect.

4.

Partnership as Donor and Beneficiary.
PLR 9419021 approved a term of years charitable remainder

unitrust with a partnership as donor and beneficiary.
accord~nce

with its previous ruling policy.

This is in

The IRS has, in the

past year, refused to issue a favorable ruling allowing a gran-tor
trust to be the beneficiary of a charitable remainder trust for the
lifetime of the grantor.

Favorable rulings have been issued where

the beneficiary is disabled.

-=:::::::.1

A-lO

D.

Section 408 - lRAs

:::.:J

~

1.

Spousal Rollover Via Trust.
PLR 9350040 considered whether a surviving spouse who

received IRA distributions through a trust could roll them over to
her own IRA.

The IRA beneficiary was a trust, which required the

distribution to be allocated to a subtrust over which the surviving
spouse had an unlimited power of withdrawal.
rollover.

'"'4

~

A-II

The IRS allowed the

E.

Sections 671-687 -- Grantor Trusts
1.

~

Section 675 (4) (C) '-- Power to Substitute Assets.

~

Whenever it is important to have the grantor treated as
the owner of a t'rust for income tax purposes (e.g., GRITs, GRATs,
PRTs) section 675(4) (C) is often used.

That section of the Code

provides that the grantor is the owner of a trust if the grantor
retains, in a nonfiduciary capacity, the power to reacquire trust
property by substituting other property of an equivalent value.
The IRS is not currently happy with this approach.
letter

rulings

(e.g.,

9335028,

9337011,

9352004,

In several
9352007

and

9413045), the IRS· has refused to rule on the issue, stating that
the issue of whether an act could be exercised in a non-fiduciary
capacity was a fact and circumstance inquiry.
An example would be PLR 9335028 which states:

Based on the information submitted and our
examination of the terms o,f each of the
_proposed trust instruments, we conclude as
follows:
1.
The
circumstances
surrounding
the
administration of each of proposed trusts will
determine whether A [the grantor] holds the
power of administration in a nonfiduciary
capaci ty.
This is a question of fact, the
determination of which must be deferred until
the federal income tax returns of the parties
involved here have been examined by the office
of the District Director in which the returns
are filed.
Upon execution of each of the
proposed
trusts,
provided
that
the
circumstances indicate that A has a power of
administration exercisable over the corpus of
each trust in a nonfiduciary capacity, A will
be treated as the owner of the two trusts

A -12

~

::--.--:

::j

=

under section 675 and will be taxed on the
income of X allocated to these trusts under
section 671.
Accordingly, A must include in
computing taxable income,
deductions, and
credits, all items of income, deductions and
credits against tax of the trusts.
On the other hand, other rulings have been issued which do not
raise the issue (e.g., 9345035, 9351005, 9352017, and 9416009).
On this point, Treas. Reg. §1.675-1(b) (4) provides that:
I f a power is exercisable by a person as
trustee, it is presumed that the power is
exercisable in a fiduciary capacity primarily
in the interests of the beneficiaries.
This
presumption may be rebutted only by clear and
convincing proof that the power is not
exercisable primarily in the inte~ests of the
beneficiaries. If a power is not exercisable
by a person as trustee, the determination of
whether the power
is
exercisable
in a
fiduciary or a nonfiduciary capacity depends
on all the terms of the trust and the
circumstances surrounding its creation and
administration.
(c) Authority of trustee. The mere fact that
a power exercisable by a trustee is described
in broad language does not indicate that the
trustee is authorized to purchase, exchange,
or otherwise deal with or dispose of the trust
property or income for less than an adequate
and full consideration in money or money's
worth, or is authorized to lend the trust
property or income to the grantor without
adequate interest.
On the other hand, such
authority may be indicated by the actual
administration of the trust.
Another aspect of the issue is, who can have the power?
it be the grantor?

The Code uses

Must

the term "reacquire" which

suggests only the grantor can have the power -- others could not
"reacquire."

Treas. Reg. §1.675-1(b) (4) provides that the grantor
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is

taxed on a portion of a

trust as

to which there is

"[t] he
~

existence of certain powers of administration exercisable in a
nonfiduciary capacity by any nonadverse party without the approval
or consent of any person in a fiduciary capacity" and a power of
administration includes a "power to reacquire the trust corpus by
substituting other property of equivalent value,. "The IRS has, in
previous letter rulings, not even required that the person with the
power be nonadverse.
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Section 1361 -- S Corporations

'~,

Continued Use.

1.

Limited Liability Companies will often be used instead of
S

corporations'

because

LLCs

are

more

flexible

entities.

Legislation has been introduced in Congress which would expand the
categories

of

shareholders

of

S

corporations.

Especially

beneficial could be the use of S stock to fund charitable remainder
trusts.
2.

Second Class of Stock and Split-Dollar Life Insurance.

PLR

9331009

holds

that

split-dollar

1if~insurance

arrangements between a company and its shareholder-employees do not
create more than one class of stock within the meaning of IRC Sec.
1361(b) (1) (D).
or

However, the ruling states "no opinion is expressed

implied concerning the

application of section 7872."

This

presents the question whether the IRS is considering revocation of
Revenue

Ruling

arrangement as a

64-328,

which

characterizes

a

split-dollar

"life insurance plan" and not a loan from the

employer to an employee.
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IRC Sec. 2013 -- Previously Taxed Property Credit
1.
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Val ue of Annui ty .

Estate of Benjamin Shapiro,

67 TCM 1067,

involved the

valuation of a trust annuity for section 2013 purposes, but it is
of more importance with respect to

The· IRS

zeroed-out GRATs.

~

conceded that there was a credit, but disagreed with the estate as
to its amount.
million;
$943,000.

the

The trust· was valued at a little more than $1
estat'e

valued

the

decedent's

interest

at

about

The annuity was equal to roughly 30% of the original

value of the trust clearly in excess of the trust's earning power
under the IRS Tables.

Treas. Reg. §20.2013-4(a) provides that a

limited interest in property is valued for section 2013 purposes
pursuant to Treas. Reg. §§20.2031-7 and 20.2031-10.

Treas. Reg.

§20.2031-7 (a) (2) provides that:
The present value of an annuity *** which is
dependent on the continuation or termination
of the life of one person is computed by the
use of Table A in paragraph (f) of this
section. ***
[However), [i)f the interest to
be valued is dependent upon *** a term certain
concurrent with one or more lives,
see
paragraph (e) of this section.
The estate used Table A.

The IRS disagreed for several reasons.
the decedent's

~

interest in the trust must ,be valued as a term certain concurrent

·--'-1

Of interest here are the IRS arguments that

with one life rather than as a
payments would be
therefore

was

not

lifetime "annuity" because the

limited by the
solely

(a)

decreasing

dependent
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on

the

trust

assets

continuation

and
or

~

'---J

termination of the life of one person as required under Treas. Reg.

:.:J

;;;;;;;j

§20.2031-7(a) (2);

and

(b)

Table A would not apply in any event

!!iii!il

because the residuary trust was "underfunded" because the corpus
:..::....:;
j

was not large enough to support the annuity obligation in case
decedent

had

lived

to

be

age

109.

These

contentions

essentially the same.
The Tax Court rejected the IRS position, as follows:
Taking
respondent's
argument·
to
its
theoretical conclusion, ANY TRUST created with
corpus funds equivalent to the present value
of a lifetime annuity obligation as computed
under
Table A would be
deemed to be
"underfunded"
in
that
it
wouid
have
insufficient funds to sustain the annual
payments should the annuitant liv,e beyond his
or her average' life expectancy.
In this
regard, respondent's argument contravenes the
fundamental
purposes
and
presumptions
underlying the actuarial tables.
Table A is
premised
on
two
actuarial
presumptions:
'( 1) the interest rate on the
principal amount is assumed to be 10 percent,
and (2) a person, at any given age, is assumed
to die within a time consistent with the
average mortality rate for that age.
Sec.
20.2031-7 (f), Estate Tax Regs. Table A does
not expect or presume that a 91~year-old
person will live for 18 more years; to the
contrary, the table implicitly recognizes the
possibility of any person reaching 109 years
of age is extremely remote.

*

*

*

In essence, respondent argues that unless an
annuity
is
"guaranteed"
throughout
an
annuitant's extreme life expectancy, just as a
commercial
annuity
is
guaranteed,
the
computation of the annuity's present value
must be made on a case-by-case basis using a
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special actuarial factor supplied by the
Internal Revenue Service; any computation of
an unguaranteed, private annuity under Table A
would be deemed invalid in respondent's view.
Respondent's position, if it were correct,
would vitiate the use of Table A as an
administrative convenience and bright-line
approach to valuation.
Table A could not be
used to determine the present values of all
sorts
of
unguaranteed,
privately
funded
annuities; they would all be subject to
individuai
analysis
under
~
facts-andcircumstances test.

..::.::.::J:

----;

~

As noted, one of the principal purposes of the
actuarial tables is to prevent every case from
becoming a question of fact as to the most
likely outcome of the case. Simpson v. United
States, 252 U.S. 547 (1920). Although we have
ignored the actuarial tables when their use
will violate reason, Estate of McLendon v.
Commissioner, T~C. Memo. 1993-459, and cases
cited therein, absent an unreasonable result
we will use the tables as the best. method of
valuation.
Estate of Lion v. Commissioner,
438 F.2d 56 (4th Cir. 1971), affg. 52 T~C. 601
(1969).
In petitioner's case, we have found
that the valuation of decedent's interest in
his wife's residuary trust under Table A is
not unreasonable.
Moreover, respondent has
failed to present any persuasive reason for
ignoring the valuation result achieved under
Table A. Accordingly, we reject respondent's
argument that petitioner's Table A valuation
is invalid because the residuary trust was
incapable of sustaining the annuity payments
in the event .decedent lived to be 109 years
old.
We have evaluated respondent's other
arguments
and
find
them
similarly
unpersuasive.
----00

We have
found
that petitioner properly
.characterized decedent's interest in his
wife's residuary trust as a lifetime annuity
under both New York law and section 20.2031-7,
Estate Tax Regs. We have also fo~nd that the
value of the residuary trust on the date of
Mrs. Shapiro's death exceeded the present

A-IS
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value of decedent's annuity as computed under
Table A and that the trust was therefore
sufficient to sustain the annuity obligation
for decedent's life.
The IRS, essentially, argued the position adopted in Revenue
Ruling 77-454.

The court soundly rejected the argument, or did it?

By noting that the Tables apply always unless unreasonable, the Tax
Court left open future challenges of this type.
annuity in question was sufficiently large
a great many GRATs, but not all.

~
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Of course,

the

provide.comfort for

H.

Sections 2031 and 2513 -- Valuation

Valuation continues to be a most important issue in estate
planning.

In large part the benefit of family limited partnerships

turn out to be, primarily, a help in valuation.
1.

Control Stock.

In Estate of Charles Russell Bennett,
decedent

owned all

development company.

of

the

65 TCM 1816, the

outstanding stock of

a

real

estate

The estate valued the stock using a lack of

marketability discount, but the IRS claimed that such a discount
should never be allowed in a 100 percent ownership case.

The IRS

relied on Estate of Jephson v. Comm'r, 87 T.C. 297 (1986), where a
discount was not allowed when valuing the stock of two investment
companies consisting of cash and marketable securities.
The court allowed a 15 percent discount:
Our holding that a lack of marketability
discount is warranted is based on a totality
of the facts presented. Here, we have a real
estate management company whose assets are
varied and nonliquid.
We think that the
corporate
form
is
a
quite
important
consideration here:
there is definitely a
difference in owning the assets and liability
of Fairlawn directly and in owning the stock
of Fairlawn, albeit 100 percent of the stock.
We think some discounting is necessary to find
a buyer willing to buy Fairlawn's package of
desirable and less desirable properties.
Thus, the line of cases in which we have
recognized that difficulties arise in holding
nonliquid assets in the corporate form, even
in the lOa-percent ownership situation, is
applicable in this case.
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The

court

did

not

allow,

however,

a

discount

for

associated with the liquidation of the company's real estate.

costs
The

court noted that:
[b]oth parties have agreed that there was no
reasonable prospect of liquidation in this
case.
When liquidation is only speculative,
the valuation of assets should not take these
costs into account because it is unlikely they
will ever be incurred.
Our goal of
determining the price a willing seller could
get from a willing buyer is not assisted by
considering what a buyer might eventually
realize
from
the
sale
of
all
of
the
corporation's assets.
I

The court's holding on this issue is in line with the IRS position
in TAM 9150001.
TAM 9419001 disregarded the value stipulated in the company's
Articles

of

Incorporation

for

certain

preferred

shares

upon

liquidation and redemption, without reference to Chapter 14 (the
restrictions occurred in 1984; the death in July, 1990), because
the preferred shares represented 99.86% of voting control.

With

voting control, the company did not need to .be liquidated nor the
shares redeemed in order for the owner to benefit.
2.

Discounts and Penalties.

In Estate of Jung, the issue was the valuation of a 20
percent interest in a closely-held company, Jung Corp., for estate
tax purposes on the decedent's death in 1984.
sold

most

of

its

assets

to

another

In 1986 the company

corporation

for

$59,000,000, and sold other assets worth almost $7,000,000.
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over
Thus,

the decedent's estate received more than $13,000,000 ($66,000,000
x 20%).

These sales were not foreseeable at the decedent death.

..:::.=..:J
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The court determined that when the decedent died Jung Corp.
was worth between $32,000,000 and $34,000,000 meaning that the

=:J
~

~
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decedent's
discounts.

shares

were

worth

$6,400,000

to

$6,800,000

before

The court allowed a 35 percent discount for lack of

marketability; no discount was allowed for a minority interest,
because the court accepted an appraisal which used the discounted
cash flow method.
The court discussed use of the discounted cash flow (I'DCF")
method, as discussed in a previously decided case:
Peti tioner contends that in Northern Trust
Co., Transferee v. Commissioner, 87 T.e. 349,
(1986), affd. sub nom. Citizens Bank & Trust
Co. v. Commissioner, 839 F.2d 1249 (7th Cir.
1988), this Court approved the use of a
minori ty discount when the DCF approach is
used in valuation.
Respondent tells us that
the
instant case provides us
"with an
opportunity to reconsider issues" in Northern
Trust Co.! Transferee.
In Northern Trust Co.! Transferee, stock of a
closely
held
corporation
was
valueq.
Grabowski [the appraiser] submitted an expert
wi tnessreport and testified in that case.
Grabowski used the DCF approach, and he used.
the CAPM [capital asset pricing model] to
determine the discount rate.
After deciding
on a value for the corporation, he applied a
minori ty discount.
87 T. C. at 369.
This
court
concluded
tha t
the
DCF
approach
correctly determined the value of the stock.
We
also
allowed
both
minor~ty
and
marketabili ty discounts.
Id.
However, in
Northern Trust co.! Transferee, respondent did
not content that no minority discount was
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appropriate.· Rather, respondent merely argued
for a lower minority discount that the
discount for which the taxpayer contended.
Id.
Because the parties in Northern Trust
Co., Transferee did not present to the Court
the question of whether a minority discount
could ·be allowed in conjunction with the DCF
approach, the opinion in that case did not
explore
whether
the
DCF
approach
that
Grabowski used in the case was calculated on a
control basis rather than on a minority basis.
See Estate of Fusz v. Commissioner, 46 T.C.
214, 215n.2 (1966).
Thus, we do not accept respondent's invitation
to reconsider our opinion in Northern Trust
Co., Transferee v. Commissioner, supra, and we
also conclude that that opinion does not
require us to allow a minority discount in the
instant case.
In general, if the discounted cash flow method is used based
on factors derived from publicly traded companies, as will usually
be the case, the method values a business as a minority interest,
with no further discount for a minority interest being appropriate.
The court also held that the IRS abused its discretion by not
waiving the addition to tax under section 6660
6662).

(old) (now section

That section provided fora waiver upon a showing that (I)

there was a reasonable basis for the valuation and (2) the taxpayer
acted in good faith in claiming that valuation.

Here,

in large

part, the estate was saved because the IRS asserted a value which
was substantially higher than the court's finding, and the estate
did have an appraisal.

The court noted:

Also, it is evident that valuing decedent's
interest is a difficult task.
After all, in
the notice of deficiency respondent overvalued
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decedent's interest by about 89 percent. Even
on brief, after having access to all the
expert witness reports and other evidence of
record
(more than 3-1/2 linear feet of
exhibits
and
almost
1,000
pages
of
transcript), respondent overvalued decedent's
intere·st
by
about
82
percent.
Thus,
petitioner's valuation was much closer to the
mark than was respondent's valuation.
Of importance also is the court's discussion of Estate of
Berg, in which penalties were approved by the Tax Court, but not by
the Eighth Circuit:
In Estate of Berg v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo
1991-279, affd. in part and revd. in part 976
F.2d 1163 (8th Cir. 1992), we held that
respondent's discretion had not been abused in
refusing to waive the section 6660 addition to
tax.
The Court of Appeals reversed on that
issue~
The record in the instant case is far
more favorable to petitioner than the record
presented by the taxpayer in Estate of Berg.
In Estate of Berg, the taxpayer did not
commission an appraisal until more than 4
years after the decedent's death; in the
instant case petitioner did commission an
appraisal promptly, and the value of the
timely field estate tax return was based on
that appraisal. In Estate of Berg, the estate
tax return did not provide support for the
claimed valuation, except for a reference to
another opinion of this Court; in the instant
case, Robinson's appraisal was deficient in
terms of evidentiary standards, but provided
some substantive support for the claimed
valuation. In Estate of Berg, we agreed with
respondent's determination of value; in the
instant
case,
respondent
oven-Talued
the
property by more than twice as much as
peti tioner
undervalued
it.
Thus,
our
conclusion
in
the
instant
case
that
respondent's
discretion
was
abused
is
consistent with out conclusion in Estate of
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Berg that
abused.
3.

respondent's

discretion

was

not

Valuation of Interests in Jointly-Held Property.

In TAM 9336002,

the IRS ruled that the amount of the

discount should be limited to the estimated cost of a partition of
the property,

which seems inconsistent with the results in the

recently decided cases.

The IRS stated:

From the perspective of the owner of an
undi vided interest in property, a lack of
unity of ownership is a possible disadvantage
if the owner wishes to sell the interest. If
the seller's co-owners decline to join in a
sale of the whole property, the seller of an
undivided interest may be forced either to
accept a reduced price for his interest or to.
seek a partition.
On the other hand, if all
the co-owners were to join in the sale, the
rationale for a discount would disappear
because the owners' unity for disposition
purposes would permit them to convey a 100
percent interest in the property.
In such a
case, the purchaser would acquire the property
free of the disadvantages associated with
ownership of undivided interests, and there
would be no reason for him to demand, or for
the sellers to accept, a discount from the
property's full fair market value.

==9

The
definition
of
fair
market
value
contemplates that the hypothetical buyer and
seller will choose to act in their own best
economic interests. The courts recognize that
partitioning is an alternative that results in
greater economic benefit to the owner of an
undivided interest. In Estate of Frank Fittl
v. Commissioner, TC Memo 1986-542 [CCH Dec.
43,488(M)], the court held that the discount
attributable to an undivided interest in real
property should be limited to the cost of
partition. See also, Kennedy v. Commissioner,
804 F.2d 1332
(7th Cir. 1986) [86-2 USTC
<]I13, 699] .
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The Fittl case involved the valuation of farmland.

There the

taxpayer's expert failed to take such a discount, so the court did
not

either.

The

Kennedy

case

is

primarily concerned with

a

disclaimer.
In Samuel J. LeFrak, 66 TCM 1297, a father gave interests in
various buildings to his children, or to trusts for their benefit.
The interest transferred to each child or.trust was .less than 10
percent.

After

discussing

the

appraisal

experts,

the

court

discussed the applicable discounts:
Discounts for Minority Interest and Lack of
Marketability
For gift tax purposes, the value of the
fractional
interest
in
the
property
transferred, and not the value of the property
as a whole, must ultimately be decided. "
Propstra v.United States
[82-2 USTC Cj[
13,475], 680 F.2d 1248, 1251 (9th Cir. 1982);
Bank of the West v.
Commissioner. [Dec.
46,073], 93 T.C. 462, 468 (1989); Zable v.
Commissioner [Dec. 46,360(M)], T.C. Memo.
1990-55;
Filler
v.
Commissioner,
[Dec.
44,201(M), T.C. Memo, 1987-468, affd. sub nom.
Robino, Inc. Pension Trust v. Commissioner
[90-1 USTC Cj[ 50,059], 894 F.2d 342 (9th Cir.
1990). The fair market value of a fractional'
interest in real property cannot as a general
rule be derived by simply applying the
percentage of the interest in the whole to the
value of the entire property. See Propstra v.
United States, supra; Estate of Campanari v.
Commissioner [Dec. 14,685, 5 T.C. 488, 492
(1945); Estate of Henry V. Commissioner [Dec.
14,259], 4 T.C. 423, 447 (1944), affd. [47-1
USTC Cj[ 10,558] 161 F.2d 574 (3d Cir. 1947);
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Estate
of
Haydel
v.
Commissioner
[Dec.
47,678(M), T.C. Memo. 1919-507, affd. without
published opinion 988 F.2d 1213 (5th Cir.
1993). Accordingly, we must consider whether
the proportional net value of the interests in
the buildings should be further adjusted to
arrive at the taxable value of the gifts.
Whether a discount should be allowed in
arriving at the final value of the gift is a
question of fact.
Estate of Newhouse v.
Commissioner [Dec. 46,411], 94 T.C. at 249.
Petitioners ask that· the value of the gifts be
discounted
because
the
donees
received
minority interests in the buildings and
because the interests transferred were not
readily marketable.
Petitioners offered the
expert report of Mr. Gregory Vlasak to support
their contention concerning the appropriate
amount of discount. Respondent contends that
no
discount
is warranted,
and,
in
the
alternative, disputes the amount of discount
calculated by petitioners' expert.

-;:

Petitioners point out that each discount
sought
is
conceptually distinct
and
is
designed
to
measure
a
different
factor
reducing the value.
Estate of Andrews v.
Commissioner [Dec. 39,523], 79 T.C. 938, 952953
(1982).
A minority disco\lnt for an
interest in real property may be allowed on
account
of
the
lack
of
control
which
accompanies co-ownership. Estate of Campanari
v. Commissioner, supra at 492-493. However, a
holder of a fractional interest in real
property has the power to' compel partition of
property, which is not available with other
types of shares ownership interests. Bittker
& Lokken, Federal Income Taxation of Estates,
Gifts, & Trusts, par. 135.3.4, at 135-41 (2d
ed. 1993).
Accordingly, Bi ttker and Lokken
have suggested that the discount should
reflect the cost of partition and the value of
the interest secured thereby. Id. We have on
several
occasions
considered
the
cost,
uncertainty,
and
delays
attendant
upon
parti tion proceedings
as
the
basis
for
allowing a
discount in value fractional
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interests in- real property.
Estate of
Pillsbury v. Commissioner [Dec. 48,378 (M) ],
T.C. Memo. 1992-425; Estate of Wildman v.
Commissioner, [Dec. 46,218(M)] T.C. Memo 1989667; Estate of Youle V. Commissioner, [Dec.
45,579(M)], T.C. Memo. 1989-138; Sels V.
Commis·sioner, T.C. Memo 1986-501; see also
Estate of Henry V. Commissioner, supra at 477.
The marketability discount,
by contrast,
measures the diminution in value attributable
to the lack of a ready market for the
property.
Ward v~ Commissioner, [Dec. 43,
178],
87
T.C.
78,
106-107
(1986).
Accordingly, we will consider each discount
separately.

c::..::..

~
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* * *
Mr.
Vlasak estimated that
a
40-percent
discount for minority interest should be
allowed in valuing the donated interests.
Respondent criticizes Mr. Vlasak's analysis,
and contends that no more than 15 percent
should be allowed, if any. Respondent points
out
that,
on
their
gift
tax
return,
petitioners claimed only a 15-percent discount
in valuing the gift for tax purposes, and that
this Court in other cases generally has not
allowed discounts of greater magnitude in
valuing donative transfers of real estate
interests.
Estate
of
Campanari
v.
Commissioner [Dec. 14,685], 5 T.C. 488, 492
(1945); Estate of Wildman v. Commissioner
[Dec. 46, 218(M)], T.C. Memo 1989-667.
Petitioners counter that this Court has
allowed min6ri tyinterest discounts of the
magnitude advanced by Mr. Vlasak, citing
Harwood v. Commissioner [Dec. 40,985], 82 T.C.
239, 269 (1984), affd. without published
opinion 786 F.2d 1174 (9th Cir. 1986), in
which a 50-percent discount was allowed.
We
do not agree. The discount allowed in Harwood
represents a combined reduction for both lack
of marketability and minority interest and so
does not furnish a basis for comparison solely
as
to
minority
interest.
Id.
at
268.
Petitioners also cite Estate of Watts v.
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Commissioner,
[Dec. 42,521(M)], T.C. Memo.
1985-595, affd. [87-2 USTC <]I 13,726] 823 F.2d
483 (11th Cir. 1987), in which a 35-percent
discount was allowed, but such discount also
represents a combined·· figure for lack of
marketability
and
minority
interest.
Accordingly, such cases seem to suggest that
the
discount
urged
by
petitioners
is
excessive, but, as the question is one of
fact, we must remind the parties that i:he
amount of discount must be decided on . the
basis of the record in the instant case, and
not on what a court found reasonable in
another case involving different evidence.

:=J.
~

~
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The court allowed a 20 percent minority interest discount and
a

10

percent

contrary

to

lack
TAM

of

marketability discount.

9336002.

Also

of

importance

The
is

result

the

is

court's

implication that .greater discounts would have been allowed had the
real estate interests been subsumed within a partnership and the
partnership interests transferred, assuming the holders of those·
interests CQuld not liquidate the

partnership~

That point could be

different under section 2704.
What is

the value of

jointly-held property included in a

decedent's estate under section 2040?
included.

Only half the property is

Does section 2040 mean that with two joint tenants one-

half of the entire value is included, or does section 2040 provide
only for inclusion, with valuation being determined separately, and
at a discounted value?

4.

~

Use of Actuarial Tables.
Estate of Gordon B. McLendon,

66 TCM 946, involved the

application of Revenue Ruling 80-80, 1980-1 C.B. 194, relating to
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the use of the actuarial tables to value partial interests in
~

~

property that depend upon the life expectancy of an individual who
does not have a normal

~

expectancy~

"

~

The Tax Court held that the decedent's actual life expectancy
was sufficiently predictable as of March 5, 1986, the date of the
private annuity, to require departure from the actuarial tables in
computing

the

transaction

value

resulted

of
in

the
a

remainder

large

taxable

Thus,

interest.
gift.

The

facts

the
in

McClendon were very disadvantageous to the taxpayer and are worth
reading to review circumstances in which a private annuity should
not be attempted.

The court described him as "an increasingly sick

man suffering from a virtually incurable
life expectancy to be one year.

diseas~"

and found his

The court's statement of the law

is of interest:
Use of Actuarial Tables
The common theme of these cases is that the
actuarial tables generally are to be respected
unless the established facts show that the
result under the tables is unrealistic or
unreasonable.
Consistent with the Estate of
Jennings [10 T.C. 323 (1948)] line of cases,
the proper inquiry in this case is whether the
life tenant's actual life expectancy is so
~xceptional
that . a
departure . from
the
actuarial tables is justified. While·the term
rrexceptional" is difficult to define, Estate
of Jennings and its progeny require proof that
death is either imminent or predictable to a
reasonable certainty within 1 year of the
valuation date.

I

~
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In private annuity cases it matters whether the transaction is

d
~

ul timately

characterized as

retained interest.

a

gift,

or

as

a

transfer with

a

Often the second argument -- that the assets

i
~.

should

be

included

in

the

estate

because

the

annuity

was

essentially the income of the property -- is a "throwaway" for the
IRS.

But,

if

the

case

is

settled,

settlement

on that basis

produces an increase in basis.

5.

New IRS Valuation Handbook.
On January 28, 1994 the IRS issued a new Valuation Guide

for use in training appeals officers.
attached as Appendix B.

The Table of Contents is

The text is worth review because (a) it is

a good discussion of important valuation principles and techniques,
(b) it contains good, albeit selective, references to other sources
(e.g., SEC studies),

(c)

the cases cited are not representative,

and thus provide insight into particular IRS bias,

and

(d)

the

examining agent, and appeals officer, will have read it.
In

general,

the

text

supports

settlement

rather

than

litigation.

6.

Flower Bonds.
Weld v. U.S.,

(U.S. ct. Fed. Cl. 1994)

involved the valuation of flower bonds.

The court held that the

value is par plus accrued interest as of the decedent's date of
death.

The court rejected; as creative but wrong, the taxpayer's

argument:
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[p]laintiffs argue that a discount analysis is
necessary to determine the value of flower
bonds on the date of death because the estate
will not receive the full. value of the bonds
until nine months after the date of death.
Under such a discount analysis, each monetary
benefit that the estate. will receive during
these nine months must be discounted from the
date of its receipt back to·the date of death,
using as the discount rate the pertinent
Treasury bill interest rates in effect on the
date of death.
When this methodology is
applied
to
the
instant
facts ,
on
the
respective dates of death the Bright and Weld
flower fonds have a value that is less than
par value plus accrued interest because the
discount rate employed on the dates of death
(i.e., the applicable Txeasury bill interest
rate) was· significantly higher than the rate
at which the flower bonds accrued interest
during the nine-month period.

*

*

*

In sum,
the tax laws,
in effect,
left
plaintiffs with a choice.
They could redeem
the bonds in the payment of estate taxes for
par value plus accrued interest on the dates
of death or they could take advantage of the
grace period and wait up to nine months and
redeem the bonds for par value plus a slightly
higher accrued interest. Plaintiffs selected
the economically optimal choice and waited the
full nine months before redeeming the flower.
bonds and thereby secured the ~xtrainterest.
But when valuing all assets. for estate tax
purposes, the regulations focus on the fair
market value on date of death, not on the
amount of income that a bond owner potentially
could receive . during the nine months' after
death.
Herein, on the respective dates· of
death, the government stood willing to redeem
the bonds for par value plus accrued interest
in the payment· of estate taxes. That was the
highest value plaintiffs could secure on those
dates.
It would be inconsistent with the
controlling standards to ignore the existence
of such a willing buyer and to designate the
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fair market value on the date of death at an
amount that is less than the amount that a
willing buyer was prepared to pay.
Thus,
while the premise that plaintiffs would be
unwilling to turn the bonds over to the
government on the dates. of death in the
payment of taxes owed is an appropriate
premise
for
predicting
the
timing
of
plaintiffs' actions, it is not determinative
when assessing the fair market value of the
bonds on the dates of death.

=

~
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7.

Underwriting Fees.
Gillespie v. U.S.,

(2d Cir. 1994) dealt

with the valuation of a large block of publicly held stock.

The

estate involved was that of Eugene Meyer of the Washington Post.·
Because a

large block of stock was in the estate,

most .. of ,the

shares were valued, and in fact sold, in an underwritten secondary
offering.

The court stated these facts:
The proceeds received by the Estate from its
underwriter,
Salomon
Brothers,
Inc.
("Salomon"), totaled $14,365,000, or $34 per
share.
In connection with this offering the
Estate incurred expenses of $213,142, which
included, inter alia, accounting fees, legal
fees, printing fees, and registration fees,
but
did
not
include
underwriting
fees.
Plaintiffs and Salomon agreed that, as an
underwriting fee for the transaction, Salomon
would be allowed to retain possession of the
proceeds of the sale of the 422,500 shares
until the 90th day following the sale and
would make no payment to the Estate for the
use of those funds during. the 90-day period.
In seeking to place a value on the Estate's
original 743,500 WPC shares for tax purposes,
plaintiffs sought the opinion of Salomon . . as to
the price, expense, and yield that could have
been realized in a second offering immediately
after
Meyer's
death
(the
"hypothetical
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offering").
In an opinion dated November 22,
1982, Salomon concluded that the·hypothetical
offering would have yielded $25.3725 p~r share
to the Estate.

~

--l

In its valuation, Salomon deducted presumed underwriting fees.
The

primary

issue

before

the

Second

Circuit

deductibility of the "estimated" underwriting fee,

was

the

given that no
~~-=\'

actual underwriting .fee was paid, and the fees.
the relevant authority to be Revenue Ruling

The tourt found

83~30:

Although there is 'no dispositive Treasury
regulation, in 1983 the IRS issued a pertinent
revenue ruling. In Revenue Ruling 83-30 (the
"1983 Ruling"),
the IRS ruled that,
in
determining the value of a block of stock too
large to be sold on the open market without
depressing the price, "th~ relevant figure is
the price that the public would pay to the
underwriter for the stock, and not the price
that the underwriter would pay to the estate.,
Accordingly, underwriting fees should not be
considered
in
determining
·the
blockage
discount." Rev. Rul. 83-30, 1983-1 C.B. 224,
225 (1983).
The 1983 Ruling went on to hold
that
" [u] nderwri ting
fees,
necessarily
incurred in marketing a large block of stock·
are deductible as an administration expense
under section 2053(a) (2) of the Code, and are
not considered in determining the blockage
discount to be accorded in valuing the stock
under section 2013." Rev. Rul. 83-30, 1983-1
C.B. at 225.
The court's conclusion was that:
. Revenue Ruling 83-30, which held that
underwriting fees incurred in a secondary
offering of a large block of stock should be
excluded from the calculation· of the fair
market value of the stock for the purposes of
computing the value of the gross estate, is
neither unreasonable nor contrary to any
statutory or regulatory provision.
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The district court found, and no one disputes,
that buyers would have been willing and able
to pay for the Estate's WPC shares $27.125 per
share, that is, the market price less the
blockage
discount.
The
court
properly
declined to allow a· fur_ther deduction for
hypothetical underwriting fees and other salerelated expenses in arriving at the fair
market value of the stock.
8.

Lack of Marketability -- S Corporation; Preferred Shares.

A unique ranch, . the

largest

single tract of

land in

Arizona, was valued by the Tax Court in Estate of star Simpson, 67
TCM 1994-207.

The ranch was owned by an S corporation.

arose in the context of a gift.

The issue

The court allowed a 30% discount

for lack of marketability (there was no true minority interest
the family acted in concert at the father's direction).
On another issue,
di fferent

company)

the court valued preferred shares

which lacked any

"equity kicker"

(in a

such as

a

convertibility feature, by using the dividend rate and calculating
a price for the shares which would make the dividend a market rate.
A 10% discount for lack of marketability was allowed, but not
a minority interest discount because the dividend rate had been
derived from publicly traded comparables which already included a
discount.
9.

Valuation of Art; Risks of Litigation.

Estate of Robert C. Scull, 67 TCM 1994-211, provides an
overview of art valuation in a complex case.
were sold at auction,

Some works of art

others were so offered but not sold,
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and

others were merely appraised.

In general,

the

court used the

auction prices (without reduction for commissions paid) for those
auctioned, and the appraised values for the others.

Litigation was

~

involved, having to do with a property settlement, which resulted
in the decedent receiving a 65% interest in the collection;

the

court allowed, reluctantly, a 5% discount for risks of litigation.
10.

Residential Valuation.

The Tax Court opinion in Estate of Calista B. Dowlin, TCM
1994-183,may be reviewed for a discussion of expert opinion in
residential valuation.

The opinion does not deal with valuing one-

half of a residence owned by a husband whose wife owns the other
half.

That issue is of importance when creating personal residence

trusts.
11.

General Discounts.

Estate

of

Ray

A.

Ford,

TCM

1993-580,

valuation of three real estate holding companies,
holding company, and one operating company.

involved

the

one equipment

The court allowed a

10% lack of marketability discount for each corporation, and a 20%
minority discount for those in which the decedent was a minority
shareholder.

The net asset method was used to value the holding

companies.

~
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I.

Section 2032A -- Special Use Valuation
1.

Fixed Cash Rental.

Children of

a

decedent whose

farm was

valued

under

section 2032A must continue to farm (i.e., use in a qualified use)
the property for 10 years after the decedent's death.

In general,

when the children enter into a fixed cash rental arrangement with
another party who assumes the "financial risks of farming," they
cease to be in the farming business and became landlords.
triggers recapture of the estate tax savings.

This

In Minter v. U.S.,

(8th eire 1994), the decedent's children entered
into a .fixed cash rental to a family farming. corporation owned,
after parent's death,

by

(directly or indirectly)

the children.

The court held:
When we
apply the
test
of substantial
dependence on production to the undisputed
facts in this case, we conclude the trustee's
leases of the farmland to the family's farming
corporation continued the use that qualified
Mrs.
Fisher's
estate
for
preferential
treatment when the estate tax return was
filed. As the owners of the farmland and the
family farming corporation, the sisters and
their
brother
necessarily
retained
the
financial risks of farming when their farmland
was farmed by their corporation. The sisters'
rent income, like their mother's rent income
before them,
depended on the farmland's
producti vi ty
and
the
variable
risks
of
weather,
disease,
and fluctuating prices.
Unlike landowners entering into leases with
another farmer who takes on the risks and
agrees to pay fixed rent whether the farming
operation is profitable or not, the sisters
assumed substantially the same risks under the
trustee's leases as they would have incuired
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by farming the land themselves.
If the
corporation's farming operation flourished,
the sisters received their rent income;
otherwise not.
Indeed, the undisputed facts
refute the Government's argument that the
leases insulated the sisters from the risks of
farming.
During the period covered by the
trustee's leases, the sisters each lost over
$25,000
from
the
corporation's
farming
activities.

2.

---,

~
,
~

General Points.
PLR 9407015 breaks no new ground, but does illustrate two

points.
First, section 2032A, when properly elected, determines the
value,

for estate tax purposes,

election is made.

of the property for which the

Rev. Rul. 83-81, 1983-1 C.B. 230.

Thus, the

section 2032A value is used in making the allocations required by
a marital deduction formula clause.
When the drafter anticipates use of section 2032A, the formula
clause

should use

a

residual disposition.

pecuniary marital

with

a

credit

shelter

Assume a decedent who owns a $1,000,000

farm, but which has a value for section 2032A purposes of $400,000.
The decedent has $150,000 of other assets.
shelter

is

used,

requiring

distribution

If a pecuniary credit
based

on

date

of

distribution values, not all of the farm will be "needed" and thus
some will pass to the marital share.
is used,

the entire

farm,

But, if a pecuniary marital

and other assets,

will pass to the

residue because no pecuniary amount need be set aside.
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Second, where a decedent creates a life estate for the family

~

with remainder to charity, section 2032A cannot be used because the
charity is not a qualified heir under Section 2032A(e) (1).

Rev.

Rul. 81-220, 198.1-2 C.B. 175.

.
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J.

Section 2033 - Gross Estate
1.

~

Corporate Stock.

~

The taxpayer decedent lost in Estate of.Ruth E. DuBois,

,,------=;
=----=j

67 TCM

1994-210~

The facts confronted by the Tax Court involved

ownership of a certain corporation:
Bell Estates (Corporation) is a California
corporation, formed on January 7, 1957.
the
three incorporators were Edwin W. Lehmer, Jane
Wood, and William D. Markee who were also
named as the initial directors.
On January. 8, 1957, decedent transferred
property which she valued at $338,670 to the
Corporation.
In the estate tax return, the
Corporation was valued, based upon 1,000
"fictional shareS," at $2,658.1D per share, a
value which respondent has not disputed. The
Corporation never issued any shares of stock.
The record does not disclose any minutes in
respect of the issuance of stocik or the
election of directors and/or officers.
Decedent's last will and testament provided
that her property be divided equally between
her two sons, Edwin W. Lehmer and George H.
Lehmer.
The Corporation's tax return for its fiscal
year ending August 31, 1964, was signed by
decedent as secretary.
The Corporation's tax return for its fiscal
year ending August 31, 1965, was signed by
Edwin W. Lehmer, as president.
On the Corporation's tax returns for the
fiscal years ending on August 31, 1969, 1973,
1979, and 1983 through 1988, the question
whether
any
corporation,
individual,
partnership, trust, estate or association
owned 50 percent or more of its voting stock
was answered, "No."
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On the Corporation's tax returns for the years
ending on August 31, 1979, and 1983 through
1987, the decedent and her two sons were.
reported as officers of the Corporation, each
owning 33.33 percent of its stock.
All returns other than those for the years
ending August 31, 1964 and 1965, were signed
by a tax return preparer, but the name or
signature of the signing officer of the
Corporation does not appear on the stipulated
copies of the returns. Those returns contain
no further relevant information.
The issue was whether the decedent owned only one-third of the
company, or all of it.

The court rejected the estate's argument

that it should be one-third only:
Petitioner relies heavily on the statement of
ownership of the Corporation on several of the
Corporation's tax returns.
However,
tax
returns do not establish facts.
Roberts v.
Commissioner [Dec. 32, 789], 62 TC. 834, 837
(1974).
Nor does the fact that decedent's
will divided her property between her two sons
constitute persuasive evidence that she gifted
them an interest in the Corporation prior to
her death. A will speaks only as of the date
of death and, in any event, the provisions
equally dividing the "property" does not
answer the question of what property was being
divided.
Beyond the foregoing, we think it
significant that decedent never filed any gift
tax return covering the claimed gifts to her
two sons.
Wi th respect to the financial
activities reflected on the Corporation's tax
returns and the actions of Edwin W. Lehmer, as
president of the Corporation, neither of these
elements provides any persuasive evidence as
to the ownership of the Corporation.
The record herein is totally devoid of any
other actions on the part of decedent, such as
the issuance and transfer of certificates of
shares of stock or transfers of stock on the
books and records of the corporation, actions
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which standing alone might not have been
sufficient but in the totality of the picture
herein might have buttressed petitioner's
position.

~

~

The clear point is the importance of proper, and consistent,
records.

2.

Plan Benefits.
The issue in Stack, .Admin v. U. S., 94-1 USTC

decided

by

construction

the
of

Eighth
the

Circuit

following

earlier

this

retirement

-------,

year

plan

was

the

beneficiary

designation:
In the event of my death, I [J. Fred McCarthy]
hereby designate Milan E. McCarthy. (address
inser:ted) ,
son,
Mrs. Mary Francis Quinn
(address inserted), daughter, or their. ~ssue
per
stirpes
as
the
beneficiary
·or
beneficiaries of whatever benefits are due me
from the trust funds at the time of my death,
and
in
the
event
the
aforementioned
beneficiary or beneficiaries shall predeceas~
me, I hereby designate to my estate as a
contingent beneficiary or beneficiaries.
Fred McCarthy died in 1981; Mrs. Quinn died in 1982.

The plan

proceeds were being distributed in 10 equal annual installments.
Mrs. Quinn's estate contended, essentially, that the beneficiary
designation created a life estate and that the unpaid balance of
Mrs.

Quinn's

portion

should

not

be

included

in

her

estate.

Applying Minnesota law, the court disagreed and held the language
was unambiguous.
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Sections 2035-2038 -- Retained Interests
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1.

Revenue Ruling 79-353 and the Power to Replace Trustee.
In Estate of Wall v. Comm'r, 101 T.C. 21, the Tax Court

rejected the holding of Revenue Ruling 79-353,
That ruling had held that

1979-2 C.B.

325.

the grantor's unrestricted power to

replace a corporate trustee causes the powers of that trustee to be
attributed to the grantor for estate tax purposes.
The court summarized the IRS position as follows:
The underlying assumption of Rev. Rul. 79-353
and respondent's argument is that even a
corporate trustee will be compelled to follow
the bidding of a settlor who has the power to
remove the trustee; otherwise the settlor will
be able to find another corporate trustee
which will. act as the settlor wishes.
In
other words, says respondent, under these
circumstances the settlor has the de facto·
power to exercise the powers vested· in . the ....
trustee.· But the Supreme Court has· said in
Byrum, [1972)] that the section 2036 (a) (2)
right connotes an ascertainable and legally
enforceable power, as exemplified by the facts
in United States v. O'Malley, 383 U. S. 627
(1966). As the Supreme Court states in Byrum,
"O'Malley was covered precisely by the statute
[section 2036 (a) (2)] for two reasons:
(1)
there the settlbr had reserved a legal right,
. set fOiLth in the instrument; and (2). this
right expressly authorized the settlor, ' in
conjunction' with others, to accumulate income
and thereby 'to designate' the persons to
enjoy it." United States v. Byrum, 408 U.S.
at 136.
.

*

d
=='

*

*

In irrevocable trusts such as those under
scrutiny, the trustee is accountable only to
the beneficiaries, not to the settlor, and any
right of action for breach of fiduciary duty
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lies in the beneficiaries, not in the settlor.
Bogert, supra, sec. 42, at 431-433.
It also
seems incontrovertible that the trustee's duty
of sole fidelity to the beneficiary remains
the
same
regardless
of whether or not
distributions are discretionary and whether or
not limited by a standard such as one related
to health, education, support in reasonable
comfort, and the like.

4

e

~

In the absence of some compelling reason to do
so, which respondent has not shown, we are not
inclined to infer any kind of fraudulent side
agreement
between
Mrs.
Wall
and
First
Wisconsin as to how the administration of
these trusts would be manipulated by Mrs.
Wall.
Instead, since the language of the
trust indentures provides maximum flexibility
as to distributions of income and principal,
the trustee would be expected to look.to the
circumstances of the beneficiaries to whom
sole allegiance is owed, and not to Mrs. Wall,
in order to determine the timing and amount of
discretionary distributions.
The IRS is very unhappy with this result.

The now widely-

publicized "IRS Wish List," see Section W, contains a proposal that
a new Code section be created to compel the Revenue Ruling 79-353
position.

The case is also significant for purposes of section

2041.

2.

Limited Partnerships.
PLR 9415007 confirms that limited partnership interests

may be effectively given away with the transferor continuing to
exercise

control

as

general

partner.

The

facts

and

requested were these:
The Transferor and his wife created the
limited partnership (Partnership) in 1993.
The Transferor initially contributed cash to
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rulings
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the Partnership in exchange for a 9.259
percent general partnership interest and a
90.278 percent limited partnership interest.
The Transferor's wife initially contributed
cash in exchange for a 0.463 percent limited
partnership interest.
Subsequently,
the
trustees of certain trusts for the benefit Of
the Transferor's family and a custodian under
a uniform gifts to minors act account invested
addi tional . funds
in .the . Partnership in
exchange for limited partnership interests.
The
Transferor
as
general
partner. has
exclusi ve
management
control
of
the
Partnership, including full discretion· to
determine
the
amount
and
timing
the
distributions to the partners;
provided,
however, that if the general partner directs
the distribution of partnership funds to the
partners, distributions must be made to all
partners at the same time in accordance with
each partner's percentage interest in the
Partnership (based on each partner's capital
account) ..
Under the terms . of. the partnership agreement
and applicable state law, the Transferor as
general partner has a fiduciary duty t.o the
limi ted partners to manage and operate the
Partnership in the best interests of the
Partnership and its partners.
In exercising
the .powers
granted· in
the
partnership
agreement, the general partner is bound to act
in accordance with this fiduciary duty.
The partnership agreement provides that all
items of income and deductions are· to be
allocated in accordance with theprincipl~s of
§704(b) and the regulations thereunder.
During the term of the Partnership, no partner
is entitled to demand a distribution or a
return of his capital account.
however, the
partners have the right to sell their
interests to third parties, subj ect to the
right of first refusal granted to the other
partners.
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When the partnership is dissolved, its assets
will be distributed to the partners on a pro
rata basis in accordance with their respective
partnership interests.

~

'=l

~

The transferor proposes to make gifts of
limi ted partnership
interests . I f the
transferor desires to have a particular gift
qualify for the $10,000 annual exclusion·under
§2053 (b), he will make the transfer either
outright or to a trustee of a trust that meets
the requirements of §2503(c).
You request that we rule as follows:
1.
The
Transferor's
proposed
transfers
(outright or to trusts qualifying under §.
2503(c)) of limited partnership interests will
constitute gifts of present interests for
purposes of §2053 (b) .
2.
The value of the limited partnership
interests gratuitously transferred will not b~
subject to the special valuation rules under
§2701.
3.
Upon the death of the Transferor, the
value of the transferred ~artnership interests
will not be includible in the Transferor's
gross estate under §§ 2036 and 2038 as a result
of the Transferor's retained powers as general
partner.
All of the requested rulings were given.

3.

Gifts Within Three Years of Death .
. The U. s.

District Court

for

the Eas·tern District of

Michigan rendered an incredible opinion in Estate of Collins

u.s.,

94-1 USTC

After first

v~

finding that the· decedent's

attorney in fact was not authorized to make gifts under Michigan
law, because the power of attorney did not specifically: authorize
such,

the court considered whether gifts made from a revocable
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trust

wi thin

three

years

of

death

should be

included

in

the

:::::::::l

The IRS position is that

decedent's estate under section 2035.

such gifts will be if the grantor is not the sole beneficiary of
the trust, based on the Jalkut decision, discussed as follows:
The seminal case on this issue is Estate of
Jalkut v. Commissioner, 96 T.C. 675· (1991),
acq., 1991-2 C.B. 1.
Pursuant to Jalkut,
inclusion in the gross estate under §2038 is
dependent
on
the
terms
of
the
trust
instrument.
If the decedent-settlor is the
sole beneficiary of the trust, then transfers
to donees are viewed as withdrawal of trust
funds by the grantor and then direct gifts
from the grantor to the donees. If the donees
are potential beneficiaries of the trust,
transfers to them are seen as direct transfers
to them from the trust.
In the first
instance, the transferred amounts are not
included in the gross estate under §2038,·
while in the latter instance they are.
Jalkut, 96 T.C. at 685-686.
The trust provision was as follows:
Section 3.
During Grantor I s lifetime, the
Trust shall be administered for the sole and
exclusive benefit of Grantor pursuant to the
following terms hereof, to wit:
(a)
Trustee shall distribute all net income
of the Trust Estate ei ther to or for the
benefit of Grantor at least quarter annually,
or at such other or more frequent intervals as
maybe convenient; (emphasis added).
The court concluded that because distributions of income could
be made

for

the

grantor's

benefit

the

"plain meaning"

provision is that others were proper beneficiaries.
the court's interpretation would seem to be wrong.
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of the

In general,

L.

Sections 2041 and 2514 -- General Power of Appointment
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1.

~

Ascertainable Standards.

The Tenth Circuit has reversed the Tax Court in Estate of
Vissering v. Comm'r, 96 T.C. 749
was

a

(1991).

The income beneficiary

co-trustee and would receive principal

"as may,

in the

discretion of the Trustees, be required for the continued comfort,
support, maintenance, or education of said beneficiary."
The

Tenth

Circuit,

construing

Florida

law,

stated

that

"comfort" standing alone may create a general power of appointment,
but did not in this instance:
However, there is modifying language in the
trust before us that we believe would lead the
Florida courts to hold that "comfort," in
context, does not permit an unlimited "power of"
invasion.
The instant language states that
invasion of principal is permitted to the
extent "required for the continued comfort" of
the decedent,
and is part of a clause
referencing the support,
maintenance and
education of the beneficiary. Invasion of the
corpus
is not permitted "to the
extent
"determined"
or
"desired"
for
the
beneficiary's comfort but only to the extent
that it is "required."
Furthermore; "the
invasion must
be
for
the
beneficiary's
"continued" comfort, implying, we believe,
more than the minimum necessary for survival,
but nevertheless reasonably necessary" to
maintain the beneficiary in his accustomed
manner of living.
These words in context
state a standard essentially no different from
the examples in the Treasury Regulation, in
which phrases such as "support in reasonable
comfort," maintenance in health and reasonable
comfort" and "support in his accustomed manner
of living" are deemed to be limited by an
ascertainable standard. Treas. Reg. §20.20411(c)(2). See, e.g., United states v. Powell,
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307 F.2d 821, 828 (10th Cir. 1962) (under
Kansas law, invasion of the corpus if "it is
necessary or advisable
for
the
maintenance, welfare, comfort or happiness" of
beneficiaries, and only if the need justifies
the reduction in principal, is subj ect to
ascert·ainable standard); Hunter v. United
states, 597 F.Supp. 1293, 1295 (W.D. Pa. 1984)
(power to invade for "comfortable support and
maintenance" of beneficiaries is subj ect to
ascertainable standard).

Cl
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We believe that had decedent, during his life,
sought to use the assets of the trust to
increase significantly his standard of living
beyond that which he had previously enjoyed,
his co-trustee would have been obligated to
refuse
to
consent,
and
the
remainder
beneficiaries
of
the
trust
could
have
successfully petitioned the court to disallow
such expenditures as inconsistent with the
intent of the trust instrument. The Tax court
erred in ruling that this power was a general
power of appointment includible in decedent's
estate.
The opinion renders unnecessary,

in part,

the new Florida

statute on point.
2.

Life Estate.

In Estate of Jane H. Duvall, 66 TCM 164, the Tax Court
addressed the issue of whether, under Kentucky law, a life tenant
has a general power of appointment.

The Will creating the life

estate had been construed by the federal district court for the
Eastern District of Kentucky in 1965, as not creating a general
power

(thus denying a marital deduction).

The IRS argument was

described by the court as follows:

:J
§§j

Respondent does not
rationale and ~ppeal

dispute
of the
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the general
intervenors'

argument.
Respondent, however, argues:
(1)
That in 1974 a decision was rendered by the
Kentucky Court of Appeals in Melton v. Wyatt,
517 s.w. 2d 242 (Ky. 1974), that effectively
overruled the District Court's holding in
Duvall v. United states, supra;
(2) that
Melton v. Wyatt, supra, would be applied by
Kentucky
courts
retroactively;
(3)
that
therefore Duvall v. United states, supra, must
now be regarded by us as wrongly decided and
that we should ignore or refuse to follow
Duvall
v.
United
states,
supra,
in
interpreting the language of Mr. Duvall's will
and in reaching our conclusion as to the
nature of decedent's life estate in the
remainder of Mr. Duvall's property; (4) that
primarily because of the alleged change in
Kentucky case law collateral estoppel does not
apply;
and
(5)
that Mr.
Duvall's will
established in favor of decedent a life estate
in the remainder of Mr. Duvall's property that
constituted a general power of appointment not
limited by an ascertainable standard.
We agree with the intervenors as to the proper
interpretation of Mr. Duvall's will.
In our
opinion,
respondent significantly misreads
Duvall v. United states, supra, and Melton v.
Wyatt, suora.
The former decision was not
overruled by the latter decision, and the
decision of the District Court in Duvall v.
United states, supra, provided significant
guidance to us as to how Kentucky courts would
interpret the language of Mr. Duvall's will.
Prior to 1974, where the language of a will
created a life estate in favor of a surviving
spouse with a gift over, but where the
language of the will was not clear as to the
extent of the power to invade corpus that was
given to the holder of the life estate,
Kentucky state courts, in analyzing the nature
of the life estate, would reach differing and
not always consistent results.
As explained
in Melton v. Wyatt, supra at 243:
The cases decided by this court in construing
language in a will which would by the
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application
of
ordinarily
understood
definitions import unlimited power of use and
disposition with a gift over have evolved from
denying the power to encroach upon the
principal, to successive recognition of the
power to encroach on the principal to the
extent of providing for necessaries,
to
encroach on the principal to the extent deemed
necessary, to unlimited power to encroach upon
the principal for the personal use and benefit
of the devisee and the unlimited power of use
and disposition without the power to waste or
give away the property.
The court in Melton v. Wyatt, supra at 244,
went on to hold that - language of unlimited
power in a devise of life estate with a gift
over should mean what it says and that such
power to use AND DISPOSE of during the
lifetime of the devisee of the life estate
should be unlimited. *** [Emphasis added.]
Thus, where the language of a will implied a
testamentary intent to give the surviving
spouse unlimited power over property subject
to a life estate, the Kentucky Court of
Appeals in Melton v. Wyatt, supra, at 244,
held that the implied language of unlimited
power should mean "what it says" and that
"such power to use and dispose of during the
lifetime of the devisee of the life estate
should be unlimited." Id.
Melton v. Wyatt, supra, however, in our
opinion did not in any way change Kentucky law
to the effect that where language of a will
and the testator's intent are clear, where
that language does not contain language of
unlimited power,
and where the language
establishes only a limited power to invade
corpus, that language will be recognized.
Clarke v. Kirk, 795 S.W.2d 936, 938 (Ky.
1990); Molloy v. Molloy, 727 S.W.~d 870, 872
(Ky. ct. App. 1987).
Where a will contains
language that confers broad discretion merely
to use and manage the life estate but does not
contain language of disposition, the power of
appointment will, under Kentucky law, be
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regarded as a limited power of appointment.
Molloy v. Molloy, supra, at 872.
~

That is the case here, and that is exactly
what the District Court held in Duvall v.
United States, 246 F. Sup. 378 (E.D. Ky.
1965).· After commenting on a number of cases
involving upclear testamentary language, some
of which were also commented on and reversed
by Melton v. Wyatt, 517 S.W.2d 242 (Ky. 1974),
the District Court in Duvall v. United States,
. supra, distinguished those cases (and thereby
the issue involved in and the holding of
Melton v. Wyatt, supra) by concluding that Mr.
Duvall's will was not unclear, that it was
"explicit," that the will gave to decedent a
power to invade corpus only to the extent
necessary for decedent's "health, education,
support, and maintenance."
Duvall v. United
States, supra.
In further support of our reading of Duvall v.
United States, supra, and of our conclusion
that Melton v. Wyatt, supra, did not overrule
Duvall v. United States, supra, we note that
the opinion in Melton v. Wyatt, supra, does
not even refer to Duvall v. United States,
supra.
Footnote 3 of the opinion quotes KRS 391.160 enacted in 1974
which limits, absent direction in the instrument to the contrary,
a life tenant's invasion to health, educatron (including college
and professional education), and support in accustomed .manner of
living) .
The court discusses the statutes as follows:
Further, it would appear that if language
similar to the language of Mr. Duvall's will
is to be regarded as ambiguous and unclear as
to the extent of the beneficiary's power of
appointment, under this statute (at least with
respect to Kentucky wills whose effective date
is after enactment of the statute)
the
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beneficiary would be regarded as having a
power of appointment over the remainder of the
property that is limited by the demands of the
decedent's health, education, s~pport, and
maintenance
an interpretation consistent
with that of the District Court in Duvall v.
United states, 236 F.Supp. 378
(E.D. Ky.
1965), and with our interpretation herein.
Distributions From Marital Trust.

3.

TAM 9337001 involved facts similar to those presented in
Estate of Hartzell v. Comm'r, Tax Court Docket No. 27300-92.
trustees

were

authorized to

distribute

from the marital

The
trust

amounts of principal to the surviving spouse "as my trustees shall,
after

consultation

with

her,

deem

necessary

or

advisable

in

addition to the net income, for her care, support, maintenance, and
comfort."

In 1989, 1990 and 1991 the trustees made distributions

as annual exclusion gifts to the spouse's grandchildren and greatgrandchildren.

Those distributions were approved by the spouse.

The IRS ruled that distributions to descendants for estate planning
purposes were not for the benefit of the spouse, and so were not
authorized.
A way to solve this difficulty would be to allow the spouse to
withdraw 5% of the martial trust annually.
could

be

marriage.

problematic

with

a

Such a withdrawal right

spendthrift

spouse

or

a

second

Conditioning the withdrawal right on the spouse using

the funds to make gifts would probably be challenged by the IRS as
tantamount to the spouse having an inter vivos special power.
are not allowed in QTIP trusts.

Such

What if the spouse could withdraw
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the lesser of 5% of the trust property or the amount the spouse
gave away in the previous year through annual exclusion gifts?
There would be no condition on the exercise,

rather the amount

~ ~

--'
~
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subject to the spouse's withdrawal right would be limited.

=~
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Section 2042 - Life Insurance
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1.

Corporation Owns Policy on Shareholder's Life.
TAM 9349002 dealt with the inclusion of life insurance

:=j

proceeds on the life of a shareholder where the corporation owned
the policy.

The decedent owned 49.5 percent of the stock of a

closely-held company, with the other shares owned mostly by B.
few employees owned the rest.

The ruling discussed the buy-sell

and related arrangements:
After the Third amendment, the buy-sell agreement
provided that, if either Decedent or B survived the other
by thirty days, the Company stock held by the first to
die of Decedent or B would be acquired by the surviving
shareholders to the extent insurance proceeds were
available.
To the extent such proceeds were not
available, or if neither survived the other by thirty
days, the Company was to redeem the stock. The amount to
be paid on the purchase of redemption of the stock was
the greater of (1) the amount of insurance proceeds
available, or (2) the amount otherwise calculated under
the agreement.
Any amount in excess of the insurance
proceeds was to be paid by the Company over a period of
four years pursuant to a promissory note containing the
terms set forth in the agreement.

* * *
.The amended buy-sell agreement named a corporate
trustee to be the applicant, owner, and beneficiary of
policies of insurance on the lives of each of Decedent
and B except that the company was to be the owner to the
extent of each policy's cash surrender value.
The
trustee was precluded from exercising any powers of
ownership by canceling a policy, assigning ownership,
changing the name of the beneficiary, borrowing against
a policy, or otherwise changing the nature or value of
any policy.

;]
~

A

The amended buy-sell agreement provided that, upon
termination of the trust, any unmatured policy was to be
transferred to the Company subject to the right of the
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insured to purchase the policy for the then interpolated
terminal reserve (cash surrender value) .
In 1989,

when Decedent was

age 54,

~

-

the trust acquired an

increasing premium term policy on Decedent's life ($500,000 face
value)

and the company paid the premium.

Under the terms of the

policy there would be "no cash values until after insured's age
71."

Subsequently

in

1989,

Decedent,

and

three

of

the

small

shareholders entered into "STOCK PURCHASE AND REDEMPTION AGREEMENT"
(the "redemption agreement") wherein it was agreed that the Company
would purchase Decedent's shares by delivery of a promissory

note

having a face value of $300,000 payable over a thirty month period.
The agreement also provided that Decedent would receive a

cash

payment of $150,000 at closing in exchange for her covenant not to
compete for a period of two years.

The agreement, signed by B as

President, was contingent on the execution by B of a repurchase
agreement with respect to B' s
company engaged in a

similar

shares

in another

line of business.

jointly owned
No

insurance

policies were involved with respect to the repurchase of B's shares
in the other company.
On December 15,
Company
$300,000.

in

exchange

1989,
for

a

Decedent

surrendered her shares

promissory

The note provided for

note

in

the

amount

to
of

30 equal monthly payments of

principal and interest with the final payment due on June 15, 1992.
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Decedent died on September 27, 1991, at age 55 (age 56 as of
~,

her nearest birthday)
note was about $96,000

when the balance due under the promissory
Upon the death of Decedent the trustee

distributed a.portion of the insurance proceeds to the estate (in
an amount equal to the balance due on the promissory note) and the
balance to B and the other shareholders.
In effect, the insurance was security for the payment of the
purchase price.

The IRS concluded:

The policy was structured so that its cash
surrender value would be zero until several
years after the trust terminated.
Thus, the
Decedent would have been able to acquire the
policy by paying the then unexpired (pro-rata)
portion of the annual premium regardless of
the actual value of the policy at the
completion of the redemption.
Treas. Reg. §20.2042-1 (c) (4) states in part:
A decedent is considered to have an "incident
of ownership" in an insurance policy on his
life held in trust if, under the terms of the
policy, the decedent (either alone or in
conj unction with another person or persons)
has the power (as trustee or otherwise) to
change the beneficial ownership in the policy
or its proceeds, or the time or manner of
enj oyment thereof, even though the decedent
has no beneficial interest in the trust.
The IRS found that the decedent did possess an incident of
ownership:
When the insured cannot initiate the acts
associated with the incidents of ownership but
can only consent to or veto the exercise of
the incidents of ownership by another, the
courts have held that the veto power itself
constltutes an incident of ownership over the
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policy.
The Second Circuit held that where
the insured must consent before the actions of
others effectively alter a revocable trust,
the insured holds incidents of ownership in a
life insurance policy held by the trust.
Estate of Karagheusian v. Commissioner, 233
F.2d 197 (2d Cir. 1956). Similarly, the Court
of
Claims
held
that
where
the
beneficiary/owner of an insurance policy had
the power to change the beneficiary, but the
power could be exercised only with the consent
of the insured, the insured held incidents of
ownership in the policy for federal estate tax
purposes.
Estate of Goldstein v. United
States, 122 F.Supp 677 (ct. CI. 1954). It is
immaterial whether the decedent may initiate
changes, or whether he must merely consent to
them.
It
is
the power
and not
the
substantiality of the power that we must look
to.
Schwager v. Commissioner, 64 T.C. 781
(1975) .

-,

----'

~
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* * *
Analysis of the terms of the amended buy-sell
agreement indicates that the duties of the
"trustee" thereunder are limited to acquiring
the policies of insurance on the lives of B
and the Decedent; receiving premium payments
from the Company and forwarding those payments
to the insurer, and distributing any proceeds
paid under
the policies
to
the
actual
beneficiaries thereof.
In as much as the
"trustee" was precluded from exercising any of
the "powers of ownership" of the policy, it is
apparent that the "trustee" acted more as an
agent for the shareholders rather than as an
independent ·trustee.
The IRS also ruled that the proceeds would be included in the
gross estate because the decedent had a reversionary interest in
the policy:
-\

Taxpayer argues that the Decedent did not have a
reversionary.interest in the policy immediately prior to

A- 58

."

-~

~

,. .

death. Taxpayer contends that a reversion cannot exist
in property that was never held by the Decedent and, even
if it could, no reversion exists in this case because the
policy would not have automatically returned to the
Decedent.

,
Taxpayer relies on Estate of Leder v. Commissioner,
893 F.2d 237 (10th Cir. 1989), Estate of Headrick v.
Commissioner, 918 F.2d 1263 (6th Cir. 1990), and Estate
of Perry v. Commissioner, 927 F.2d 209 (5th Cir. 1991),
for the proposition that Decedent did not "transfer" a
policy of insurance on Decedent's life.
We believe
taxpayer's reliance is misplaced. While those cases did
. reject a "constructive" (or "beamed") transfer doctrine
in the application of section 2035(d) (2), they did not
deny the validity of that doctrine.
In Leder for example, the court recognized the
existence of a transfer, stating, in part:
This typical example of a constructive
transfer is where the decedent purchases
a life insurance policy on himself or
herself, pays all the premiums,
and
designates his or her children or spouse
as the owners and beneficiaries.
In
these
situations
courts
construing
section 2035(a)
view the decedent's
actions as acts of.transfer, because the
decedent's "beamed" the policy proceeds
to the children or spouse by paying the
policy premiums and creating in the
children or spouse all of the contractual
rights to the insurance benefits.
[Bel,
452 F.2d 683 (5th Cir. 1971), cert.
denied, 406 u.s. 919 (1972)].

~

It is clear that in Leder, as in the other cases
ci ted by the taxpayer, the decision· did not hinge on
whether the insured had transferred a policy of insurance
but on the technical issue of whether the insured had
transferred an interest in the policy that would have
caused inclusion of the proceeds under section 2042 of
the Code if the interest had not been transferred.
In
addition, in those cases the trustee or other third party
transferee who purchased the policy ostensibly had a much
greater degree of independence in the selection and
acquisition of trust assets.
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In this case the Decedent, along with the other
shareholders, caused the Company to transfer assets to
the trustee who was directed to acquire a policy of
insurance on the life of each of the two major
shareholders.
Whether the arrahgement is viewed as a
transfer of the assets or as an ,interest free loan, the
result is a·constructive transfer of an insurance policy.

'-.:l

:.......;
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Similarly, we disagree with the taxpayer's analysis
of the Decedent's potential right to re-acquire the
policy.

~--~

Taxpayer, citing Estate of Smith, 73 T.C. 307
(1979), in result only, 1981-1 C.B. 2, suggests that no
reversion exists if return of the policy is contingent on
events over which the insured has no control. We believe
the absence of control is relevant only with respect to
the value of the insured's right (the probability of
reverter) and has no relevance with respect to the
existence of that right (the possibility of reverter).
2.

When Is a Policy Transferred.

In Estate of O'Daniel v. United States,
Cir. 1993), the taxpayer won a strange

ohe~

6

F.3d 321 (5th

'The facts are worth

quoting in detail.
'Pioneer began negotiations for a merger with the'
Pillsbury Company that would result in Pillsbury's owning
the insurance policies. During the neqotiations, there
were discussions about Pillsbury's selling the life
insurance policies to O'Daniel. The general counsel for
Pioneer, Norvell Plowman, testified that he met with
Jerry Levin, an officer of Pillsbury, during a lunch
meeting in Minneapolis, at which they agreed that
Pillsbury would sell the life insurance policies to
O'Daniel at the closing date of the merger.
Levin
testified by deposition that there was such an agreement,
al though he did not state whether the agreement was
struck at the lunch meeting in Minneapolis, or on a
different day. No written agreement regarding the sale
of life insurance policies from Pillsbury to O'Daniel was
ever executed either before or after the merger.
On June 29, 1979, Pioneer merged with Pillsbury. On
the morning of the merger, O'Daniel and Levin reconfirmed
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that 0' Daniel would own the insurance policies at the
time of the
closing.
One week after the PillsburyPioneer merger, on July 8, 1979,O'Daniel and his wife
signed a trust agreement (the "life insurance trust"),
which provided that O'Daniel transferred the life
insurance policies to his wife as trustee.

'--'1

.:------1
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On May 29, 1980, change of ownership forms were
signed that switched ownership of the NORTHWESTERN policy
from Pioneer to O'Daniel. One day later, O'Daniel signed
a change of beneficiary form on the NORTHWESTERN policy,
requesting that the beneficiary be changed to his wife as
trustee of the life insurance trust. On July 24, 1980,
NORTHWESTERN loaned $48,996.78 to O'Daniel on the
NORTHWESTERN policy.
On September 24, 1980, O'Daniel
signed an insurance form requesting that ownership of the
NORTHWESTERN policy be transferred from him to his wife
as trustee.
Between May and September 1980, the
insurance company records for all twelve policies were
changed to reflect a change in ownership from Pioneer to
O'Daniel, a change in beneficiary from Pioneer to the
life insurance trust, and finally a change in ownership
from O'Daniel to the life insurance trust.
O'Danie1 died on September 18, .1982.
The issue was whether O'Danie1 transferred· all incidents of
ownership in the policies more than three years before his death.
The.

court

first

determined

that

under

applicable

state

law

(Arkansas) the oral agreement of Pillsbury to sell the policies to
O'Danie1 was unenforceable.

Even so, the Fifth Circuit went on as

follows:

I

~

~

Even though the oral agreement was unenforceable, it
still was valid for the purpose of the incidents-ofownership test.
In Camp v. Commissioner, 21 B.T.A. 962
(1930) the Board of Tax Appeals held that when land is
sold pursuant to an agreement violating the statute of
frauds, any subsequent income arising form the land is
taxable to the buyer, not to the seller. By analogy, an
oral agreement although unenforceable under the statute
of frauds, can transfer all incidents of legal ownership
from Pillsbury to O'Daniel .within the meaning of §2035.·
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The loR. S. is a third party and cannot assert the statute
of frauds to void the contract.
The district court may have erred technically in
characterizing the oral agreement as "enforceable."
Nonetheless, the agreement was valid for the purpose of
determining. the value of Estate.

~
~

The Fifth Circuit dismissed the contentions of the IRS:
The government makes two arguments why 0' Daniel
still retained incidents of ownership in the policies
despite the signing of the trust agreement on July 8,
1979. First, the government argues that O'Daniel failed
to pay a gift tax on his gift of the insurance policies
to the trust on that date.
Despite the fact that the
policies had a cash value of over $100,000, O'Daniel did
not report any such gift on his gift tax return for the
appropriate quarter (the quarter ending September 30~
1979). Although O'Daniel's failure to pay a gift tax may
help prove a gift was never made, it does not establish
that the gift was made later rather than sooner.

~==t

Second, the government argues that O'Daniel withdrew
the cash surrender values on all policies in 1980. This
withdrawal, the government argues, was an exercise of
O'Daniel's incidents of ownership over the policies. The
Estate replies that the withdrawal took place in
O'Daniel's capacity as the agent for his trust, rather
than for his own personal benefit.

* * *
Even if 0' Daniel acted illegally in withdrawing
money from the insurance policy, however, he did not
exercise incidents of ownership within the meaning of
§2042. Incidents of ownership connote the legal power to
exercise ownership, not the decedent's practical ability
to do so. As the Tax Court stated in Estate of Bartlett,
54 T. C . 1590 , 1598 , 197 0 WL 2411 ( 197 0) ,
While the insured could possibly have cashed
in some of the policies or could have
exercised a second assignment with notice
thereof to the insurers, any such action on
his part would have constiiuted a breach of
the trust agreement and would have amounted to
fraud against the bank,
as assignee and

A - 62

1

=:J
~

trustee.
"Incidents of ownership" are to be
measured by a
"general,
legal power to
exercise ownership without regard to the
owner's ,ability to exercise it at a particular
moment." Commissioner v. Estate of Noel, 380
U.S. 678, 684 [85 S.ct; 1238, 1241, 14 L.Ed.2d
159] (1965).

---.:.
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Even though O'Daniel possessed and exercised the
practical ability to withdraw the cash value of the
insurance policies, he did not see a legal incident of
ownership over the policies during the three years before
his death. Therefore, the proceeds of the twelve key man'
life insurance policies should have been excluded from
his estate.
To summarize, the court held that O'Daniel's statement that
ownership was transferred, in the trust agreement, was sufficient.
Should

practitioners

transfers

follow

·O'Daniel

by

treating

insurance

as occurring on the date an insurance trust -- with

appropriate recitations -- is executed, rather than waiting for the
formal transfer (which may take a few days, or many months)?
3.

Defective Insurance Trust; Bail-Out.
How can you bail-out of a bad life insurance trust.

issue was dealt with in PLR 9413045.

The facts were as foliows:

[I]n 1985, the taxpayer and his spouse each
created a life insurance trust.
The A trust
was created by the taxpayer as grantor, and
designated his spouse as Trustee. The B trust
was created by this spous'e as grantor, and
designated the taxpayer as trustee.
Both
trusts were irrevocable.
Life insurance
policies insuring the life of the taxpayer
were transferred to the A trust and policies
insuring
the
life
of
the
spouse
were
transferred to the B trust.
In 1989, the spouse,
trust,
purchased
a

as trustee of the A
life
second-to-die
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That

insurance policy insuring the lives of both
the taxpayer and herself, the spouse. On the
same date, the taxpayer, as trustee of the B
trust,
purchased
a
second-to-die
life
insurance policy on the lives of the taxpayer
and his spouse.
The taxpayer and his spouse, as trustees of
the A and B trusts, have the right to change
the beneficiaries on the policies in their
respective trusts and to pledge or assign the
policies or their proceeds as collateral.
In
addi tion, the trustees have various powers
over the trusts
including the power to
distribute trust income and principal, to sell
trust assets, and to merge the trusts with
other trusts. Thus, the taxpayer/trustee has
incidents of ownership over the second-to-die
policy held in the B trust of which the
taxpayer is the trustee.
Similarly, the
spouse, as trustee of the A trust, holds·
incidents of ownership over the second-to-die
policy in the A trust.
Thus, there are reciprocal trusts, each with polices included
in the spouses' estates.

To solve the problem,

proposed, with a third-party as trustee.

a new trust was

Thetaxpayer~

and spouse

would have no rights in the new trust except a section 675 (4)
power, and the right to be reimbursed for income taxes if the trust
were a grantor trust.
grantor trust.)

(The trust was, of course, designed to be a

The new trust would then purchase the policies,

for fair market value (interpolated terminal reserve plus unexpired
premiums), from the "bad".trusts.
The IRS first concluded that, after the purchase, there would
be no inclusion of the policies in the taxpayers' or the spouse's
estates, under section 2035, even if death occurred within 3 years

A - 64

of the purchase.
~

~

And, the IRS concluded that the section 675(4)

power (without the approval or consent of any person in a fiduciary
capaci ty,

to reacquire all or any part of the trust corpus by

substituting other property of an equivalent value in place of such
reacquired trust corpus,
policies

to be

in this instance) . would not cause the

included in the taxpayer's

citing Estate of Jordahl,

or spouse's estate,

65 T.C. 92 (1975), acq. 1977-1 C.B. 1.

Interestingly, Jordahl itself dealt with the power to substitute
assets in a fiduciary capacity; the distinction is not relevant,
according the IRS.
taxes

The right to receive reimbursement for income

if the trust were a

grantor trust waS not section 2036

retained right.
Ominously the IRS refused to rule on whether the new trqst
would be a grantor trust because,
extensive study."

Thus,

it stated,. the area. is "under

it could not rule on whether the sale

constituted a transfer for value under section 101(a) (2).
Traditionally these sort of defective insurance trusts have
been

handled by

the

insured

purchaSing

the

transferring it to a proper life insurance trust.

policy,

and

That, of course,

requires the insured to make a gift to the new trust,
survi ve three years.
al ternati ve would be a

then

and to

Many commentators have suggested that an
sale to a

grantor trust,

claiming that

Swanson, ___________ , stands for the proposition that a sale to a
I

~

grantor trust is the equivalent of a sale to the grantor (insured)
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and is outside the transfer for value rules.

However, in Swanson

the

clear.

=l

grantor trust

status of the trust was

insured is very likely to die within three years,

Unless the

~

="'

the potential

income tax risk would seem to outweigh the transfer tax savings.

4.

Indirect Incidents of Ownership.
PLR 9421037

finds

no

incidents of ownership

over

an

insurance policy on an employee's life in an employer who can, by
firing the employee, terminate (indirectly) the employee's interest
in the trust which owns the policy.
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Section 2053 - Debts and Administration Expenses
1.

Expenses in Selling Residence.

TAM 9342002 involved the deductibility of the expenses of
sale of the decedent's residence.

The decedent's child was the

only beneficiary of the estate . . The IRS auditing agent argued that
the sale was unnecessary because there was sufficient cash in bank
accounts which were joint with the decedent's child.
The National Office found otherwise:
Although the decedent had created the joint·
accounts and had contributed all of the
property held in the accounts, the jointly
held property passed to A [the child] outside
of the decedent's will and' was beyond the
jurisdiction of the probate court. Therefore,
A,
in his capacity as executor,
had no
authority to apply the cash in the bank
. accounts for the payment of the· expenses
allocable to the probate estate.
Because there were no cash assets in the
probate estate, a sale of some probate assets
was necessary to obtain the proceeds to pay
the
decedent's
debts,
the
expenses
of
administration of the estate, and those taxes
payable
from
the
probate
estate.
Consequently, to the extent that the sale of
the residence was necessary for the settlement
and the distribution of the estate, the costs
incurred thereon· are allowable deductions as
administration expenses within the meaning of
section 2053(a) of the Code.
2.

Interest.

In Axtell v. United States,

(D. C. Wy.

1994), the court considered the deductibility of interest paid to
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a

third-party lender on a

federal estate tax.

loan used by the estate to pay the

The court recited these facts:

The
plaintiff
in
this
c~se
'is
the
representative and beneficiary of the estate
of Paul W. Axtell. Paul Axtell died on March
19, 1979.
His estate originally elected to
defer payment of estate taxes pursuant to
Internal Revenue Code ("IRC") §6166. Section
6166 allows for a deferral 'of e'state taxes
when the estate consists largely of interest
in a closely held business.
See 26 U.S.C.
§6166 (1986).

,

s
=---,;

4

In 1985, in order to avoid the high interest
expense on the outstanding estate tax, the
Axtell estate obtained a third party loan from
the Wyoming Farm Loan Board to pay down the
estate tax liability.
As a result of the
Internal Revenue Service's ("IRS") allowance
of interest deductions as credits against the
estate tax and interest still owing, the
estate tax and interest was fully paid as of
December 16, 1988. In the years 1986 through
1989, the estate made, and the IRS allowed,
refund
claims
based
on
IRC
§2053
administrative expense deductions for loan
interest paid during those years.
When the
Axtell estate made a refund claim based on the
same interest payments in 1990, however, the
IRS disallowed the claim as untimely under IRC
§6511.
Section 6511(a) requires an estate to file a claim for refund
within 3 years from the time the return was filed or 2 years from
the time the tax was paid, whichever is later.
had expired.

Here that period

The court stated the estate's problem very well:

When an estate borrows funds from a private
lender to satisfy its estate taxes, the
interest on the loan remains deductible as an
administrative expense deduction under IRC
§2053(a) (2).
HiDD v. United States, 72-1
U.S.T.t. 84,678, 84,680 (D.S.C. 1971); Estate
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of Sturgis, 56 T.C.M. (P-H) en 87,415 at 2155
(1987).
As with interest on deferred estate
tax payments, interest on a private loan for
the purpose of paying federal estate tax
generally
does
not
meet
the
Treasury
Regulation
20.2053-1 (b) (3)
test
for
the
allowance
of
estimated
administrative
expenses, and therefore the interest may only
be claimed once the interest has actually been
paid. 1
However, unlike an estate which "borrows"
money from the IRS by deferring payment for
the estate tax, and which, as a result, does
not fully pay the estate tax until the last
installment is paid, an estate which borrows
money from a private lender to pay its federal
estate tax pays its tax liability in full.
Consequently, where an estate borrows funds
from a private lender, the section 6511 (a)
limitations period may expire before the
estate has made all of the interest payments
which
might
otherwise
be
allowed
as
administrative expense deductions.
In other
words, by operation of the section 6511 (a)
limitations period, the treatment of an estate
which defers payment of the estate tax and an
estate which borrows money from a private
lender may be quite different even though both
estates are paying interest on their tax
payment.
An estate that makes deferred
payments to the IRS will be able to submit an

lThe question remains open, however, whether an estate can
avoid this rule in a particular case by demonstrating that the
possibili ty of the interest not being paid is remote.
Compare
Spillar, 54 T.C.M. (P-H) at 2381 (even the remote possibility of
nonpayment of interest prevents claiming a deduction as estimated
future administrative expense); with Estate of Graegin, 57 T.C.M.
(P-H)
en88,477 at 2447
(1988) (allowing estate's deduction of
estimated future administrative expense for interest to be paid
because amount of interest is certain and co-executor intends to
pay the interest). Regardless of whether an estate may be able to
meet the 20.2053-1(b) (3) requirements with respect to a claim for
estimated future interest on a private loan used to pay the estate
tax, such a claim was not made in this case and need to be
addressed by this Court.
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administrative. refund claim for all interest
paid because it will not fully pay the estate
tax until the last payment is. made.
In
contrast, an estate that borrows money and
pays the estate tax liability in full will be
unable to tile a claim for administrative
refund- once the section 6511 (a) limitations
period expires, even though it may continue to
pay interest on the loan after that time.
The estate advanced two arguments.
Forms

706

consti tuted protective

claims.

First, that the amended
The

court

disagreed

because the forms, as filed, did not contain sufficient information
to allow the IRS to commence an examination of the claim.

In a

footnote the court noted that amended Forms 706 could, in certain
instances, constitute protective claims:
That is not to say, however, that a Form 706
could never constitute a valid protective
claim.
In order to do so the taxpayer must
apprise the IRS of its intention to take
future interest expense deductions and must
detail the factual· basis for the claim,
including as estimation of anticipated future
interest payments and the years in which those
payments will be made.
Second,

the

unconstitutional.

estate

argued

that

section

6511 (a)

was

Although recognizing the unfairness involved,

the court held as follows:
The Court recognizes that the limitations
period at issue in this case, IRC §6511 (a) ,
prevents estates that elect to take loans from
private lenders to payoff their estate tax
liabilities from claiming the administrative
expense deduction for interest paid on their
loan more than two years after the payment of
the estate tax in full and more than three
years after the filing of the estate tax
return.
The Court also recognizes that this
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result is inconsistent with the treatment of
those estates that .elect .to defer payment of
the estate tax to the IRS, because those
estate are able tc deduct all interest paid to
the IRS.

.:....:J
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The Court concludes, however, that this uneven
treatment is not unconstitutional.·
Section
6511 (a")
serves
the
rational
purpose
of
establishing a time limit by which taxpayers
must bring an administrative claim for refund
against the iRS. Tying the limitations period
for an administrative claim to the tie when
the tax is paid in full or when the tax "return
is filed is certainly a rational manner in
which to accomplish the legitimate purpose of
finality and closure. Moreover, taxpayers
the same situation as the estate in this case
unilaterally elect to take private loans to
pay their estate tax fully, knowing that the
section
6511 (a)
may
prevent
theni.
from
deducting all interest paid on their loans as"
administrative
expenses.
Finally,
as
mentioned above, a taxpayer would easily avoid
this result by making a protective claim for
the deduction of future interest payments.

in

The planning point is to note that interest "is deductible even
in the non-6166 situation, if properly claimed.
3.

City Inheritance Taxes.

TAM 9422002 determined that city inheritance taxes are
"not

deductible

as

administration

expenses

based

on

section

2053(c) (1) (B), which specifically precludes the deduction, and the
legislative history"from 1924.

da
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Sections 2055 and 2522 - Charitable Deduction
=

;d

1.

Qualified Reformation.

~

Wells Fargo Bank v. United states, 1 F.3d 830 (9th Cir.),
involved a special rule under section 2055 (e) (3), which permits a
charitable

deduction

for

a

qualified

executed before January 1, 1979.

reformation,

for

wills

The decedent's will was executed

in 1971; a third codicil was executed in 1982 which changed an
annuity payable, and then stated "I confirm and republish" the 1971
will.

The issue was whether the Codicil republished the Will, so

that the Will became executed after January 1, 1979.

The court

relied upon a 1974 amendment of the special rule which deleted
certain

language

regarding

"republishing"

and

held

that

the

decedent's will was executed before January 1,1979.
The opinion is also interesting bec'ause the court held' that
the

decedent's

remainder was

will

could be

ascert~inable.

reformed,

because

the

chari table

In pertinent part the will provided

as follows:
1.
My said Trustee shall pay from the income
or from the principal,if necessary, of said
trust to my trusted employee, JAMES M., FULLER,
the sum of Two Hundred Fifty Dollars ($250.00)
per month for the term of his natural life.
2.
I direct that my house located at li44
Crestline Drive, Las Posi tas Estates, Santa
Barbara, California, be held and maintained by
my said Trustee during the lifetime of said
JAMES M. FULLER. There shall be paid from my
Trust all taxes, all expenses of maintenance,
repairs or improvements ,on said house. 'The
use of said house as to maintained shall 'be
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provided for my said employee,
JAMES
FULLER, for the term of his natural life.

~
---1

i

~
~

I

M.

3.
Further I direct my said Trustee to pay
from the income or, if necessary, from the
principal of said Trust all unusual and
exceptional expenses of said JAMES.M. FULLER,
such as hospital, medical, dental bills and to
pay all income taxes due from said JAMES M.
FULLER to the United states of America and to
the State of California.during the period of
his life.
The primary purpose and intent in creating
this Trust is to provide for said JAMES M.
FULLER, and the rights and interests of
remainderman are subordinate and incidental to
that purpose.
The provisions of this Trust
shall be liberally construed in the interest
and for the benefit of said JAMES M. FULLER,
however, the Trustees shall consider JAMES M.
FULLER's
independent
income
and
other
resources outside the Trust Estate in .reaching .
such decisions covered by this paragraph.
The language did not grant unlimited power to the trustee,
according to the court because:

1

=:i

~

A house may sometimes need improvements in
order to remain ,in substantially the same
condition of usefulness, as when a drain must
be installed to prevent flooding, yet such an
expense is no less ascertainable than that
which will be necessary to maintain the life
tenant in "comfort," cf. Thaca, and is about
the same as "upkeep."
Cf~. Bowers v. South
Carolina Nat' 1 Bank v. Greenville, 228· F. 2d 4.
(4th Cir. ,1955).
For example;. Mr. Fuller
needed a handrail to move about the house.
The handrail was probably an improvement
rather than maintenance, but it was no more
than necessary to maintain the house for his
use,
and no less ascertainable than his
comfort.
Nothing
about
the
phrase
"improvement" suggests unlimited subj ecti ve
power in Mr. Fuller .to improve the house
beyond what would be necessary to so maintain
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it. Cf. Salisbury v. United states, 377 F.2d
700, 704-05 (2nd Cir. 1967).
The Government
argues that discretion to invade the corpus
for "improvements" destroys ascertainability,
under In re McCord's Estate, 516 F.2d 832, 836
(6th Cir. 1075), cert. denied sub. nom. U. S.
Braton v. United States, 423 U.S. 995 (19785),
but there the testatrix's "primary objective"
was the "betterment of the condition under
which my daughter is living," ide at 833,
suggesting change, while here, the phrase "as
so maintained" suggests stability.

~

As for the trustee's power to invade principal
to pay Mr. Fuller's federal and state income
taxes, this bequest is no more unascertainable
in amount than invasion of principal for the
beneficiary's future "comfort," or to cover
those
"reasonably
necessary"
expenses
occasioned by accident or illness. The amount
of Mr. Fuller's income taxes would have
nothing to do with such untrammeled standards
as his "happiness," "desire," or "pleasure."
Cf.
Ithaca,
Comm's of Internal Revenue,
Merchants, Henslee. We agree with the Second
Circuit that a power to invade principal for
income
taxes
does
not
give
the
life
beneficiary "significant volitional power"
over the charitable remainderman, and, so
doesn't lack the objectivity necessary of
present
ascertainability.
Schildkraut's
Estate v. Comm'r of Internal Revenue, 368 F.2d
40, 47 (2nd Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S.
,
959 (1967).
The instrument at issue in the
-, Revenue Ruling cited by the government, Rev.
Rul. 71-221, unlike Mrs. Wand's will, involved
a power to invade for any kinds of taxes, and
numerous and indeterminate life beneficiaries.
2.

Disclaimer to Private Foundations.

Rulings continued to be issued
private foundations.
The

issue

in~olving

disclaimers to

See, e.g., PLRs 9350032 and 9350033.

involved

is

how

much,

if

any,

control

the

disclaiming party may have over the distribution of the funds from
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In general, the rulings will allow the

the private foundation.
'----\

~

disclaiming party to be involved in the
someone

else makes

foundation

distribution decisions.

If

a

so long as
grandchild's

private foundation is the intended beneficiary, the grandchild's
parent can be the disclaiming party.
3.

Section 2055(a) versus Section 170(c) .
TAM

9404002

is

important

as

an

illustration

of

the

differences between organizations described in section 170(c) and
those described in section 2055(a).

Section 170(c) provides as

follows:
(c) CHARITABLE CONTRIBUTION DEFINED. - For purposes of
this section, the term "charitable contribution" means a
contribution.or gift to or for the use of -(1) A State, a possession of the United
States, or any political subdivision of any of
the foregoing, or the United States or the
District
bf Columbia,
but only if
the
contribution or gift is made for exclusively
public purposes.
(2) A corporation, trust, or community chest,
fund, or foundation -(A) created or organized in the Uni teq
States or in any possession thereof, or under
the law of the United States, any State, the
District of Columbia, or any possession of the
United States;

1

~

(B) organized and operated exclusively
for
religious,
charitable,
scientific,
literary, or educational purposes,
or to
foster national or
international amateur
sports competition (but only if no part of its
activities involve the provision of athletic
facilities
or
equipment),
or
for
the
prevention of cruelty to children or animals;
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(C) no part of the net earnings of which
inures
to
the
benefit -of
any, private
shareholder or individual; and
(D)· which is not cii:;5qualif;ied for tax
exemption under section 510 (c) (3) by reason of
attempting to influence legislation, and which
does not participate in, or intervene in
(including the publishing or distributing of
statements), or political campaign on behalf
of (or in opposition to) any candidate for
public office.

~

~

~

~

A contribution or gift by a corporation to a trust,
chest, fund, or foundation shall be deductible by reason
of this paragraph only if it is to be used within the
United states or any of its possessions exclusively for
purposes specified in subparagraph (B). Rules similar to
the rules of section 501(j) shall apply for purposes of
this paragraph.
(3)
A post or organization of war veterans,
or an auxiliary unit or society of, or trust
or
foundation
for,
any
such
post. or
organization -(A) organized in the United states or-any
of its possessions, and
(B) no part of. the net earnings of which
inures
to
the
benefit
of
any private
shareholder or individual.
.
(4)
In the case of a contribution or gift by
-, an individual, a domestic fraternal society,
order, or association, operating under the
lodge system, but only if such contribution or
gift is to be used exclusively for religious,
charitable,
scientific,
literary,
or
educational purposes, or for the prevention of
cruelty to children or animals.
(5)
A cemetery company owned and operated
exclusively for the benefit of its members, or
any corporation chartered solely for burial
purposes as a cemetery corporation and not
permi tted by its charter to engage in any
business not necessarily incident to that

A-76

~4

1

~

.~

'=l

~
.

purpose, if such company or corporation is. not
operated for profit and no part of the net
earnings of such company or corporation inures
to the benefit of any private shareholder or
individual .

,

~
:~

For purposes of this section, the term "charitable
contribution" also means an amount treated under
subsection (g}as paid for the use of an organization
described in paragraph (2), (3), or (4).
Section 2055(a) reads differently:
(a)
IN GENERAL. - For purposes of the ta~ imposed by
section 2001, the value of the taxable estate shall be
determined by deducting from the value of the gross
estate the amount of all bequests, legacies, devises, or
transfers -(I) to or for the use of the United States,
any State, any political subdivision thereof,
or the District of Columbia,. for exclusively
public purposes;

~

J

(2 } t o or for the use of any corporation
organized
and
operated
exclusively
for
religious , charitable, scientific, literary,
or. educational
purposes,
including
the
encouragement of art, or to foster national OT
international amateur sports competition (but
only if.no part of its. activities involve the
provision
of
athletic
facilities
or
equipment), and the pr~vention of cruelty to
children or animals, no part of the net
earnings of which inures to the benefit of any.
private stockholder or individual, wpich is
not disqualified for tax exemption under
section 501(c} (3) by reason of attempting to
influence legislation, and which does not
participate in, or intervene in (including.the
publishing or distributing of statements), any
political campaign on behalf of
(or in
opposition to)
any candidate
for public
office;
(3) to a trustee or trustees, or a fraternal
society, order, or association operating under
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the
lodge
system,
but
only
if
such
contributions or gifts are to be used by such
trustee or trustees, or by such fraternal
society, order, or association, exclusively
for
religious,
chari table,
scientific,
literary, or educational purposes, or for the
prevention of cruelty to children or animals,
such trust,
fraternal society, order,
or
association would not be disqualified for tax
exemption under section 501(c) (3) by reason of
attempting to influence legislation, and such
trustee
or
trustees,
or
such fraternal
society, order, or association, does not
participate in, or intervene in (including the
publishing or distributing of statements), any
political campaign on behalf of
(or in
opposition to)
any candidate for public
office; or
(4) to or for the use of any veterans'
organization incorporated by Act of Congress,
or of its departments or local chapters or
posts, no part of the net earnings of Which
inures
to
the
benefit
of
any
private
shareholder or individual.
For purposes of this subsection, the complete termination
before the date prescribed for the filing of the estate
tax return of a power to consume, invade, or appropriate
property for the benefit of an individual before such
power has been exercised by reason of the death of such
individual or for any other reason shall be considered
and deemed to be a qualified disclaimer with the same
fuJI force and effect as though he had filed such
qualified disclaimer.
Rules similar to the rules of
. section501(j) shall apply for purposes of paragraph (2).
In . the TAM,

a transfer to a foundation was involved.

foundation's governing instrument provided:
At all times, and from time to time, Trustee
and the Administrative Committee shall use and
apply all of the principal and income of
Foundation
exclusively
for
religious,
chari table,
.li terary,
scientific,
or
educational purposes, or for the prevention of
cruelty to children or animals.
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The

* * *
No gift may be made by Trustee to any
organization,
or
directed
by
the
Administrati ve Committee to be made to an
organization, other than to the type of
organization
to
which
a
charitable
contribution as defined in sectlon 170 (c) ,
Internal Revenue Code of 1954, or any amended
statute of similar import, may be made.

:::::J
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The IRS concluded that the Foundation's purposes were limited
to those described in section 2055(a), thus a charitable estate tax
deduction would be allowed.
by

the

Service,

Rev. Rul. 76-307, 1976-2 CB 56, cited

requires

a

governing instrument

to

limit

the

charitable beneficiaries to organizations to those described in
section 170 (c)

and 2055 (a)

nonresident noncitizens).

(or 2522,

g~ft

tax,

or 2106,

In general, charitable transfers: should

be made to organizations described in section 170(c),
.2522 (a);

tax on

2055(a)~

and

if the transfer is to be limited to public charities,

excluding thereby private foundations,

then reference should' be

made tO,section 170(b) (1) (A) as well.

4.=

Calculation of Charitable Deduction; Tax Apportionment.

The

IRS

national

office in TAM 9419006.

office

disagreed with

remainder

uni trust.

The

facts

the trust became a
as

relate

apportionment were these:

~

district

The decedent died with a marital trust

included in her estate under section 2044;
chari table

the

Under §2207A and the terms of the decedent's
will, the marital trust was burdened with the
estate taxes generated by the inclusion of the
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trust in the decedent's gross estate.
The
trust
instrument
contains
no
provision
regarding the apportionment of federal estate
taxes to be paid by the trust. The applicable
state X apportionment statute provides as
follows with respect to the apportionment of
transfer taxes in the case of successive
interests passing in trust:
If both a present interest and a future
interest in property are involved, a tax shall
be apportioned entirely to the principal~
This shall be the· case even if the future
interest
qualifies
for
an
estate
tax
chari table deduction, even if the holder of
the present interest also has rights in the
principal, and even if the principal is
otherwise exempt from apportionment.
The estate calculated the charitable deduction by determining
the net amount passing to the unitrust, before payment of estate
taxes, subtracting the share of taxes attributable to the unitrust,
and' using the uni trust remainder factor.

The district office

advocated another approach:
Upon audit of the return, the district office
took the position that pursuant to the
estate's methodology, because the estate tax
liability was paid "off the top" of the trust
corpus, the lifetime beneficiary's unitrust
interest (which is the lesser of trust income
or percentage of the value of the trust) was
necessarily reduced proportionately.
Thus,
the estate's method for apportioning the
estate tax effectively placed the burden of a
portion the estate tax liability generated by
the unitrust on the interest of the lifetime
unitrust beneficiary.
The
district
argues
that
this
approach
conflicts with the state X statute which
specifically provides that any estate tax is
to be apportioned "entirely to the principal."
The district contends that, under the statute,
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the unitrust/income beneficiary is exonerated
from paying any tax, and the entire tax burgen
is borne by beneficiary of the trust principal
- the charitable remainderman.
This result
could be obtained, even though the taxes are
paid currently, if for example, the lifetime
beneficiary received an additional payment
each month to compensate for the reduced
unitrust/income payment resulting from the tax
payment.
The charitable deduction would be
computed by subtracting the value of the'
unitrust interest from the value of the trust
corpus and from the amount so obtained,
subtract the estate taxe~ allocab).e to the
trust.
The balance is the amount of the
charitable deduction.

~
~
~

c-J
~

The IRS agreed with the estate, upon review of court decisions
(not in State X) which appeared to say that tax created by the life
interest is charged .to the trust corpus.
5.

Val ue of .Property Passing to Chari ty .

The Tax Court confronted several difficult issues in
Estate of Foy Pro"ctor, 67 TCM 1994-208:
(1) the fair market value of the Channing
Ranch to be included in decedent's gross
estate for purposes of section 2031 (a); (2)
whether an option to lease the surface rights
of the Channing Ranch for grazing purposes,
granted to Mrs. Hays for the duration of her
life, diminishes the fair market value of the
Channing Ranch, and, if so, the amount of such
diminution; and (3) whether such option causes
the devise of the Channing Ranch to Texas T.ech
Uni versi ty (Texas Tech) to lapse under the
terms of decedent's will.
In

pertinent

part,

the

decedent's

estate

plan

gave

his

Channing Reach to charity (Texas Tech University), but subject to

d
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an

option· in certain persons

purposes.

to

lease

the

Ranch

for

grazing

The option was designed to be at fair market value:

d
~

The special devise contained in Section 5.1
hereof shall be subject to a continuing option
in favor of J.D. (Junior) Hays and wife, Beth
Hays, or the survivor of them to lease said
Channing Ranch for grazing purposes, for a
term or terms not to exceed the duration of
the life of the survivor of them, plus six
months.
Such lease shall be negotiated and
renegotiated from time to time between J. D.
(Junior) Hays and wife, Beth Hays, or the
survivor of them, and Texas Tech University to
provide for lease terms conforming to the fair
market value of the use of said land for
grazing purposes, and for such terms and
restrictions
as
are
appropriate
to
the
maintenance and preservation of the market
vqlue of said land for grazing purposes.

=----,;;
=g

* * *
It is the intent hereof that Texas Tech
University shall receive, upon my death, the
full fee title to said premises, and that the
terms of the optional lease available to J.D.
(Junior) Hays and wife, Beth Hays, or the
survivor of them, shall be such as conform to
the market value of the grazing use of the
premises, and shall not operate to reduce the
commercial value of the premises as a ranch
property.
In addition, the decedent provided that the devise would lapse
if no charitable deduction were allowed:
The special devise in favor of Texas Tech
University contained in Section 5.1 hereof is
made in the good faith, belief and expectation
that the value of the subject matter thereof
will be deductible from my gross estate for
the determination of the United states estate
tax liability of my estate, as provided in
section 2055(a) (1), Internal Revenue Code.
Should it be finally determined by competent
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authority that the expected deduction is not
allowed, whether under Section 2055(a) (1), or
other provision of applicable law, the special
devise made in this Section 5 hereof to Texas
Tech University shall lapse. In such event, I
give and devise the surface interest in and to
my said Channing Reach,exclusive of my record
interest in and to the oil, . gas and other
minerals in and under and that may be produced
therefrom, to J~D. (Junior) Hays and wife,
Beth Hays, or the survivor of them, subject,
however, to payment by the devisees of so much
of the death taxes assessed upon my estate,as
may exceed the amount of death taxes which
would have been assessed upon my estate had I
not owned such surface interest in said
Channing Ranch. This contingent devise of the
surface interest in such Channing Ranch to
J.D. (Junior) Hays and wife, Beth Hays, or the
survivor of them, shall not entail personal
liability of the devisees for such taxes, but
shall constitute a lien upon the subject
matter.
Should the devise to Texas Tech
University given in this Section 5 hereof be
defeated by the contingency contemplated in
this Subsection 5.3 hereof, my record interest
in and to the oil, gas and other minerals in
and under and that may be produced from said
land shall be a part of the residue of my
estate to pass as provided in Subsection 6.1
hereof.
The reason the devise of the Ranch was handled in this way was
described by the drafting attorney in a letter to a trust officer,
quoted by the court:
Though Section 5.2 of the will gives to Beth
Hays a continuing option to lease the Channing
Ranch for grazing purposes for a term or terms
not to exceed the duration of her life plus
six months, it contains restrictions intended
to insure that the option will not be
construed as repugnant to the fee given to
Texas Tech University in Section 5.1, in
either a legal or economic sense. ***
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* * *
Section 5.3 of the will subjects the gift to
. Texas Tech University appearing in Section 5.1
thereof to a condition subsequent which will
defeat· such gift,
"should it be finally
determined by competent authority that the
expected deduction is not allowed, whether
under Section 2055(a) (1) or other provision of
applicable law; that is, should it be so
determined that the value of the gift to the
University is not 'deductible from the 'value of
Foy Proctor's gross estate for determination
of federal estate tax liability of the estate .
. TO insure that such adverse authoritative
determination will not be made, the gift to
the University is recited several times to be
of the fee simple title vesting upon the death
of the testator as provided by Section 37,
Texas Probate Code, and the option to lease
gi ven to Beth Hays is so restricted as to
provide for a rental conforming to the fair
market value of the premises for grazirig
purpose,s, and for a rental and other terms not
impairing the market value of the premises for
grazing purposes. In order to effectuate the
intent of the testatbr, it is essential that·
the option not be construed as a gift of a
life interest in land, and that, the gift to
the University not be' construed as a remainder
interest in land.

~
i
~

9

* * *
The structure of the will and its dominant
intent is to avoid the creation of a
charitable remainder trust.
An additional
argument that his result has been' achieved may
be made with reference to the exclusion of
family farms in the statutory restriction upon
the deductibility of remainder interests in
charitable trusts.
The emphasis of the will
is upon avoiding the creation of a trust which
is a chari table remainder trust inei ther an
economic or a legal sense regardless of the
application of the family farm provision.
[Emphasis added.]
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Texas Tech sought to intervene in the case,
interest,

to protect its

as did the residuary takers, Mrs. Hays and Ms. Baker,

which the court allowed:

~-

In the instant case, Texas Tech, Mrs. Hays,'
and Ms. Baker contend that intervention should
be permitted for the following reasons: (1)
Because, according to the terms of decedent's
will, our decision regarding the deductibilty
and fair market value of the Channing Reach
subject to Mrs. Hays' lifetime lease affects
whether the devise of the Channing Ranch to
Texas Tech lapses, all three of the moving
parties have a direct and immediate interest
in the subject matter of his proceeding; (2)
because petitioner has a fiduciary duty to
deal impartially with all beneficiaries of
decedent's estate, petitioner is not able to
adequately protect the interests of Texas
Tech, Mrs. Hays, and Ms. Baker due to the fact
that their respective interests in the subject
matter of the instant case are adverse; (3)
permitting intervention will not result in new
issues of law or fact to, be decided by the
Court, and therefore, intervention will not
unduly delay the adjudication; (4) permitting
intervention will allow a more complete
presentation of issues to be resolved in the
instant case; and (5) petitioner has not
objected to the parties' motions to intervene,
but rather,
has invited the parties to
intervene.
We granted the motions to intervene of Texas
Tech and Mrs. Hays and Ms. Baker.
In so
doing, we limited the scope of intervention to
(1) the issue of the fair market value of the
Channing Ranch to be included in decedent's
gross estate for purposes of section 2031(a),
and (2) respondent's adjustment to the value
of the charitable contribution deduction for
the Channing Ranch claimed by petitioner on
its Federal estate tax return.

--,
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The court first determined that the option was not relevant in
determining estate tax value.
nei ther

the

decedent's

decedent owned.

The Tax Court pointed out that

death

nor

Thus the full

his

Will

affected what

the

fair market value of the Ranch.

::::li

~
~

;
=----;

~

($6,000,000), without the option, was included.in the decedent's
gross estate.
Next,

the court determined the valu.e· with the option for

purposes of deciding the amount of the charitable deduction.

The

experts of the various parties were not far from one another and
the court settled on a value of $4,836,320.
The court finally confronted the IRS and the residuary takers
which argued that the charitable bequest lapsed.

The issue turned

on the meaning of the sentence, "[s]hould it be finally.determined
by competent authority that the expected deduction is not.allo.wed,
.
.

j

whether under Section 2055(a) (1), or other provision of applicable
law, this special devise . .

~

shall lapse."

What did the decedent

mean by the expected deduction?
Th'""e' residuary takers

and the

IRS

argued that

it meant

a

deduction equal to the value of the Ranch in the decedent's gross
estate.

Texas Tech argued that it meant only substantially equal;

the residuary takers and the IRS responded that the deduction --

~

!

...J

$4,836,320 --was not substantially equal to the gross estate value
($6,000,000) .

~

:;;;;I
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The court found the phrase to be ambiguous and looked to
::----¥

:::J
~.

extrinsic evidence, particularly testimony from, and client letters
written by,

the drafter of the Will.

In particular,

the court

focused on the following discussion of the effect of the grazing
-- j

option on the value of the charitable deduction:
You may well ask why provide that J.D.
(Junior) Hays and wife, Beth Hayes, must pay
rent to Texas Tech University for a grazing
lease on the Channing Ranch.
I have two
reasons; namely,
(1) It enables me to pass the fee simple title
to the Ranch to the Uni versi ty· immediately
upon your death, thus distinguishing it from a
remainder interest, which is a title postponed
to
title having prior enjoyment; and

a

.

(2) It should make the value of the interest
passing to the University· substantially the
full value of the Ranch at date of death. A
remainder
interest
must
pe
valued
by
subtracting the value of the preceding life
estate .,from the date of death value.
The
value of the life estate is determined by
applying a factor found in life tables
published in the Internal Revenue Regulations
to the full value, as of the inception of the
life interest.
Valuation. of the interest
passing to charity in that manner would result
in an increased burden on the liquid assets of
the estate to pay death taxes.
If the
University is to receive immediate title,
subj ect only to an option to J. D. (Junior)
Hays and wife, Beth Hays, to lease the
premises for the only purpose for which it is
definitely suited at the market value of such
a lease, it can hardly be supposed that the
value to the University is substalltially less
than it would be in the absence of the option.
[Emphasis added.]

~
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The court held that the tests were whether the deduction was
"substantially equal" to the gross estate value.

The court stated

~

==

as follows on the issue of substantially equal:

,

In light of the foregoing, we hold that
decedent's primary intent was to devise his
interest in the Channing Ranch to charity in a
manner that would allow his estate to claim a
substantial charitable deduction under section
2055(a) while allowing"Mrs. Hays to remain on
the Ranch. Accordingly, we hold that decedent
"expected" that his estate would be entitled
to claim a substantial chari table deduction
for the devise of the Channing Ranch to Texas
Tech.
We concluded,
supra p. 53, that
petitioner would be entitled to a charitable
deduction under section 2055(a) in the amount
of $4,836,320, if the devise of the Channing
Ranch to Texas Tech did not lapse under
section 5.3 of decedent's will. A $4,836,320
deduction is slightly more than 80 percent of
the value of the Channing Ranch on the date of
decedent's death ($6,000,000).
We believe
that a deduction equal to approximately 80
percent of the fair market value" of the
Channing Ranch on the date of decedent's death
is "substantial."
Consequently, the special
devise of the Channing Ranch to Texas Tech
does not lapse under section 5.3 of decedent's
will.

=~
~-.--;

The court did not discuss the tax apportionment ramifications
of its decision.

From portions of. the Will reproduced in the

opinion it would appear that the intestate takers would pay the
increase in estate taxes.
An interesting issue would have been the effect of putting the
option on the property prior to the decedent's death.

~1
~

Presumably

that could have been done by sale to Mrs. Hays and Ms. Baker, for

~

even a de minimis sum.
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P.

Sections 2056 and 2056A - Marital Deduction
1.

Post-Death Interest.

In Richardson, 89 T.C. 1193 (1987), street, 974 F.2d 723
(6th Cir.

1992),

and Whittle,

994 F. 2d 379

(7th Cir.),

various

courts determined that post-death interest on· deferred federal
estate taxes payable from transferred property should not reduce
the value of this property.

The issue is important for valuing the

charitable deduction, but is more important (because more frequent)
with respect to the marital deduction.
Revenue

Ruling

93-48,

acknowledgement of the cases.

IRB

1993-25

at

9,

reflects

The ruling states as follows:

Rev. Rul. 82-6 [1982-1 C.B. 137] holds that,
if deferred federal estate taxes and post-.
death interest thereon are payable out of a
residuary estate, the value of a residuary
chari table bequest for purposes of section
2055 of the Internal Revenue Code must be
reduced by an estimate of the maximum amount
of the interest that is expected to be paid
out of the residuary estate. In light of the
cases cited above 7 Rev. Rul. 82-6 is revoked.
~-

Rev. Rul. 66-233, 1966-2 C.B. 428, holds that,
for purposes of section 2013 of the Code, the
value of a residuary bequest transferred by a
prior decedent is to be reduced by the amount
of all administrative expenses payable from
the residuary bequest.
Rev . Rul. 66-233 is
modified to apply to administration expenses
other than interest accruing on obligations
payable from the residuary bequest.
Rev. Rul. 73-98, 1973-1 C.B. 407, holds that,
for purposes of section 2055 of the Code, the
value of a residuary chari table bequest is
reduced by the amount of administrative
expenses payable from the income of the
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IRS

residuary property.
Rev. Rul.
73-98 is
modified to apply to administrative expenses
other than interest accruing on obligations
payable from the residuary principal or
income.
Rev. Rul. 80-159, 1980-1 C.B. 206, holds that,
for purposes of section 2056 of the Code, the
value of a residuary marital request is not
reduced by any interest paid on deferred
federal estate taxes where state law requires
both estate tax and interest on the tax to be
paid from portions of the estate other than
the residuary marital bequest. Rev. Rul. 80159 is clarified to hold that the value of the
marital bequest for purposes of section
2056(b) (4)
is not reduced by post-death
interest expense accruing on taxes even if
state law requires payment from the marital
bequest of estate tax and interest on the tax.
2.

---=-,

QTIP Regulations.

The IRS has issued final and temporary regulations' taking
into consideration the following tax acts:
,TAMRA, OBRA, and EPA '92.
Appendix B.

ERTA, DRA '84, TRA '86,

The drafter's Explanation is attached as

The following are a few of the more important points:
Lifetime QTIP.

a.

The regulations allow a donor spouse to create a
lifetime QTIP trust for the donee spouse, which will be included in
the donee spouse's estate under section 2044(b), even if the donor
spouse retains an income interest if the donee spouse predeceases.
Generally, absent a gift tax return showing a gift, section 2044
inclusion will be presumed.
Treas. Reg.

§

Treas. Reg.

§

25.2523(f)-1(d),

25.2523(f)-1(f), Examples 10 and 11.

are as follows:

d

and

Those Examples
~
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Example 10.
Retention by donor spouse of
income interest in property.
On October 1,
1994, D transfers property to an irrevocable
trust under the terms of which trust income is
to be paid to S for life,then to D for life
and, on D's death, the trust corpus is to be
paid to D's children. D elects under section
2523 (f) to treat the property as qualified
terminable interest property_ D dies in 1996,
survived by S.
S subsequently dies in 1998.
Under §2523(f)-1(d) (1), because D elected to
treat the transfer as qualified terminable
interest property, no part of the trust corpus
i's includible, in D's gross estate because of
D's retained interest in the trust corpus. On
S's subsequent death in 1998, the trust corpus
is includible in S's gross estate under
section 2044.

------;:

Example 11.
Retention by donor spouse of
income interest in property.
The facts are
the same as in Example 10, except that S dies
in 1996 survived by D, who subsequently dies
in 1998.
Because D made an election under
section 2523(f) with respect to the trust, on
S's death the trust corpus is includible in
S's
gross
estate
under
section
2044.
Accordingly, under section 2044(c),
S is
treated as the transferor of the property for
estate and gift tax purposes.
Upon D's
subsequent death in 1998, because the property
was subject to inclusion in S's gross estate
under section 2044, the exclusion rule in
§25.2523(f)-1(d) (1)
does not apply under
§25.2523 (f) -1 (d) (2) .
However, because S is
treated as the transferor of the property, the
property is not subject to inclusion in D's
gross estate under section 2036 or section
2038.
If the executor of S's estate made a
section 2056 (b) (7) election with respect to
the trust, the trust is includible in D's
gross estate under section 2044 upon D's later
death.
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Presumably,

J

I

J

the

donor

spouse

may

also

receive

principal

distributions, and may have a special power of appointment, without

-l

~

;

causing inclusion in the donor spouse's estate.

c,
~
;:::;j
=

~

1:

On the other hand,

J

,

~

the donor spouse may not have an income

~
~

~

interest which precedes the donee spouse's (Example 9).

b.

Specific Portion.
The

term has

been redefined to

allow

a

marital

deduction if a spouse receives an income interest over a specific
portion of property.

The issue about receiving an annuity is

answered "yes" for transfers before October 25,
unanswered thereafter.
be.

1992,

but left

The answer should be the same, but may not

Treas. Reg. §§ 20.2056(b)-5(c) (2) and 2S.2523(e)-1(c).

c.

Protective Elections.
Are allowed.

d.

Treas. Reg. §20.20S6(b)-7(c).

Trust Division.
A trust division will be allowed which meets three

criteria:

(1) it is allowed by the trust instrument or applicable

state law;

(2) it is done before estate administration ends, and is

noted on the estate tax return; and (3) it is made on a fractional
or percentage basis, but may be non-pro rata (contrary to the GST
regulations).

A faulty division simply means that the division is

invalid for income tax and estate tax purposes.

,

~

-.J

A partial QTIP can

be made, and all distributions to the spouse charged to the QTIPed

~
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portion, withdut dividing the trust.

Treas. Reg. §§ 20.2056(b)-

7 (b) (2) (ii) and 20.2044-1 (d) (3) .
e.

Distributions to Spouse to Make Gifts.
This will be a problem if the spouse is legally

bound to make gifts.

Treas. Reg. § 20.2056(b)-7(d) (6) provides as

follows:

(6)

Power to distribute principal to spouse.

An income interest in a trust will not fail to

. consti tute a qualifying income interest for
life solely because the trustee has a power to
distribute principal to or for the benefit of
the surviving spouse. The fact that property
distributed to a surviving spouse may be
transferred by the spouse to another person
does not result in a failure to satisfy the
requirement of section 2056 (b) (7) (B) (ii) (II) .
However, if the surviving spouse is legally
bound to transfer the distributed property to
another person without full and adequate
consideration in money or money's worth, the
requirement of section 2056(b) (7) (B) (ii) (II)
is not satisfied.
[See the discussion in Section L-3 of these materials.]
f.

Charitable Remainder Trusts and Pooled Income Funds.
Treas.

Reg.

20.2056-b(8)

§

and

Treas.

Reg.

§

20.2056(b)-7(d) (5) allow the marital deduction only if the spouse
has

the

only

non-chari table

interest

(with

some

grandfathered

exceptions) .
g.

Right of Recovery -- Section 2207.
Failure to exercise a right of recovery is a gift,

unless the beneficiaries cannot compel the executor to exercise it.
Treas. Reg. § 20.2207A-1 (a) (3).
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3.

Partial QTIP Election.

This is a different result from Prop.

~
~

Reg.

§26. 2 654-

l(c) (2), which for GST purposes, that the trusts be "funded with a

fractional share of each and every substantial interest or right
held by the single trust."

Private Letter Ruling 9335025 indicates

that the IRS may not require pro rata funding when dividing a QTIP
trust.

The ruling states:
A trust may be divided into separate trusts to .
reflect a partial election that has been made
or is to be made if authorized under the
governing instrument or otherwise permissible
under local law.
The division of the trust
must be done on a fractional or percentage
basis to reflect the partial election.
The
separate trusts formed after the division do
not have to be funded with a pro rata portion
of each asset held by the undivided trust.
However, the value of the assets used to fund
each trust must be equal respectively to the
value of the fractional portion of the
residuary trust as of the date of funding
represented by each trust.

The

ruling

is

in

accordance

with

the

QTIP

regulations

discussed above.
4.

Contingent QTIP.

The Eighth Circuit, in Robertson Estate v. Commissioner,
15 F.3d 779

(1994)

has followed the Fifth Circuit's decision in

Estate of Clayton v. Commissioner,

976 F.2d 1486 (5th Cir. 1992)

and reversed the Tax Court on the issue of the QTIP election where
the

executor's

failure

to make

disposition of the property.

the

election would

change

the

A case is before the Sixth Circuit on
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this

issue.

Treas.

Reg.

§ 20.2056(b)-7(d) (3)

follows

the

IRS

position.
5.

Marital Deduction and Guarantees.
PLR 9113009 set forth an IRS position that no marital

deduction would be allowed for any assets which could be used to
satisfy loans guaranteed by the decedent.
changed its position.

,

~

The Service has now

The facts recited by the IRS were:

To facilitate a lender's approval of loans to
corporations and other business entities owned
by the taxpayer's children,
the taxpayer
gratuitously provided the lender with the
taxpayer's personal guarantee that the loans
will be repaid. The taxpayer has not pledged
or otherwise conveyed any interest in specific
property to secure any of these guarantees.
If the taxpayer dies before all of these loans
are repaid, the taxpayer's estate will become
liable for each outstanding guarantee.
As a
result, property that passes t o a marital
discretionary
income
trust
described
in
§20.2056(e)-2(b) of the Estate Tax Regulations
(Estate Trust) and a marital income trust
described in §2056(b) (7)
of the Internal
Revenue Code
(Marital Trust)
may become
subject to the payment of the guaranteed
loans. The will provides that property equal
to two times the "Net Value Cost" of making
payments on guarantees given by the taxpayer
that are outstanding as of the date of the
taxpayer's death is to be alloca-ced to the
Estate Trust.
The Estate Trust defines "Net
Value Cost" in terms of twice an estimate of
the present value of satisfying the loan
guarantees.
The residue of the estate is to
be allocated to the Marital Trust.
Under applicable local law, if the borrower
defaul ts
on a
guaranteed loan and the
guarantor or his estate pays the defaulted
amount to the lender, the guarantor or his
estate
is
subrogated
to
the
lender's
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collection rights on the loan for the amount
the guarantor or his estate paid.
The new conclusions are:
Under §2056(b) (4), if property passing to the
surviving spouse is encumbered in any manner,
the encumbrance is taken into account in the
same manner as if the amount of a gift to the
spouse were being determined. Under the terms
of the taxpayer's will, assets will pass to
the Estate,:Trust for the benefit of the
surviving spouse only if there are any loan
guarantees outstanding at the
taxpayer's
death. The marital deduction for the bequest
of such assets would not be reduced by the
entire unpaid balance of the guaranteed loans
unless at the time of the taxpayer's death it
appears that a default after the Estate Tax
Return is filed is likely, that" assets of the
Estate Trust will be used to pay the entire
unpaid balance of such loans, and that the
SUbrogation rights appear to be worthless.
It is well settled that, notwithstanding the
restrictions of §2056(b), an asset in the form
of a promissory note that passes from a
decedent to or for the benefit of the
surviving spouse is ordinarily eligible for
the marital deduction, whether the note passes
outright to the spouse or to an estate trust
described in §20.2056(e)-2(b) or to a marital
trust described in §2056(b) (5) or (b) (7).
After a decedent's death, the spouse (or the
trustee of the trust for the benefit of the
spouse) holds the note asa creditor of the
borrower and is subject to a risk of loss if
the borrower were to default and be incapable
of repaying the note.
It follows that the
mere presence of a promissory note among
assets passing to a trust for the benefit of
the surviving spouse would not ordinarily
cause
the
disallowance
of
the
marital
deduction.
If one or more assets
(not necessarily
promissory notes) pass from a decedent to or
for the benefit of the spouse subject to a
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loan guarantee encumbrance, the spouse (or the
trustee of the trust for the benefit of the
spouse) is subject to a risk of loss if the
borrower were to default and be incapable of
repaying the guaranteed loan. In the event of
default, the spouse (or the trustee) would pay
the lender pursuant to the guarantee, as a
result of which the spouse (or the trustee)
would be immediately subrogated to the lender
and would consequently become a creditor of
the borrower for the amount paid pursuant to
the guarantee.

....;;

Thus, for purposes of §2056(b), the position
of a spouse (or trustee) as a note holder is
indistinguishable from the position of a
spouse
(or trustee)
as holder of assets
subject to a loan guarantee.
In the case of
the note asset and in the case of the
guarantee-encumbered asset, the risk of the
borrower's default presents the same issue for
purposes of determining whether a surviving
spouse's interest in the asset is considered a
nondeductible terminable interest. In either
case, neither the borrower nor the lender
possesses an "interest in" or a "power to
appoint" property, as those terms are used in
§2056(b) .
The importance of the changes is clear:
a

there is no risk of

complete disallowance of the marital deduction.

number of issues remain.

note

repayment.

depends

on,

a

The IRS analogized to the risk that a

promissory note might be unpaid.
the

However,

among

In such instances, the value of

other

factors,

the

likelihood

of

Presumably, if marital deduction assets were likely to

be used for the payment of a guarantee, there would be a reduction
in the value of the marital deduction.
~

The 1990 ruling had also dealt with gift guarantees.
ruling does not.

11 _ Q7

The new

6.

Loans From a QTIP.

~

~
~

The IRS addressed loans from a QTIP trust in PLR 9418013.
In pertinent part, the transaction was as follows:

4

The Marital Trust contains substantial liquid
assets. The trustee proposes to make loans of
up to $Y to each 0 f the three sons from the
assets of the Marital Trust.
These loans in
the aggregate will not exceed 8% of the
current fair market value of the Martial
Trust.
In exchange for the loan, each son
will execute a promissory note to the Marital
Trust, payable on the spouse's death bearing a
rate of interest sufficient to satisfy the
provisions of §7872, although the interest
will accrue instead of being paid on a current
basis.
Under. the proposed. loan arrangements, the
trustee will make principal distributions to·
the spouse each year in an amount equal to the
accrued interest on the promissory notes.
The IRS held that there was no disposition of the spouse's
interest:
In th~ present case, the trustee proposes to
make loans of up to $Y to each of decedent's
three sons from the corpus of the Marital
Trust.
The interest on the loans will be a
rate of interest that meets the requirements
of §7872.
The intereet howe~er, will· accrue
instead of being paid on a current basis.
Under the proposed loan arrangement, the
trustee will make principal distributions to
spouse each year in an amount equal to the
accrued interest.
This distribution will
offset the loss of "real income i ' to spouse.
Under these circumstances,the spouse will not
be deprived of the income that she would
receive from the Marital Trust if the loans
were not made. Therefore, the quality of the
spouse's qualifying income interest for life
will remain substantially unchanged as a
result of the proposed transaction.
In
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addition, the promissory notes that will be
given in exchange for the loans will accrue
interest over the life of the spouse and upon
her death,
the promissory notes and the
accrued interest thereon, will be includible
in spouse's estate under section 2044.

;.......

7.

Apportionment of Taxes to QTIP.

The Ohio tax apportionment statute was involved in Estate
of Hans W. Vahlteich,

67 TCM 1994-168.

The statute provides as

follows, in relevant part:
(A)
Unless a will or other governing
instrument otherwise provides, and except as
otherwise provided in this section, a tax
shall be apportioned equitably in accordance
with the provisions of this section among all
persons interested in an estate in proportion
to the value of the interest of each person as
determined for estate tax purposes.

* * *
(I)
If any part of an estate consists of
property, the value of which is included in
the gross estate of the decedent by reason of
section 2044 of the "Internal Revenue Code of
1986," 100 sta. 2085, 26 U.S.C.A. 2044, as
amended, or of section 5731.131 * * * of the
Revised Code,
the estate is entitled to
recover from the persons holding or receiving
the property any amount by which the estate
tax payable exceeds the estate tax that would
have been payable if the value of the property
had not been incltided in the gross estate of
the decedent.
This division does not apply i f
a decedent provides otherwise in his will or
another governing instrument and the will or
instrument refers to either section mentioned
in this division or to qualified terminable
interest
marital
deduction
property.
[Emphasis added.]
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The decedent's will provided for the residue of the estate to
be distributed to charity.
a QTIP trust;
trust

were

An asset of the decedent's estate was

if the taxes generated to the estate by the QTIP

paid

from

the

residue,

the

resulting

charitable

deduction would be reduced creating a "tax on tax" situation.
the other hand,

On

if the taxes were to come from the QTIP trust

itself, the residue would remain intact.
The decedent's tax clause said this:
I direct that all my just debts, funeral and
administration expenses be paid as soon as
practicable after my decease and that all
transfer,
estate
or
inheritance
taxes,
including any interest and penalties thereon,
imposed by any taxing authority upon or in
relation to any property owned by me at the
time of my death which is disposed of by this
Will or any Codicil to it, or upon or in
relation- to any trust,
gift,
insurance,
annuity, joint property or transfer, included
as part of my taxable estate, shall be paid as
an expense out of my residuary estate (as
hereinafter defined)
without apportionment
against the legatees, beneficiaries, donees,
or transferees thereof.
[Emphasis added.]
The court determined the nub of the issue to be: does the Ohio
statute require a specific reference to either section 2044 of the
Internal Revenue Code or qualified terminable interest property in
order for apportionment to be waived?

The court said no.

First

the court noted that the Ohio Legislature could have required a
specific reference,

but that the statute does not.

Second,

the

decedent's tax clause provided that all taxes imposed on account of
trust being included in the decedent's taxable estate would be paid
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The QTIP trust was the

from the residue without apportionment.
only such trust.
KRS 140.190(2) provides that:

(2) The .heir, devisee or other donee shall be
personally liable
for
the
tax on
real
property,
as
well
as
the
personal
representative 'or trustee, and if the personal
representative or trustee pays the tax he may,
unless
the tax is made
an expense of
administration
by
the
will
or
other
instrument, recover the tax from the heir,
devisee or other donee of the real property.
Also
National

of
Bank

interest
& Trust

is

University

Company,

Ky.,

of

Louisville
499

S.W.2d

v.
288

Libertv
(1973)

construing a clause to pay taxes from the estate to be a direction
that the residue generally should be charged, without allocation,
with the result that a charitable interest was burdened with tax,
and Union Bank and Trust Company v. Barrett, Ky., 253 S.W.2d 632
(1952) dealing with allocation to power of appointment property.
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Q.

sections 2501 to 2524 - Gifts
1.

Check to Individual.

In recent years several cases have dealt with when a gift
by check is effective for gift tax purposes, the most recent being
Estate of Metzger v. Comm'r, 100 T.C 204, which discusses the prior
cases.

The issue was whether payment of checks to individuals in

1986 related back to the delivery and deposit of the checks in
1985.

The court answered this question in the affirmative.

The

opinion states:
We see no reason for refusing to apply the
relating back doctrine to noncharitable gifts
wher.e the taxpayer is able to establish:
(1)
The donor's intent to make a gift,
(2)
unconditional delivery of the check, and (3)
presentment of the check within the year for
which favorable tax treatment is sought and
wi thin
a
reasonable
time
of
issuance.
Assuming these elements are present,
the
practical realities of everyday commerce
recognized
in
Estate
of
Spiegel
v.
Commissioner, 12 T.C. 524, 529 (1949), require
a limited extension of the relation-back rule.
A contrary interpretation was reached by the Virginia Supreme
Court in Woo v. Smart, 442 S.E.2d 690 (1994) which held that checks
given to donee prior to the donor's death that were cashed after
the donor's death were not gifts.

The court held that a check was

neither an inter vivos gift nor a gift causa mortis because there
were no transfers of funds and thus no delivery.

A _ 10')

2.

Gifts by Power of Attorney.

Technical Advice Memorandum 9342002 holds that a power of
attorney which gives the attorneys-in-fact broad powers but does
not expressly authorize them to make gifts cannot be effectively
exercised, under Oregon law, to make gifts or to create a trust on
behalf

of

the

decedent

which

authorizes

the

trustee

to

make

the

same

transfers to other persons during the decedent's life.
Technical Advice Memorandum 9347003

reaches

result under Texas law .
. Al though the Texas Supreme Court has not
addressed the authority of an attorney-in-fact
under a durable power of attorney to make
gifts if not specifically authorized, other
Texas courts have addressed the extent of the
authority of an agent under a power of
attorney.
In Gciuldy v. Metcalf, 12 S.W. 830
(Tex.
1889) '.
the
court
set
forth
the
established rule that, where the authority is·
conferred in a formal instrument, the general
words are restricted to the context of the
instrument and construed as to exclude the
exercise of any unwarranted power.
(Citations
omi tted. )
The durable power of attorney gave A the power
to sell, convey, mortgage, and exchange any
real property and, generally, to do anything
that D could do.
However,
it did not
specifically give A the power to make gifts of
the property or to transfer the property
without adequate consideration.
under Texas
law, the instrument must be strictly construed
and we do not believe that the Texas Supreme
Court would construe this instrument as giving
a the power to transfer D's property without
full and adequate consideration.
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PLR 9410028 expresses the IRS view that, under Colorado law,

~

~

attorneys in fact may not make gifts without specific authority to
do so.
3.

No Colorado case or statute was cited.

~~

=------;;

Section 483 - Interest Rates.

In Schusterman v. U. S.,

(D.C. N. Okla.

1994) the court followed Krabbenhoft v. Commissioner, 939 F. 29 529
(8th Cir. 1991) and rejected Ballard v. Commissioner, 854 F.2d 184
(7th Cir. 1988), in holding that the interest rates of section 483
are irrelevant to gift tax.

The facts involved interest-free leans

prior to Dickman v. Commissioner, 465 U.S. 330 (1984).
4.

Dominion and Control.

The case of Claude J. Autin v.Commissioner, 102 T.C. No.
35, involved unusual facts.

On August 14, 1974, father and son

incorporated Louisiana International Marine, Inc.
received 51 shares and son received 49 shares.

("LIM"); father
Father filed no

gift tax return, even though son furnished no capital.
day,

On the same

father and son executed a "counter letter" which the court

discussed as follows:
On August 14, 1974, petitioner and his son executed the
counter letter, which states that petitioner signed the
following documents before Mr. Pitre, as notary public:
Articles
of
Incorporation
for
Louisiana
International Marine, Inc., an Initial Report,
Minutes of a Meeting of Incorporation, Minutes
of the First Meeting of the Board of
Directors, By-Laws, two (2) stock certificates
and a receipt for Stock Certificate No. 1 for
fifty-one (51) shares of Capital Stock of
Louisiana International Marine, Inc. for the
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purpose of forming said Corporation so that he
and his son Bobby C. Autin, could begin
working together in the Marine Industry; that
in accordance with all of the documents above
mentioned, Claude J. Autin, appeals herein,
received and is the registered owner of
Certificate No. 1 representinq 51 shares of
the Capital stock of Louisiana International.
Marine, Inc.;
The counter letter further states:
That in truth and in fact appearer has no
ownership interest in said stock certificate
of said capital stock of· said corporation;
that the same was acquired by him for the
account of his son, Bobby C. Autin, and that
he will execute in favor of said Bobby C.
Autin, or his nominee, at such time as
appearer is called upon so to do, .any and all
instruments
and
documents
necessary
to
transfer to the said Bobby C.Autin all right,
title and interest that appearer has or may
have in and to Louisiana International Marine,
Inc. and/or Certificate No. 1 representing 51
shares
of
the
capital
stock
of
said
corporation.
The counter letter also states the following as the
reason why the 51 shares. were issued in petitioner's
name:
although the corporation in truth and in fact
belongs to Bobby C. Autin, and appearer will
be employed as president of the corporation,
it will be to the best interest of the
corporation, and his son that the clients and
customers of said corporation believe appearer
to be the principal stock holder of Louisiana
International
Marine,
Inc.
because
of
appearer's reputation in the Marine industry
and because of the personal contacts and
relationships established over the years
between appearer and these customers.

J

~

~

Father held himself out as in charge of LIM, although son also
worked in the business.

In 1988, father retired from LIM and the
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51 shares were recorded in son's name.

Upon gift tax audit, father

argued there was no 1988 gift because he never owned the shares, or
had transferred them by the counter letter.

The IRS claimed that

=

j

~

,
~
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father never relinquished dominion and control over the shares and
that the counter letter was not effective against people who had no
notice of it.

~

The court concluded as follows:
Respondent contends that the following factors
indicate petitioner's dominion and' control
over, and substantive ownership of, the 51
shares:
(1) Petitioner held himself out as a
51-percent shareholder on LIM's Federal and
state corporate income tax returns;
(2)
petitioner signed corporate tax returns under
penalties of perjury, (3) petitioner reported
51 percent of all of LIM's undistributed
taxable income on his Form 1040 for taxable
year 1974 when LIM was an S corporation; (4)
during 1974, LIM reported to the Internal
Revenue Service that petitioner was a 51percent shareholder in LIM; (5) to break the
subchapter S election, the 49 shares held by
petitioner's son were reduced to 48, rather
then reducing petitioner's shares from 51 to
50; (6) once LIM became a C corporation, LIM's
corporate minutes reflect that petitioner
attended
the
shareholders
meetings
and
exercised his voting rights as to the 51
shares; (7) petitioner was in charge of LIM
from the time of LIM's incorporation until
June 1988 when he resigned as president (in
favor of his son's become president) and
became vice president; (8) petitioner traveled
2 to 4 days per week to meet with potential
customers
to
sell
LIM's
services;
(9)
petitioner was the guiding force who set up
LIM's business and successfully managed it
until his son gained the experience necessary
to successfully run LIM;
(10) petitioner
personally guaranteed several of LIM's loans
during early days; (11) petitioner had the
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authority to invest LIM's capital; (12) as
part of their community property settlement,
peti tioner paid Cherie Autin to waive her
rights and claims to petitioner's interest in
LIM;
. and
(.13)
throughout . the
years,
petitioner's auditors and attorneys who knew
of the counter letter apparently treated the
counter letter as a secret document that had
an· effect only between petitioner and his son.
We agree with respondent that· petitioner's
actions indicate his extensive assertion of
dominion and control over LIM and petitioner's
substantive ownership of the 51 shares.
Significantly, petitioner held himself out as
the majority shareholder to all of LIM's
customers and business associates and acted as
the true owner of the 51 shares.
He held
himself out to the Internal Revenue Service as
well as the Louisiana taxing authorities as a
51-percent owner.
Petitioner reported 51
percent of' LIM's undistributed taxable income
on his Form 1040 for taxable year 1974.
He
attended shareholders meetings and exercised
his voting rights with respect to the 51
shares .
Petitioner
controlled
LIM
as
president from August 1974. through June 1988.
At the same time that petitioner relinquished
the presidency of LIM, he trans£erred the 51
shares
into
his
son's
name.
Indeed,
petitioner transferred the shares to his son
during 1988, not because his son demanded
them, but because petitioner decided that he.
wanted to retire from LIM.

J

~

There is nothing in the record indicating that
petitioner's son, who purportedly owned 100
percent of LIM pursuant to. the counter letter,.
had acted as the sole shareholder. There were
no voting trust agreements or shareholder
agreements to document that petitioner was
required to vote the 51 shares as a fiduciary
on behalf of his son or in the same manner
that his son voted his .shares.
Moreover,
petitioner's son did not testify as to his
control
over
the
51
shares
or
his
understanding with petitioner as to the
ownership of the 51 shares. The rule is well
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settled that failure of a party to introduce
evidence within his possession and which, if
true, would be favorable to him, gives rise to
the presumption that if produced it would be
unfavorable."
Wichita· Terminal Elevator Co.
v. Commissioner, 6 T.C. 1158, 1165 (1946),
affd. 162 F.2d 513 (10th Cir. 1947).

5.

~

-~
~

~-----.;;
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Exercise of Special Power of Appointment.
In TAM 9419007 the IRS found that a gift occurred upon

the exercise of an inter vivos power of appointment.

The facts,

which are very important, were these:
Under the facts as presented, in 1959, the
Grantor purportedly created eleven separate
trusts for the benefit of the members of the
family of M.
Each trust had an initial term
of 20 years. During the first 15 years of the
trust term, income was accumulated.
During
the next 5 years of the trust term, income was
paid for the support of a· designated older
generation family member.
·At the end of the 20-year term, each trust was
to be· held for the benefit of a designated
grandchild
of
N.
The
principal
and
accumulated income of each separate trust was
distributable to a designated grandchild when
he or she reached age 30.
If a grandchild
died before reaching age 30,
the trust
property otherwise distributable to him or her
was to be distributed instead to his bt her
issue, or·if none, to (or for the benefit of)
the other younger generation family members.
Between the end of the 20-year trust term and
the date that a respective grandchild reached
age 30, the income of the separate trust held
for that grandchild wa·s payable to him or her.
The provision creating this interest states:
As to any persons designated to receive
distributions
who shall be·· under- 30
. years of age at the end of the 60 month
period, instead of making distribution to such
person,
Trustee shall distribute to 'such
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person the net income from his trust until he
attains the age of 30, at which time Trustee
shall distribute to him all the accumulated
income fund, current income and any principal
then remaining in his trust.
[Emphasis
added. ]
Under the provisions of each separate trust,
each grandchild had a power of appointment,
labeled a "Limited Power of Appointment." The
power was exercisable at any time during the
grandchild's lifetime by written instrument or
at death by testamentary instrument.
Under
the "Limited Power of Appointment," each
grandchild could appoint "his interest in the
trust estate" to, or in trust for, certain
family members. The trust instrument states:
No power of appointment
shall be
exercised to any extent in favor of the Donee
of such power, his estate or for the benefit
of his creditor or the creditors of his
estate.
In 1980, when the Donor's grandchild was of majority age, but
not yet· 30, the Donor exercised the power of appointment in favor
of new trusts

for other beneficiaries.

The

IRS described the

Donor's property interests at that time, and the issue:
At the time that the powers of appointment
were
exercised,
the
Donor
(and
each
grandchild)
possessed:
1)
a contingent
remainder interest in a trust (which would
ripen into absolute ownership of the property
upon that grandchild's reaching age 30); and
2) the right to receive current trust income
until reaching age 30. The issue presented is
whether the Donor made a taxable gift when she
exercised the "Limited Power of Appointment,"
thus relinquishing these interests in favor of
the other family members.
The IRS position was that by exercising the power the Donor
relinquished valuable property rights, namely the right to income,
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and the contingent remainder.

The IRS refused to follow Self v.

::::
::l
q

United States, 142 F.Supp. 939 (ct. Cl. 1956) , as stated in Rev.

~

Rul.

79-327,

1979-2 C.B.

342.

Self involved the appointment of

~

principal which terminated an income interest.
The IRS relied on the U.S. Supreme Court opinion in Jewett v.
Commissioner, 455 U.S. 302 (1982) where the Court said:
[P]etitioner argues that the disclaimer ofa
contingent remainder is not a taxable event by
analogizing it to an exercise of a special
power of appointment, which generally is not
considered a taxable trans fer.
26 U. S . C.
§2514. As the Commissioner notes in response,
however, a disclaimant's control over property
more closely resembles a general power of
appointment, the exercise of which is a
taxable transfer . . . Unlike the holder of a
special power -- but like the holder of a
general power -- a disclaimant may decide to
retain the interest himself.
The donor argued that this passage was dictum, because,

in fact,

Jewett was decided primarily on other grounds.
If correct, the IRS position would transform the exercise of
many inter vivos special powers into gifts.

For example,

someone

for

can

receive

income

and

standards there could be a gift.
the

trust provides

for

the

principal

where

ascertainable

Is there a different result if

beneficiary to

receive

income

and

principal only if beneficiary does not exercise the special power
of appointment; in that event the "standard" has anticipated an
exercise?

What if distributions are purely discretionary?
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6.

Gift By Not Redeeming stock.

The

IRS

answered

the

following

question

in

the

affirmative in TAM 9420001:
For purposes of §2511 of the Internal Revenue
Code, did the taxpayer, as the sole voting
common shareholder, make taxable gifts to the
nonvoting preferred shareholders by failing to
have the corporation redeem the preferred
stock, if, as a result of the failure to
redeem the preferred stock, the preferred
stock became convertible into voting common
stock with a value in excess of the preferred
stock?
From 1964 until

1984

the preferred stock could have been

redeemed to prevent its conversion . . The IRS relied on Snyder v.
Commissioner, 93 T.C. 529 (1989), Rev. Rul. 89-3, 1989-1 C.B. 278,
and Rev. Rul. 84-105, 984-2 C.B. 197, to conclude, in general, that
"the taxpayer's failure to protect her economic interest resulted
in an indirect transfer to the other shareholders.

Consequently,

for purposes of the gift tax, the taxpayer is regarded as making an
indirect gift to the preferred shareholders."
7.

Value of Gift.

The Eighth Circuit, in O'Reilly v. Commissioner, 973 F.2d
1403

(8th Cir.

1992),

determined that

the valuation tables of

section 2512 should not apply in valuing an income interest in
closely-held
dividend.

shares

which,

historically;

had paid

a

miniscule

The Tax Court has now determined the proper value to be
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less than 10% of the fair market value of the shares.

Charles H.

~

O'Reilly, Sr., 67 TCM 1994-61.

8.

Promise To Make a Gift.
;:
:::5

Roberta Schreiber Ulmer, et. ale v. Commissioner, 67 TCM
1994-234, was a taxpayer victory in Tax Court.

~

The facts were

complex and involved IRS claims that gifts were made by means of
certain family agreements and bargain sales.

Of interest is the

court's discussion of the gift tax implications of promises to make
gifts:
The rule with regard to a promise to make a
gift has been well stated by the Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit, in Rosenthal
v. Commissioner [53-2 USTC ~1I10,908], 205 F.2d
505, 509 (,1953), revg. and remanding [Dec. 18,
681] 17 T.C. 1047 (1951):
"a binding promise
to make a gift becomes subject to gift
taxation in the year the obligation is
undertaken and not when the discharging
payments are made." That was the view of the
Tax Court in Rosenthal v. Commissioner [Dec.
18,681], 17 T.C. 1047 (1951), which was revd.
and remanded by the Court of Appeals for the
Second'Circuit [53-2 USTC CjIlO,908], 205 F.2d
505 (2d Cir. 1953), to determine whether the
binding promise in question was made in
consideration of the release of the taxpayer
from an earlier binding promise.
See also
Estate of Coply v. Commissioner, 15 T.C. 17,
20 (1950) (payments made' in 1946 and 1944,
pursuant to a binding contract (an antenuptial
agreement) entered into in 1931, were not
taxable as gifts in 1936 and 1944), affd. 194
F.2d 364 (7th Cir. 1952).

9.

Timing of Gift.
The Tax Court, in Estate of Larch M. Cummins, TCM 1993-

518, determined that funds transferred after the decedent's death
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by the decedent's stock broker to individuals named in a letter of
::::J

~

instruction were not completed gifts under applicable state law
(Oregon).

=1

decedent

The Irrevocable Letter of Instruction was signed by the
at

3:46 p.m.,

delivered to

the broker at

4:00 p.m.,

accepted by 4:30 p.m. by the broker, and the decedent died at 4:40
p.m.

The instructions were carried out the next day.

The court

rejected arguments that· the letter created a trust relationship
because the broker was not a designated trustee and the letter did
not transfer legal title to the broker.

And, the broker was not

the donees' agent because the letter created no obligation to the
donees directly.

!

~
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Section 2518 - Disclaimer
1.

Effective Date.

The U.S. Supreme Court has held that the disclaimer of a
remainder interest in a trust is subject to federal gift tax even
if the trust created before the enactment of the tax.
Irvine,

(U.S.

1994).

U.S. v.

Justice Souter stated the

issue to be:
In Jewett v. Commissioner,
455 U.S.
305
(1982), we construed the 1958 version of
Treasury Regulation §25.2511-1(c) to provide
that the disclaimer of a remainder interest in
a trust effects a taxable gift unless the
disclaimant acts within a reasonable time
after learning of the transfer that created
the interest. This case presents the question
whether the rule is the same, under current
Treasury
Regulation
§25.2511l(c) (2) (Regulation), when the creation of the
interest (but not the disclaimer) occurred
before enactment of the federal gift tax
provisions of the Revenue Act of 1932.
We
hold that it is.
In 1917 Mr. Ordway established a trust, which terminated in
1979

in

favor

descendants

of

of
a

Mr.

Ordway' s

deceased

living

grandchildren

grandchild).

Two

(and

months

the

after

termination a grandchild disclaimed; the disclaimer was valid under
applicable state law (Minnesota) because it was within 6 months of
the grandchild becoming indefeasibly vested in the interest.

The

IRS argued that the disclaimer was not within a reasonable time
after the grandchild learned of the interest.
reasonableness, the Court said:
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Wi th respect to
~

The opportunity to disclaim, and thereby to
avoid gift as well as estate taxation, should
not be so long as to provide a virtually
unlimited opportunity to consider estate
planning consequences.
While a decision to
disclaim even at the earliest opportunity may
be made with appreciation of potential estate
tax consequences, the passage of time puts the
prospective disclaimant in a correspondingly
superior position to determine whether her
need to enjoy the property (~nd incur a tax
for a subsequent gift of it or an increased
estate tax if she retains it) outweighs the
favorable estate and gift tax consequences of
a disclaimer.
Al though there is no bright
line rule for timeliness in the absence of a
statute or regulation providing one, Mrs.
Irvine's delay for at least 47 years after the
clock began running, until she reached age 68,
could not possibly be thought reasonable. By
the date of her disclaimer, Mrs. Irvine was in
a
position
to
make
a
fairly
precise
determination of the advantage to be gained by
a transfer diminishing her estate and its
eventual taxation.
If her decision were
treated as timely, the requirement for a
timely election would have no bite at all.

:.::::.J
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The Court rejected the taxpayer's arguments:
Even assuming the soundness of one or both of
these
arguments
that
the Regulation
is
inapposite, however, the disclaimer would not
escape federal gift taxation by reference to
state
law
rules
giving
effect
to
the
disclaimer as causing a transfer to the
beneficiary next in line. Any such reasoning
would run counter to our holding in Jewett.
2.

Devolution of Disclaimed Property.

TAM

9417002

reviewed Mississippi

disclaimer

law

and

discussed the consequences in light of no statutory provisions.
The

result was unfortunate

for

the

simple:
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taxpayer.

The

facts

were

The decedent died testate in 1989, a resident
of Mississippi.
under the decedent's Will,
her daughter, A, was named as the sole
beneficiary of the residue after the payment
of debts and expenses.
The Wtll further
provides that if A does not survive the
d.ecedent,
a specified percentage of the
decedent's stock in a close corporation will
pass to each of A's three children named in
the will and to A's spouse; the remaining
property will pass to A's children named in
the Will.
The Will contains no provision
concerning any beneficiary's disclaimer of an
interest or the lapse of an interest.
A
survived the decedent and was appointed
executor of the estate.

=

~
~j
~

;
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Within nine months after the decedent's death,
A executed a disclaimer of part of her
interest as sole residuary beneficiary in the
closely held shares.
The disclaimer recited
that, under the decedent's will, A is the
beneficiary of 48,162 shares of the stock and
that she was disclaiming any interest in
23,085 of the shares in that gift.
On the
same date, A's spouse executed a disclaimer,
reciting his
belief
that,
due
to A's
disclaimer, an interest in the disclaimed
. shares would pass to him under the decedent's
will and that he disclaimed that interest.
Both disclaimers were silent concerning any
possible intestate interests of either person
in the disclaimed property.
A,
as executor,
distributed all of the
disclaimed shares to her children named in the
will.
~\

The IRS determined that at common law disclaimed property
passed to intestate takers.
intestate taker.

The decedent's child,

A,

was the

Thus, there was a gift when A distributed the

assets to her children.
--J

~~
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The· intended

result

could

have

:'-1

~
~

disclaimed the intestate share too.

!

~

~
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been

achieved

if

A had

S.

Sections 2601-2654 - Generation-Skipping Transfer Tax
::....3

~

Grandfather Protection.

1.

s

PLR 9335005 held that a

judicial modification of two
-

,::

~----i

trusts

would

purposes.

not

affect

their

grandfathered

status

forGST

Among the trust assets were closely-held stock.

One of

the two trust remaindermen was actively involved with the closelyheld company.
to

make

a

The judicial modification would permit the trustee

non-pro

rata

distribution

of

the

trust

assets

at

termination so that the stock of the closely-held company would be
distributed to the remainderman who was active in the company.

The

other remainderman would receive other assets of equal value.

The

ruling notes this additional limitation on the trustee's power:
The trust as judicially modified will provide
that the power to make a non-pro rata
distribution must not allow the trustee to
affect the timing or fair market value of any
distribution.
Under the proposed modification, in selecting assets to be distributed
to E and F,
the trustee would not be
restricted by the liquidity, or the income tax
basis, of the assets being distributed, or the
acceptance or approval of the non-:-pro rata
distribution by the trust beneficiaries.

~
~

A -118

T.· . Sections 2701-2704 - Special Valuation Rules
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1.

Section 2701.

In T.D.

8536

(May 4,

1994)

a short final

regulation

relating to the mitigation of double taxation was issued.
2.

Section 2702.

A.

T.D. 8536 also eliminated the need to prorate the

first year's payment for GRATs and GRUTs, thereby simplifying the
valuation.
~.

As

interest

rates

increase,

personal

trusts become more attractive and GRATs less attractive.

=

~

.J
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residence

U.

Sections 4940 - 4947 -- Private Foundation Restriction.

=

d

stock Options.

1.

o-=l

PLR 9411018 allowed the contribution of stock options to
a

private

foundation

by

a

disqualified

person.

presented, and rulings given, were as follows:

The

facts

~
=-------1

'

M is an individual who owns approximately 81%
of the outstanding common stock of X and 100%
of the Series A preferred stock ofX.
Foundation is a nonprofit trust recognized by
the Internal Revenue Service as exempt from
tax under section 501 (c) (3) of the Internal
Revenue Code.
Foundation is also a private
foundation as defined in section 509(a) of the
Code. ,Both M and X are disqualified persons
with respect to Foundation.
M wishes to pledge stock options to Foundation
which provides Foundation with a];l option to
purchase XIS common stock at an option price
equal toM's mean per share cost basis in the
stock.
The pledge option is exercisable by
Foundation commencing on December 31, 1993
until twenty years from the 'date' of the
pledge.
Prior to the expiration of the stock options,
Foundation will transfer the stock options to
one or more unrelated charitable organizations
described in section 501 (c) (3) of the Code.
It is expected that the unrelated charitable
organizations will pay to Foundation a price
for the option equal to the diffe-rence between
the fair market value of the stock subject to
the option on the date of the transfer and the
exercise price of the option, less an agreedupon discount.
The unrelated charitable
organization will thereafter exercise the
option prior to its expiration date.

* * *
~-1

Based on the information submitted, we rule as
follows:
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1. The pledge of the stock options by M
to Foundation does not constitute an act of
self-dealing
between
Foundation
and
a
disqualified person under section 4941 of the
Code.

g
,;

~

~

2.
The exercise of the pledged stock
options by unrelated charitable organizations
to whom the options are transferred will not
consti tute
acts
of
self-dealing between
Foundation and a disqualified person under
section 4941 of the Code.
4. The pledged options will be excluded
from the assets
taken into
account
in
computing the amount of the minimum investment
return
or
Foundation
for
purposes
of
determining the tax on failure to distribute
income under section 4942 of the Code.
5.
Gains form the sales of the options
by
Foundation
to
unrelated
charitable
organizations will not be treated as net
investment income of Foundation under section
4940 of the Code.
6.
Gains from Foundation's sale of
options to unrelated charitable organizations
will be excluded from unrelated business
taxable income under section 512(b) (5).
2.

Charitable Lead Trusts and Private Foundations.

The Ninth Circuit has upheld the Tax Court in The Ann
Jackson Family Foundation v. Commissioner,
The issue,

as the court presented it,

(1994).

was whether Treas.

Reg.

§53.4942(l)-2(b) (2) was invalid because inconsistent with section
4942(e)

of the Internal Revenue Code.

The court's analysis was

straightforward:

~

By placing the amended statute [amended in
1981] alongside the unrevised regulation, the
difference between the two becomes obvious:
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Under the statute, "distributable amount" is
effectively limited to a maximum cf 5% of the
fair market value of a foundation's own
assets,
while
the
regulation
defines
"distributable amount" as beginning with that
same 5%, then adding thereto the income
portion of trusts (which the IRS seeks to have
here defined as included the Trust's entire
corpus) .
In short, the regulation seeks to
include all of the Trusts's assets in those of
the Foundation.
(Footnote omitted.)
Thus, charitable lead trusts become very helpful as ways to
fund a family foundation.
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V.

Tax Admdnistration

"'-""'1

~
~
~
,

1.

Section 6501 - Six Year Gift Tax Statute of Limitations.

Section 6501(e) (2)

provides that if a gift tax return

~

- }

omits from total gifts an item or items in excess of 25 percent of
the amount of total gifts, gift tax may be assessed within 6 years
after the filing of the return.

In Estate of Robinson v. Comm'r,

101 T.C. 33, the court rejected the IRS position that the section
applied to ~ a return in which the donor claimed excessive annual
exclusions:

~

=j

-.J

-]
::::J
r:::1

The 6-year period of limitations found in
section 6501(e) (2) does not apply in the
instant
gift· tax
case because
decedent
reported the correct values of all gifts she
made during 1983 on her 1983 Federal gift tax
return.
There was no omission from total
gifts of an item or items in excess of 25
percent of the amount of total gifts reported
by decedent on her 1983 gift tax return.
Assuming, without deciding, for the purpose of
the instant case, that claiming more annual
exclusions
that
allowable
under
section
2503 (b) would lead to our holding that an
omission from the total amount of gifts
occurred for purposes of section 6501 (e) (2),
the gift tax returns filed by decedent made no
such omission.
As stated above, section
6501(e) (2) provides that items which are
adequately disclosed are not taken into
account in determining the amount omitted from
total gifts.
The Federal gift tax. returns
filed by decedent stated the number of annual
exclusions being claimed and,
therefore,
adequately apprised the Commissioner of the
specific number of annual exclusions claimed
by decedent.
Indeed, respondent does not
argue
that
decedent
did not
adequately
disclose the annual exclu~ions b~irig claimed.
Consequently, the exclusions are not to be
taken into account for purposes of determining
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the amount omitted from total gifts for
purposes of section 6501 (e) (2), and the 6-year
period of
limitations
found
in
section
6501 (e) (2) is not applicable to the 1983 gift
tax year.

;]

2.

Section 6324 (b) - Gift Tax Lien.

In Ripley v. Commissioner, 102 T.C. No. 26
court held that

the gift tax lien of section

(1994), the

6324 (b)

was

not

subject to usual deficiency procedures (e.g 90 day letter, etc.).
The court described the operation of section 6324 as follows:
In sum, section 6324(b) provides that where a
donor fails to pay Federal gift tax for
particular period for which a gift tax return
was filed, a special 10-year lien attached to
all gifts made by the donor during that period
and the donees of such gifts are personally
liable for the tax. Further, should the donee
transfer the gifted property to a purchaser or
security interest holder, the lien does not
remain on the transferred property but a like
lien attaches to the donee's other property,
including after-acquired property.
The court relied on the regulations issued under section 6324:
Application of lien imposed by section
The general lien under section 6321 and
the special lien under subsection (a) or (b)
of section 6234 for the estate or gift tax are
not
excl usi ve
of
each
other,
but
are
cumula ti ve.
Each lien will arise when the
conditions precedent to the creation of such
lien are met and will continue in accordance
wi th
the
provisions
applicable
to
the
particular lien.
Thus, the special lien may
exist without the general lien being in force,
or the general lien may exist without the
special lien being in force, or the general
lien
and
the
special
lien
may
exist
simultaneously, depending upon the facts and
p~rtinent statutory provisions applicable to
the respective liens.
(d)

6321.

A - 124

__ :1

three year gift tax statute of iimitations expired, under section

~

~

6501(a), without an audit by the IRS.

On April 13, 1992, the IRS

sent to the grandchildren notices of transferee liability for a
deficiency in the O'Neals' gift tax liability.
~_o-A

The gift tax issue

was picked up by the IRS because Mrs. O'Neal died in 1988, and the
gift tax returns were reviewed as part of the estate tax audit.
The Tax Court stated the issues as follows:
The issues for decision are: (1) whether a
donee/transferee ca~be held liable at law as
a
donee/transferee
for
gift
tax
and
generation-skipping
transfer
. tax
when
respondent failed to assert the deficiency
against the donor prior to the running of the
statute of limitations against the donor; (2)
whether, in accordance with section 6910,
notice of liability was properly sent to
petitioners; and (3) whether section 2504(c)
precludes respondent from challenging the
value used by the donors in reporting the
gifts when the period of limitations for
assessment against the donors has expired.
The court analyzed the first issue in this way:
Section 2501 imposes a tax on the transfer of
property by gift.
An additional tax on a
generation-skipping transfer is imposed by
section 2601.· A generation-skipping transfer
is defined to include transfers of property
from a grandparent to a grandchild.
Secs.
2611, 2612 and 2613.
The
second
sentence
of
section
6324 (b)
provides that if the gift tax or generationskipping transfer tax is not paid when due,
the donee is personally liable for the gift
tax or the generation skipping transfer tax to
the
extent of the value of the
gift.
Mississippi Valley Trust Co. v. Commissioner,
147 F.2d 186, 187-188 (8th Cir. 1945), affg. a
Memorandum Opinion of this Court. In Fletcher
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Trust Co. V. Commissioner, 141 F.2d 36, 40
(7th Cir. 1944), affg. 1 T.C. 798 (1943), the
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, in
affirming
our
decision,
held
that
the
predecessor
to
section
6324(b)
imposed
liability at law upon a donee. See also Bauer
V. Commissioner, 145 F.2d 338 (3d Cir. 1944)
affg. 2 T.C. 1916 (1943).
There are no
requirements that respondent first assert a
deficiency against a donor or that other steps
be
taken
to
collect
from
the
donor.
Mississippi Valley Trust Co. v. Commissioner,
supra at 188; Moore v. Commissioner, 1 T.C.
14, 15 (1942), affd. 146 F.2d 824 (2d Cir.
1945) .
Likewise, there is not requirement
under section 6324(b) that the period of
limitations on assessment of tax against the
donor has not expired.
I f the tax "is not
paid when due," the dOnee is personally liable
for the tax to the extent of the gift under
section 6324(b).

~

~

""'=--j"

The fact of the personal liability of the.
donee "at law" distinguishes this case and
similar cases from those cases such as
Commissioner v. Stern, 257 U.S. 39 (1958),
whether respondent was required to show
liabili ty of the transferee in equity under
State law.
cases such as Ste:cn have no
applicability to the instant case.
No matter what the reason for the donor's
failure to pay the tax when due, the donee is
liable for the tax to the extent of the value
of the Gift. Mississippi Valley Trust Co. v.
Commissioner, supra at 187-188.
That the
reason for the donor's not paying the tax when
due was that no deficiency had been determined
against the donor before the period of
limitations for assessment against the donor
expired is immaterial.
The only requirement
is that there be tax due with respect to the
gift which remains unpaid.
With respect to the second issue, the court noted that section
6901(c) gives the IRS one year after the limitations period against
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the donor runs to assess the donees.
met.

Thus, the time periods were

The court also rejected the application of section 2504(c)

saying:
Section 2504(c) does not limit how respondent
values a gift of the current year. It limits
the valuation for a prior year where the time
within which "a tax may be assessed under this
chapter" for the year has expired.
Here, we
have held that the time to assess the gift tax
for the year would have not expired as to the
transferee. Section 2504(c) limits how a gift
from a preceding calendar year is valued for
assessment of the gift tax for a subsequent
calendar year.
In the present case, the
asserted deficiency is for the 1987 calendar
year, and the gifts took place during 1987.
Since the gifts are not gifts from a calendar
period preceding the year in issue,
the
valuation of the gifts is not restricted by
section 2;504 (c) .
4.

Renunciation; Effect on Section 6321.

In U.S. v.
Cir.

1994),

Comparato,

the court held that once

F.3d

(2d

liens attach to property

interests to be received by taxpayers from an estate, under section
6321, a subsequent renunciation of the property interests by the
taxpayers will not defeat the liens even if the renunciation is
retroactive under applicable state law to before the date of the
IRS assessments against the taxpayers.
5.

Retroactivity of Tax Changes.

In United States v. Carlton,

U.S.

(1994),

Justice Blackmun delivered the unanimous judgment of the Court that
the 1987 repeal of a 1986 estate tax provision giving special tax
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treatment to sales to ESOPs, which harmed a taxpayer who made use
of the provision before repeal, did not violate the Fifth Amendment
of the Constitution.
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Potential Forthcoming Developments
1.,

=:3
~

Reportedly,

Fiduciary Income Tax Rates.

effo'rts are'

being made to have the income tax rates on trusts and estates
lowered to the rates
separately.

that apply to married individuals

filing

The Daily Tax Reporter (May 23, 1994) notes efforts by

the AICPA Tax Division, the American Bankers Association Taxation
Committee,

and the ABA Taxation and Real Property,

Trust Law, 'Sections, and ACTEC.

.,!

Probate and

If successIul, the top tax rate

for a trust or estate would begin above $125,000 .
Regulations.

2.

Comments of Richard Grosebauer

(Branch

Chief, Office of Assistant Chief Counse'l, Passthroughs and Special
Industries) before ABA Tax Sect,ion on May 13.
A.
fact,

Section 7520 - final regulations expected soon (in

issued· on

June

10,

1994;

see

Appendix

C for

copy

and

comments) .
B.

Section 2056A -- proposed regulations expected by

October (QDOTs).
C.

Section

proposed

2518

regulation

relating

to

timing in light of the u.S. Supreme Court's decision in J. Irvine,
and clarifying rules about disclaimers of joint property.
:=J

J

D.

Section 2056 - proposed regulations relating to the

mari tal deduction "specific portion" requirements and annuities
expected, maybe, in early 1995.

~
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E.

..
"'"
""i!

Generally working on some section 2032A issues and
-=---:]

Chapter 14 issues .

~

3.

IRS Wish List.

This Wish List has now been widely circulated (e.g., 1994
Heckerling Estate Planning Institute; Practical Drafting) .
IRS "Wish List" of Transfer Tax Changes

The following list of suggested transfer tax changes prepared
by personnel in the IRS National Office as distributed at a June
1993 IRS meeting in Austin, Texas:
a.

Amend section 2053(a) (2) to disallow a deduction for any

interest expense accruing to the estate after the decedent's death.
b.

Amend section 2503(b) to provide that an annual exclusion

is not allowable for a gift to a donee unle.ss it is certain that
the donee will eventually receive the gift property.
c.

Amend section 2519 of the Code to provide that, to the

extent that there is an underfunding of a disposition establishing
a QTIP interest for a surviving spouse,

the underfunded portion

will be deemed a gift made by the surviving spouse.

The statute of

limitations would not begin to run on this gift until the later of
the date it is reported in full or the date that the estate tax
return of the surviving spouse is filed.
d.

Amend

section

2519

of

the

Code

to

provide

that

the

purchase by the surviving spouse (or donee spouse) of the remainder
interest in property subject to a QTIP election is deemed to be a

A - 131

gift

of

the

amount

of

the

purchase

price.

The

statute

of

~

a

limitations would not begin to run on this gift until the later of

J
:i

the date it is reported in full or the date that the estate tax

~

return of the surviving spouse is filed.
e.

Amend section 2652 (a) (3)

to permit the estate of the

decedent to elect to treat all ora portion of the property in a
QTIP trust as if the election to be ·treated as QTIP had not been
made.
fo

Add new

se~tion

2047 to provide that if an individual

[who could be the grantor or beneficiary] has a power to remove and
replace a trustee, then that individual shall be deemed to pos·sess
the powers of the trustee.
g.

HR 11 section 4702 would amend section 2035 of the Code

by clarifying the present language.
h.

Amend the present section 2035(d) (2)

to provide that a

life insurance policy issued within three. years of the decedent's
death is includible in the gross estate even if the decedent did
not technically own the incidents of ownership in the policy prior
to death.
i.

Amend section 2039(a) to provide that s.urvivor benefits

payable pursuant to an employer's nonqualifiedbenefi t

plan are

treated as payable under the same contract or agreement as the
benefits payable under the employer's qualified pension plan.

d
E"l
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j.
~

Amend the estate, gift and generation-skipping transfer

tax provisions of the Code to limit the application or minority

9

discounts when valuing transfers of minority interests in closely
held corporations among family members.
k.

Amend

2056 (d) (5) (i)

sections

2056 (d) (2) (B) ,

2056(d) (4) (A)

. and

to clarify that the .acts required by these relief

provisions must be completed before the estate tax return is filed
and no later than one year after the due date for the return.
1.

Amend section 2056 (d) (3)

to provide specific rules for

allowance of the section 2013 credit for prior transfers for the
estate of the surviving alien spouse.
m.

Amend section 2056 to provide that,

to the extent that

property passing to the surviving spouse exceeds $3,000,000, the
marital deduction is limited to one-half of the value so passing.
n.

Amend section 2604 of the Code to repeal the credit for

certain state generation-skipping transfer taxes (GSTT).
o.

Amend

section

2612

to

clarify

that

any

generation-

skipping transfer that meets the definition of a direct skip and
the definition of a

taxable termination shall be defined as

a

direct skip.

tax

p.

Amend section 6163 to provide for the deferral of estate

that

is

attributable

to

the

inclusion of an annuity in a

decedent's gross estate.
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q.

Add a new section 7872 A to provide for the valuation of

rl

~
~

loan guarantees for purposes of chapters 11 and 12.

,i
-

'

4
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x.

Miscellaneous state Cases of Interest

In Matter of Estate of Laschkewitsch, 507 N.W.2d 65 (N.D.

1.

1993), the court denied a claim filed in the state of ancillary
probate, even though the claim related to repairs made on property
in the ancillary state, because the claimant had actual knowledge
of the domiciliary probate.
2.

In Lansburgh v. Lansburgh, 632 A.2d 221

a trust terminated at the death of husband,

(Md. App. 1993),

with the remaining

assets to be divided with husband's widow receiving the amount she
would have received had the trust been part of husband's estate at
his death.
trust

was

Husband was a domiciliary of Texas at his death; the
created

and

administered

in

Maryland.

The

court

concluded Maryland law would control.
3.

Burch v. George, 866 P.2d 92 (Cal. 1994), dealt with the

application of community property claims, and ERISA preemption, to
in terrorem clauses.
Ii tigate

certain

The surviving spouse wanted to be free to

community property claims,

and ERISA claims,

without being subject to the clause; the court said no.
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Kentucky Developments.

Copy

New Health Care Surrogate-and Living Will Statute.

1.

attached as Appendix D.
The new Act is a clear improvement over the prior legislative
efforts.
a.

There are a number of potential issues however.
The term

What is its effect on non-Kentucky documents?

"advance directive" applies to "any other document that provides
direction relative to health care to be provided to the person
executing the

document."

Yet,

section

3 (2)

provides

that

an

"advance directive" must be executed in a particular manner.

What

about

this

those

executed

in

other

states

that

do

not

meet

requirement?
b.

grantor

Precedence.

has

Assume that in the Living Will Directive the

authorized

the

withholding

or

withdrawal

of

artificially provided food, water, or other artificially provided
nourishment or fluids.
subservient

to,

the

Does that take precedence over, or is it
provisions

of

section

5 (3)

setting

forth

specific circumstances under which a health care surrogate may
authorize a withdrawal or withholding of artificially provided
nutrition and hydration?

Section 2 provides that a directive must

be honored even if there is no health care surrogate.

This should

not mean that you are better off in certain circumstances not to
have a health care surrogate.
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c.

it

sets

Effectiveness.

forth

the

The Living Will Djrective provides that

grantor is

wishes

regarding

"life-prolonging

treatment and artificially provided nutrition and hydration to be
provided to me if I

no longer have decisional capacity,

terminal condition, or become permanently unconscious.
the lack of decisional capacity alone a triggering event?

have a

"

Is

Or,

is

it tied to having a terminal condition or becoming permanently
unconscious?

Presumably the latter was intended,

but the exact

wording of the statute is confusing.
d.

Terminal

The

Condition.

definition

of

"terminal

condition" is a condition which "to a reasonable degree of medical
probabili ty,"

as

certified

in

certain

ways,

is

incurable

and

irreversible and will result in death within a relatively short
time, and where the application of life-prolonging treatment would
serve only to artificially prolong the dying process.

What about

conditions which would otherwise be terminal -- that is they are
incurable,

irreversible

and

will

relatively

short

but

which

application

of

time,

life-prolonging

result
are

in
not

treatment

death

within

affected
but

only

a

by

the

by

the

application of artificial nutrition and hydration?
e.

Life-prolonging

treatment.

The

definition of

"life-

prolonging treatment" is any medical action which uses mechanical
or other artificial means to sustain, prolong, restore, or supplant
a spontaneous vital function and when administered to a patient
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would

serve

only to

prolong

the

Is

dying process.

there

an
-

~

accepted meaning to "prolong the dying process?"
Determination

f.

condition.

of

permanently unconscious

or

terminal

Both the definition of "permanently unconscious" and

"terminal condition" require a determination to a reasonable degree
of medical probability, and provide that such will be determined
solely

by

physician.

the

patient's

attending

physician

and

one

other

Presumably, to determine a terminal condition,. it is

not necessary to have the other physician clinically examine the
individual, because the phrase "on clinical examination" is present
in the definition of permanently unconscious,
condition.

Is that intentional?

Can a person's
Generally,

but not terminal

attending physician be changed?

By whom?

that would be part of a health care decision-making

process so that a health care surrogate could change the attending
physician.

Th~

phrase "attending physician" is defined as "the

physician who has primary responsibility for the treatment and care
of the patient."
Is it intended that the determination of whether someone is in
a permanently unconscious state or has a terminal condition is not
to be subject to review by (1) the health care provider, or (2) the
courts.

Section 7 (2)

provides that a physician or health care

facility which refuses to comply with an advance directive may not
impede the transfer of the patient to another physician or health
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care facility which will comply.

3
.=
d

attending physician has
surrogate

_--=---=3

directed,

no

for

This could create a paradox.

duty to

example,

to

comply with
withdraw

a

An

health care

life

prolonging

treatment if there is no terminal condition (because the attending
physician has decided that there is not a terminal condition).
But,

if another physician would decide that there is a terminal

condition, then presumably the statute intends the second att!=nding
physician to take over.
Execution.

9 .

two

or· more adults

The Advance Directive must be witnessed by
in the presence of the Grantor and in the

presence of each other, or acknowledged before a Notary Public, and
the statute sets forth a number of people who cannot be witnesses.
That would appear to mean that the Notary replaces the witnesses,
not that the witnesses have either to be in the presence of the
Grantor and the presence of each other, or the witnesses have to be
acknowledged by the Notary.
relative, etc.?

If

so,

can the Notary be a blood

Ordinarily you would think "yes" because of the

literal language of the statute.

However, the statute specifically

provides that an employee of a health care facility in which the
grantor is a patient cannot be a witness,
Public.

but Gan be a Notary

The safest path would appear to be to have two witnesses

and a Notary, like a Will.
h.

~

surrogate

Withdrawal of nutrition and hydration.
may

authorize

the

withdrawal
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A health care

or' withholding

of

artificially

provided

nutrition

and

hydration

circumstances, some of which are interesting.
inevitable death is imminent."

in

certain

The first is "when

For that purpose, the statute says

the phrase means when death is expected within a few days, and that
the determination is to be made "by reasonable medical judgment."
There is none of the attending physician/second physician language
that the statute provides elsewhere.

The second is "when a patient

is in a permanently unconscious state if the grantor has executed
an advance directive" authorizing the withholding or withdrawal.
Presumably that means that the health care surrogate can authorize
a withdrawal or withholding of artificially provided nutrition and
hydration at any time when inevitable death is imminent, regardless
of what the Grantor has said,

assuming that the Grantor has not

said anything contrary, but only if the Grantor is in a permanently
unconscious state if the Grantor has executed an Advance Directive.
In the so called "Karen Ann Quinlan situation," the person would be
in a permanently unconscious state, but would not have executed an
Advance Directive.
circumstance.

The same would be true in a DeGrella or similar

Of course,the statute says that "may authorize" in

the following circumstances and does not rule out authorizing in
other circumstances.
i.
statute

Pregnancy.

returns

to

Is that important?
The pregnancy provision is of interest.
the

reasonable

degree

standard but with subtle differences.
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of medical

The

certainty

The reasonable degree of

medical certainty must be certified on the woman's medical chart by
the intending physician and one other physician who has examined
the woman.

Is the change intentional?

The statute goes on to

provide that nutrition and hydration will be provided to a pregnant
woman unless, in accordance with that reasonable degree of medical
certainty, the procedures will not maintain the woman in a way to
permit the continuing development live birth of the unborn child,
or will be physically harmful to the woman, or will prolong severe
pain which cannot be alleviated by medication.
provision

of

artificial

harmful to the woman?

nutrition

When would the

and hydration be physically

Further, the statute already suggests that

artificial nutrition and hydration cannot be withdrawn if it is
needed for the comfort or relief of pain (section 4(3) (d))
j.

Applicability.

2 provides

that

an

This Act only applies to adults.

adult with decisional

written living will directive.

Section

capacity may make

a

Section 6 provides what happens to

an adult patient who does not have decisional capacity but who has
not executed an advance directive or who has not executed one which
is directed if a decision must be made.

A potential problem with

section 6 would be for a person who has multiple children, and no
spouse,

and no

guardian,

because

the

decisions

are made

by a

majority of the adult children who are reasonably available for
consultation.
mean?

What does

reasonably available

for

consultation

If a person has no guardian, spouse, adult child or parent,

A -141

the person

falls

into

a

catchall which

is

the

nearest

living

relative of the patient, or, if more than one relative of the same
-

relation, a majority of the nearest living relatives, again using
the reasonably available consultation standard.

~

The statute provides that more than one health care surrogate
may be designated, and that the health care surrogate(s) will act
by unanimous decision unless a designation provides otherwise.

Yet

the statute earlier provided for a majority of children to serve.
Thus,

the

statute

does

not

choose

a

clear

policy

when

the

provisions of section 6(1) have in line the parents of the patient,
does it require the parents to act unanimously or not?

By the way,

it also does not say the parents who are reasonably available, or
if one declines to act, can the other act?
k.

Section 9 contains interesting provisions.

Presumptions.

Section 4 provides that the Act will not create a presumption
concerning the intention of an adult who has revoked or has not
executed an Advance Directive with respect to the use, withholding,
withdrawal of a life-prolonging treatment if a terminal condition
exists.

Does that mean there is a presumption if the person is

permanently unconscious?
intended.

Surely that is not what the Legislature

Also, should there be an inference from the fact that a

person has revoked an Advance Directive?
2.

Real

Appendix E.

Estate

Transfer Tax statute.

In general,

Copy attached as

transfers for estate planning purposes

~,

_=J

~

;::]I
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(e.g., to a revocable trust agreement or personal residence trust)
are protected.
3.
App.,

Lilly v. Citizens Fidelity Bank and Trust Company, Ky.
859 S.W.

facts,

that the

2d 666

(1993).

The court held,

law in effect when a

on complicated

testator died controlled

whether a power of appointment was exercised, not the law at the
time the power was created.

Further, a power of appointment may be

exercised in favor of a trust, absent a limitation in the power, as
long as the trust beneficiaries are objects of the power.

4.

Everly v.

Wright,

Ky. App.,

872 S.W.2d 95

(1993)

A

widow who had never been appointed personal representative could
not bring a wrongful death action.
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IRS NEWS RELEASE 93-121 (12/21/93)
AND PROPOSED REGULATIONS (5/26/94)
REQUIREMENT FOR CHARITABLE CONTRIBUTIONS
TO BE SUBSTANTIATED BY WRITTEN ACKNOWLEDGEMENT
FROM CHARITY

[, 7222)

IDtem&l Revenue Hew. IteIeue 93-121. December 21. 1993.

(CodeSec& 170md6lJS)
Charitable caatribw:iooa: R.nesaue RecoaciUatiOD Act of 1993.-Tbe IRS baa provided
cuidmce to charities IUd iDdi'9idua1l for compliance with the n_ requirementa for doaatiolw
0\'eI" S250 &ad quid pro quo caatribudoaa impoeed by the Rrlenae Reconciliation Act oil993 in
New Public:atioo 1771. Charitable Coatrihationa-Sut.watiatioo aDd DiaclOlVl RequiremeatL
18S2.051Jlcl5Ol4A.05.
Back
This statement must give a good faith estiinate
Charities have a new substantiation J"eQUiRment for certain contributions they receive OIl or: of the value of the goods and service5 plus inform
the donor that the charitable ded,1,ICti0ll iJ.liinited
after January I, 1994, due to the Omnibus Budset
Reconciliation Act'of 1993.
to the amount of the payment in u.cas of the
value of the goods and services provided. for
eJaDlple, if a penon gives a charity $100 aDd
To usi.st tharities in comp1yina1riththele new
rs:eives in exchanse & $40 din.qer, the charity
~ the IRS IIudeveloped new Publication
must inform the donor in writing that the dinner
1171, Chari~1e Cootributiont-Substantiatioo
was valued .at $40 and only the portion of the
and Disclosure Requiremenu. The IRS aid it is
payment exc:eediDs tbe value 0( the dinner, $60,
mailing tliis pu&licatioa to over ~OOkharities
qualifies u a ~haritable contribution.
in December 1993.
A written statement is DOt required if the &OOds

refereoces:,

Besinnins January I, clwities reeeiviiJ« payments described IS' "quid pro quo caBtributiens,"
in excess of $75, must provide a wriftell statement
to the doooI. A qWd pro quo contributa-.iI ODe in
which .part of the J1!ly¥l .~ for sooda or ~
received and part is a contribuUoe... .
2

If section l(Xl2(d)-

Tedurica.l

o(tiae"Tu

Carnctioal-~·

~. Ud

at 1993, H..;R. 3419, 103d

or services provided by the orPruzatiOll are de
. minimis,. token gpod.s or services, or an intan&ible

reli&ious ~t.
The responsibilitY. for providing disclosure
statements for quid pro quo contrlbutioes fillet
$75 rests with the charity. The t~ty Dust pro92-lOZ (immodifled) wauId be ~ ler ta ,....
beciJmin&.in 1993~
..'

Cq., 1st Sesa., is enacted, SectiCIIl 7· of 1CeY. PnE.
Cll994. Commerce a-riaC'
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New Developmenta-Rulings

vide the statement in connection with either the
solicitation or the receipt of the contribution. A
penalty of $10 per contribution can be imposed on
the charity for each failure to provide the reo
quired statement.

Donor', Subauntilltion

10,041-21
R~uirrnnenu

Documenting Certain Charitable Contribu·
tionl.-Beginning January 1, 1994, no deduction
will be allowed under section 170 of the Internal
Revenue Code for any charitable contribution of
$250 or more unless the donor has contemporaneCharities also need to be aware of a new change
ous written substantiation from the charity. In
affecting contributors. For charitable contribucases where the charity has provided goods or
tions of $250 or more made after Dec. 31, 1993,
services to the donor in exchange for making the
the· donor is not allowed a deduction unless the
contribution, this contemporaneous written acgift is acknowledged by the charity in writing.
knowledgement must· include a good faith estiAlso, the donor must obtain the acknowledgement
rna te of the value of such goods or services. Thus,
by the earlier of the date the return is filed or the
taxpayers may no longer rely solely on a cancelled
due date of the return. including any extensions.
check to substantiate a cash contribution of $250
or more.
The acknowledgement must contain the
The substantiation must be "contemporaneous."
amount of the cash or check and a description of
That is, it must be obtained by the donor no later
any noncash propeny contributed. It must state
than the date the donor actually files a return for
whether the charity provided any goods or serthe tax year in which the contribution was made.
vices in return for the contribution. If so, it must
also include a description and good faith estimate If the return is filed after the due date or extended due date. then the substantiation must
of the val ue of the goods or services or, if the goods
have been obtained by the due date or extended
and services consist solely of intangible religious
due date.
benefits, a statement to that effect.
The responsibility for obtaining this substantiaA copy of Publication 1771 is attached.
tion lies with the donor, who must request it from
the charity. The charity is not required to record
Publication 1771
or report this information to the IRS on behalf of
donors.
C1ari~ble Contributio~ul¥untiation
and Disclosure Requiremenr.
The legislation provides that substantiation will
not be required if, in accordance with regulations
UNDER THE NEW LAW. CHARITIES
prescribed by the Secretary, the charity reports
WILL NEED TO PROVIDE NEW KINDS
directly to the IRS the information required to be
OF INFORMATION TO DONORS. Failure
provided in the written substantiation. At preto do so may result in denial of deductions to
sent, there are no regulations establishing pr0cedonors and the imposition of penalties on charidures for direct reporting by charities to the IRS
ties.
of charitable contributions made in 1994. Consequently. charities and donors should be pr~pared
Legislation signed into law by the President on
to provide/obtain the described substantiation for
August 10, 1993. contains a number of significant
1994 contributions of $250 or more.
provisions affecting tax~xempt charitable organiunions described in section 501(cX3) of the Inter- There is no prescribed format fOf" the written
nal Revenue Code. These provisions include: (1)
acknowledgement. For exam~, letten, postcards
new substantiation requirements for donors, and
or computer·generated forms may be acceptable.
(2) new public disclosure requirements for chari· The acknowledgement does not have to include
ties (with potential penalties for failing to com·
the donor's social security or tax identification
ply). Additionally, charities should note that
number. It must, however, provide sufficient in·
donors could be penalized by loss of the deduction
formation to substantiate the amOWlt of the deif they fail to substantiate. THE SUBST ANTI· ductible contribution. The acknowledgement
ATION AND DISCLOSURE PROVI· should note the amount of any cash contribution.
SIONS APPLY TO CONTRIBUTIONS
However, if the donation is in the form of propMADE AFTER DECEMBER 31. 1993.
erty, then the acknowledgement must describe,
but need not value. such property. Valuation of
Charities need to familiarize themselves with
the donated property is the responsibility of the
these tax law changes in order to briq themselves
into compliance. This Publication alerts you to donor.
the new provisions affecting tax-exempt charita· The written substantiation should also note
ble organizations. Set forth below are brief de- whether the donee organization provided any
scriptions of the new law's key provisiOns. The
goods or services in considera tion, in whole or in
Internal Revenue Service plans to provide further
pan, for the contribution and, if so, must provide
Ij;uidance in the near future.
a description and good-faith estimate of the value
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New Developmenta-Rulinp

of the goods or services. In the new law these are
referred to as "quid pro quo contributions."
Please note that there is a new law requiring
charities to furnish disclosure statements to donors for such quid pro quo donations in excess of
$75. This is addressed in the next section regarding Disclosure by Charity.
If the goods or services consist entirely of intangible religious benefits, the statement should indicate this, but the statement need not describe or
provide an estimate of the value of these benefits.
"Intangible religious benefits" are also discussed
in the following section on Disclosure by Charity.
If, on the other hand, the donor received nothing
in return for the contribution, the written substantiation must so state.
The present law remains in effect that, generally,
if the value of' an item or group of like items
exceeds $5,000, the donor must obtain a qualified
appraisal and submit an appraisal summary with
the return claiming the deduction.
The organization may either provide separate
statements for each contribution of $250 or more
from a taxpayer, or furnish periodic statements
substantiating contributions of $250 or more.
Separate payments are. regarded as independent
contributions and are not aggregated for purposes
of measuring the $250 threshold. However. the
Service is authorized to establish anti-abuse rules
to prevent avoidance of the substantiation requirement by taxpayers writing separate smaller
checks on the same date.
If donations are made through payroll deductions,
the deduction from each paycheck is regarded as a
separate payment..
A charity that knowingly provides false written
substantiation to a donor may be subject to the
penalties for aiding and abetting an understatement of tax liability under section 6701 of the
Code.

Disclosure by Charity of Reaript of Quid Pro
Quo Contribution
Beginning January I, 1994, under new section
6115 of the Internal Revenue Code, a charitable
organIzation must provide a written disclosure
statement to donors who make a payment, de.
scribed as a "quid pro quo contiibution," in excess
of $75. This requirement is separate from the
written substantiation required for deductibility
purposes as discussed above. While, in cenain
circumstances, an organization may be able to
meet both requirements with the same written
document, an organization must be careful to
satisfy the section 6115 written disclosure statement requirement in a timely manner because of
the penalties involved.

~
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A quid pro quo contribution is a payment made
partly as a contribution and panly for goods or
services provided to the donor by the charity. An
example of a quid. pro quo contribution is where
the donor gives a charity $100 in consideration for
a concert ticket valued at $40. In this example,
$60 would be deductible. Because the donor's payment (quid pro' quo contribution) exceeds $75, the
disclosure statement must be furnished, even
though the deductible amount does not exceed
$75.
Separate payments of $75 or less made at different times of the year for separate fundraising
events will not be aggregated for purposes of the
$75 threshold. However, the Service is authorized
to develop anti-abuse rules to prevent avoidance
of this disclosure requirement in situations such
as the writing of multiple checks for the same
transaction.
The required written disclosure statement
must:
(1) inform the donor that the amount of the
contribution that is deductible for federal income
ta)!: purposes is limited to the excess of any money
(and the value of any property other than money)
contributed by the donor over the value of goOds
or services provided by the charity. and

(2) provide the donor with a good-faith estimate
of the value of the goods or services that the donor
received.
The charity must furnish the statement in connec·
tion with either the solicitation or the receipt of
the quid pro quo contribution. If the disclosure
statement is furnished in connection with a particular ~licitation, it is not necessary for the
organization to provide another statement when
the associated contribution is actually received.
The disclosure must be in writing and must be
made in a manner that is reasonably likely to
come to the attention of the donor. For eumple, a
disclosure in small print within a larger document
mi6.~t not meet this requirement.
In the foUowiB« three circumstances, the discl~
sure statement is not required.
(1) Where the only goods or services given to a
donor meet the standards for "insubstantial
value" set out in section 3.01, paracraph 2 of Rev.
Proc. 90-12, 1990-1 C.B. 471, as amplified by
section 2.01 of Rev. Proc. 92-49, 1992-1 CoB. 987
(or 'any updates or revisions thereof);
(2) Where there is no donative element involved in a particular transaction wjth a charity,
such as in a typical museum gift shop sale.
(3) Where there is only an intangible religious
benefit provided to the donor. The intallgible reo

~7222
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10,041-23

~

the required disclosure in connection with a quid
ligious benefit must be provided to the donor by
an organization organized exclusively for religious . pro quo contribution of more than $75, there is a
penalty of $10 per contribution, not to exceed
purposes, and must be of a type that generally is
not sold in a commercial transaction outside the
$5,000 per fundraising event or mailing. The
donative context. An example of an intangible charity may avoid the penalty if it can show that
religious benefit would be admission to a religious
the failure was due to reasonable cause.
ceremony. The exception also generaIly applies to
Please note that the prevailing basic rule allowing
de minimis tangible benefits, such as wine, 'prodonor deductions only to the extent that the pay·.
vided in connection with a religious ceremony.
ment exceeds the fair market value of the goods or
The intangible religious benefit excep.tion, how·
ever, does not apply to such items as payments for
services received in return still applies generally
tuition for education leading to a recognized de· . to all quid pro quo contributions. The $75 threshgree, or for travel services, or consumer goods.
old pertains only to the obligation to disclose and
the imposition of the $10 per contribution penA penalty is imposed on charities that do not meet
the disclosure' requirements. For failure to make alty, not the rule on deductibility of the payment.

: ~

Exempt Orpnizationa Reports

---,
~
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INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE TEMPORARY REGULATIONS (TO 8544)
AND NOTICE OF PROPOSED RULEMAKING (IA-74-93) BY CROSS-REFERENCE
TO TEMPORARY REGULATIONS REGARDING SUBSTANTIATION REQUIREMENTS
FOR CERTAIN CONTRIBUTIONS, ISSUED MAY 26,1994
(TEXT)
(Note: The temporary regulations and notice of proposed rulemaking are scheduled to appear in the Federal
Register dated May 27, 1994.)
ing publ:s!led in the Proposed Rules section of this issue of
the Federal Register.

DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY
Internal Revenue Service
26 CFR Parts 1 and 602
[TO 8544]

Background

RIN 1545-AS28
Substantiation Requirement for Certain Contributions
r

AGENCY: Internal Revenue Service (IRS), Treasury.
ACTION: Temporary regulations.
SUMMARY: These temporary regulations are being issued
to provide guidance to the public with respect to the substantiation requirement contained in section 170(f)(8) of the Internal Revenue Code. Section 170(f)(8) was added to the Code by
section 13172 of the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of
1993. The guidance contained in these regulations affects
donors of charitable contributions of $250 or more.
EFFECTIVE DATE: January 1, 1994.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Joel S. Rutstein, 202-622-4930 (not a toll-free call).
SUPPLEMENT ARY INFORMATION:

This document contains amendments to the Income Tax
Regulations (26 CFR part 1) relating to the substantiation
requirement for the deduction of certain charitable contributions under section 170(f)(8) of the Internal Revenue Code
(Code). Section 170(f)(8) was added by section 13172 of the
Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993.
Need for Temporary Regulations

The prOvisions contained in this Treasury decision are
needed immediately to provide guidance to the public with
respect to the application of the substantiation requirement
of section 170(f)(8). Therefore, it is found impracticable and
contrary to the public interest to issue this Treasury deci~
sion with prior notice under section 553(b) of title 5 of the
United States Code.
Explanation of Provisions

Paperwork Reduction Act

These regulations are being issued without prior notice
and public procedure pursuant to the Administrative Procedure Act (5 U.S.C. 553). For this reason, the collection of
information contained in these regulations has been reviewed and, pending receipt and evaluation of public comments, approved by the Office of Management and Budget
(OMB) under control number 1545-1431.
For further information concerning this collection of information, and where to submit comments on this collection
of information, the accuracy of the estimated burden, and
suggestions for reducing this burden, please refer to the
preamble in the cross-reference notice of proposed rulemak-

Section 170 allows a deduction for contributions to or for
the use of certain specified organizations, including those
organized and operated exclusively for religious, charitable,
scientific, literary, or educational purposes.
To be deductible under section 170 of the Code, a payment
to or for the use oia qualified organization must be a giftthat is, a payment of money or transfer of property without
adequate consideration. Rev.Rul. 67-246, 1967-2 C.B. 104.
Thus, if a taxpayer receives goods or services from the
organization in consideration for a payment, the taxpayer
may not deduct as a charitable contribution more than the
excess of the amount paid over the value of. the consideration received therefor. Id. The Service has determined,
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however, that if a taxpayer receives only certain inconsequential or insubstantial benefits in consideration for a
payment to a qualified organization, the taxpayer may
deduct the entire payment as a charitable contribution. Rev.
Proc. 90-12, 1990-1 C.B. 471. See also Rev. Proc. 92-49,
1992-1 C.B. 987 (amplifying Rev. Proc. 90-12 by providing
that certain free, unordered, low-cost items that accompany
charitable solicitations are considered to have insubstantial
value). (See §601.601(d)(2)(ii) of the Statement of Procedural
Rules, 26 CFR part 601.)
Section 170(f)(8) disallows a deduction for any contribution of $250 or more that is not substantiated by a written
acknowledgment from the donee organization. The acknowledgment must provide information regarding (a) the money
or other property contributed, and (b) any goods or services
provided by the donee organization in whole or partial
consideration for the contributed money or other property.
Section 170(f)(8) is a compliance provision, intended to
facilitate the enforcement of the substantive requirements
for a deduction under section 170. The compliance purpose
of section 170(f)(8) does not require that an acknowledgment
refer to goods or services provided by a donee organization
to a donor if the provision of goods or services does not
affect the amount that the donor is entitled to deduct as a
charitable contribution. Therefore, the temporary regulations provide that goods or services given in return for a
contribution need not be taken into account for purposes of
section 170(f)(8), if the goods or services have insubstantial
value under the guidelines provided in Rev. Procs. 90-12 and
92-49 (and any successor documents). (See §601.601(d)(2)(ii)
of the Statement of Procedural Rules, 26 CFR part 601.)
The legislative history of the 1993 Act states that Congress intended a similar exception to apply in connection
with the disclosure requirement of section 6115. See H. Rep.
No. 213, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. 566 (1993). Although the
legislative history does not discuss application of such an
exception to the substantiation requirement of section
170(f)(8), the Service has determined that such al\ exception
is equally appropriate.
Some donee organizations receive contributions through
arrangements in which employers withhold amounts from the
wages of their employees in accordance with pledges made
by the employees, and pay the withheld amounts to the donee
organizations. Donee organizations that use these arrangements may not know the identity of the contributing employees or the amounts contributed by each employee. Therefore,
these donee organizations may face difficulty in preparing
the acknowledgments contemplated by section 170(f)(8).
The statutory language and legislative history of section
170(f)(8) suggest that Congress appreciated the difficulties of
applying the substantiation requirement to contributions
made by payroll deduction and intended that these difficulties be addressed by regulations. Section 170(fX8)(E) directs
the Secretary to "provide such regulations as may be necessary or appropriate" to carry out the purposes of section
170(f)(8), "including regulations that may provide that some
or all of the requirements of [that section] do not apply in
appropriate cases." The Conference Report on the 1993 Act
expresses the conferees' intent that the Secretary exercise
his regulatory authority "to clarify the treatment of contributions made through payroll deductions." H. Rep. No. 213,
supra, at 567.
Accordingly, the temporary regulations also provide special rules for contributions made by payroll deduction. The
special rules allow taxpayers to substantiate contributions
made by payroll deduction by a combination of two documents: (a) a document furnished by the taxpayer's employer

(No. 101)

c..

that evidences the amount withheld from the taxpayer's
wages, and (b) a document prepared by the donee organization that states that the organization does not provide goods
or services as whole or partial consideration for any contributions made by payroll deduction.
The special rules for contributions made by payroll deduction, like the underlying statutory provisions, do not require
that the document prepared by the donee organization take
any particular form. Similarly, although donors must obtain
the document in time to meet the "contemporaneous" requirement of the statute (generally, by the time they file the
relevant tax return), the rules do not require· the donee
organization to prepare the document at· any particular
time. Therefore, if a donee organization includes the statement contemplated by the rules on a pledge card prepared
to solicit contributions in 1995, a donor who receives the
card before timely filing the donor's 1994 tax return could
use the card to substantiate contributions made in 1994.
Contributions made by payroll deduction during 1994 can
thus be substantiated under these rules even if the donee
organization has used pledge cards for 1994 contributions
that do not include the statement contemplated by the rules."
As a result; the Service understands that donee organizations will be able to comply with the "contemporaneous"
requirement for 1994 contributions. The Service invites
comments, however, on whether transitional relief from the
"contemporaneous" requirement is needed for 1994
contributions.
.
The temporary regulations also provide that, for purposes
of applying the $250 threshold provided in section
170(f)(8)(A) to contributions made by payroll deduction, the
amount withheld from each paycheck is treated as a separate contribution. Thus, the substantiation requirement of
section 170(f)(8) will not apply to contributions made by
payroll deduction unless the employer deducts $250 or more
from a single paycheck for the purpose of payment to a
donee organization. This rule is consistent with the legislative history of section 170(f)(8). See H. Rep. No. 213. supra,
at 565 n.29 ("In cases of contributions paid by withholding
from wages, the deduction from each paycheck will be
treated as a separate payment.").
Some charitable organizations solicit contributions in the
form of payroll deductions or lump-sum payments for the
purpose of distributing the amounts received to other charitable organizations. The temporary regulations provide that.
in such cases, the distributing organization is treated as a
donee organization for purposes of the substantiation requirement of section 170(f)(8). This rule applies regardless of
whether the distributing organization distributes the contributed funds pursuant to the donor's instructions. The rule
does not apply, however, if a distributee organization provides goods or services to the donor as part of a transaction
structured with a view to avoid taking the goods or services
into account in determining the amount of the deduction to
which the donor is entitled under section 170.

=

~

----i

~

Special Analyses

It has been determined that these temporary regulations
are not a significant regulatory action as defined in Executive Order 12866. It has also been determined that se<:tion
553(b) of the Administrative Procedure Act (5 U.S.C. chapter
5) and the Regulatory Flexibility Act (5 U.S.C. chapter 6) do
not apply to these regulations, and, therefore, an initial
Regulatory Flexibility Analysis is not required. Pursuant to
section 7805(f) of the Internal Revenue Code, these regulations will be submitted to the Chief Counsel for Advocacy of

Copyright © 1994 by THE BUREAU OF NATIONAL AFFAIRS, INC., Washington. D.C. 20037

A -150

".

:

~
=

L - 8

TAXATION, BUDGET AND ACCOUNTING TEXT

(No.1 01)

the Small Business Administration for comment on their
impact on small business.
Drafting Information

-=----.?

The principal author of these regulations is Joel S. Rutstein, Office of the Assistant Chief counsel (Income Tax &
Accounting), Internal Revenue Service. However, other personnel from the Service and Treasury Department participated in their development.
List of Subjects
26 CFR part 1

(OTR)

5-27-94

in that capacity, that receives a payment made as a contribution is treated as a donee organization solely for purposes
of section 170(f)(8), even if the organization (pursuant to the
donor's instructions or otherwise) distributes the amount
received to one or more organizations described in section
170(c). This paragraph (c) does not apply, however, to a case
in which the distributee organization provides goods or
services as part of a transaction structured with a view to
avoid taking the goods or services into account in determining the amount of the deduction to which the donor is
entitled under section 170.
(d) Effective date. The rules of this section apply to
contributions made on or after January 1, 1994.

Income taxes, Reporting and recordkeeping requirements.
PART 602-0MB CONTROL NUMBERS UNDER
THE PAPE.RWORK REDUCTION ACT

26 CFR part 602

Reporting and recordkeeping requirements.
Adoption of Amendments to the Regulations

Accordingly, 26 CFR parts 1 and 602, are amended as
follows:
PART 1 -

Par. 3. The authority for part 602 continues to read:
Authority: 26 U.S.C. 7805.
Par. 4. Section 602.101(c) is amended by adding the entry
"1.l70A-13T ... 1545-1431" in numerical order to the table ..
/s/ Margaret Milner Richardson
Commissioner of Internal Revenue

INCOME TAXES

Paragraph 1. The authority citation for part 1 is amended
by adding an entry in numerical order to read as follows:
Authority: 26 U.S.C. 7805 • •• §1.l70A-13T also issued
under 26 U.S.C 170(f)(8)(E).
Par. 2. Section 1.170A-13T is added to read as follows:

Approved: May 6, 1994
/s/ Leslie Samuels
Assistant Secretary of the Treasury
DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY
Internal Revenue Service

§ 1.170A-13T Substantiation requirement for certain
contributions.
(a) Certain goods or services that have insubstantial

value not taken into account. Goods or services that have
insubstantial value under the guidelines provided in Revenue Procedures 90-12, 1990-1 C.B. 471, and 92~49, 1992-1
C.B. 987, (and any successor documents) need not be taken
into account for purposes of section 170(fX8). (See
§601.601(d)(2Xii) of the Statement of Procedural Rules, 26
CFR part 601.)
(b) Contributions made by payroU deduction - (1)
Form of substantiation. A contribution made by means of

withholding from a taxpayer's wages and payment by the
taxpayer's employer to a donee organization may be substantiated, for purposes of section 170(£)(8), by (i) A pay stub, Form W-2, or other document furnished
by the employer that evidences the amount withheld by
the employer for the purpose of payment to a donee
organization, and
(ii) A pledge card or other document prepared by the
donee organization that includes a statement that the
organization does not provide goods or services in whole
or partial consideration for any contributions made to the
organization by payroll deduction.
(2) Application of $250 threshold. For the purpose of
applying the $250 threshold provided in section 170(fX8XA)
to contributions made by the means described in paragraph
(b)(l) of this section, the amount withheld from each payment of wages to a taxpayer is treated as a separate
contribution.
(c) Distributing organizations as donees. An organization described in section 170(c), or an organization described
in 5 CFR 950.105 (a Principal Combined Fund Organization
for purposes of the Combined Federal Campaign) and acting

26 .CFR Parts 1 and 602
IA-.74-93
RIN 1545-AS27
Substantiation Requirement for Certain Contributions

AGENCY: Internal Revenue Service (IRS), Treasury.
ACTION: Notice of proposed rulemaking by cross-reference to temporary regulations.
SUMMARY: In the Rules and Regulations section of this
issue. of the Federal Register, the Internal Revenue Service
is issuing temporary regulations relating to the substantiation requirement for certain charitable contributions under
section 170(fX8) of the Internal Revenue Code. The guidance
contained in those temporary regulations affects donors of
charitable contributions of $250 or more. The text of the
temporary regulations also serves as the comment document for this notice of proposed rulemaking. Comments will
be considered not only on the temporary rules promulgated,
but also on other issues arising under section 170(f)(8). These
issues include, but are not limited to, (a) what constitutes a
good faith estimate of the value of goods and services, (b)
what is an intangible religious benefit, and (c) what is a
contemporaneous acknowledgment.
DATES: Comments and requests for a public hearing must
be delivered or maileq by July 26, 1994.
ADDRESS: Send comments and requests for a public hearing to: Internal Revenue Service, P.O. Box 7604, Ben Franklin Station,
Attn: CC:DOM:CORP:T:R (IA-74-93), Room 5228, Washington, DC 20044.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Joel S. Rutstein, 202-622-4930 (not a toll-free call).
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Comments and Request for a Public Hearing

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

Before these proposed regulations are adopted as final
regulations, consideration will be given to any written comments that are timely submitted (preferably a signed original and eight copies) to the Internal Revenue Service. All
comments will be available for public inspection and' copying in their entirety. A public hearing will be scheduled and
held upon written request by any person who timely submits
written comments on the proposed rules. Notice of the date,
time, and place for the hearing will be published in the
Federal Register.

Paperwork Reduction Act

'The collection of information contained in these regulations has been submitted to the Office of Management and
Budget for review n accordance with the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1980 (44 U.S.C. 3504(h». Comments on the
collection of information should be sent to the Office of
Management and Budget: Paperwork Reduction Project,
Washington, DC 20503, with copies to the Internal Revenue
Service, Attn: IRS Reports Clearance Officer PC:FP, Washington; DC 20224.
The collection of information in this notice of proposed
rulemaking is in section 1.170A-13T. This information, is
required by the Internal Revenue Service to substantiate
certain charitable contributions. The likely recordkeepers
are individuals, business or other for-profit institutions, and
small businesses.
Estimated total annual recordkeeping burden: 51,500
hours. The estimated annual burden per recordkeeper varies
from 15 minutes to 30 minutes, depending on individual
circumstances, with an estimated average of 30 minutes.
Estimated number of record keepers: 16,000.

.......:
~

Drafting Information

The principal author of these proposed regulations is Joel
S. Rutstein, Office of the Assistant Chief Counsel (Income
Tax & Accounting), Internal Revenue Service. However,
other personnel from the Service and Treasury Department
participated in their development.
List of Subjects in 26 CFR part 1

Income taxes! Reporting and recordkeephlg requirements:
Proposed Amendments to the Regulations

Accordingly, 26 CFR part 1 is proposed to be amended as
follows:

Background

For the text of the temporary regulations adding
§1.l70A-13T to 26 CFR part 1, see TD 8544, published in the
Rules and Regulations section of this issue of the Federal
Register. The preamble to the temporary regulations explains the regulations.

PART 1-INCOME TAXES

Paragraph 1. The authority citation for part 1 is amended
by adding an entry in numerical order to read as follows:
Authority: 26 U.S.C. 7805 ••• §1.170A-13A also issued
under 26 U.S.C. 170(f)(8)(E).
Par. 2. Section 1.170A-13A is added to read as follows:

Special Analyses
It has been determined that this notice of proposed rule-

making is not a significant regulatory action as defined in
Executive Order 12866. It has also been determined that
section 553(b) of the Administrative Procedure Act (5 U.S.C.
chapter 5) and the Regulatory Flexibility Act (5 U.S.C.
chapter 6) do not apply to these regulations, and;therefore,
an initial Regulatory Flexibility Analysis is not required.
Pursuant to section 7805(f) of the Internal Revenue Code,
these proposed regulations will be submitted to the Chief
Counsel for Advocacy of the Small Business Administration
for comment on their impact on small business.

§1.170A-13A
contributions.

Substantiation

requirement

for

certain

[The text of this proposed section is the same as the
text of §1.170A-13T published elsewhere in this issue of
the Federal Register].
/s/ Margaret Milner Richardson
Commissioner of Internal Revenue

End of Text
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INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE NOTICE OF PROPOSED RULEMAKING (PS-26-93),
PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO INCOME, ESTATE, AND GIFT TAX REGULATIONS
UNDER INTERNAL REVENUE CODE RELATING TO EXCEPTIONS TO USE OF STANDARD
VALUATION TABLES FOR VALUING ANNUITIES, INTERESTS OF LIFE OR A TERM OF YEARS,
AND REMAINDER OR REVERSIONARY INTERESTS, ISSUED JUNE 9, 1994
(TEXT)
(Note: The notice of proposed rulemaking is scheduled to appear in the Federal Register dated June 10, 1994.)
term of years, and remainder or reversionary interests is to
be determined under tables published by the IRS based on an
interest rate equal to 120 percent of the applicable Federal
26 CFR Parts 1, 20, and 25
mid-term rate (rounded to the nearest two-tenths of one
percent) in effect under section 1274(dX1) for the month in
[PS-26-93]
which the valuation date falls. Section 7520(b) provides that
RIN 1545-AR56
section 7520 shall not apply for purposes of any provision
specified in regulations. The Conference Report to the. TechActuarial Tables Exceptions
nical and . Miscellaneous Revenue Act of 1988, H.R. Conf.
Rep. No. 1104, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 113 (1988), 1988-3 C.B.
AGENCY: Internal Revenue Service (IRS), Treasury.
603. explains that section 7520 does not apply to "situations
ACTION: Notice of proposed rulemaking.
specified in Treasury regulations."
SUMMARY: This document contains proposed amend. .' The "IRS has 'never attempted to include in the regulations
ments to the income, estate, and gift tax regulations under
the Internal Revenue Code relating to exceptions to. the use . ~: ~1l·oUh.e :different actuarial factors that could apply to the
many different kinds of vested and contingent annuity,
of standard valuation tables for valuing annuities, interests
i~!!!l.me, and remainder interests that can arise in tax adminfor life or a term of years, and remainder or reversionary
"istration,Thtql.c~uarial tables that have been set forth in the
interests. These amendments are necessary in order to
regulatio~'fropi'time to time have listed only those factors
provide guidance consistent with court decisions that call
that are t.DQst frequently needed by taxpayers. Generally,
for deviation from the use of standard valuation tables in .
these ac;:~a.rial tables have included the one-life annuity.
valuing those interests. The proposed regulations would
income; and remainder factors for ages 0 through 109 and
apply in valuing all interests that would, but for the exceptl)e term-certain annuity, income. and remainder factors for
tions, be valued under section 7520 of the Code~
;.
periods of 1 through 60 years. These one-life· and termDATES: Written comments and requests for a puolic.
certain factors are often referred to in this notice of prohearing must be received by August 9, 1994.
posed rulemaking as "standard actuarial. factors" or
ADDRESSES: Send submissions to: CC:OOM..-CORP:T:R.
"standard section 7520 actuarial factors."
([PS-26-93D, room 5228, Internal Revenue Service, POB
Other standard actuarial factors that are less frequently
7604. Ben Franklin Station, Washington. DC 20044. In the
needed by taxpayers. are included in tables that have been
alternative, submissions may be hand delivered to: CC:DOM:
separately published by the IRS from time to time and that
CORP:T:R ([PS-2S-93D, room 5228, Internal Revenue Sermay be purchased. from the Government printing Office.
vice, 1111 Constitution Avenue NW, Washington, DC.
The
tables in these books include two-life actuarial factors,
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: William L.
as well as many one-life factors and term-certain factors
Blodgett, telephone (202) 622-3090 (not a toll-f~ number).
not found in the regulations tables. These publications also
SUPPLEMENT ARY INFORMATION:
include a number of examples that illustrate how to compute sp~cial section 7520 actuarial factors such as the
Background
annuity, income, or remainder factor for a period limited to
This document contains proposed regulations (26 CFR
the lesser of a term certain or a lifetime; Special actuarial
1.7520-3(b), 20.7520-3(b). and 25.7520-3(b» for th-e valuation
factors have for many years been referred to as such in the
of certain partial interests in property under section 7520 of
regulations. See, for example, §20.2055-2(fX5).
the Internal Revenue Code (Code), as added by rection 5031
Other special section 7520 actuarial factors that may
of the Technical and Miscellaneous Revenue Act of 1988,
apply to more unusual situations may be computed by the
when the use of standard actuarial tables would produce
taxpayer or, upon request, by the Internal Revenue Service
unreasonable results. The regulations are proposed to be
for the taxpayer, by using actuarial methods consistent with
effective for valuation dates occurring after the date the
those used to compute the standard section 7520 actuarial
regulations are published as final regulations in the Federal
factors that appear in the tables in the regulations and in the
Register.
Service's publications. Examples of these more unusual
situations include an annuity-payable for more than two
Explanation of Provisions
Section 7520(a), which is effective after April, 30, 1989,
lives, a right to income for a term certain or until the prior
death of the first to die of two individuals, and the right to
provides that the value of annuities, interests for life or a
DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY
Internal Revenue Service

--!

~
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receive a remainder after a term certain if an individual
survives the term.
In calculating a standard section 7520 actuarial factor,
certain assumptions are made. For all standard section 7520
actuarial factors in the single-life and term-certain tables in
§20.2031-7(d), the interest rate for enjoyment or the postponement of enjoyment is the applicable section 7520 rate. In
the case of a life annuity, income, or remainder factor, the
basis for mortality rates for measuring lives is the data in
Table 80 CNSMT. However, in unusual situations, where
special section 7520. actuarial factors must be computed,
one or more alternaflve assumptions may be appropriate.
For example, if the actual income is known to be below
applicable standards, the section 7520 interest rate may not
be used to project the trust income yield. Similarly, jf a
measuring life is classified as terminally iII, the standard
mortality data from Table 80 CNSMT may not be used as
the mortality basis. But, even though one or both of these
exceptions is applicable in a case, the section 7520 interest
rate will ordinarily be used to discount the value of the right
to any postponed enjoyment.
In cases requiring the valuation of ordinary annuities,
income interests, and remainder and reversionary interests,
the courts have consistently recognized the need to use the
standard actuarial factors prescribed by the regulations. See
Ithaca Trust v. United States, 279 U.S. 151 (1929).
However, the courts have recognized that the use of the
standard actuarial factors is inappropriate in certain cases.
Robinette v. Helvering, 318 U.S. 184 (1943) (reversionary
interest with several interdependent contingencies); Stark
v. United States, 477 F.2d 131 (8th Cir. 1973), cert. denied,
414 U.S. 975 (1973) (closely held stock that was not publicly
traded and paid no dividends); O'Reilly v. Commissioner,
973 F.2d 1403 (8th Cir. 1992), rem'd, T.C.M. 1994-61 (disparity between .2 percent yield and 10 percent tables produced
unrealistic and unreasonable result); and Commissioner v.
Estate of Sternberger, 348 U.S. 187 (1955) (charitable
bequest that would occur only if decedent's unmarried
daughter died without issue surviving her and her mother).
In addition, the courts have held that the standard actuarial
factors cannot be used if the measuring life is terminally iII.
Estate of McLendon v. Commissioner, T.C.M. 1993-459;
Estate of Jennings v. Commissioner, 10 T.C. 323 (1948);
and Estate of Denbigh v. Commissioner, 7 T.C. 387 (1946).
See Rev. Rul. 80-80, 1980-1 C.B. 194, which provides that, in
cases where the individual's death is imminent, the taxpayer
may not use standard actuarial factors prescribed by the
regulations. See also, Carter v. United States, 921 F.2d 63
(5th Cir. 1991), where the court refused to ascribe value to
an income interest for purposes of the section 2013 credit
where death of the measuring life was simultaneous with
that of the decedent.
In Shapiro v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo 1993-483
(1993), the Tax Court allowed the taxpayer to improperly
value an annuity with a standard one-life annuity actuarial
factor from Table A in §20.2031-7(f) in a situation in which
the annuity could have exhausted the fund from which the
annuity was to be paid before the death of the annuitant. The
Internal Revenue Service believes that the annuity factor
that should have been used in this case is a special annuity
factor for the right to receive annual payments for 4 years
or until the prior death of the annuitant. See Rev. Rul. 77454, 1977-2 C.B. 351. See also Moffett v. Commissioner,
269 F.2d 738 (4th Cir. 1959), and United States v. Dean, 224
f.2d 26 (1st Cir. 1955). Therefore, the Service will not follow
the result in Shapiro.
Sections 1.7520-3(a), 20.7520-3(a), and 25.7520-3(a) set
forth specific Code sections that are exempt from the valuCopyright

~

(DTR)
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ation rules of section 7520. The proposed regulations contamed. in this notice descr~be other areas in which the
valuatIOn methodology apphcable to standard and special
section 7520 actuarial factors is not to be used. Generally if
the interest in property that is to be valued is not 'an
ordinary annuity, income interest, or remainder interest, the
standard annuity, income, and remainder factors in the
tables of factors set forth in the regulations and IRS publications cannot be used. In some cases in which the standard
factors from the regulations and publications tables cannot
be used. a special factor may be computed by the taxpayer
or by the Service upon the request of the taxpayer. In other
cases where standard or special factors may not be used, the
property interest may be valued using other valuation techniques. Depending upon the facts and circumstances, a
property interest that cannot be valued using the standard
or special section 7520 factors may have no ascertainable
value.
The proposed regulations establish two primary tests to
determine whether the fair market value of the interest is
computed by use of the standard section 7520 actuarial
factors found in the regulations and IRS publications. The
first test is whether the instrument of transfer provid~s the
beneficiary with the degree of beneficial enjoyment that is
consistent with the type of property interest that the standard valuation tables are designed to measure. In this regard,
the rights of an annuity beneficiary must be adequately
defined and, if the annUity is payable from a group of assets,
the value of the assets must be sufficient to support all of
the annuity payments. Similarly, the rights of an income
beneficiary must be consistent with the rights of an outright
owner of the property interest for the same period of time,
and the rights of a remainder or reversionary beneficiary
must be protected against invasion or erosion of the corpus.
The second test in the proposed regulations addresses the
mortality component of the transferred interest. The Internal Revenue Service previously addressed this issue in Rev.
.Rul. 66- 307, 1966-2 C.B. 429, and Rev. Rul 80-80. Rev. Rul.
66-307 set forth the rule that the value of a life or remainder
interest would be determined by taking into account the
health of the life tenant if it was known on the valuation
date that the life tenant was afflicted with a fatal and
incurable disease in its advanced stages and that the life
tenant could not survive for more· than a brief period of
time. Rev. Rul. 80·80 clarified the "brief period" test in Rev.
Rul. 66-307, and stated that the standard life actuarial
factors are to be applied to value the interest unless death is
clearly imminent. In the view of the Service, because the
test for determining whether death is imminent set forth in
Rev. Rul. 66-307 and Rev. Rul. 80-80 does not satisfactorily
quantify the probability of death occurring within 1 year
from the valuation date, this test may permit the use of
standard actuarial factors in inappropriate situations. These
regulations propose to explicitly quantify the applicable
standard for purposes of applying this test.
Under the proposed regulations, if an individual who is a
measuring life of the interest being transferred is known to
be terminally ill, the mortality test of the proposed regulations is not satisfied and a special section 7502 actuarial
factor, rather than a standard actuarial factor must be used
in valuing the interest. Terminal illness is defined in the
proposed regulations as an incurable illness or other deteriorating physical condition that would substantially reduce a
person's life expectancy to the extent that there is at least a
50 percent probability that the individual will not survive
for more than 1 year from the valuation date. Exceptions
are made in the regulations for special situations under
sections 2013, 2037, and 2042.
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In the case of the simultaneous death of the transferor and
an individual who is the measuring life of a property interest, the proposed regulations specifically preclude use of the
standard factors in the tables to value that interest. This is
pertinent in determining the previously taxed property credit under section 2013 and reaffirms the pOSition of the Fifth
Circuit in the Carter case.
.
Special Analyses

It has been determined that this notice of proposed rulemaking is not a significant regulatory action as defined in
EO 12866. Therefore, a regulatory assessment is not required. It also has been determined that section 553(b) of the
Administrative Procedure Act (5 U.S.C. chapter 5) and the
Regulatory Flexibility Act (5 U.S.C. chapter 6) do not apply
to these regulations, and, therefore, an initial Regulatory
Flexibility Analysis is not required. Pursuant to section
7805(f) of the Internal Revenue Code, this notice of proposed
rulemaking will be submitted to the Chief Counsel for
Advocacy of the Small Business Administration for comment on its impact on small business.
.
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Authority: 26 U.S.C. 7805 * • •
.
Par. 2. Section 1.7520-3 is amended by adding the text of
paragraph (b) to read as follows:
§1.7520-3 Limitation on the application of section 7520.

•••••
(b). Other limitations on the application of section
7520-- (1) In general--(i) Ordinary beneficial interests. For purposes of this section:
(A) An ordinary annuity interest is the right to receive

a fixed dollar amount at the end of each year during one or
more measuring lives or for some other defined period. A
standard section 7520 annuity factor for an ordinary annuity
interest represents the present worth of the right to receive
$1.00 per year for a defined period, using the interest rate
prescribed under section 7520 for the appropriate month. If
an annuity interest is payable more often than annually or is
payable at the .beginning of each period, a special adjustment must be made in any computation with a standard
section 7520 annuity factor. .
.
...
(B) An ordinary income i*erest is the right to reCeive
the income from, or the use of, property during one or more
measuring lives or for some other defined period. A standard section 7520 income factor for an ordinary income
interest represents the present worth of the right to receive
the incQl'ne from $1.00 for a defined period, using the
interest rate. prescribed under section 7520 for the appropriate month. '.
.(C) An.ordinary remainder or reversionary interest is
1;I!e right to receive an interest in property at the end of one
or inor:e measuring lives or for some other defined period. A
. standard section 7520 remainder factor for an ordinary
remainder or ~versionary interest represents the present
worth. of the right to receive $1.00 at the end of a defined
period, using the interest rate prescribed under section 7520
for the appropriate month, .. . .
(ii)-Certain restricted beneficial interests. A restricted
beneficial interest is an annuity, income, remainder, or
reversionary interest that is subject to a contingency, power,
or other restriction, whether the restriction is provided for
by thelerms of the trust, will, or other governing instrumerit
. -' : or is caused by other circumstances. In general, a standard
section 7520 annuity, income, or remainder factor may not
be used to value a restricted beneficial interest. However, a
special section 7520 annuity, income, or. remainder factor
may be used to value a restricted beneficial interest under
some drcums~nces. See Example 2 in §1.7520-3(bX4),
which illustrates a situation where a. special section 7520
actuarial factor is needed to take into account the shorter
life expectancy of the terminally ill measuring life. See
§1.7520-1(c) for requesting a special factor from the Internal
Revenue Service.
(iii) Other beneficial interests. If, under the provisions
of §1.7520-3(b), the interest rate and mortality components
prescribed under section 7520 are not applicable in deter-.
mining the value of any annUity, income, remainder, or
reversionary interest, the actual fair market value of the
interest (determined without regard to section 7520) is based
on all of the facts and circumstances if and to the extent
permitted by the Internal Revenue Code provision applicable to the property interest.
.
<

Comments and Requests for a Public Hearing

Before these proposed regulations are adopted as final
regulations, consideration will be given to any written comments that are submitted timely (preferably a signed original and eight copies) to the Internal Revenue Service. In
particular, the Service invites .comments on whether the
proposed definition of terminal illness adequately deals with
certain illnesses that are known to cause death in a short
period of time but are often· diagnosed more than 1 year
before death. All comments will be available for public
. inspection and copying. A public hearing may be scheduled
if requested in. writing by a person that timely submits
. written comments. If a public hearing is scheduled, notice of
the date, time, and place for the hearing will be published in
the Federal Register.
Drafting Information

:.

.The principal author of these proposed regulations js
William L. Blodgett,. Office of Assistant Chief COUnSel
(Passthroughs and Special Industries), Internal Revenue ~r~
vice. However, other personnel from the IRS and Treasury
Department participated in their development.
. List of Subjects
26CFR Part 1

Income taxes, Reporting and recordkeeping requirements.
26 CFR Part 20

Estate taxes, Reporting and recordkeeping requirements.
26 CFR Part 25

Gift taxes, Reporting and

recordkeepin~

requirements.

Proposed Amendments to the Regulations

Accordingly, 26 CFR parts 1, 20 and 25 are proposed to be
amended as follows:
.

-1
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Part 1--INCOME TAXES

(2) Provisions of governing instrument and other
limitations on source of payinent--(i) Annuities. A

Paragraph 1. The authority citation for part 1 continues to
read in part as follows:

standard section 7520 annuity factor is not to be used to
determine the present value of an annuity for a specified

~
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term of years or the life of one or more individuals unless
the effect of the trust, will, or other governing instrument is
to ensure that the annuity will be paid for the entire defined
period. In the case of an annuity payable from a trust or
other limited fund, the annuity is not considered payable for
the entire defined period if, considering the applicable section 7520 interest rate, the annuity is expected to exhaust
the fund before the last possible annuity payment is made in
full. For this purpose, it must be assumed that it is possible
for each measuring life to survive until age 110, because
every standard section 7520 life annuity factor is calculated
on the basis of that asSumption. If it is determined that the
trust or other fund from which an annuity is to be paid may
exhaust before the end of the defined period of the annuity,
it will be necessary' to calculate a special section 7520
annuity factor that takes into account the facts and circumstances that may exhaust the trust or fund.
(ii) Income and similar interests--(A) Beneficial
enjoyment. A standard section 7520 income factor for an·
ordinary income interest is not to be used to determine the
present value of an income or similar interest in trust for a
term of years or for the life of one or more individuals
unless the effect of the trust, will, or other governing
instrument is to provide the income beneficiary with that
degree of beneficial enjoyment of the property during the.
term of the income interest that the principles of the law of
trusts accord to a person who is unqualifiedly designated as
the income beneficiary of a trust for a similar period of
time. This degree of beneficial enjoyment is provided only if
it was the transferor'S intent, as manifested by the provi~
sions of the governing instrument and the surrounding cir~
cumstances, that the trust provide an income interest for the
income beneficiary during the specified period of time that
is consistent with the value of the trust corpus and with its
preservation. In determining whether a trust arrangement
evidences that intention, the treatment required or permitted with respect to individual items must be considered in
relation to the entire system provided for in the administration of the subject trust. Similarly, in determining the
present value of the right to use tangible property (whether
or not in trust) for one or more measuring lives or other
specified period of time, the interest rate component prescribed under section 7520 and §l. 7520-1 is not to be used
unless, during the specified period, the beneficiary is entitled to that degree of use, possession, and enjoyment of the
property that an outright owner would be entitled to exercise during a similar period of time.
(B) Diversions of income and corpus. A standard section 7520 income factor for an ordinary income interest is
not to be used to value an income interest or similar interest
in property for a term of years or for one or more measuring lives i f - (1) The trust, Will, or other governing instrument requires
or permits the beneficiary's income or other enjoyment to
be withheld, diverted, or accumulated for another person's
benefit without the consent of the income beneficiary; or
(2) The governing instrument requires or permits trust
corpus to be withdrawn from the trust for another person's
benefit during the income beneficiary's term of enjoyment
without the consent of and accountability to the income
beneficiary for such diversion.
(iii) Remainder and reversionary interests. A standard
section 7520 remainder interest factor for an ordinary remainder or reversionarv interest is not to be used to determine the present value of a remainder or reversionary
interest (whether in trust or otherwise) unless, consistent
with the preservation and protection that the law of trusts
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would provide for a person who is unqualifiedly designated
as the remainder beneficiary of a trust for a similar duration, the effect of the administrative and dispositive provisions for the interest or interests that precede the remainder
or reversionary interest is to assure that the property will
be adequately preserved and protected from erosion, invasion, depletion, or damage until the remainder or reversionary interest takes effect in possession and enjoyment. This
degree of preservation and protection is provided only if it
was the transferor's intent, as manifested by the provisions
of the arrangement and the surrounding circumstances, that
the entire disposition provide the remainder or reversionary
beneficiary with an undiminished interest in the property
transferred.
(iv) Pooled income fund interests. In general, pooled
income funds are created and administered to achieve a
special rate of return. A beneficial interest in a pooled
income fund is not ordinarily valued using a standard section 7520 income or remainder interest factor. The present
value of a beneficial interest in a pooled income fund is
determined according to rules and special remainder factors··
prescribed in §1.642(c)-6.
.
. (3) Mortality component. The mortality comp<ment prescribed under section 7520 is not to be used to determine the
present value of an annuity, income interest, remainder
interest, or reversionary interest if an individual who is a
measuring life for the interest dies or is terminally ill at the
time of the transaction. For purposes of this paragraph
(b)(3), an individual who is known to have an incurable
illness or other deteriorating physical condition is considered terminally ill if there is at least a 50 percent probability that the individual will die within 1 year.
.
(4) Examples. The provisions of this paragraph (b) are
illustrated by the following examples:
.

~

=
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~
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Example 1. Annuity funded with unproductive property. The taxpayer transfers corporation stock worth

$1,000,000 to a trust. The trust provides for a 6 percent
($60,000 per year) annuity' in cash or other property to be
paid to a charitable. organization for 25 years and for the
. remainder to be distributed to the donor's child. The trust
specifically authorizes, but· does not require, the trustee to
retain the shares of stock. The section 7520 interest rate for
the month of the transfer is 8.2 percent. The corporation has
paid no dividends on this stock during the past 5 years, and
there is no indication that this policy will change in the near
future. Under applicable state law, the corporation is considered to be a sound investment for a trust with diversified
investments because the corporation's practice of retaining
its earnings has caused the value of the corporation stock to
grow commensurately each year. Considering the 6 percent
annuity payout rate and the 8.2 percent section 7520 interest
rate, the trust corpus is considered sufficient to pay this
annuity for the entire 25-year term of the trust, or even
indefinitely. Thus, though the trust assets not likely to earn
dividend income during the term of the trust, the assets
would be assumed to apprecjate at the rate of 8.2 percent
per year if there were no income. Therefore, the trust's sole
investment in this corporation is not expected to adversely
affect the inter.est of either the annuitant or the remainder
beneficiary. Although it appears that neither beneficiary
would be able to compel the trustee to make the trust corpus·
produce investment income, the annuity interest in this case
is considered to be an ordinary annuity interest, and the
standard section 7520 annuity factor may be used to determine the present value of the annuity. In this case, the
section 7520 annuity factor would represent the right to
receive $1.00 per year for a term of 25 years.
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Example 2. Terminal illness. The taxpayer transfers
property worth $1,000,000, to a charitable remainder unitrust described in section 664(d)(2) and §l.664-3. The trust
provides for a fixed-percentage 7 p.ercent unitrust benefit
(each annual payment is equal to 7 percent of the trust
assets as valued at the beginning of each year) to be paid
quarterly to an individual beneficiary for life and for the
remainder to be distributed to a charitable organization. At
the time the trust is created, the individual beneficiary is
age 60 and has been diagnosed with an incurable illness and
there is at least a 50 percent probability of the individual
dying within 1 year. Because there is at least a 50 percent
probability that this beneficiary will die within 1 year, the
standard section 7520 unitrust remainder factor for a person
age 60 from the valuation tables may not be used to determine the present value of the charitable remainder interest.
Instead, a special unitrust remainder factor must be computed that is based on the section 7520 interest rate and that
takes into account the projection of the individual beneficiary's actual life expectancy.
(5) Additional limitations. Section 7520 does not apply to
the extent provided by the Internal Revenue Service in
revenue rulings or revenue procedures.
(6) Effective date. The provisions of paragraph (b) of this
section are effective with respect' to transactions after the
date these regulations are published as final regulations in
the Federal Register.
.
PART 20--ESTATE TAX; ESTATES OF DECEDENTS
DYING AFTER AUGUST 16,1954

Par. 3. The authority citation for part 20 continues to read
in part as follows:
Authority: 26 U.S.C. 7805 • • •
Par. 4. Section 20.7520-3 is amended by adding the text of
paragraph (b) to read as follows:
.
§20.7520-3 Limitation on the application of section 7520.

•••••
(b)

Other limitations on the application of ~~ction

7520-- (1) In general--(i) Ordinary beneficial infer-

~

ests. For purposes of this section:
.. ,
(A) An ordinary annuity interest is the right to receive
a fixed dollar amount at the end of each year during one or
more measuring lives or for some other defined period. A
standard section 7520 annuity factor for an ordinary annuity
interest represents the present worth of the right to receive
$LOO per year for a defined period: using the interest rate
prescribed under section 7520 for the appropriate month. If
an annuity interest is payable more often than annually or is
payable at the beginning of each period, a special adjustment must be made in any computation with a standard
section 7520 annuity factor.
(B) An ordinary income interest is the right to receive
the income from or the use of property during one or more
measuring lives or for some other defined period. A standard section 7520 income faCtor for an ordinary income
interest represents the present worth of the right to receive
the income from $1.00 for a defined period, using the
interest rate prescribed under section 7520 for the appropriate month.
(e) An ordinary remainder or reversionary interest is
the right to receive an interest in property at the end of one
or more measuring lives or for some other defined period. A
standard section 7520 remainder factor for an ordinary
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remainder or reversionary interest represents the present.
worth of the right to receive $1.00 at the end of a defined
period, using the interest rat"e prescribed under section 7520
for the appropriate month.
(ii) Certain restricted beneficial interests. A restricted
beneficial interest is an annuity, income, remainder, or
reversionary interest that is subject to any contingency,
power, or other restriction, whether the restriction is provided for by the terms of the trust, will, or other governing
instrument or is caused by other circumstances. In general,
a . standard section 7520 annuity, income, or remainder
factor m~y not be used to value a restricted beneficial
interest. However, a special section 7520 annuity, income, or
remainder factor may be used to value a restricted beneficial interest under some circumstances. See Example 4 in
§20.7520-3(b)(2)(iv) and Example 2 in §20.7520- 3(b)(4),
which illustrate situations where special section 7520 actuarial factors are needed to take into account limitations on
beneficial interests. See §20.7520-1(c) for requesting a special. factor from the Internal Revenue Service.
(iii) Other beneficial interests. If, under the provisions
of §20.7520-3(b), the interest rate and mortality components·'
prescribed under section 7520 are not applicable in determining the value of any annuity, income, remainder, or
reversionary interest, the actual fair market value of the
interest (determined without regard to section 7520) is. based
on all of the facts and circumstances if and to the extent
permitted by the Code provision applicable to the property
interest.
(2) Provjsions of governing instrument and other
limttations 'on source of payment--(i) Annuities. A
standard section 7520 annuity factor is not to be used to
- deter~ine the present value of an annuity for a specified
te~ :~f years or the life of one or more individuals unless
. the effe~t of the trust, will, or other governing instrument is
. to ensure thae the annuity will be paid for the entire defined
period. In .the case of an annuity payable from a trust or
other llmiJed fund, the annuity is not considered payable for
the ~ntire defined period if, considering the applicable sec~
tion 7520 interest rate, the annuity is expected to exhaust
the fund before the last possible annuity payment is made in
full. ]for this purpose, it must be assumed that it is possible
for each measuring life to survive until age 110, because
:. everj standard section 7520 annuity factor is calculated on
• the. basis of that assumption. If it is determined that the
trust or other fund from which an annuity is to be paid may
exhaust before the end of the defined period of the annuity,
it will be necessary to calculate a special section 7520
annuity factor that takes into account the ·facts and circumstances that may exhaust the trust or fund.
(ti) Income and Similar Interests--(A) Beneficial
enjoyment. A standard section 7520 income factor for an
ordinary income interest is not to be used. to determine the
pr~ent value of an income or similar interest in trust for a
term of years, or for the life of one or more individuals,
unless the effect of the trust, will, or other governing
instrument is to provide the income beneficiary with that
degree of beneficial enjoyment of the property during the
term of the income interest that the principles of the law of
. trusts accord to a person who is unqualifiedly designated as
the income beneficiary of a trust for a similar period of
time. This degree of beneficial enjoyment is provided only if
it was the transferor'S intent, as manifested by the provisions of the governing instrument and the surrounding circumstances, that the trust provide an income interest for the
income beneficiary during the specified period of time that
is consistent with the value of the trust corpus' and with its
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preservation. In determining whether a trust arrangement
evidences that intention, the treatment required or permitted with respect to individual items must be considered in
relation to the entire system provided for in the administration of the subject trust. Similarly, in determining the
present value of the right to use tangible property (whether
or not in trust) for one or more measuring lives or other
specified period of time, the interest rate component prescribed under section 7520 and §20.7520-1 is not to be used
unless, during the specified period, the beneficiary is entitled to that degree of use, possession, and enjoyment of the
property that an outright owner would be entitled to exercise during a similar period of time.
(B) Diversions of income and corpus. A standard section 7520 income factor for an ordinary income interest is
not to be used to value an income interest or similar interest
in property for a term of years, or for one or more measuring lives. if-(1) The trust, will, or other governing instrument requires
or permits the beneficiary's income or other enjoyment to
be withheld, diverted, Qr accumulated for another person's
benefit without the consent of the income beneficiary; or
(2) The governing instrument requires or permits trust
corpus to be withdrawn from the trust for another person's
benefit without the consent of the income beneficiary during
the income beneficiary's term of enjoyment and without
accountability to the income beneficiary for such diversion.
(iii) Remainder and reversionary interests. A standard
section 7520 remainder interest factor for an ordinary remainder or reversionary interest is not to be used to determine the present value of a remainder or reversionary
interest (whether in trust or otherwise) unless, consistent
with the preservation and protection that the law of trusts
would provide for a person who is unqualifiedly designated
as the remainder benefiCiary of a trust for a similar duration, the effect of the administrative. and dispositive provisions for the interest or interests that precede the remainder
or reversionary interest is to assure that the property will
be adequately preserved and protected from erosion, invasion, depletion, or damage until the remainder or reversionary interest takes effect in possession and enjoyment. This
degree of preservation and protection is provided only if it
was the transferor's intent, as manifested by the provisions
of the arrangement and the surrounding circumstances, that
the entire disposition provide the remainder or reversionary
beneficiary with an undiminished interest in the property
"
transferred.
(iv) Pooled income fund interests_ In general, pooled
income funds are created and administered to achieve a
special rate of return. A beneficial interest in a pooled
income fund is not ordinarily valued using a standard section 7520 income or remainder interest factor. The present
value of a beneficial interest in a pooled income fund is
determined according to rules and special remainder factors
prescribed in §42(c)-B of this chapter (Income Tax
Regulations ).
(v) Examples. The provisions of this paragraph (bX2) are
illustrated by the following examples:
Example 1. Unproductive property. The decedent's
will provides for a bequest of corporation stock to a trust
under the terms of which all of the trust income is payable
to the decedent's child for life. After the death of the life
income beneficiary, the trust is to terminate and the trust
property is to be distributed to the decedent's grandchild.
The trust specifically authorizes, but does. not require, the
trustee to retain the shares of stock. The corporation has
paid no dividends on this stock during the past 5 years, and
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there is no indication that this policy will change in the near
future. Under applicable state law, the corporation is considered to be an adequately sound growth investment for a
trust with diversified investments because the corporation's
practice of retaining its earnings has caused the value of the
corporation stock to increase commensurately each year.
The facts and circumstances, including applicable state law,
indicate that the life income beneficiary would not be able
to compel the trustee to make the trust corpus productive in
conformity with the requirements for a lifetime trust income interest under applicable local law. Therefore, the life
income interest in this case is considered nonproductive.
Consequently, the income interest may not be valued actuarially under this section.

Example 2. Beneficiary's right to make trust productive. The facts are the same as in Example 1, except that
the trustee is not specifically authorized to retain the shares
of stock. Further, the terms of the trust specifically provide
that the, life income benefiCiary may require the trustee to
make the trust corpus productive consistent with income
yield standards for trusts under applicable state law. Under
that law, the minimum rate of income that a productive
trust may produce is substantially below the section 7520
interest 'rate for the month of the decedent's death. In this
case, because the income beneficiary has the right to compel
the trustee to make the trust productive for purposes of
applicable local law during the beneficiary'S lifetime, the
income interest is. considered an ordinary income interest
for purposes of this paragraph, and the standard section
7520 life income interest factor may be used to determine
the present value of the income interest.
Example 3. Discretionary invasion of corpus. The
decedent transfers property to a trust under the terms of
which all of the trust income is to be paid to the decedent's
child for life and the remainder of the trust is to be
distributed to. a grandchild. The trust authorizes the trustee
without restriction to distribute corpus to the decedent's
surviving spouse for the spouse's comfort and happiness. In
this case, because the trustee's power to invade trust corpus
is unrestricted, the exercise of the power could result in the
termination of the income interest at any time. Consequently,the income interest is' not considered an ordinary income
interest for purposes of this paragraph, and may not be
valued actuarially under this section.
Example 4. Limited invasion of corpus. The decedent
bequeaths property to a trust under the terms of which all of
the trust income is to b'e paid to the decedent's child for life
and the remainder is to be distributed to the decedent's
grandchild. The trust authorizes the child to withdraw up to
$5,000 per' year from the trust corpus. In this case, the
child's power to invade trust corpus is limited to an ascertainable amount each year. Annual invasions of any amount
. would be expec.ted to progressively dimiriish the property
from which the child's income is paid. Consequently, the
income interest is not considered an ordinary income interest for purposes of this paragraph, and the standard section
7520 income interest factor may not be used to determine
the present value cif the income interest. Nevertheless, the
present value of the child's income interest is ascertainable
by making a special actuarial calculation that would take
into account not only the initial value of the trust corpus, the
section 7520 interest rate for the month of the transfer, and
the mortality component for the child's age, but also the
assumption that the trust corpus will decline at the rate of
$5,000 each year during the child's lifetime. The child's right
to receive an amount not in excess of $5,000 per year may
be separately valued in this instance and, assuming the trust
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person age 60 (7.4230) may not be used to determine the
present value of the charitable organization's annuity interest because there is at least a 50 percent probability that the
measuring life will die within 1 year. Instead, a special
section 7520 annuity factor must be computed that takes
into account the projection of the child's actual life
expectancy.
(5) Additional Limitations Section 7520 does not apply
to the extent provided by the Internal Revenue Service in
revenue rulings or revenue procedures.
(6) Effective date. The provisions of this paragraph (b)
are effective with respect to estates of decedents dying after
the date these regulations are published as final regulations
in the Federal Register.

corpus would not exhaust before the child would attain age
110, would be considered an ordinary annuity interest.
Example 5. Power to consume. The decedent devises a
life estate in 3 parcels of real estate to the surviving spouse
with the remainder to a child. The decedent also confers
upon the spouse an unrestricted power to consume the
property, which includes the right to sell part or all of the
property and to use the proceeds for the spouse's support,
comfort, happiness, and other purposes. Any portion of the
property or its sale proceeds remaining at the death of the
surviving spouse is to vest by operation of law in the child at
that time. In this case, the surviving spouse's power to
consume the corpus is unrestricted, and the exercise of the
power could entirely exhaust the remainder interest during
the life of the spouse. Consequently, the remainder interest
is not considered an ordinary remainder interest for purposes of this paragraph and may not be valued actuarially
under this section.

PART 25--GIFT TAX; GIFTS MADE
AFTER DECEMBER 31,1954

(3) Mortality component. (i) Terminal illness cases.
Par. 5. The authority citation for part 25 continues to read
Except as provided in paragraph (bX3Xii) of this section, the
in part as follows:
mortality component prescribed under section 7520 is not to
Authority: 26 U.S.C. 7805 .* •
be used to determine the present value of an annuity,
Par. 6. Section 25.7520-3 is amended by adding the text of
income interest, remainder interest, or reversionary interest
paragraph (b) to read as follows:
if an individual who is a measuring life dies or is terminally
ill at the time of the decedent's death. For purposes of this .
§25.7520-3 Limitation on the application of section 7520.
paragraph (b)(3), an individual who is known to have an
incurable illness or other deteriorating physical condition is
• * •••
considered terminally ill if there is at least a 50 percent
probability that the individual will die within 1 year.
(b) Other limitations on the application of section
(ii) Exceptions. If, in the case of the allowance of the
7520--(1) In general--(i) Ordinary beneficial intercredit for tax on a prior transfer under section 2013, the taxests. For purposes of this section:
in the transferor's estate was finally determined withol1t~···,<,.".,:JA) An ordinary annuity interest is the right to receive
regard to the fact that one or more measuring lives were <" .. a fix.ed dollar amount at the end of each year during one or
terminally ill at the time of the transferor's death, the value ... ~ .. }jiore measuring lives or for some other defined period. A
of any transferred interest dependent on any of those lives .-. :·standard·section 7520 annuity factor for an ordinary annuity
shall be detE!rmined for purposes of section 2013 without
interest represents the present worth of the right to receive
regard to the fact that those measuring lives were terminal. $1.00 per year for a defined period, using the interest rate
ly ill. In addition, the value of a decedent's reversionary
prescribed under section 7520 for the appropriate month. If
interest under section 2037(b) or 2042(2) shall be determined
an annuity interest is payable more often than annually or is
without regard to the physical condition of the deGedent
payable at the beginning of each period, a special adjustimmediately before death.
.: . .
mentmust be made in any computation With a 'standard
(4) Examples. The provisions of paragraph (b)(3) of this
sectiori 7520 annuity factor.
section are illustrated by the following examples:.
. (B) An ordinary income interest is the right to receiVE!
Example 1. Simultaneous deaths. The decedent's
the income from or the use of property during one or more
measuring lives or for some other defined period. A standestablishes a trust to pay income to the decedent's surviving
spouse for life. The will provides that, upon the spouse's
ard section 7520 income factor for an ordinary income
interest represents the present worth of the right to receive
death, or if the spouse fails to survive the decedent, the trust
the income from $1.00 for a defined period, using the
property is to pass to the decedent's children. The decedent
and the decedent's spouse die simultaneously in an accident
interest rate prescribed under section 7520 for the appropriate month. However, in the case of certain gifts made after
under circumstances in which it was impossible to determine who survived the other. Applicable state law presumes
October 8, 1990, if the donor does not retain a qualified
that the decedent died first with the result that the property
annuity, unitrust, or reversionary iriterest, the value of any
interest is considered to have passed in trust for the benefit
interest retained by the donor is considered to be zero if the
of the spouse for life, after which the remainder is to be
remainder benefiCiary is a member of the donor's family.
distributed to the decedent's children. Therefore, the
See §25.2702-2.
spouse's life income interest may not be valued under this
(C) An ordinary remainder or reversionary interest is
section.
the right to receive an interest in property at the end of one
Example 2. Terminal illness. The decedent bequeaths
or more measuring lives or for some other defined period. A
$1,000,000 to a trust under the terms of which the trustee is
standard section 7520 remainder factor for an ordinary
to pay $103,000 per year to a charitable organization during
remainder or reversionary interest represents the present
the life of the decedent's child. Upon the death of the child,
worth of the right to receive $1.00 at the end of a defined
the remainder in the trust is to be distributed to the deceperiod, using the interest rate prescribed under section 7520
dent's grandchild. The child, who is age 60, has been diagfor the appropriate month.
nosed with an incurable illness, and there is at least a 50
(ii) Certain restricted beneficial interests. A restricted
percent probability of the child dying within 1 year. The
beneficial interest is an annuity, income, remainder, or
section 7520 interest rate for the month of the decedent's
reversionary interest that is subject to any contingency,
death is 10.6 percent. The standard life annuity factor for a
power, or other restriction, whether the restriction is pro-

will .;.
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vided for by the terms of the trust, will, or other governing
instrument or is caused by other circumstances. In general,
a standard section 7520 annuity, income, or remainder
factor may not be used to value a restricted beneficial
interest. However, a special section 7520 annuity, income, or
remainder factor may be used to value a restricted beneficial interest under some circumstances. See Examples 3, 4,
and 5 in §25.7520-3(b)(2)(iv) and the Example in §25.75203(b)( 4), which illustrate situations in which special section
7520 actuarial factors are needed to take into account
limitations on beneficiaL,interests. See §25.7520-1(c) for requesting a special factor from the Internal Revenue Service.
(iii) Other beneficial interests. If, under the prOVisions
of §25.7520-3(b), the interest rate and mortality components
prescribed under section 7520 are not applicable in determining the value of any annUity, income, remainder, or
reversionary interest, the actual fair market value of the
interest (determined without regard to section 7520) is based
on all of the facts and circumstances if and to the extent
permitted by the Internal Revenue Code provision applicable to the property interest.

(2) Provisions of governing instrument and other
limitations on source of payment--(i) Annuities. A
standard section 7520 annuity factor is not to be used to
determine the present value of an annuity for a specified
term of years or the life of one or more individuals unless
the effect of the trust, will, or other governing instrument is
to ensure·that the annuity will be paid for the entire defined
period. In the case of an annuity payable from a trust or
other limited fund, the annuity is not considered payable for
the entire defined period if, considering the applicable section 7520 interest rate, the annuity is expected to exhaust
the fund before the last possible annuity payment is made in
full. For this purpose, it must be assumed that it is possible
for each measuring life to survive until age 110, because
every standard section 7520 annuity factor is calculated on
the basis of that assumption. If it is determined that the
trust or other fund from which an annuity is to be paid may
exhaust before the end of the defined period of the annuity,
it will be necessary to calculate a special section 7520
annuity factor that takes into account the facts and circumstances that may exhaust the trust or fund.
(ii) Income and similar interests--(A) Beneficial
enjoyment. A standard section 7520 income factor for an
ordinary income interest is not to be used to determine the
present value of an income or similar interest in trust for a
term of years, or for the life of one or more individuals,
unless the effect of the trust, will, or other governing
instrument is to provide the income beneficiary with that
degree of beneficial enjoyment of the property during the
term of the income interest that the principles of the law of
trusts accord to a person who is unqualifiedly designated as
the income beneficiary of a trust for a similar period of
time. This degree of beneficial enjoyment is provided only if
it was the transferor's intent, as manifested by the provisions of the governing instrument and the surrounding circumstances, that the trust provide an income interest for the
income benefiCiary during the specified period of time that
is consistent with the value of the trust corpus and with its
preservation. In determining whether a trust arrangement
evidences that intention, the treatment required or permitted with respect to individual items must be considered in
relation to the entire system provided for in the administration of the subject trust. Similarly, in determining the
present value of the right to use tangible property (whether
or not in trust) for one or more measuring lives or other
specified period of time, the interest rate component pre-

6-10-94

scribed under section 7520 and §25.7520-1 is not to be used
unless, during the specified period, the beneficiary is entitled to that degree of use, possession, and enjoyment of the
property that an outright owner would be entitled to exercise during a similar period of time.
(B) Diversions of income and corpus. A standard section 7520 income factor for an ordinary income interest is
not to be used to value an income interest or similar interest
in property for a term of years, or for one or more measuring lives, i f - (1) The trust, will, or other governing instrument requires
or permits the beneficiary's income or other enjoyment to
be withheld, diverted, or accumulated for another person's
benefit without the consent of the income beneficiary; or
(2) The governing instrument requires or permits trust
corpus to be withdrawn from the trust for another person's
benefit without the consent of the income beneficiary during
the income beneficiary's term of enjoyment and without
accountability to the income beneficiary for such diversion.
(iii) Remainder and reversionary interests. A standard
section 7520 remainder interest factor for an ordinary remainder or reversionary interest is not to be used to deter~
mine the present value of a remainder or reversionary
interest (whether in trust or otherwise) unless, consistent
with the preservation and protection that the law of trusts
would provide for a person who is unqualifiedly designated
as the remainder benefiCiary of a trust for a similar duration, the effect of the administrative and dispositive provisions for the interest or interests that precede the remainder
or reversionary interest is to assure that the property will
be adequately preserved and protected from erosion, invasion, depletion, or damage until the remainder or reversionary interest takes effect in possession and enjoyment. This
degree of preservation and protection is provided only if it
was the transferor's intent, as manifested by the provisions
of the arrangement and the surrounding circumstances, that
the entire disposition provide the remainder or reversionary
beneficiary with an undiminished interest in the property
transferred.
(iv) Pooled income fund interests. In general, pooled
income funds are created and administered to achieve a
special· rate of return. A beneficial interest in a pooled
income fund is not ordinarily valued Using a standard section 7520 income or remainder interest factor. The present
value of a beneficial interest in a pooled income fund is
determined according to rules and special remainder factors
prescribed in §1.S42(c)-S of this chapter (Income Tax
Regulations).
(v) Examples. The provisions of this paragraph (b)(2) are
illustrated by the following examples:
Example 1. Unproductive property. The donor transfers corporation stock to a trust under the terms of which all
of the trust income is payable to a child for life. After the
death of the life income beneficiary, the trust is to terminate
and the trust property is to be distributed to a grandchild.
The trust specifically authorizes, but does not require, the
trustee to retain the shares of stock. The corporation has
paid no dividends on this stock during the past 5 years, and
there is no indication that this policy will change in.the near
future. Under applicable state law, the corporation is considered to be an adequately sound growth investment for a
trust with diversified investments because the corporation's
practice of retaining its earnings has caused the value of the
corporation stock to increase commensurately each year.
The facts and circumstances, including applicable state law,
indicate that the income beneficiary would not have the
legal right to compel the trustee to make the trust corpus
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productive in conformity with the requirements for a lifeest may be determined by using the section 7520 unitrust
time trust income interest under applicable local law.
factor for a term of years or a prior death.
Therefore, the life income interest in this case is considered
Example 5. Eroding corpus in an annuity trlLst. The
nonproductive. Consequently, the income interest may not
donor, who is age 60 and in normal health, transfers properbe valued actuarially under this section.
ty worth $1,000,000 to a trust. The trust will pay a 10
Example 2. Beneficiary's right to make trust producpercent ($100,000 per year) annuity to a charitable orgaijizative. The facts are the same as in Example 1, except that
tion for the life of the donor, and the remainder is to be
the trustee is not specifically authorized to retain the shares
distributed to the donor's child. The section 7520 rate for the
of corporation stock. Further, the terms of the trust specifi. month of the transfer is 6.8 percent. Because the 10 percent
cally provide that the life income beneficiary may require
annuity payout rate exceeds the 6.8 percent income and
the trustee to make the trust corpus productive consistent
growth rate that the trust is expected to experience each
with income yield standards for trusts under applicable
year, the annuity payout must ·be assumed to progressively
state law. Under that law, the minimum rate of income that
erode the corpus. Using an interest rate of 6.8 percent, an
a productive trust may produce is substantially below the
annuity payout of $100,000 per year will exhaust a
section 7520 interest rate on the valuation date. In this case,
. $1,000,000 trust corpus 'in 18 years. The final payment at the
because the income beneficiary has the right to compel the
end of the 18th year will consist of a partial payment of
trustee to make the trust productive for purposes of applica$32,712. Under section 7520, the standard life annuity facble local law during the beneficiary's lifetime, the income
tors are based on the assumption that any person may
interest is considered an ordinary income interest for pursurvive until age 110. This means that the standard life
poses of this paragraph, and the standard section 7520 life
annuity factor for age 60 (9.8585) takes into account the
income factor may be used to determine the value of the
separate probabilities that a person age 60 may surv~ve to
income interest. However, in . the case of gifts made after
receive each of 50 different annuity payments. Howev~r, in
October 8, 1990, if the donor was the life income beneficiary,
the present case, because of the eroding corpus, the person
the value of the income interest would be considered to be
age 60 can be assumed to receive no more than 17 $100,000
zero in this situation. See §25.2702-2. .:
annuity payments, regardless how long that person might
. Example 3. Annuity trust funded with unproductive
survive. Therefore; the standard life annuity factor for a
property. The donor, who is age 60, transfers corporation
person age 60 (9.8585) is not applicable in this case, and
stock worth $1,000,000 to a trust. The trust will pay a 6
special section 7520 annuity factors that take into account
percent ($60,000 per year) annuity in cash or other property
the 18-yea~ limitation on the annuity payout must be used.
to the donor for 10 years or until the donor's prior death.
The special annuity factor for the present value of the right
Upon the termination of the trust, the trust property is to b~.. _ to receive $1.00 per year for 17 years or until the prior death
distributed to the donor's child. The section 7520 rate for the, ;.' --qfa person age 60 is $8.6121, and the special factor for the
month of the transfer is 8.2 percent. .The corporation has'"
present value of the right to receive $1.00 in 18 years if a
paid no dividends on the stock during the past 5 years, and .. ·~.;.:_p'erson ~ge 60 survives is $.1836. The present value of the
there is no indication that this policy will change in the near' - .. charitable annuity interest is $867,269 ($100,000 X 8.6121
future. Under applicable state law, the corporation is con. plus $32,712 X .1836).
.
sidered to be a sound investment for a trust with diversified
(3) MoTjality component. The mortality component prescri~ed.under section 7520 is not to be used to determine the
investments because the corporation's practice of retaining
its earnings has caused the value of the corporation stock to.
present value of an annuity, income interest, remainder
grow commensurately each year. Considering the 6 percent
interest, or reversionary interest if an individual who is a
annuity payout rate and the 8.2 percent section 7520 interest
measJIring life dies or is terminally ill at the time the gift is .
. rate, the trust corpus is considered sufficient to pay this
completed. For purposes of this paragraph (b)(3), an individannuity for the entire 10-year term of the trust, or even
ual who is known to have an incurable illness or other
indefinitely. Thus, though the trust assets not likely to earn 'o' deteriorating physical condition is considered termillally ill
dividend income during the term of the trust, the assets
if there is at least" a 50 percent probability that the individual will die within 1 year. .
.
.
would be assumed to appreciate at the rate of 8.2 percent
per year if there were no income~ Therefore, the trust's sole
(4) Example. The provisions of paragraph (b)(3) of this
investment in this corporation is not expected to adversely
section are illustrated by the following example:
. .
affect the interest of either the annuity beneficiary or the
Example. Terminal illness. The donor transfers properre~ainder beneficiary. The trust specifically authorizes, but
ty worth $1,000,000 to a child in exchange for the child's
does not require, the trustee to retain the shares of stock.
promise to pay the donor $103,000 per year for the donor's
Although it appears that neither beneficiary would be able
life. The donor is age 60 but has been diagnosed with an
to compel the trustee to ma:ke the trust corpus produce
inc\lrable. illness and has at least a 50 percent probability of
investment income, the annuity interest in this case is
dying within 1 year. The section 7520 interest rate for the
considered to be an ordinary annuity interest, and a section
month of the transfer is 10.6 percent, and the standard
7520 annuity factor may be used to determine the present
annuity factor at that interest rate for a person age 60 in
value of the annuity. In this case, the section 7520 annuity
normal health is 7.4230. Thus, if the donor were not termifactor would represent the right to receive $UiO per year
nilily ill, the present value of the annuity would be $764,569
for a term of 10 years or the prior death of a person age 60.
($103;000 X 7.4230). Because there is at least a 50 percent
Example 4. Unitrust funded with unproductive propprobability that the donor will not survive for 1 more year,
erty. The facts are the same as in Example 3, except that
the standard section 7520 annuity factor may not be used to
the donor has retained a unitrust interest equal to 7 percent
determine the present value of the donor's annuity interest.
of the value of the trust property, valued as of the beginning
Instead, a special section 7520 annuity factor must be
of each year. Although the trust corpus is non income produccomputed that takes into account the projection of the
ing, the present value of the donor's retained unitrust interdonor's actual life expectancy.
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(5) Additional limitations. Section 7520 does not apply to
the extent provided by the Internal Revenue Service in
revenue rulings or revenue procedures.
(6) Effective date. The provisions of this paragraph are
effective with respect to gifts made after the date these

(OTR)
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regulations are published as final regulations in the Federal
Register.
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lsi Margaret Milner Richardson
Commissioner of Internal Revenue
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REGULAR SESSION 1994
SENATE BILL NO. 311

WEDNESDAY; MARCH 16,1994

The following bill was reported to the Ho~ from

the Senate and ordered to be printed.
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AN ACT relating to health care decisions.

Bt it tnacted by the Gerumn Assembly of the Commonwealth of Kentucky:
SECTION 1.

A NEW SECTION OF KRS CHAPTER 311 IS CREATED TO

2

READ AS FOLLOWS:

3

As used in Sections 1 to

4

(J)

"Adr!ll" meanJ a person

ei~hteen

(1S) years of afe or older ang wllQ is of squad

miruL.

5
6

n ofthis Act;

(2)

"Advance directiye" means: g lirine will directixe made in aHordgnce with

7

Sections 1 to 12 of this Act. g Urine win or desiengtion of health care

1.\

executed prior to the effectiye date of Septions 1 to 12 of this A cl. and any other

9

document thai provides directi9ns relaliff to health cart to be provided to the
Del1QtJ executine the document.

10
11

(3)

(4)

(5)

16

17

~)

..
wntinlloluntarily

made by an adult

(1L "Grantor' meqns an aduY who has executed an adyance directive in accordance

with Sections ., .to 12 of this A ct.
(8)

"Health ewe decision" means Consenting to. or withdrawing consent for anY

m,di&al Slt'9ctdurt, treatment or jnteryeotion.

22
23

'n

"DiI'tcve
ti " means amn~
[' . lfl1l1ctiye
'U d'
..

in accQrdance with the provisions of Sections 1 to 12 of this Act,

20

21

"Decisional cauacjt,y" means the ability (9 make and communicate a health care
decjsjoQ.

18
19

"AUendinr physician" means the uhvrician whQ has.primary ros.ponsibiljty for
the treatment and care of the.l'qdUli.

14

'15

"Artificiqlly prorided nutrition and hydratjpn" means sustenance or fluids that

are 4tOficiaIlv 9l.: IecbnQIQiical{y ~ministered.

12
13

surro~gl!!

(9)

"Health Cartfacili/J" means any

institu.tion, place. buildinf, aten~ or portion

24

thereof., public or priyal(. whether oCfaniud for profit or not. uud.,..QQerakd. or

25

desi~ned

to prorlde medical diaenosis. treatment "ursine. rehabilitative. or
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preventive car~ and licensed pursuant to KBS Chapter 216B.
:2

!J..QJ. "Health carr orovider" means

care facility Qr l1rovidfr of healtb

3

sea ices, includin, but nat limited to. those licensed. certified, or ",ulated under

4

th' prOVisions of KBS Chapters 211, 216, 311.312, 313. or 314.

5

(J 1)

"Life·"rolon:ing treatment" meqns qny mediCal procedure, treatment. Or

6'

intervention which.'

7

(G)

9

Utilizes mechanical or other artificial means

to sustain, prolong, res/Q[£, Qr

supplant a SJ2Qntaoeous vital function: and

8

(b)

When administered to a ment lfOuld serve only to "rolom:· the

dyiu~

10

process. "Life-proloaeing treatment" shaU not include the administratjon

II

of medicqtjon or the "eaoemanc, of aay medicqi proceJiJu:e deemed

12

"'cessary W alleviate Rain.

13

(12) "Pfnnqnently unconscious" means. a condition which. to

a reasonable d~r€e of

14

medical probability, as determined solely by the ['alient's qttendine l>/usician and

15

Qne (J 1. gl!Jer uhysjcian gn clinical examination.

16

of cerebral cortical functions indicative of consc;iou:):nco¥s or behavioral

17

interaction with the environment,

18

19

20

is characteriud by qn qbsence

OJ) "Ph.Ymtgn" means a Rerson licensed to practice medici", in.Jhe Commonwealth
QfKeatucky.

(14) "Responsible party" megns an adult who has authority untler Section 6 Qj this

21

del t!J make

22

will directive.

23

(15) "Surro~ale"

24

~

gni health

a health care decision for a patient who has not executed a livin~

means an adult who has beea desimated to make health care

decisions in accordance with Sections 1 to -12 orchjs A,t.

25

(16) "Terminal condition" means a condition caused by injury, disease, or iUness

26

which, it;! a reasonable dewe of medical prob«bilit.y, as determined solely by tlte

27

pqtient's attendine physician and one

(1)
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other physician. is incurable and

irreversible and will result in death within a relatively shQrt time. and wheu.. the

applicatiQn of life-Drolon~in~ treatment would seae only

2

tQ

grtiJicially

p[Qlon~

. the dying urocess.

3

SECTION 2.

4

;,-...'

A NEW SEcrION OF KRS CHAPTER 31\ IS CREATED TO

5

READ AS FOLLOWS:

6

(l)

An adult with decisional

,aracily may

make a written living will gjre'llve that

7

dan

any or all of the (ollow;ne:

8

Ca)

Directs the withholdiur or withdraw"' o( [ife-urolonrjne treatment: or

9

Cb)

DjlXcis the witbholdini Qr

withdrawql of artificjally provided dutdtion or

hYdration; or

10

(e)

11

DnifnateS one (l) or more adults as. a surrogate or succeSSQr surrOK,afe to

12

make heqlth care decisions on behalf at the ,raptor.

13

which llf'a

14

IUlgnjmous COBrent afaa the actinr surrogates unless the

15

lU1Jyides otherwise.

16

(2)

or more surrogates are serving. all decisions shall be bJ

adVance directive

this section shaa be honored by a wntqr's family. regular fgrnilY llhysician or

tg

18

fUkwnr

19

patital.
(J)

lleriod in

Exce;t a,s provided in Section Z q(thil Act, a Iivin¥ will dirrctiye miule pucsuant

17

20

(2)

Durin~ an~

ph)'ficiqn, and any

heSlUh care

(qcilifJ' of or in Which the grantor is a

for purpQSU of Sections 1 to 12 or this Aflt l1qtWcgtjon to

any emer~enc)!

bJ KRS Chqpter 211 or any paramedic as defined

21

medic;Y responder

22

b.1 KRS ChCU'ter 3Il, of a peqon's authentic wish not to be resuscitated shall be

23

recQfnil,ed QnlY iron a standard (orm' or identific{llitm.,cwroved

24

Board QJ Medical Uten!u,.,. in consultation with the Cabinet fur Human

25

RtSQurcet

26

SECTION 3.

27

a.t defined

by the Kentucky

A NEW SECTION OF KRS CHAPTER 311 IS CREATED TO

READ AS FOLLOWS:
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(J)
~

A livine will directive made pursuant
fQlIowin~

tp

Section 2 of this Act shall be
~efific

2

substantially in the

3

which are in accordance with (lfceJ?1eq mediCal practice and not wecificqlly

4

prohibited by any 9the! statute. [faro Qtb-er specific di,.e,tiQM are held by a court

5

of WropriqJe iurisdiction

6

directive,

10

(orm, and mQl' include alha:

directions

be invalid. that invalidity shgll not. af(ect th{

7

"Livinr}fill D;,ecJju

8

My wishes re~ardin, life-prolonging treatment and artiftcially D~vided nutritiqn and

9

hydration to be provided to me ifl no·lQnger haye decisional capacity. have a lermlltill

10

condition. or become QermanentlY unconscious haye been indicated b.y checking and

11

initialing the appropriate lines below. By checking and initiqling the appropriate lines.

12

1 5Pecifl,g~

13

_

14

decisions for me in accordance with this directjyc when 1 no lon"r haye decisjonal

15

capqcity. [[

16

"",,""""'''''''''''''''' as my health care sunoe'ale(s).

17

Any prior designation is revoked.

18

If 1 do

19

physician. If 1 haye desirnated a suuoz.flIf. my suuQe'Clk shall cQwU1y with my wishes

20

asindic.ated beJcv£:

21

~

22

naturallJ

23

medi~al

24

we

25

....... Authorite the wjthhoimng or withdrawal of artificially PrQvided food. water. Qr

26

other artificially proyided nourishmentor auids.

27

~

DesiraW

"11"""".... " " ....

as

"';""'!!!!T!W'!!""'W

l7l]

health

ClUJ:

surromk(s) to mgkf health

Care

refuses or is not able to act (or me, [ t/esirnate

not "sirna', g surrout" the foUowin~ are my directions 10 my attendin~

Dinet that treatment be withheld or wjthd1JDfn. and that 1 be permitted to die

lfitiJ only the administration qf medicatiqn or the pedormance of any

trcgtm,nt deemed nectssm to alleviate pain. .

DO NOT qutltoriu that life.l'ro/Qnrinr treatment be withheld or withdrawn.

DO NOT authorize the withhQldin~ or withdrawal of artificially provided food.
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water. or ather artificiaUy p,-ayjded nourishment 0,. fluids,
A "(harite my mrro~te, desiznated qbove. 10 withhold or withdraw artificially

2

....

3

vrol'jdednourislzment or fluids. or other trea/ment if the suaoeale determines thgt

4

withholwnr or withdrawing is in my best intrrest,' but 1 do not

5

withholding Qr withdrawing,

6

In the absence of my abilitlUq 'gire directions revarding the use of Iiff-lZcolqnginc

7

tcJatment and artlflciaUy proyjded nutrition and hydration. it is my

g

directive shall be honored by my attending physician. my (gmily. and any surrogate

9

desi~nqted

10
11

manda~

int~ntion

that

that this

pU11uant to this directive as thr final expression Q,( my legal debt to lefuse

medical or sur~ical treatment and I accept the conseqyences of the refusal.

If 1 han heeD

d
djaV/Oie tU

Qreg·ant

Q' d

tbGl diar:naSJs. .IS kn own

ta my

attendjn~

r effect duri.g the Mum

0

(

J

m

12

.
physician,

13

Reernancy,

14

1 understqnd the fUll importa,f this dU:ective and 1 am emotionally and menIally

15

cQwpmnr to make this directiYL

·16

Sifneg this " .. dgy 0("",,," .. 19...

thlSITf
d' ctive

sh aII have

Signature gnd addU

17

"0 [arce 0

« 0(0£ rrantor.

18

In our joint presence. tbe uantof', who is of sound mind and €i~bteen years {If are. or

19

older. voluntarily dated and signed this wOOn, ar dilected it to be dated and limed /IlL

20

the erantor.

21

S,itryztuu and address Q[ witness·

22

Siznaluu and addreu Q[ witnas.

23

QJI

24

S:TA TE OF KENTUCKY)

2S

t .....

tr."County)

26

Befort me. the

27

ei~hte,eJl (lS) years of

undtrsj~ned

authority. came the

~rantor

whQ is of sound mind and

aee, or oldEr. and acknowledf£ui thai
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he voluntarily dated and
~

~

=
=----l

1

si~ned this

2

Done this

::::::::I

writini' or fljrected it to 1H sieved and dqted qs aboye.

'tf!

dca of """'" 19...

~

=

3

Signature. orNota" Public or other officer.

4

Dgte commission expires.·...."" .. ".

5

Execution of this dgcument restricts wilhholdinr and

6

proceduru. Consu« KenJucg Rev1sedStatutes or your alJorna, "

7

(2)

~

withdrawin~

of some medical

All adyanced c!irecUye shgll be in writing. dated. and sir,.ed by the VantOt. Qr at

8

the· rrantor's direction. and either witnessed

9

J2resence

of (he mntor and

a notarY public

ia the

by

two (2). or more gduUs in the

greKace qf each other, or acknowledfe4 ,.

or ather person quthorized to administer oaths. None of

to

biro"

1l

tiz, follow;,.,. shall be a wiIDe« to any advance directive made under this section.'

12

(q)

A bloqd relative of the uaatf/Cj

13

(b)

A beneficiary

fl.r the frantar under descent and distribution statutes of the

Commonwealth;

14

Cd

15

A n employee of a health cve racility in which the Va"to,"- ii a patient.

unleu IbJ. ,"U'lq1f' scml til a "olga R"~li£i

16

17

Cd)

An atkndin, phYsician oUb, grantor.· or

18

Cel

Arocze".on C#rectlY [manciaUy

19

(3)

A Renon desivrated

w

as a suUQ~at, llUltuaol to an adya,.«

20

at

21

surroratl •. if any; to theatiersdial

22

which

23

(4)

reuzoruibk for (he ~rqnfQr'i h~glth Can.

tim, by 2jvi"r written notice to the van to,.:

to

directive mQJ

resif,a

the immediate wc.ceSSOl

physicillnj and to any. heaUh care

fqc,Ujt.)1

is then waitinr for. the Stplozate to make a health care decision.

An employ(C. owner. director, or officer of

4

heaUh

care facility where the

24

ua"tar is a "sident or patient shall nol be designated or act as SUUall"te unless

2S

related ~ the ,rantor within the fourth dew" of cQns"n(ujnjb' aT affinity or q

26
27

. member orthe same rcliriaus order,

SECTION 4.

A NEW SECTION OF KRS CHAPTER 311 [S CREATED TO
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READ AS FOLLOWS:
:1

(ll

~
:;-~

An aelvance directive made Dunnam to Section 2 QfthisAQI may be revoked by:
(a)

3

A wririr;r

declarin~

an intention to revoke....wh;ch ""iiia, shall be sieved

gad dated by the frantor;

4

(bl

5

An oral statement of inteat to rqvQke made

6

c@qcia in the "resenee of&o

-7

care provider; 0"

Cd

8

(2)

(2)

adulls. one (J) of whom shall be a health

III

the wgntor or by some Qerson in the

An oral !I£Zltment by a vantol' with decisional capacit;y to revoke an advance

dirtctiyt shall override anYNevious written adrancq directive made.

11

12

decisjonal

fran/or's "resent, and at the Wlnta", direction.

9
10

Destruction of the document

ax a ~rantor with

(3)

A ax revOtation made puauant to this section shall become dfective immediatelli

13

dIJ attend;nr physician or health cQlU4cility Shall not be required to administer

14

treatment in

IS

reyocation is llceived, Upon receiyinr noli"

16

phYSjcian or health ~gre facility shqll record. in the aaametE medical record, the

17

rimc, date, and plgce oUhe notice «cripl. .No physician

18

sha« be SlIbie,' 10 any liability (or acting iQgOQd fqith "Don the knowledte. or

19

lack theaa.G Qj'the existetlt(t or reyocatioa ofan gdvance directive.

20

(4)

accordance

with the reyacation until the time noli" of the

at (he

reyacatian. the attendini

or health "gre fqcility

The desiuration.p(q health care mrrofllle made pursuant to Section 2 alibis Act
surro~ate'$

21

mo be revoked in whole Dr in Daetor the

22

at

23

desjgnation shaH woke an, Driar designation· unless the revocation. in whole or

24

in gart. issuec(fically negated.

25

SECTION 5.

DOWen reduced or limited

any time by the uantor. if Ihe eranlDl:..bas decisional capacity. A new

A NEW SECTION OF KRS CHAPTER 311 IS CREATED TO

26

READ AS FOLLOWS;

27

(]!

A SUUQrate

deri~nQted

puauaal to an advance directive rna): make health care
Page 7 of 16
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decisions fof' the (roalor which the grantor could make indi1!idually

if he or she

had decisiPnal capacify. plOyided aU the decisions shaU be .mgde in accordance

2
~

. with the desires of the frantor as indicated

3

in the advance directive,

Whea

wan consider the

4

making aay health care misionfQr the "aato4the surrogate

5

recommendation of the attendini physician. and hODor the .decjsion made by the

6

ucmtor as €:rRwsed in the advance wcJiVf,

7

(2)

The surrogate maY not make a health care decisjgn in any situation in which the

~

fran tar's qtteadinf physician has determined in rood f«jlh that the vantOr has

9

decisicnql cf1.U{(city, The gttenciinr, DitwcifW 3,hqU proceed as if ther, I!!ere no

10

desirnation

11

decision.

12

(3)

if the surrorate

i~

"!Hlrailable or refuses to make

a health

A health (are surrorate may quthorize the witht/cawal or withholdini

13

'artificia1lJ provided nutrition and hydratiqn in the (ollow;nr circumstances.'

14

(a)

When merilable death

is imminent. which

15

shan mean when geath if'Dect"

16

a few

au

17

cgee

Qf

for the pU'l1oses of this l2rovjsjon

by rraroaqble

medical ju~menb within

dalE Qr

When q pgtillli is in a permanently unconscious state if the fran tor has

18

executed an mance dkecJjye authoriijn~ the withholdin, Qr withdralf.gl of

19

artificiallv provided nutritioagnd hJdration; or
ee)

20

When the proriston

Qf

cu:tWcial nutrition '(Ulno' be physically Cljsimilated

b,y the Derron,' or

21

Cd)

22

When the burden Qf th~ provision of artificial nutation and hYdration itself

23

shaIl outwei:h its benefit. Even in the exce.ptions listed in parawuzhs(al.

24

Cb), and (d of this subsection. grtifjciallY.,p1'Ovided nutrition and hydration

25

shall not be withheld or withdrawn

if it is needed for comfort or the reUdol

26
27

(4)

NotwithstamiineJlJlilJ.
the exec«tiQ 11 of an advanc• diw:1iVI1 lif.
I
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,u,/ai"iar

(".!m,n'

and artificially provided nutritjon gng hydration shall be provided to a preen ant
woman unlessl to a reasonable d,tuee of medical certainty. as certified on (hf

1

~

attendin~

gh.J5ician and Qne

~hy"sician

3

woman's medical chart by the

4

who has eXamined the woman. ti,e prQcedwes win not maintain the woman in a

5

way to "eunit the CQntjnuinr clevelapment and live birth

6

be physjcally harmful to the woman. or "to lon, severe gain which cannot he

7

glleyjated by medicqtion.

8

SECfION 6.

9

10

(J)

Qf the

other

unborn child. will

A NEW SECTION OF KRS CHAPTER 311 IS CREATED TO

READ AS FOLLOWS:
(1)

If gn adult patient. who dues not have decisional capacity. has not execukd an

to

th~

altnl the advance directive does not addresS a

11

adyaace directive or

12

chcision thai muu be made. anyone

13

the foUowine Qrder af priority

14

arailgble. wining. and caml''',nt to

IS

decisions on behq1,fo fthe owent:

16

(q)

(1)

of the following rnDonSIble pqrties. in

if no inditidual

in a priQr class is reasonably

act. shan be q(llhqriud to make health

care

The judicially wointed pardiaa of the patient. if the ,"ardian hgs been

17

ClRZ?Ojnted and if

18

,uqtdignshilli

medical

d,dsions

are

within

the

seQue

19

Cb)

The SoRaus, of the RatiUlt;

20

Cd

A n adult child p( the Patient. or l' lbg patient has more than oae

21

the majoril] oj the adult 'hilda" \fIh" cue

22

consultation;

23

(d)

The "aarDlS af the aatient;

24

(e)

The nea,est liyin2 re1atjye

"«somma

of

(J)

the

child.

ayailable foe

o.t.the "atient or ijmQrethaa One (J) relative of

25

the same relation is reasonably ayailabJe (or consultation, a majority of the

26

Manst liYin~ refqfiyer.

27

(2)

In any case in which a health can decision is made

under this section, the.
=-=:-cj
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ge£isien shall be noted in writinf in the patient's medjcal records.
:!

[Jl

An jndjviduaLauthorized Ie conseat Lor anether under. this sectw ShqU act in

with an, advance directive executed by the indiliidual

3

good fqith! in accordance

4

whQ lacks decisienal capacity! and in the best internt of the individual who dOf5

.5

not have decisional capacity!

6

W.

A n individual authorizec{ to make a health cart decision under this section may

7

authoriz;e the withdrawal or withholdin, of artificiallY-proyitkd.· nutrition aTJd

8

hydration only in the circumstances as set forth in mbsection (3l of Section 5 of

9

this Act.

SECTION 7.

10

A NEW SECTION OF KRS CHAPTER 311 IS CREATED TO

11'

READ AS FOLLOWS:

12

(I)

It shall hI th, responsibility of the wan tor or the' responsible DartY of the uantor

13

to rupvide for notification to the uanlDc's attendine ,llhysicjan and health care

14

fqdlit.x where the grantor if a patient thgt an advgnce directive has peen

15

the uanloe iJ comatose. incompettnt. oe otherwise. mtmallv. or phuically

16

incapable,

17

Qf

18

make the liyiar win diactive

19

uantor's medical records.

20

(2l

any other person may notify the gtlfLnWI l'hyricjan

an adyanct directive. An

attendin~
Ot

Q,f the exislenH

ghysician whq is noCififd.

a copy

Qf

madf. [(

~hgU

the advimce directive

grQmgtll

a Dart. of the

An gtteadjne physician or health care fqcility which refuses to carnaly with the

21

adyanCl directive of «I patient or decision made by a surrofate

22

partJ shall immediateLY Worm the patient or the paJimt's reSllonsible party and

23

the ["milY or 2uaniian of the patient of the refusal. No physician or health caFf

24

facility which refuses to complY with the advance dire,me qf a qualified patient

25

Qr decision mqde by a responsible Qqrty

26

gnother physiciQIJ or heaUh care facility which will comply with the advanc(!

27

directive. Lf Ihe gatient, the family. or the iuardian of the ,,«film has requested

,

Dr

responsible

shall impede fM transfer of the patient to·

Page lOof 16
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,

1

~
I

j

and a"(hQOted a transfer. the transferrine attending physician and health care

~

~

2

facility shall s"@li

i

3

assistance medically nrerum for the continued care of the Dgtienl. to the

4

receiv;nr physicign and health care facility.

;

the

patient's medical records and other information or

d

~
I

~

.;;;;;;!

§;j

=-----,;;

S

(3)

=----=--=1

No phYsician, nurse. stqffmember. or emlliQ}!ee ora gublic Qr private h~~itql. or
taqUiO'. who shqll start in writing

6

employee of a public or gtivate health care

7

the haSlljtal or health care (qcilitJ -his objection to complYing with the qdvance

8

directive' of q rxWent or a he'alth care

9

Sections I

decision

qf g responsible

Dam

to

under

to 12 ottbis Act. an moral. reli(iQus. argrqfessional munds. shgn be
n:bwIl to.

10

regKiad to. or held liable (or

11

health cm decjsion as IOnr ~ lite physician. nurse. staff member. or employee

12

COMan" with the requirements of subsection (2) Qf this nclion reegrding patient

13

""tmeatio" and patient trQ!!sfer.

14

(4)

It $haU be unlawful discrimjngtoa

comply with th, adyance directive

Qr

pm"';" (or any peaon to imD0geDenalties or

15

tab disciplinary getion miDlt or deny or limit licenses. eerN,ticatioD$. df~rees.

16

or other

17

member. or employee whq

18

patient or a b,aUh carr decision b.y a t;fuansibll. EZgrtv under Sections 1 [2 12 gf

19

this del. asian, il3 th, physician, num stqfjmember. or ~mRIOJ'" complier with

20

the ProvtsWtlf

21

transfer.

22

SECTION 8.

23

~rqyals ~r documenq qf 'lllfJlification to

d

tfluw' to

~u~sectiolf (2) of

any gbysician. nUl'sestq'"

comply with the gdyance directive qf a

this section

r<,ardin, notification and

A NEW.SECTION OF KRS CHAPTER 311 IS CREATED TO

READ AS FOLLOWS:

=i
i

24

(J)

A health cgrc facility. physician; or other penon actinr under the directjon of a

25

Dbydcian shaY not be sult,iecl to criminal prosecution

26

.deemed to have eniA~ed in ultlmnsional conduct Ka resuU Qf the

Or

--1

cifil ligbility or be
withhQldin~
""')

27

or the withdrawal of life-Drolonrin& treatment or artificially provided nutrition
Page 11 of 16

A -182

~
.d
~

and hvdrqtion from
~

'='

4

Datiln' in « tenninal condition in qccordance with an

2

advance directive executed pursuant to Se.,tians 1 to 12 q(this Act. A "erson who

3

authorizes the withholding or withdtawal of life-proTone;nr tr;rQtment· or

4

artificially profided nutrition (md hYdmU(JR (ram q patient in a termjnal

5

conditioa in accordance with qn adyane, directive ,hall no' be subject to criminal

6

"rqscrcu#on or dyi1liqbUitv for 0, gction,

'~

;:::::::::
~

~

"7

W. An independent investiration of q surrogate', authority

mqU not be necessary

g

unleu II person is in "pssesSion of infonnatipn as to the

9

disqualification. No sunyr«t"

responSible

pam.

su"o~ate's

physiciao, or health egre

10

fgcilill gctini' in good faith. shall be mbject to criminal or ciyjlligbilia [or riyine

11

.instiuetion, IQ" a mrro"". mqkjni' a health car' decision. as q resDonsilzle UactY·

OJ tllil Aq.

12

under Section' 1 to 12

13

pursuant to Section Z of

14

the aantor's desirngtiqa oJ a SHuvrate or a
beaUh care decision by a C'IPQasible party undu Section! 1 io 12 of this A,t.
The pmvi$iolu of tbis Kctioll thaY tWIll unleu.it is maWR by a r;ruoh4erance

0i1. Act, the ,uwlater, ar reuwnsible D(111y's

instmctions or acting in reliance on

15
16

or carryi!, out. or afuring to carry oul

en

17

Q/tb, mdene, that fh, peaoRi

18

fa) . Autho ..

nunr or e(feetugtia r th, wrthholdi
.
pmlaarill. tWltmlllll;
ng 9r. lffthdrawl af life.

19

Givinr
. jnWuction, ll$ a fUno,,",·

20

(b)

21

(£1 Makin,
a health carr deClslO
..
•
( . Act..
RIllA mp!!!!Ijblc JIf!lf1 under£ecdqn I
I!l.tlllS

wU

22

23

(d)

24
25

26

~
~

27

Cgminr out.

or reJusint to Carry Ollt. tle !iUUQrate's or responsible party's.

inl/tUctiQW; qr

(e)

Actinr

ira

reliane; on the ,rantor's

d(fj~natiQn

Q f,

a sunpgat€ or a health

cg~ deciSion ~Y a TespolJrjb[, pam under S"tjons l

'2 12 of this A cL

did not. in fQodiajth. comply with the RrovisiaDr "(Sections 1 to 12 oOM3 AcL
Page 12 of 16
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(41
J

~

An advanct: directive made ;n accordance with Sections I to 5 of this Act shalllz€

2

presumed to have

voluntarily and

:1

attending physjcian or health Cart fqcility has actual knowletf$e to the contrau.

4

SECTION 9.

betn madf

l'alidiy

executed unless

the
d

A NEW SECTION OF KRS CHAPTER 311 IS CREATED TO

s

READ AS FOLLOWS:

6

(l)

The wilhholdiltg Or with4mwal of life-proloRrin, treatment or artificiall1.

7

provided nutrition and hydration from a irgntor in accordance with the

8

proyjsions" of St£ti9as 1 to 12 of this Act· thaU not. far gay purpose. constitute a

9

suicide. the makjn~ oran aclyanee directive under Stetigall to 5 of this Act or a

10

health em decision by q resVOaS'ible paw uada: Sectiom I to 12 of this Act shall

11

no' qffect in any manner 0, sale. procurement. or issuance of any llolicy of life

12

insurance. ngr shall it be considered 19 modify the terms of au existing policy

13

life insUWlce. Notwithstanding any term of the Wlic! to the contrary. no policy

14

of lift jnsurance shall be lewlJ

IS

heaUh care decision made by a maa2aie or· re9110nsjble PartY Qr by the

16

withholdint or withdJ:awaJ from an insured patient any medicgJ IJ!79,edure !l.!

l7

inteNtation whjch would sery, only to groWu. artificially the cbinK gro,ess.

18

(2)

imggiud or inyalidated in gay manner QY q

No gerson. cO'l1oration. or wyetnnJental cu:gDC1 Wall re'lu;"

to

Urine

peCIon

20

rngansibk Party under Sections 1 ~

21

or (oelhe prol'itiQl1lif"nJ DrY;«. medicaltreatmen~ or benefit.
(3)

or

induct an1

will dim;tiye ar ttl make q heaUh care decision as Ii

19

22

e:recute a

Qf

l~

of this Act as a condition

(Qr

a contract

No0inr in SedWns 119 12 of this Act shaY be construed to impose anY liability

23

on a suao:ate of respon~ible llartx for aa! errzenst.$ of the uantor for whjch the

24

surrogate or responsible party would not othuwise have beeR liauk.

25

(4)

Sections 1 to ·12j)r this Ad shall..notcreqte a presumption

or an

adult who

26

intention

,7

with respect to the use.

has revoked or h~ not executed an

cQncemin~

the

a!/yance directive

withholdine. or withdrawal of l,fe-Drolonrine treatment
Page 13 of 16 .
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it

a tenninq/ condition aids.
2

(5)

Sectjons 1 to 12

of this Act shall not affect the common law or slaty/oO' dehl of

3

sn adult

4

10llr as the adult is able to

S

I1f1114lal]

6

medj,al care.

7

(6)

to make decisions ~eardint the use qf Ufe,-prolongine treatment. so

d~ht that

do so, or impair or supenedfl

an adult

hasJo g(Jeet the

gay common

law

Qr;

witbhaIdinv or wUhdralfine of

Sectioas 1 to 12 of (his Act shgU oat preclude or restrict the debt of persons to
, make aciyaart djrectivn outside the provisions of Sections 1 (0 12 ofthis Act.' and

8

l1 of this Act $haU not.Dstz:i£t.. or pre.dlldc medical personnfL

9

Sections 1

tg

10

physician!.

nurses, or health

11

weedv,s consistent with accepted medical practice.

12

SEcnON 10.

CgB

facilities from foUowine oth" written advance

A NEW SECTION OF KRS CHAPTER 311 IS CREATED TO

13

READ AS FOLLOWS:

14

Sections 1 to 12

IS

mercy killin, or euthanasia. ar to pemit any q,fJirmatiye or. deUberqtf

16

othet thaa to Qennit the nalUraiRroceu orching.

at this Act sh"U not be construed to condone. authoriub or aPllroye

SECTION 11.

17

act to end Ute

A NEW-SECTION OF KRS CHAPTER 311 IS CREATED TO

18

READ AS FOLLOWS:

19

(1)

A nJ DelAon who wiUfuUv conceals. caneth. de.fqcU. oblitaates. or dwn(lW the

20

advance djrccfut Q,f another without the uantor'S consent or who falsifies or

21

(arc" a

22

prolonr;nr treatment 10 be Uh1iud in contravention of tb~ preyiously eXj?ressed

23

intent orlbe gatignt sball b, civilly liable.

24

a)

teyocgtion

oflhe qdJ'(lDce directive pf aMthee,

tlwub cgusinr liff·

A ay person whQ lalsifies or fQ~e$ the ac/yance directive of another. or wiUfulLv

2S

cpnctals

26

djrfcjjYf. with the intent

27

lITatment, contrary to the. wishes

Q7

withholds· PCl10nal knowledze Q[ the I'tvQcation of an

advance

to cause a withhQldine or withdrawal af li(e.prQ1Qn~ng
Q,f

the frantor. and thereby causes life-

Page 14ofl6
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prolonfin~jceatme.fJt

to be withheld Qr withdrawn and deRlh to be hastened, 5hgll

2

be gujltv ora elgss B felony.

3

SECTION 12.

~

A NEW SECTION OF KRS CHAPTER 311 [S CREATED TO

4

READ AS FOLLOWS:

5

Sections 1 to 12 qfthis Act mCJ.)' by cited as' the "KentuckJ Liying Will Directiye..Act. It

6

Section 13. The following KRS sections are repealed:

7

311.622 Legislative finding.

S

3 11.624 Definitions for KRS 311. 622 to 311.644.

9

311.626 Declaration -- Witness.

10

3 t 1.628 Notification of declarli!lt's attending physician of ~xistence of declaration.

11

311.630 Revocation procedures.

12

311.632 Exemption of health care facility or physician from criminal prosecution or civil

13

14
15

liability for actions.
311.634 Notification of patient when .attending physician or health care facility refuses to

comply -- Transfer of patient.

16

311.636 Construction of KRS 311.622 to 311.644.

17

311.638 \yithholding or withdrawal of ute-prolonging treatment not to constitute suidde

1S

-- Effect of declaration on life insurance.

19

311.640 Effect of KRS 311.622 to 3~1.644 onintemion or right of adult

20

311.642 Civil liability .- Penalty.

21

311.644 Short title.

22

311. 970 Defmitions for KRS 311.970 to 311.986.

23

311. 972 Designation of surrogate - Resignation - Persons prohibited from serving.

24

311.974 Execution of designation.

25

311.976 Revocation of qesi~ation.

26

311. 978 Powers of surrogate -- Limitations.

27

311. 980 Fonn of designation.
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1

311.982 Refusal of health care provider to comply with desi~nation -- Effect of refusal.

2

311.984 Liabilities of surrogate -- Effect of designation on life insurance -- Right to

3

make decision as to use of life-prolonging treatment

1

=----1

"==:1

4

311.986 Shon title.

~

]
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APPENDIX E

KENTUCKY'S 1994 REAL ESTATE TRANSFER TAX STATUTE

GENERAL ASSEMBLY
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
REGULAR SESSION 1994
HOUSE BILL NO. 157

WEDNESDAY, FEBRUARY 2, 1994

The following bill was reported to the Senate from the House and ordered to be printed.
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AN ACT relating to real estate transfer tax.

Be it enacted by the General Assembly of the Commonwealth ofKentucky:
Section 1. KRS 142.050 is amended to read as follows:

1

2

(1)

(a)

3

~

As used in this section, unless the context otherwise requires:
"Deed" means any document, instrument, or writing other than a will and other

4

than a lease or easement, regardless of where made, executed, or delivered by

5

which any real property in Kentucky, or any interest therein; is conveyed,

6

vested, granted, bargained, sold, transferred, or assigned.

(b)

7

"Value" means:

1~'

8

In the case of any deed not ~- gift, the amount of the full actual
consideration therefor, paid or to be paid, including the amount of any

9

lien or liens thereon; and

10

--

In the case of a gift, or any deed wi.th nominal consideration or Without

2.

11
12

stated consideration, the estimated price the property would -bring in an

13

open market and under the- therr prevailing market conditions in a sale

14

between a- willing selIer and a: willing buyer~ both conversant with the

15

property and with prev.ailing general price levels. _

16

-

(2)

oc- fraction thereo( which vaJueis declared in the

($0.50) for each S500 of value

18

deed upon the privilege oftransfeningtitleto real property.
(3)

(a)

If any deed evidencing a-transfer of title subject to the tax herein imposed is

20

offered for recordation, the county clerk shall ascertain - and compute the

21

amount of the tax due thereon and shall collect the amount as prerequisite to

22

acceptance of the deed for-recordation.

23

I·

A tax upon the grantor named in the-deed' shaB- be-imposed at the rate of fifty cents

17

19

~~

(b)

.

The amount- of tax shall be - computed- on the -basis of,the: -value -of the
transferred property as set forth in the deed.

24

-,

25

(c)

The tax required to- be levied by-this section shall be collected: only once on

d
~
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each transaction and in the county in which the deed is required to be recorded
by KRS 382.110(1).

2
3

(4)

The county clerk shall collect the amount due and certify the date .of payment and

4

the amount of cellectien on the deed. Theceunty clerk shall retain five percent (5%)

5

as his fee for cellectien and remit the balance every three (3) menths te the county

6

treasurer, whe shall depesit the meney in the ceunty general fund.

7

(5)

.of this section.

8
9

The Revenue Cabinet may prescribe regulatiens necessary te carry .out the purpeses

(6)

Any ceunty clerk whe willfully shall recerd any deed upon which a tax is impesed by

10

this sectien witheut cellecting the pre per ameunt .of tax and· certifying the date and

11

ameunt .of cellectien .on the deed as required by this sectien based en the declared

12

value indicated in the affidavit appended te the deed shall, upen cenvictien, be fined

13

$50 fer each .offense.

14

(7)

The tax impesed by this sectien shall net apply te a transfer .of title:

15

(a)

Recorded prier te March 27, 1968;

16

(b)

Te, in the event .of a deed .of gift .or deed with neminal censideratien, .or frem

17

the United States .of America, this state, any city or ceunty within this state, or

18

any instrumentality, agency, .or subdivision hereof,

19

(c)

Selely in .order te previde .or release security fer a debt .or ebligatien;

20

(d)

Which cenfinns .or corrects a deed previeusly recorded;

21

(e)

Between husband and wife, .or between fermer speuses as part .of a diverce
proceeding;

22
23

(t)

On sale fer delinquent taxes .or assessments;

24

(g)

On partitien;

25

(h)

Pursuant te mergers .of corperations;

26

(i)

By a subsidiary cerperatien te its parent cerporatien fer no censideratien,

~-..

27

neminal consideration, .or in sele censideratien .of the cancellatien .or surrender
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of the subsidiary's stock;
2

G)

Under a foreclosure proceeding;

3

(k)

Between individuals and a corporation, with only nominal consideration

4

therefor, if those individuals are the exclusive owners of that corporation;

5

faOOt

6

7

(1)

~

~

Between parent and child or grandparent and grandchild, with only nominal
consideration therefor; and

8

(m) Of property to a trustee. to be held in trust. or bv a trustee to a beneficiary

9

of the trust. if a direct transfer from the grantor of the trust to each

10

individual beneficiary of the trust would' have qualified (or an exemption

11

from the tax pursuant to one of the provisions of this section. As used in

12

this paragraph, "trust" shall have the same definition as contained in KRS

13

386.800.

,j-,-,

~
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SELECTED SOPHISTICATED GIFTING STRATEGIES:
A CHECKLIST OF IDEAS
by
THEODORE B. ATLASS, ESQ.
Atlass Professional Corporation
2100 East Fourteenth Avenue
Denver, Colorado 80206
(303) 377-0707

I.

INTRODUCTION TO GIFTING
A.

What Constitutes A Gift?
Virtually any direct or indirect gratuitous transfer will constitute a gift for
purposes of Chapter 12 (i.e., the gift tax provisions) of the Internal Revenue
Code unless such transfer qualifies for some specific exemption.

B.

Non-Tax Reasons For Making Gifts
1.

Funding Specific Needs Of The Donee
To assist the donee by providing funds to go to college, purchase a
home, start a business, or to otherwise have an enriched life.

2.

Facilitating Financial Maturity
To provide funds for the donee to gain some experience in managing
money, making investment decisions, dealing with professional advisors,
etc.

3.

Testing The Donee's Financial Acumen
To see what the donee will do with a large gift. If the donee acts
responsibly with the gifted property, then the donor may be more
generous later. If the donee wastes the gift, then the donor may be
very tightfisted with later gifts.

4.

Not Requiring The Donee To Wait
To allow the donee to receive funds while still young enough to benefit
from them, as opposed to making the donee wait until the donor's
death to receive anything, at which time the donee may be very old.
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5.

Providing The Donee With Financial Security
To provide the donee with financial security, such as might b
accomplished by setting up a trust for the donee which would be
protected from the beneficiary's creditors, divorce actions, financial
mismanagement, or from death taxes at the beneficiary's death.

6.

Anti-Creditor Planning
To get some assets set aside for family members while the donor is
solvent, just in case some financial calamity later financially wipes the
donor out.

7.

Planning To Qualify For Medicaid
To position the donor so that Medicaid will pay for the donor's nursing
home costs by gifting non-exempt property away and letting the 36
month waiting period expire.

C.

Tax-Motivated Reasons For Making Gifts
1.

Income Tax Minimization
To shift income from the donor's income tax return to the another
income tax return (i.e., the donor's income tax return or a trust's
income tax return) where it will be subject to a lower effective income
tax rate.
Example: If assets producing $1,200 in income are gifted by a donor
(who is in a 39.6% tax bracket) to a child under age 14 with no other
income, $385.20 in annual tax savings will result. The child's taxes on
$1,200 would only be $90 (as $600 is exempt and $600 is taxed at 15%,
based upon the 1992 kiddie tax rules and 1993 rates). If such $1,200
of income had been retained by the donor and all taxed at 39.6%, of
$475.20 of tax would instead be due.

2.

Gift Tax Minimization
To shift assets from the donor to the donee at the least (if any) gift tax
cost possible so that such assets will be subject to a lowest possible
effective transfer tax rate.
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Example: Husband and wife, who will ultimately be in a 55% death tax

bracket, strongly believe in home ownership and desire to see that each
of their children has $100,000 at age 25 to own a home free and clear.
They could wait until each child turns 25 to give such child the
$100,000. However, even with gift-splitting and use of two annual
exclusions, $80,000 of taxable gifts would then be made (which would
result in $44,000 additional estate tax at death). Instead, $20,000 per
year (less whatever benefit is achieved from appreciation and/or
accumulation of net income after taxes) could be made for five years
without any taxable gifts being incurred.

::__ ~J'

.:;i
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3.

Estate Tax Minimization
To eliminate (to the extent possible) estate taxes at the client's death
and, if such taxes can't be eliminated, then to postpone them until the
death of the client's spouse.
Example: Client has a pre-1981 will which leaves one-half of client's

$2,000,000 estate to the spouse, and the balance (after estate taxes) to
a so-called "family trust" for the surviving spouse and children. The
$1,000,000 going to the family trust exceeds the $600,000 exemptionequivalent, and is subject to $153,000 in death taxes (not considering
any available credits). The client's estate planning documents (i.e., will
and/or revocable trust) can be updated, if desired, to take advantage
of the unlimited marital deduction introduced in 1981. This will cause
more assets to go to the spouse (or to be set aside in a so-called
"marital deduction trust" for the spouse's benefit), and will completely
eliminate death taxes upon the client's death, assuming that the client
is survived by his or her spouse. It should be noted, however, that
assets which qualify for the marital deduction are subject to estate
taxation at the surviving spouse's later death, to the extent that they
have not been used up or given away by the time of the surviving
spouse's death.
Example: Husband and wife have combined assets of $1,200,000, all of

--l

.d

which are owned by wife, and simple wills which leave all of their
assets to the survivor of them. No estate tax will be due at the first
death (Le., husband has no assets, and wife's estate will not be taxed
because of the marital deduction). Whoever dies last will have
$1,200,000 to pass on to the children. Only $600,000 of those assets will
be sheltered from estate taxation at the survivor's death, with the
balance of the assets generating $235,000 in death taxes (not
considering any available tax credits). If husband and wife split their

~
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assets, so that each of them had a net worth of $600,000, the first to
die could put his or her assets into a so-called IIfamily trust ll (sometimes
also called a liB trust ll or IIcredit shelter trustll ) for the surviving spouse.
The family trust would benefit the surviving spouse, but not be deemed
to be an asset of the surviving spouse for estate tax purposes, and
$253,000 of estate taxes would be eliminated.
4.

Multi-Generational Tax Planning
Thought should also be given to minimizing taxes at the death of the
donor's child, grandchild, and possibly even great grandchild by setting
up a multi-generational dynastic trust arrangement whereby successive
trust beneficiaries have very broad rights to benefit from property held
in the trust without having a transfer tax imposed when one
beneficiary's interest terminates in favor of the next beneficiary.
Example: In their wills husband and wife each put $1 Million (after
estate taxes) into generation-skipping trusts for their descendants. The
trusts are to benefit children, then grandchildren, and ultimately pass
to great grandchildren. Assume that a 55 % estate tax applies. If the
$2 Million had been given to the children and remained intact, the
estate tax when the children died would be $1.1 Million, leaving
$900,000 for grandchildren. The estate tax when the grandchildren
died would be $495,000, leaving only $405,000 of the original $2 Million
for the great grandchildren. Use of the generation-skipping trust
causes no estate taxes to be due when children and grandchildren die,
thus resulting in the entire $2 Million (rather than $405,000) being
available for the great grandchildren.

II.

APPLICABLE TAX RULES
A.

Income Tax Implications Of Non-Charitable Gifts
1.

Income Shifting Opportunities
a.

Income shifting has been made much more difficult in recent
years by bracket compression, kiddie tax, trust throwback rules,
prohibitions against multiple trusts, elimination of many income
shifting devices (Clifford trusts, Rushing trusts, spousal
remainder trusts, etc.), taxation gain realized by trust at the
grantor's tax rates under certain circumstances, etc.

~'
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b.
==i

The income tax rates for tax years beginning in 1993 are as
. follows:

:~

-----'

SINGLE INDIVIDUALS (NOT A QUALIFIED SURVIVING
SPOUSE OR HEAD OF HOUSEHOLD)
Taxable Income

Computation of Tax

Not over $22,100
$22,100 to $53,500

15 % of the taxable income
$3,315.00 plus 28% of the
excess over $22,100
$12,107.00 plus 31% of the
excess over $53,500
$31,172.00 plus 36% of the
excess over $115,000
$79,772.00 plus 39.6% of the
excess over $250,000

$53,500 to $115,000
$115,000 to $250,000
Over $250,000

MARRIED FILING JOINTLY·
SURVIVING SPOUSES
Taxable Income

AND

QUALIFIED

Computation of Tax

Not over $36,900
$36,900 to $89,150
$89,150 to $140,000
$140,000 to $250,000
Over $250,000

15 % of the taxable income
$5,535.00 plus 28% of the
excess over $36,900
$20,165.00 plus 31% of the
excess over $89,150
. $35,928.50 plus 36% of the
excess over $140,000
$75,528.50 plus 39.6% of the
excess over $250,000

HEADS OF HOUSEHOLDS
Taxable Income

Computation of Tax .

Not over $29,600 .
$29,600 to $76,400

15% of the taxable income
$4,4440.00 plus 28% of the
excess over $29,600
$17,544.00 plus 31% of the
excess over $76,400

$76,400 to 127,500
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$127,500 to $250,000
Over $250,000

$33,385.00 plus 36% of the
excess over $127,500
$77,485.00 plus 39.6% of the
excess over $250,000

~

~
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MARRIED INDIVIDUALS FILING SEPARATELY
Taxable Income

Computation of Tax

Not over $18,450
$18,450 to $44,575

15 % of the taxable income
$2767.50 plus 28%. of the
excess over $18,450
$10,082.50 plus 31% of the
excess over $44,575
$17,964.25 plus 36% of the
excess over $70,000
$37,764.25 plus 39.6% ofthe
excess over $125,000

$44,575 to $70,000
$70,000 to $125,000
Over-$125,000

ESTATES AND TRUSTS.
Taxable Income

Computation of Tax

Not over $1,500
$1,500 to $3,500

15 % .of taxable income
$225.00 plus 28% of the
excess over $1,500
$785.00 plus 31% of the
excess over $3,500
$1,405.00 plus 36% of the
excess over $5,500
$2,125.00 plus 39.6% of the
excess over $7,500
.

$3,500 to $5,500
$5,500 to $7,500
Over $7,500

c.

It may be possible to maximize income shifting possibilities by
combining the use of a trust and a custodianship under UGMA
or UTMA for a minor beneficiary. Each year the trustee would
determine how marty dollars of trust income it would be
worthwhile to instead have taxed on the minor beneficiary's
Form 1040 instead of on the trust's Form 1041, and such
amount could be distributed by the trustee to a custodiari under
UGMA or UTMA for such child's benefit. The distribution will
carry out DNI of the trust, thus shifting taxable income to the

Ej
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child's presumably lower income tax bracket. There is no
reason why the trustee couldn't also act as the custodian.
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Example: It would be possible to establish a trust which had
assets producing $8,800 in income and have such trust distribute
$1,200 per year to a child under age 14 (or a custodian under
UGMA or UTMA for such child). Mter the distributions
deduction is taken into account the trust would have $7,600 of
income, $100 of which would be exempt and $7,500 of which
would cause $2,125 of tax to be due by the trust. The child's
taxes on $1,200 would be $90 (as $600 is exempt and $600 is
taxed at 15%, based upon the 1992 kiddie tax rules and 1993
rates). If such $8,800 of total income had been retained by the
donor and all taxed at 39.6%, $3,484.80 of tax would be due.
$1,269.80 of annual income tax savings is thus achieved for each
beneficiary under age 14.

~

~

Example: It would be possible to establish a trust which had
assets producing $30,300 in income and have such trust
distribute $22,700 per year to a child over age 14 (or a
custodian under UGMA or UTMA for such child). Mter the
distributions deduction is taken into account the trust would
have $7,600 of income; $100 of which would be exempt and
$7,500 of which would cause $2,125 of tax to be due by the
trust. The child's taxes on $22,700 would be $3,315 (as $600 is
exempt and $22,100 is taxed at 15%, based upon the 1992
kiddie tax rules and 1993 rates). If such $30,300 of total income
had been retained by the donor and all taxed at 39.6%,
$11,998.80 of tax would be due. $6,558.80 of annual income tax
savings is thus achieved for each beneficiary under age 14.

d.

Many factors besides bracket differential may impact the
amount of tax savings achieved through income shifting,
including the kiddie tax rules, trust throwback rules, the
percentage limitations on various deductions (medical expenses,
charitable deductions, casualty losses, miscellaneous itemized
deductions, etc.), the (maximum 80%) disallowance of itemized
deductions impacting high income· taxpayers, capital and net
operating loss carryforwards, phaseout of the $25,000 real estate
exception to the· PAL rules, AMT consequences, etc.

--1.
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2.

Consequences To The Donor
a.

Any income generated on gifted property after the date of the
gift is shifted from the donor's income tax return to the donee's
income tax return.

b.

Any unrealized gain in appreciated gifted property becomes the
donee's problem (as the donee receives a carryover basis)
unless the gift itself is characterized as a taxable disposition
triggering gain to the donor (such as in the case of a gift of an
installment obligation ).

c.

Gift loans (i.e., those containing a below market rate of interest)
cause the lender to have imputed interest income for income
tax purposes, subject to a de minimis rule. IRC §7872.

d.

Where a "net gift" is made (i.e., the gift taxes on the transfer,
which are the legal obligation of the donor, are instead to be
paid by the donee), the donor will realize gain to the extent the
gift tax paid exceeds the donor's adjusted cost basis in the
property. Diedrich v. Commissioner, 643 F.2d 499 (8th Cir.
1981).

e.

Where a gift is made of property subject to nonrecourse
indebtedness, the donor will realize gain to the extent that
indebtedness exceeds the basis of the property. Winston F. e.
Guest, 77 T.e. 9 (1981). The "amount realized" is equal to the
outstanding balance of the nonrecourse obligation, and the fair
market value of the property is irrelevant to the computation.
.
Tufts v. Commissioner, 103 S.Ct 1826 (1983).

f.

The transfer of an installment obligation by lifetime gift will
constitute a disposition and cause an acceleration of the
deferred gain for income tax purposes. IRC §453B.

g.

The transfer of· a passive-activity asset by lifetime gift does not
trigger the recognition of suspended passive activity losses. IRC
§469(j)( 6).
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3.

Consequences To The Donee
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4.

a.

Gross income does not include the value of property acquired
by gift, bequest, devise or inheritance. IRC §102(a).

b.

Gross income does include the income derived from any
property acquired by gift, bequest, devise or inheritance. IRC
§ 102(b )(1).

c.

Gross income does include the amount of such income where
. the gift, bequest, devise or inheritance is of income from
property. IRC §102(b )(2).

d.

In the case. of the gratuitous forgiveness of indebtedness, the
Code contains conflicting provisions relating the whether the
donee has received gross income. IRC §§61(a)(2) and 102(a).
It has been held that the forgiveness of indebtedness which is a
true gift made gratuitously and with donative intent is not
included in gross income. Helvering v. American Dental, 318
U.S. 322 (1943).

e.

Gift loans (i.e., those containing a below market rate of interest)
cause the borrower to have imputed interest expense for income
tax purposes. IRC §7872.

f.

Appreciated property which is given to a trust and subsequently
sold within two years (and during the donor's lifetime) by the
trust will be taxed to the trust at the grantor's tax rate rather
than the trust's tax rate. IRC §644.

Adjusted Basis Of Gifted Property
a.

The donee of property which is received in a lifetime gift
transaction where no gain is recognized receives such property
with a carryover of the donor's cost basis and acquisition date.
IRC §1015.

b.

The basis of gifted property is increased for pre-1977 gifts by
the gift tax paid. For gifts made after 1976, the basis of gifted
property is increased by that portion of the gift tax paid
attributable to the donor's net appreciation in the gifted assets.
IRC §1015.

;J
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Example: Assume that the donor gives stock having a basis of
$200 and a fair market value of $1,000 to child, and pays $400
of gift tax. The basis adjustment for the gift tax paid is [(1000
minus 200)/1000] times $400, or $320. The donee's basis
becomes $200 plus $320, for a total basis of $520.

c.

The basis of gifted property is increased (but not to above fair
market value) by generation-skipping taxes paid. IRe §2654.
This basis adjustment for GST taxes paid is applied after the
basis adjustment for gift taxes paid pursuant to IRe §1015.

d.

Any suspended passive activity losses attributable to a gifted
asset are added to the donee's adjusted cost basis and benefit
the donee (although a dual basis may exist, and such addition
to basis, to the extent it causes basis to exceed the fair market
value of the property at the time of the gift, will not benefit the
donee in a loss transaction). IRe §469U)(6).

~

Example: Assume that the donor has an asset with a fair
market value of $100, an adjusted cost basis of $70, and a
suspended PAL of $40. When the asset is gifted, the donee will
have a $100 basis for loss purposes and a $110 basis for gain
purposes.

e.

B.

For purposes of determining loss in a subsequent sale of a
gifted asset by the donee, the donee's basis cannot exceed the
fair market value of the gifted property at the time of its receipt
by the donee. IRe §1015.

Gift Tax Implications
1.

General Scheme Of Taxation
a.

The gift tax is imposed on the donor with respect to gratuitous
transfers. IRe §2501 et ~ Obvious examples include the
transfers of cash or other property to members of the donor's
family, trusts for such persons benefit, etc.
==------i
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b.
-.=J'

The gift tax is not applicable to transfers such as which are not
gratuitous by their nature.

:-i

=

(1)

Transactions where fair consideration is received back
(i.e., parent gives child $1,000 and receives from child
$1,000 worth of stocks in return) do not constitute gifts
for gift tax purposes.

(2)

Payments made to (or for the benefit of) one family
member by another family member in fulfillment of the
payor's duty under state law to legally support the
person being benefitted (i.e., husband pays wife's grocery
or doctor bill, parent buys minor child some clothing,
etc.) do not constitute gifts for gift tax purposes.

(3)

Payments made by one spouse (or ex-spouse) to the
other incident to a divorce property settlement do not
constitute gifts for gift tax purposes. IRC §2516.

,~

c.

2.

A person who receives a gift or inheritance can turn it down
(i.e. disclaim or renounce the gift), which may cause the to go
to a. default beneficiary (possibly the disclaimant's child). If
technical . statutory requirements are met (e.g., a timely
disclaimer has been made prior to accepting any benefits of the
disclaim property, etc.), then the disclaimer will not constitute
a gift by the disclaiming party for gift tax purposes. IRC §2518.

Available Exclusions, Deductions and Credits
a.

The Annual Exclusion
It will be desirable to make gifts each calendar year to as many

people as possible. No gift tax will be incurred (nor is a gift tax
return due) so long as the total gifts to a particular individual
do not exceed $10,000 in anyone calendar year. IRC §2503(b).
The annual exclusion is $100,000 for gifts made by a person to
his or her spouse where the spouse receiving the gift is not a
U.S. citizen. Such gifts will not be included in the donor's estate
pursuant to IRC §2035, even if the donor dies within three
years, unless a life insurance policy on the donor's life was
gifted or the donor retained some interest in the gifted property
under IRC §§2036, 2037, or 2038.

B -11

b.

Spousal Gift Splitting
Spouses may consent to split gifts, which causes the amount
which the two of them (in the aggregate) can gift tax free each
calendar year to become $20,000 per individual donee. IRe
§2523. Such election can be made on a late filed gift tax return
(as long as it is the first gift tax return filed for the year in
question), and if made the election applies to all gifts made
during that year while the couple was married.

c.

~

~

~

The Exclusion For Medical And Tuition Expenses
Direct payments to the providers for the medical or tuition
expenses of another are gifts which qualify for an unlimited gift
tax exclusion. Reimbursing the individual who incurred such an
expense will not qualify for this special gift tax exclusion. IRC
§2503(e).

d.

The Marital Deduction
Outright transfers to a spouse (as well as transfers to a properly
drafted "marita~ deduction" trust for a spouse's benefit) will
qualify for the gift tax marital deduction and can thus be made
on a gift tax free basis. There is no limit on the amount of
assets that can be transferred via the marital deduction to a
spouse who is a U.S. citizen, but no gift tax marital deduction
is allowed with respect to assets transferred to a spouse who is
not a U.S. citizen.

e.

The Charitable Deduction
Gift taxes are generally not imposed on transfers to qualified
charitable organizations. IRC §2522. Unlike the income tax
charitable deduction, the gift tax charitable deduction is
. potentially unlimited (i.e., it is not subject to percentage
limitations ).

f.

Use Of The Unified Credit
Every individual has a unified credit of $192,800 for estate and
gift tax purposes which allows transfer tax free gifts of up to
$600,000 to be made in addition to whatever gifts have been
which were not gift·taxable by reason of the annual exclusion or
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exclusion for direct payment of tuition and medical expenses.
To the extent not used during lifetime to shelter otherwise
taxable gifts, it is usable at death to shelter transfers from estate
taxation .
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3.

Making Of Gifts Which Cause Gift Tax To Be Due
Gift tax is due when cumulative lifetime taxable gifts in excess of the
$600,00 exemption equivalent have been made. Gift tax is less
expensive than estate tax, even though the tax rates appear to be the
same:
a.

This result occurs because lifetime taxable gifts are computed
on a "tax exclusive" basis and taxable transfers at death are
taxed on a "tax inclusive" basis.

b.

As an example, assuming $100 in assets and a 50% flat transfer
tax bracket, $66-2/3 could be given away during lifetime with
$33-1/3 of gift taxes being paid, but if the same $100 was held
until death, only $50 would go to the donee (and $50 of estate
taxes would be paid) since the gift tax is based upon the net
amount passing to the donee (exclusive of the gift tax itself) and
the estate tax is based upon the gross amount of assets passing
to the donee (before deducting the estate tax attributable to
such assets)

c.

However, to prevent persons from making substantial taxable
deathbed gifts as a means of circumventing the less favorable
estate tax, any gift tax due on gifts made within three years of
a decedent's death is taxed as, in effect, a "phantom asset" in
the decedent's estate. IRC §2035( c). This nullifies the benefit
of having the gifted assets taxed on a "tax exclusive" basis.

d.

Another issue to consider is the time value of money. The
making of a taxable gift may save estate taxes later, but at the
cost of being out of pocket the dollars that must be used to pay
gift tax in advance of when the estate tax would otherwise have
been due.

d
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C.

Estate Tax Implications
Lifetime gifts can have estate tax implications in a number of situations,
particularly where the donor has retained some power or interest in the gifted
property:
1.

Impact Of Completed Transfers
The general rule is that completed transfers are out of the donor's
estate. However, even completed transfers have estate tax implications
if taxable gifts were involved, as the donor's lifetime use of unified
credit (i.e., of the so-called "$600,000 exemption equivalent") will
reduce the amount at death that the donor can pass to beneficiaries
without incurring death tax. Additionally, the unified nature of the gift
and estate tax situation causes lifetime taxable gifts to move the
donor's estate up the rate ladder and cause the assets remaining at
death to be taxed at a higher rate.
Example: The donor is a single person with one child and has never
made any gifts before. Donor gives $410,000 to the child in 1993.
$10,000 qualifies for the annual exclusion and $400,000 is a taxable gift.
No gift tax is due, as unified credit was used, and the donor's
remaining unified credit will allow $200,000 to pass estate tax free at
the donor's later death. If the donor died having $300,000, then
$100,000 in assets would be subject to a 37% estate tax rate.

2.

Impact Of Incomplete Transfers
a.

Retained Income Or Use Of Property
IRC Section 2036 will cause assets to be included in the donor's
estate for estate tax purposes where the donor retains the right
to use the gifted property, the right to the income from the
gifted property, the right to designate who can use (or get the
income) from the gifted property, or the right to vote gifted
securities.

b.

Retained Reversionary Interest
IRC Section 2037 will cause assets to be included in the donor's
estate for estate tax purposes where the donor retains a
reversionary interest in the gifted property and some third party
can succeed to such property only by surviving the donor.
~
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c.

Power To Alter Or Amend
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~
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IRe Section 2038 will cause assets to be included in the donor's
estate for estate tax purposes where the donor retains the
power to revoke the gift (and get the gifted property back), or
the power to alter or amend the time or manner of enjoyment
of the gifted property or its income (for the benefit of third
parties).

==l
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d.

Non-Spousal Joint Tenancy Interests
IRe Section 2040 will cause a portion of joint tenancy property
to be included in a deceased joint tenant's estate. It doesn't
matter whether a taxable gift was made when the joint tenancy
was created. A tracing of contribution test (i.e., who originally
owned it or who put his or her money into it) determines how
much of the property is included in the deceased joint tenant's
. estate. For example, if mom puts her house into joint tenancy
with daughter then nothing is included in the daughter's estate
if she dies first, but the entire property is included in mom's
estate if she dies first.

3.

Gifts Made Within Three Years Of Death
a.

The General Rule
Generally, lifetime gifts are not brought back into the donor's
estate even if the donor dies shortly after making completed
gifts. For example, a dying client could give $10,000 gifts to
everybody in the phone book shortly before dying and the gifted
property would generate no gift tax liability (by reason of the
$10,000 annual exclusion) and would also be out of the grantor's
estate for estate tax purposes.

b.

1

Release Of Certain Powers And Interests
IRC Section 2035 will cause assets to be included in the
decedent's estate for estate tax purposes where property was
transferred (e.g., a right in a trust may have been given up)
within three years of the decedent's death and, if such transfer
had not occurred, such property would have been included in
the decedent's gross estate under IRe §§2036, 2037, or 2038.

-1
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c.

Transfer Of Life Insurance
IRC Section 2035 will cause life insurance to be included in the
decedent's estate for estate tax purposes where such policy was
transferred within three years of the decedent-insured's death
and, if such transfer had not occurred, such life insurance would
have been included in the decedent-insured's gross estate under
IRC Section 2042.

d.

~

Gift Tax Liability
IRC Section 2035 will cause any gift tax paid by the decedent or
the decedent's estate with respect to gifts made within three
year's of the decedent's death to be included as a phantom asset
in the decedent's estate for estate tax purposes.

4.

=

~
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Beneficiary Issues Re Withdrawal Powers
The beneficiary of a trust who dies will be deemed to own all (or some
portion) of a trust where such beneficiary has a withdrawal right (under
a so-called "Crummey" power or five-by-five withdrawal power). The
unexercised withdrawal right that is still exercisable at the beneficiary's
death will constitute an asset for estate tax purposes, and the
beneficiary can be deemed to own a portion of the trust for purposes
of determining the beneficiary's gross estate if withdrawal rights
exceeding the five-by-five limitation have lapsed in a prior year. IRC
§2041.

5.

Restoration Of Tax Credits
Where a donor makes a taxable gift and later the gifted property is
included in the donor's gross estate at death, the gift tax credits
previously used by the donor with respect to such gift (but not the
consenting spouse's gift tax credits if gift-splitting was elected) will be
restored. IRC §2012.

D.

Generation-Skipping Tax Implications

~
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1.

Background
a.

Complex estate planning issues were introduced by provisions
of the Tax Reform Act of 1986 (TRA '86) which impose a
generation-skipping transfer (GST) tax on certain wealth

~
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transfers made to younger generation beneficiaries. It is a flat
tax imposed at the highest estate tax rate (now 55%). The GST
tax is in addition to any gift tax or estate tax payable.

~
=i
b.

The TRA '86 retroactively repealed the GST tax introduced by
the TRA '76 in favor of a somewhat simplified (but still quite
complex) approach to GST taxation that appears likely to
remain in effect. The GST tax contains exemptions designed to
exclude most persons, estates and trusts from ever having to pay
GST tax or file a GST tax return. But it is a brutally expensive
tax; in fact, it is viewed by many as confiscatory.

c.

The GST tax is contained in Chapter 13 of the Internal
Revenue Code (IRC) , which consists of IRC §2601 through
§2663. Technical corrections were made by TAMRA in 1988,
by OBRA in 1989 and by OBRA in 1990. Temporary
regulations (now finalized) were issued in 1987. Additional
proposed and temporary regulations were issued in 1988 (and
corrected later in 1988).

d.

Two sets of proposed regulations were issued on December 24,
·1992. One set (57 Fed. Reg. 61356) broadly deals with issues
such as definitions,. how GST tax exemption is allocated, how
the inclusion ratio and applicable fraction is computed, the
reverse QTIP election, and how single trusts may be separated.
The other set of proposed regulations (Fed. Reg. 61353) deals
with the liability for GST tax on life insurance where a direct
skip occurs at death and with the exercise of special powers of
appointment contained in grandfathered trusts. These two sets
of proposed regulations are generally effective as to generationskipping transfers made on or after December 24, 1992, except
for: (a) the division of a QTIP trust where a reverse QTIP
election was made and GST tax exemption allocated to it prior
to December 24, 1992; (b) elections out of an automatic
allocation of GST tax exemption to direct skips; and (c) dealing
with the GST tax consequences of transfers of non-U.S. situs
property by a non-resident alien.

e.

Historically, generation-skipping trusts have been the preferred
method for the wealthy to perpetuate their family fortune.
Prior to the introduction of the first GST tax in the Tax Reform
Act of 1976 (TRA '76), the Rule Against Perpetuities provided
the only effective time limit on how long property could escape

~
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transfer taxatiop by remaining in trust. It was possible for
several successive persons to be given broad interests and
powers over property held in a trust without any gift, estate or
other transfer tax being due at the time one beneficiary's
interest in the trust terminated in favor of a successor
beneficiary.
f.

The GST tax is designed to mmlmlze transfer tax planning
benefits which would otherwise arise from the use of
generation-skipping trusts (such as a trust for a child's lifetime
benefit that eventually terminates in favor of a grandchild) and
. from the making of direct gifts to descendants of younger
generation beneficiaries (such as a direct gift to a grandchild or
great -grandchild).

g.

It is possible to inadvertently incur GST tax under even rela-

tively simple estate plans where the client is not trying to
engage in tax motivated multi-generational estate planning.
Many older persons with large estates are certain to be
impacted by the GST tax. Accordingly, the estate plans of all
wealthy clients should now be reviewed to determine if potential
GST tax liability can be eliminated, minimized or deferred.
h.

Multi-generational tax savings trusts have not been entirely
eliminated by the generation-skipping tax. Instead a $1 Million
limit has been placed on the amount of assets which each
person can put into a generation-skipping trust without the new
GST tax law applying. There are a number of reasons why such
trusts are now viable estate planning vehicles:
(1)

Assets in such a trust are protected from the
beneficiary's creditor and divorce problems. Putting
some of junior's inheritance in a trust which benefits
junior for life and ultimately passes to grandchildren will
give junior a safety net of income and assets which
cannot be lost.

(2)

Significant tax savings can result, as funds ina trust
which is exempted for GST tax purposes will be setup so
as not to be subject to gift or death taxes when the child
dies and the grandchildren receive the assets (or
becomes the new beneficiary of the trust).
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Example: Husband and wife each set aside $1 Million
(after estate taxes) in generation-skipping trusts for their
descendants. The trusts are to benefit children, then
grandchildren, and ultimately pass to great
grandchildren. Assume that a 50% estate tax applies .
If the $2 Million had been given to the children and
remained intact, the estate tax when the children died
would be $1 Million, leaving $1 Million. The estate tax
when the grandchildren died would be $500,000, leaving
$500,000 for the great grandchildren. Use of the
generation-skipping trust causes no estate taxes to be
due when children and grandchildren die, thus resulting
in $2 Million (rather than $500,000) being available for
the great grandchildren.

~
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2.

This outline only attempts to generally familiarize the
practitioner with the operation of the GST tax, so that those
common estate planning situations in which the GST tax may
apply can be recognized. For a detailed analysis of the GST
tax, see Kalik and Schneider, Generation-Skipping Transfer Taxes
Under The Tax Reform Act of 1986, 21 INST. ON EST. PLAN.
900 (1987); Covey, Generation-Skipping Transfers, 1149
PRACTICAL DRAFTING (July, 1987); Halbach, GenerationSkipping: Planning Opportunities and Drafting Problems, 22INST.
ON EST. ·PLAN. 900 (1988); Horn, Planning and Drafting for
the Generation-Skipping Tax, 13 PROBATE NOTES 263 (1988).

Terminology
The GST tax is imposed on a "generation-skipping transfer" of property
to a "skip person". Under IRC §2611(a), a "generation-skipping
transfer" is any "taxable termination", "taxable distribution", or "direct
skip".
a.

Skip Person
IRC §2613(a) defines "skip person"as a person assigned to a
generation which is two or more generations below that of the
transferor (e.g., a grandchild or great-grandchild) or any trust
where all of the beneficiaries are skip persons. IRC §2613(b)
defines a "non-skip person" as any person who is not a skip
person.

~
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b.

Taxable Termination

IRe §2612(b) provides that a "taxable termination" occurs upon
the termination of all of the beneficial interests held by non-skip
persons in a trust, if thereafter any of the beneficiaries are skip
persons. For example, where a trust is established for the
lifetime benefit of the transferor's child and is to eventually be
distributed to the transferor's grandchildren, a taxable termination will occur at the child's death.
Transfers that qualify as both a direct skip and a taxable
termination (such as a general power of appointment marital trust
that terminates in favor of grandchildren at the surviving spouse's
death) will be considered to be a direct skip only. Prop. Treas.
Reg. §26.2612-1(b)(1)(i).

c.

~
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Taxable Distribution

IRe §2612(b) provides that a "taxable distribution" occurs when
any distribution of income or principal is made from a generation-skipping trust to a skip person (other 'than a taxable termination or direct skip). For example, where a discretionary
sprinkle trust is established for the transferor's surviving spouse
and descendants, any distribution made during the surviving
spouse's lifetime to a grandchild or great-grandchild of the
transferor is a taxable distribution.
GST tax (plus penalties and interest thereon) paid by a distlibuting
tmst shall be an additional taxable distlibution in the year in
which the original taxable distribution was made. . Prop. Treas.
Reg. §26.2612-1 (c).

d.

Direct Skip

IRe §2613(c) provides that a "direct skip" occurs when a transfer subject to federal gift tax or federal estate tax is made to a
skip person. For example, where a transfer is made during life
or at death to the transferor's grandchild or great-grandchild, a
direct skip occurs. However, a transfer to a grandchild of the
grantor is not a direct skip if the child of the grantor who is
such grandchild's parent is dead at the time of such transfer.
This so-called "predeceased child" exception only applies to
transfers in trust that are direct skips. If the transferor's child

~
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survives the transferor and is a beneficiary of a trust, a taxable
termination will occur at the child's subsequent death when the
trust assets pass to (or are held in further trust for the benefit
of) the deceased child's children.

~
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Only one direct skip occurs where a single transfer of property skips
more than one generation. Prop. Treas. Reg. §26.2612-1(a)(1).

~
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A disclaimer cannot be used to cause a living descendant to be
deemed to have predeceased the grantor or donor. Prop. Treas.
Reg. §26.2612-1 (a)(2).
e.

Generation Assignment
IRC §2651 provides that a person who is not a lineal descendant of a grandparent of the transferor or the transferor's
spouse shall be assigned to a generation on the basis of such
person's date of birth. If such person is no more than 12-1/2
years younger than the transferor, such person will be assigned
to the transferor's generation. If between 12-1/2 and 37-1/2
years younger than the transferor,. such person will be assigned
to the first generation younger than the transferor. Similar rules
apply for a new generation every 25 years.

3.

Excluded Transfers
a.

Assets Also Subject To Estate Tax Or Gift Tax
IRC §2611(b)(1) provides that any transfer (other than a direct
skip) from a trust is not a generation-skipping transfer to the
extent federal estate tax or federal gift tax is imposed on such
transfer with respect to a person in the first generation below
that of the grantor. For example, if a trust provides for the
grantor's child to receive income for life and grants the child a
general power of appointment over the remainder, the trust will
not be GST taxable at the child's death because the general
power of appointment will cause the trust to be included in the
child's gross estate for federal estate tax purposes.

--l

~
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b.

Educational And Medical Expenses
~

Any transfer which, if made during life by an individual, would
not be treated as a taxable gift by reason of IRC §2503(e)
(relating to exclusion of certain educational or medical expenses) is excluded from being a generation-skipping transfer by
IRC §2611(b)(2).
c.

~

Prior GST Taxation
In addition, IRC §2611(b )(3) provides that a transfer is not a
generation-skipping transfer to the extent the property was
subject to GST tax with respect to a prior transfer to a person
assigned to the same generation (or a lower generation) as the
current transferee if such transfer does not have the effect of
avoiding the GST tax.

d.

Annual Exclusion Gifts
Gifts that qualify for the $10,000 gift tax exclusion escape GST
taxability by reason of IRC §2642( c), which excludes such transfers from the GST tax base. However, a special provision
prevent most gifts subject to a so-called "Crummey" withdrawal
power from being excluded from the GST base by requiring that
no portion of the corpus or income of the trust can be distributed to anyone other than the "Crummey" power holder and
that, if such "Crummey" power holder dies before the trust
terminates, the trust assets must be included in his gross estate
for federal estate tax purposes.
Example: Client creates a single trust for the benefit of his four

children while they (or any of them) are alive, and which is
. ultimately to go to grandchildren after all children have died.
A $1 million life insurance policy on client's life is owned by the
trust, and the client will contribute $20,000 per year to the trust
to enable it to pay the life insurance premium on such policy.
Each of client's four children have a Crummey power to
withdraw $5,000 each year (i.e., 1/4th each of the $20,000 added
to the trust each year). If this was the client's only gift, no
beneficiary would have received a gift of more than $5,000 in a
given year and no gift tax return would be due. But it would be
necessary to file a gift tax return to elect to apply $20,000 of the
client's GST tax exemption each year.
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An initial transfer to a Crummey tnlSt constitutes a completed
transfer for gift tax purposes of the entire amount, and the lapse of
a withdrawal power (to the extent in excess of the 5 by 5
limitations) will also cause the Cntmmey beneficiary to be the
transferor to the extent the lapse is treated as a taxable gift. Prop.
Treas. Reg. 26.2652-1(a)(5), Example 5.

~

~

~

4.

Available Exemptions
a.

$1,000,000 GST Tax Exemption
Each transferor has a $1 million GST tax exemption (GST
exemption) which IRC §2631(a) allows such individual to allocate in any manner desired. Any GST exemption not used
during life is available to the transferor's estate. Once made,
any GST exemption allocation is irrevocable. If no allocation
of GST exemption is made by the transferor or his executor, a
mandated allocation of GST exemption is provided in IRC
§2632.
Prior regulations indicated that the election out of the automatic
allocation rules was revocable. Such election has now been made
in'evoca b Ie, and transitional relief is provided. Prop. Treas. Reg.
§26.2632-1 (b) (1).
Fonnula allocations of GST tax exemption are now allowed,
which will be velY helpful where hard to value assets are involved.
Additionally, except in the case of chm1table lead annuity tntsts,
allocations in excess of the amount needed to obtain a zero
inclusion ratio are void. Prop. Treas. Reg. §26.2632-1 (b)(2).
In the case of a lifetime transfer where a late allocation of GST
tax exemption to a trust is being made, the fair market value of
the tnlSt assets (except with respect to life insurance) may (by
election) be deemed to be the value of such assets on the first day
of the month during which the late election is made. Prop. Treas.
Reg. §26.2643-2(a)(2).
After death a timely election of GST tax exemption with respect to
lifetime transfers can be made by the personal representative on a
timely filed gift tax retum -- which is the earlier of the due date for
the Fonn 706 or Fonn 709, A late allocation of GST tax
exemption by the personal representative with respect to lifetime
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transfers can be made on Form 706 -- it is effective as of the date
of the transferor's death, and not on the date it is made. Prop.
Treas. Reg. §26.2632-1 (d)(I).
Exceptions to the automatic allocation rules at death have been
added to prevent GST tax exemption from being automatically
allocated in such a way as to be wasted for a certainty at the time
the Fonn 706 is due, but such rules won't save you from
affirmatively allocating GST tax exemption in a wasteful way.
Prop. Treas. Reg. §26.2632-1 (d)(2).
After death GST tax exemption can be allocated to a trnst created
at or after death even if the trnst is not yet funded when the Form
706 is filed, by formula, ~f the notice of allocation clearly identifies
the tnLSt and the amount of GST tax exemption being allocated to
such trust. Prop. Treas. Reg. §26.2632-1 (d) (1).
b.

Gallo Amendment Transfers
A special $2 million per grandchild GST exemption (the socalled "Gallo Amendment") is available for pre-1990 transfers
to grandchildren by IRC §1433(b)(3) of the TRA '86. Such
transfers can be made by lifetime gift or at the transferor's
death. Both outright transfers and transfers in trust (provided
that the grandchild is the sole beneficiary to whom distributions
can be made during the grandchild's lifetime, that the trust will
be included in the gross estate of the grandchild if he dies after
the trust's termination, and, that - as to transfers made after
June 10, 1987 - the trust's income must be distributed to the
grandchild at least annually after age twenty-one ) will qualify for
Gallo Amendment transfers.

5.

Computation Of Tax Due
a.

Overview
In the case of a taxable termination or taxable distribution, the
GST tax is computed on a tax inclusive basis (i.e., the GST tax
base or "taxable amount" is the value of the property to be
distributed, with certain deductions allowed by IRC §2621 or
§2622, but with no deduction for the GST taxes payable from
such distribution). In the case of a direct skip, IRC §2623 provides that the GST tax is computed on a more favorable tax
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exclusive basis (Le., the GST tax base or "taxable amount" is the
value of the property actually received by the transferee and is
not grossed up by the GST taxes owed by the transferor).

g
b.

Applicable Definitions
The GST tax due is defined by IRe §2602 as the taxable
amount multiplied by the "applicable fraction". Under IRC
§2641, the applicable rate is the product of the maximum
federal estate tax rate (now 50%) and the "inclusion ratio".
IRC §2642 provides that the inclusion ratio is 1.0, minus the
"applicable fraction", and that the applicable fraction has a
numerator equal to the GST exemption allocated to the trust or
direct skip and a denominator equal to the value of the property transferred to the trust (or involved in the direct skip), reduced by the sum of (1) any federal estate tax or state death tax
actually recovered from the trust attributable to such property,
and (2) any charitable deduction allowed under IRe §2055 or
§2522 with respect to such property. IRe §2604 allows a state
death tax credit, not to exceed 5% of the federal GST tax, for
state GST taxes paid on transfers (other than direct skips)
occurring by reason of death.

In detel1nining the denominator of the applicable fraction with
respect to testamentmy transfers, estate tax values are generally
used (but special I1lles may require the fair market value of
property subject to a Section 2032A election to be used). Prop.
Treas. Reg. §26. 2642-2 (b).
Special new rules for pecunimy payments have been implemented
to determine the denominator of the applicable fraction. Date of
distribution values must be used or else the pecunimy payment
must be satisfied so as to fairly reflect appreciation and
depreciation. ff the pecuniary payment is made in cash, the
denominator is the pecunimy amount. ff an in kind distribution
is made to satisfy a pecuniary gift, the pecuniary gift must be
satisfied either using property on the basis of the value of the
property: (a) on the date of distJibution, or (b) if it is a date other
than the date of distribution, using values that are fairly
representative of appreciation and depreciation in the assets of the
estate or tnlSt at such time, and such gift must be valued and
satisfied at date of distribution values. Prop. Treas. Reg. §26.2642-

I

;}

2 (b)(2).
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Complex new rules govem the computation of the denominator
where a residual transfer follows a pecuniary payment (such as a
$1,400,000 estate that provides for $400,000 to wife and the
balance to a GST trust). The pre-residumy pecunimy bequest
must cany "appropliate interest". If satisfied in kind, date of
distribution values must be used or the pecunimy amount must be
adjusted so as to be fairly representative of appreciation or
depreciation in the assets of the estate or trust. Otherwise, adverse
adjustments are made in the computation of the fraction. Prop.
Treas. Reg. §26. 2642-2 (b ).
c.

Computations
An example is helpful. Assume a lifetime transfer of $1 million
is made to a trust which is to pay its income to the transferor's
child for life and thereafter be distributed to the transferor's
grandchildren. The normal gift tax rules will apply at the time
the trust is created. If $400,000 of the transferor's GST exemption is allocated to the trust at its inception and the. trust is
valued at $2 million when the child dies, $660,000 of GST tax
will be payable when the trust terminates at the child's death.
A 55% GST tax bracket is assumed to apply.

The
The
The
The
The

applicable fraction is .40 (400,000/1,000,000)
inclusion ratio is .60 (1.0 minus .40)
applicable rate is .33 (55% times .60)
GST tax due is $660,000 (.33 times 2,000,000)
maximum state death tax credit is $33,000 (5% times 660,000)

A different result would occur if the same transfer were instead taxable
as a direct skip upon the creation of such a trust for the sole benefit
of the transferor's grandchildren. Assuming the Gallo Amendment is
not applicable, GST tax of $330,000 (i.e., the applicable rate multiplied
by the value of the trust at the time of the GST taxable event occurs)
would be due upon the creation of the trust. In addition, IRe §2515
provides that the amount of the gift for federal gift taxes is increased
by the $330,000 of GST tax imposed as a result of such gift.
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6.

d

~

Procedural Issues

a.

Who Pays The Tax
IRe §2603(a) provides that the transferor is liable for any GST
tax due upon a direct skip other than from a trust, and that the
distributee is liable for any GST tax due in the case of a taxable
distribution. If the trust making a taxable distribution pays the
GST tax due by the distributee, such GST tax paid will
constitute an additional taxable distribution. Trustees now need
to consider the establishment of a GST tax reserve when
making certain types of distributions, as IRe §2603(a) makes
the trustee liable for any GST tax due upon a taxable
termination or direct skip from a trust.

T
~
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In the case of a direct skip occurring at death with respect to
property held in a tlust an-a1tgement such as life insurance, the
personal representative must file the CST tax return and pay the
CST tax to the extent that the total value of the property included
from such insurance company causes a direct skip with respect to
the trustee of the tnLSt to the extent of the first $250,000. Prop.
Treas.Reg. §26.2662-1 (c)(2)(iii).

b.

Reporting Requirements
(1)

GST Reporting During Life By Donor
Form 709 is used by the donor to allocate GST
exemption on transfers occurring during lifetime; and to
report and compute the GST tax due on direct skip
transfers occurring during lifetime. Form· 709 must be
filed and the tax paid between January 1 and April 15 of
the year following the calendar year when the lifetime
direct skip occurred.

(2)

Reporting Direct Skip At Death
Form 706 is used by the executor to allocate GST
exemption on transfers occurring at death and to report
and compute the GST tax due on direct skips occurring
at death. Form 706 must be filed and the tax paid
within nine months of the decedent's date of death.

j

~
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Schedules Rand R-l are the specific Form 706
schedules relating to the GST tax.
§.

(3)

Reporting Taxable Distribution
Form 706 GS (D-l) is used by the trustee to report a
taxable distribution and to inform the distributee of the
distribution. Form 706 (D) is used by the recipient of a
taxable distribution to report and compute the GST tax
on taxable distributions. Form 706 GS (D) and 706 GS
(D-l) must be filed and the tax paid between January 1
and April 15 of the year following the calendar year
when the taxable distribution occurred.

(4)

~

-=---.l

Reporting Taxable Termination
Form 706 GS (T) is used by the trustee to report and
compute the GST tax due on taxable terminations of
trusts. Form 706 GS (T) must be filed and the tax paid
between January 1 and April 15 of the year following the
calendar year when the taxable termination occurred.

c.

Effective Date Provisions
(1)

General Rules
IRe §1433 of the TRA '86 makes the GST law applicable to every generation-skipping transfer occurring after
October 22, 1986. However, any lifetime transfer made
after September 25, 1985 and on or before October 22,
1986, is treated as if made on October 23, 1986 and is
therefore subject to the GST tax.

(2)

Exceptions
Transfers are exempt from the GST tax if made (1) from
trusts that were irrevocable on September 25, 1985 (to
the extent not made from additions to corpus occurring
after that date), (2) under a will executed before October 22, 1986, if the testator died before January 1, 1987,
or (3) under a will of, or trust included in the gross
estate of, a decedent who at all times from October 22,

:J
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1986 until his death lacked the legal capacity to change
the disposition of his property.

~

~

III.

GIFTING TIPS, TRICKS, AND TRAPS
A.

~

B.

Know The Tax Advantages Of Lifetime Gifting
1.

Income from gifted assets is shifted from the donor's income tax return
to the donee's income tax return, where presumably it will be taxed at
a more favorable (or no worse) effective income tax rate in most
circumstances.

2.

Gifts qualifying for the $10,000 ($20,000 if married and gift-splitting is
elected) annual gift tax exclusion completely escape both gift taxation
and estate taxation.

3.

Income and growth on gifted assets which occur subsequent to the
making of a gift escape death ta.-xation in the donor's estate.

4.

Paying gift taxes (because the gift tax is computed on a more favorable
tax exclusive basis, but estate taxes are imposed on a tax inclusive
basis) are a bargain compared to the estate tax if the donor lives three
years after making a gift upon which gift taxes are due.

Know The Disadvantages Of Lifetime Gifting
1.

The donor will not want to give away assets that may be later needed
by the donor for his or her own support, as there is no assurance that
the donee will still have the gifted assets and then be willing to help .
the donor.

2.

It is best to give away assets that are expected to appreciate between
the date of gift and the donor's later death. It would be very wasteful

to utilize unified credit and/or pay gift taxes on the lifetime gift of
assets that subsequently decline in value.
3.

The tax advantages of lifetime gifting are somewhat lessened by the
loss of stepped-up basis at the donor's death where appreciated assets
have been. given away during lifetime.

~
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C.

Practical Pointers
1.

Unintentional Gifts Should Be Avoided

~

~

l'§i

Assets are often retitled for a non-tax purpose (such as probate
avoidance), with no appreciation for the fact that a taxable gift may
have been made when another person's name was added to the title.
Proper planning can assure that no unintended tax results occur. If
probate avoidance is desired, the use of a funded revocable trust or
nominee' agreement might be advisable in lieu of joint tenancy.

---~

Example: An elderly widow wants to avoid probate on her $1,500,000
farm, so she decides to place title in the names of herself and her 4
children. She has made the children the owners of 80% of the farm,
worth some $1,200,000, and substantial gift tax will be due.
Example: Unintended gift tax consequences arise where one person
pays the premiums on a policy owned by another, and at the insured's
death where the beneficiary of the policy differs from the owner of the
policy. This would happen where wife owns a life insurance policy on
husband's life that she makes payable to their children at husband's
death. See Goodman v. Commissioner, 156 F.2d 218 (2nd Cir. 1946).

2.

Selecting The Right Assets To Gift Away
a.

Cash Need Not Be Given Away
It is not necessary to give away cash. Many more people would
make gifts if they realized that stocks, partial interests in real
estate, etc. can be gifted away.

b.

Illiquid Assets Make Ideal Gifting Candidates
Illiquid assets, such as stock in a family business or an interest
in real estate, can make especially good gifting vehicles. This is
because gifts of only a small piece of such assets will probably
qualify for a number of special discounts, including a minority
discount and lack of marketability discount.

c.

Assets with the most growth potential should be given away.
All income and growth which occurs after a completed gift is
made will escape gift and estate taxation.
cd
~

~
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d.

Avoid Making Gifts From Revocable Trusts
Annual exclusion gifts should not be made directly from a
revocable trust, as the death of the grantor within three years
may cause the gifted assets to be included in the grantor's estate
under IRC Section 2035 on the theory that an IRC Section 2036
or 2038 power or interest lapsed when the gift was made. See
PLR 8609005, TAM 9117003, and TAM 9139002. Section 602
of H.R. 3419 (introduced on November 1, 1993) would
eliminate this potential problem if passed. In the meantime,
have clients with assets in revocable trusts do a two step
transfer (i.e., take assets from trust, first transfer into trust
grantor's name, then have trust grantor individually make the
gift).

3.

Control Of Gifted Property
a.

Donees Need Not Get Immediate Benefits Or Control
The gifted assets can be held in trust for the intended
beneficiary if it is not desired that the beneficiary have
immediate access to such assets. Non-controlling interests in
corporations and partnerships can be given (i.e., non-voting
stock, limited partnership interests, etc.) can be given away
(either directly to the beneficiary or to a trust). Family limited
partnerships and second classes of non-voting stock are often
created solely to facilitate the client's gifting program.

b.

Sometimes The Donor Can Keep Control
The grantor can often keep control of gifted assets if that is
important. For example:

(1)

The grantor could gift limited partnership interests and
retain control of the partnership by being general
partner.

(2)

The grantor could gift non-voting stock (or a minority of
the voting stock) and still control the corporation by
reason of the retained voting stock.
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(3)

~
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c.

The grantor can be trustee of a trust holding assets
gifted by the grantor if the grantor's powers to distribute
are limited by so-called ascertainable standards.
However, there are many possible traps if the grantor
acts as trustee (e.g., the trust couldn't hold life insurance
on the grantor-trustee's life or voting stock in a
controlled corporation, and complex income tax
implications may arise).

Cutting Strings Is Sometimes Necessary
It is often necessary and/or advisable, from both an estate tax
and income tax standpoint, for the donor to cut all strings over
gifted assets in order to cease owning such assets for estate tax
purposes (under IRC §§2036-2042) and income tax purposes
(under IRC §§671-678).
Example: Donor has been faithfully making $10,000 gifts each
year to custodianships for each of the donor's three children.
Each child now has $100,000 sitting in an account under the
Uniform Gifts to Minors Act (UGMA) and the donor is acting
as custodian of such accounts. When donor dies, all funds in
the custodial accounts will be included in donor's gross estate
for purposes of the federal estate tax by reason of the broad
powers which donor retained over the gifted property as
custodian under UGMA. IRC §2038.

4.

Gifting Should Be Timed For Maximum Benefit
a.

Make A Series Of Annual Gifts
It is obviously better to make a series of smaller gifts which
qualify for the $10,000 annual gift tax exclusion over a period of
years, as opposed to making occasional larger gifts that use up .
unified credit and/or generate gift tax liability.

b.

Make Gifts Early In The Year
Generally, gifts should be made as early in the year as is
possible, so that the annual exclusion for such gifts will be
obtained before the donor can die or Congress can change the
rules.
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c.
~
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Beware Of Year End Gifts.
It is essential that the gift be completed prior to the end of the

calendar year if annual exclusion for that year is to be utilized,
or prior to the donor's death if exclusion from the donor's
estate is sought. Beware of last minute transfers requiring that
a check clear or a deed or stock certificate be retitled.
Consider bank wire transfers, use of certified checks (not
cashier's checks) actually delivered to the donee, etc.

d.

Leapfrog Gifts To Minimize Appraisal Costs
If the donor is healthy (i.e., no reason to expect imminent

death) and is gifting hard to value assets (such as interests in a
family partnership or corporation) requiring a formal appraisal,
then consideration should be given to updating the appraisal
late in the year every other year to minimize appraisal costs.
Example: Client is planning to make periodic and significant

gifts of a hard to value asset starting in late 1992. The
December, 1992, appraisal can be used for both 1992 and early
1993 gifts made. The client can then wait until late 1994,
update the appraisal (at a lower cost for an update then was
first incurred for the appraisal), and use the updated appraisal
for both late 1994 and early 1995 gifts.
5.

Miscellaneous Considerations
a.

Gifting By Incompetents Is Possible
It will generally be possible to cause gifts to be made by a

wealthy but incompetent older person in order to minimize his
or her expected estate tax liability.

(1)
.~

.---11
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~

Gifts can be made with the incompetent's money on
behalf of the incompetent by the incompetent's attorney
in fact (acting under a durable power of attorney signed
by the incompetent before becoming incompetent,
provided that the power specifically authorizes the
making of gifts. Note --- Care must be taken to limit the
ability of the person holding the power of attorney to
make gifts to himself or herself, as a real tax disaster
could occur if the power holder died first having a
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general power to gift an unlimited amount of assets to
himself or herself.
~

'"'

b.

(2)

Gifts can generally be made by a court appointed
guardian or conservator on behalf of an incompetent
after being authorized by the court. It will be necessary
to convince the court that the incompetent's assets are
sufficient to last for the incompetent's life, to
demonstrate that tax savings will result, and to show that
such gifts do not serve to defeat the incompetent's estate
plan (i.e., a historical pattern of gifting will be continued,
the same persons will receive the lifetime gifts as would
receive the incompetent's assets at death, etc.

(3)

It may be possible for the trustee of the incompetent's
revocable living trust to make gifts from such trust.
However, absent the passage of pending changes
proposed to be made to IRC §2035, it will be necessary
to first transfer such funds to the incompetent's name so
that the gift can be made by an attorney in fact (acting
under a durable power authorizing the making of gifts)
or conservator (with proper court authority). [See
III(C)(2)( d) above].

Maximizing Deathbed Gifts
The donor may wish to treat each branch of the family equally
(i.e., each child and such child's descendants will usually be
intended to be treated equally). It is possible to make unequal
distributions during lifetime that qualify for the annual
exclusion, and to make up the difference at death.
Example: An dying client has a son and a daughter. The son
is married and has five children. The daughter is single and
childless. Consideration should be given to giving son, son's
wife, daughter, and each of the five grandchildren $10,000, and
making an additional gift of $60,000 to the daughter (during
lifetime as a taxable gift, or in the client's will) to equalize total
gifts between the two branches of the family. This way, $80,000
escapes taxation at marginal rates as high as 60%.
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c.

Avoid Trying To Be Too Cute
Do not be too cute by trying to make gifts where you haven't
really made a gift. For example, giving the intended donee a
$10,000 note payable executed by the donor or gifting cash to
the donee which is immediately lent back to the donor can not
be expected to effectuate a valid gift.

~
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D.

Immediate Pre-Mortem Tax Planning
1.

Gifts That Might Be Made
a.

Non-Appreciated Property Might Be Gifted Away
If the dying client is going to make lifetime gifts, it will usually

be desirable to make gifts of property which is neither highly
appreciated property (and would thus be entitled to stepped up
basis at death if retained by the donor) nor loss property (since
the donee's basis for loss purposes cannot exceed the fair
market value of the property at the time of gift). IRC §§1014
and 1015.
b.

Appreciated Property Should Generally Be Kept
The dying client will want to retain appreciated property that
will be entitled to stepped up basis at death. IRC §1014.

c.

Certain Charitable Gifts Might Be Made During Life
The client may wish to make charitable gifts planned to be
made at death instead as lifetime gifts, so as to both get a
charitable income tax deduction for such gift and remove such
gifted property from the taxable estate. Charitable gifts at
death may be taken as an estate tax deduction, but are not
entitled to be taken as an income tax deduction.

2.

Gifts That Might Be Received

a.

I

~

Appreciated Property Might Be Received As A Gift
The dying client without an estate tax problem (i.e., because his
or her gross estate is under $600,000, or because the marital
deduction will be used to eliminate the estate tax) may wish to
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receive gifts of appreciated property prior to death. Such
property will be entitled to stepped up basis at the decedent's
death unless reacquired by the transferor by inheritance within
one year. IRC §1014(e). It appears that such property could
be given to the dying spouse by the other spouse within one
year of the dying spouse's death and qualify for stepped up
basis if such property were left by the decedent to children or
to a properly structured (totally discretionary sprinkle) family
trust for the surviving spouse and children.
3.

=i
~
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Rearranging Joint Tenancy And Community Property Interests
a.

Sever Certain Joint Tenancies With Non-Spouses
It may be desirable to sever certain joint tenancies between
owners who are not married to each other. This is because IRC
§2040, dealing with the taxability of joint tenancy interests
between owners who are not married to each other, requires a
tracing of contribution to determine what portion of the
property is to be included in a deceased joint tenant's estate.
Example: Mom paid $40,000 for her house in 1960 and retitled

it shortly after its purchase (in 1960) when it was still worth
$40,000 so that it would be owned by mom and her three
children as joint tenants. The house is now worth $400,000. If
mom now dies, IRC §2040 causes a $400,000 inclusion in mom's
estate, and IRC §1014 causes the children to have a $400,000
basis in the home after mom's death. This isn't a bad result if
the house is mom's only asset, so that the $600,000 exemption
equivalent causes no estate tax to be due.
Example: Assume the same facts as above (i.e., that mom had

given the house away in 1960 and is now on her deathbed),
except also assume that mom is in a 55% estate tax bracket. If
mom now dies, $220,000 of estate tax will be due upon mom's
death and the children will get stepped up basis. However,
assume that mom and the children convert the joint tenancy
ownership in the house to tenancy in common ownership while
mom is still alive. No gift is made by converting to tenancy in
common, as they each still have a 25% interest in the house, but
mom's will controls where her 25% interest goes rather than
having it automatically go to the children via joint tenancy.
Only mom's 1/4th interest (i.e., $100,000) will be included in her

-'-1

---1

~

B - 36

estate, causing $55,000 of estate tax due. The children will have
historic cost basis in their 3/4th of the house (i.e., $30,000) and
stepped up basis in the l/4th of the house included in mom's
estate (i.e., $100,000). Estate taxes due at mom's death are
reduced by $165,000 with no gift tax due as a result, but the
children have $270,000 less basis).
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b.

Sever Certain Joint Tenancies Between Spouses
Tax rules now in effect provide that one-half of property held
by husband and wife as joint tenants is included in the estate of
the first spouse to die and that the deceased spouse's one-half
interest is subject to having its basis adjusted. IRC §§1014 and
2040. However, a recent case has held that joint tenancy
.property acquired by a husband and wife prior to 1977 is
subject to the pre-1977 rules which require a tracing of
contribution to determine what portion of it is included in the
deceased spouse's gross estate and subject to basis adjustment.
Gallenstein v. United States, 91-2 USTC ~60,088 (D.C. Ky.
1991), affirmed 92-2 USTC ~60,114 (C.A. 6, 1992). The IRS
does not agree with the Gallenstein result. It may thus be
possible to pick and choose the desired tax result, and during
life to sever a pre-1977 spousal joint tenancy (by making it into
a tenancy in common or by titling the entire property in one
name or the other) in order to give the surviving owner of the
property maximum income tax basis.

c.

Create Community Property With Appreciated Separate
Property
It may be desirable to convert appreciated separate property
into community property if the client is married and lives in a
community property state. This will be appealing because
under IRC §1041 the conversion of separate property to
community property is not a taxable event, and under IRC
§1014(B)(6) both the decedent's interest and the survivor's
interest in community property has its basis adjusted to fair
.
market value at the death of either spouse.

B - 37

d.

Partition Community Property Which Has Depreciated
Conversely, it may be desirable to convert depreciated
community property into separate property if the client is
married and (because they lived in a community property state
at some time) has community property. This results because
IRC §1014(b)(6) results in a stepped down basis adjustment for
both halves of community property at the death of either
spouse, and such a conversion to separate property will allow
the surviving spouse to perpetuate his or her higher historic cost
basis in property which has declined in value.

E.

;
~

Applicable Valuation Principles
1.

The General Rule
The fair market value of property is the price at which the property
would change hands between a willing buyer and a willing seller,
neither being under any compulsion to buy or to sell and both having
reasonable knowledge of relevant facts. Determination of fair market
value will often require the assistance of one or more appraisal experts.

2.

Discounts And Premiums
Interests in closely-held businesses are inherently less marketable than
interests in a publicly traded company. A lack of marketability
discount is thus available in valuing such business. Additionally, a
minority interest in a closely-held business is particularly hard to· sell,
and a minority discount for a non-controlling interest is available.
However, a majority interest will usually have a premium attached to
it. Significant transfer tax savings result if a series of transfers causes
only minority interests in a closely-held business to be subject to gift
and/or estate taxation.
Example: Client has 4 children, has a closely-held business worth
$1,000,000, and will be in a 50% death tax bracket. If client keeps the
business until death there will be $500,000 of estate tax due. If client
gifts .15% of the business to each child, then a substantial minority
valuation discount (lets assume 30%) will be available on the gifted
stock for gift tax purposes. The client will later die owning only a
minority interest (i.e., 40% of the stock) in the business, and a similar
minority discount will be available for estate tax purposes. $300,000 in
'-i
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value has thus never been subject to taxation because of the minority
and lack of marketability discounts, resulting in tax savings of $150,000.
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Example: Client has a parcel of land worth $100,000 and wants to give
as much of it as is possible to client's child under the $10,000 annual
exclusion rule. A discount for an undivided interest in land, perhaps
15%, may be taken. This means that a 11.76% interest in the land, not
merely a 10.00% interest in the land, can be valued at $10,000 and
given away without gift tax consequences each year.

~

3.

Procedural Issues
Some form of contemporaneous expert appraisal should also be
obtained for hard to value assets (i.e., closely-held business interests,
real estate, valuable art work, etc.) whenever the client is making
lifetime gifts or dies. The extent of the appraisal may vary according
to the facts. For example, where an IRS audit is expected an MAl
may be useful in valuing real estate. But where the decedent had less
than $600,000 and value is only relevant in establishing the successor's
basis, then a letter from an experienced realtor may suffice.

F.

Getting The Client To Act·
1.

Quantify The Benefits
Clients cannot be expected to fully appreciate the value of making
lifetime gifts unless the taxes owed and the tax savings are quantified.
Running the tax savings numbers will often surprise even the tax
planning professional and cause many clients to decide to proceed with
gifting plans who otherwise would have done nothing.
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Example: Assume that husband (age 50) and wife (age 45); Bill and
Sally Moneybags, each have $5,000,000 worth of assets that are
expected to appreciate (after income taxes and consumption) at a rate
of 6% per annum. Assume that husband and wife live out their life
expectancies under the IRS unisex mortality tables, will use marital
deduction estate planning, and will each annually make $10,000 gifts to
each of their four children. Without gifting the survivor's taxable estate
would total $90,739,588 at the second death, causing $49,906,773 in
estate taxes to be due. With gifting such taxable estate would total
$78,721,584 at the second death, causing $43,296,871 in estate taxes to
be due. The estate tax savings total $6,609,902 if gifts are made.'
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Example: Assume that husband (age 60) and wife (age 60), Joe and
Mary Sample, each have $1,000,000 worth of assets that are expected
to appreciate (after income taxes and consumption) at a rate of 4%
per annum. Assume that husband and wife live out their life
expectancies under the IRS unisex mortality tables, will use marital
deduction estate planning, and will each annually make $10,000 gifts to
each of their four children. Without gifting the survivor's taxable estate
would total $4,526,608 at the second death, causing $1,937,635 in estate
taxes to be due." With gifting such taxable estate would total $1,069,871
at the second death, causing $181,647 in estate taxes to be due. The
estate tax savings total $1,755,988 if gifts are made.
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Example: Assume that a 60 year old widow, Merry Widow, has
$500,000 worth of assets that are expected to appreciate (after income
taxes and consumption) at a rate of 5 % per annum. Assume that she
lives out her life expectancy under the IRS unisex mortality table, and
that she will annually make $10,000 gifts to each of her two children.
Without gifting her taxable estate would total $1,612,550 at death,
causing $413,648 in estate taxes to be due. With gifting her taxable
estate would total $613,506 at death, causing $4,997 in estate taxes to
be due. The estate tax savings total $408,651 if gifts are made.
Example: Client is in flat 50% gift and estate tax brackets, and has
been told that paying gift taxes is a better deal than paying estate taxes
because gift taxes are computed on a tax exclusive basis, while estate
taxes are computed on a tax inclusive basis. Assuming that the client
has $1,000,000 to dispose of (via donative transfers and payment of
taxes), the client can give $666,666.67 via a taxable gift (since the
$333,333.33 gift" tax is imposed on the net amount passing to the
donee), by only $500,000 via an estate taxable transfer (since the
$500,000 estate tax is imposed on the gross amount of assets before the
estate tax is subtracted). However, deathbed taxable gifts will not
achieve this savings, as IRC §2035 will cause the $333,333.33 of gift tax
incurred within three years of death to be included as a phantom asset
of the estate, thus eliminating the benefit if the donor died within three
years of making the gift.
Example: Even last minute gifting strategies can achieve significant
estate tax savings. Assume that it is December and" an 87 year old
client in very poor health has three children in their sixties (all
married), eight grandchildren in their thirties and forties (six of whom
are married), twelve great grandchildren aged between 10 and 25 (two
of whom are married), and two young great great grandchildren. The
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client has 25 living lineal descendants and 11 spouses of living lineal
descendants. Such 36 beneficiaries will allow $360,000 to be removed
from the client's taxable estate with simple $10,000 gifts and no gift
splitting and double that amount if the client is married and gift
splitting is elected. Additionally, such gifts can be made again on
January 1st of the next calendar year (only some two weeks off). This
is in addition to any direct payment of tuition or educational expenses,
use of discounts (discussed below), use of unified credit, etc.
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2.

Illustrate The Benefits
The old saying "One picture is worth a thousand words" has great
application when explaining the tax benefits of engaging in a long term
gifting strategy to the client. See the attached exhibits hereto. They
were prepared using Estate Forecast Model, software available from
ViewPlan, Inc., a San Diego company (800-826-2127).

3.

The "KISS" Principle
Some clients cannot or will not tolerate a complex estate plan. For
such persons, it is better to utilize one or two of the simpler (i.e.,
"Keep it simple, stupid!") gifting techniques than to do nothing at all.
Significant tax savings will still result over time.

IV.

SPECIFIC LIFETIME GIFTING TECHNIQUES
A.

Transfers Which Generate No Gift Tax Liability
1.

Annual Exclusion Gifts
It will be desirable to make gifts each calendar year to as many people

as possible. No gift tax will be incurred (nor is a gift tax return due)
so long as the total gifts to a particular individual do not exceed
$10,000 in anyone calendar year. IRC §2503(b). Such gifts will not·
be included in the donor's estate pursuant to IRC §2035, even if the
donor dies within three years, unless a life insurance policy on the
donor's life was gifted or the donor retained some interest in the gifted
property under IRC §§2036, 2037, or 2038. IRC §2035( d)(2).
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2.

Spousal Gift-Splitting
Spouses may consent to split gifts, which causes the amount which the
two of them (in the aggregate) can gift tax free each calendar year to
become $20,000 per individual donee. IRC §2523. Such election can
be made on a late filed gift tax return (as long as it is the first gift tax
return filed for the year in question), and if made the election applies
to all gifts made during that year while the couple was married.

~
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3.

Payments For Medical Expenses And Tuition
Direct payments to the providers for the medical or tuition expenses
of another are gifts which qualify for an unlimited gift tax exclusion.
Reimbursing the individual who incurred such an expense will not
qualify for this special gift tax exclusion. IRe §2503( e).

4.

Use Of The Unified Credit
It will often make sense for the client to make taxable gifts during
lifetime (i.e., gifts .in excess of $10,000 annual exclusion gifts), thus
utilizing all or part of the $192,800 unified credit (sometimes called the
"$600,000 exemption equivalent"). No gift taxes will be due, although
it will be necessary to file a gift tax return to report the amount of
unified credit used. But all income and growth in value on the gifted
assets that occurs after the date of the gift will escape estate taxation
at the client's death. Additionally, the client won't have to worry about
the law changing (so as to lower the amount of unified credit) if it had
already been used prior to any change in the law.

5.

Creation Of Income Tax Defective Trusts
It is possible to gift assets to a trust in such a way as to make a
completed and effective gift for gift and estate tax purposes while, at
the same time, keeping some minor power over the trust (such as the
right to later substitute property of equivalent fair market value for
property owned by the trust) which causes the trust to be a so-called
"defective" grantor trust for income tax purposes. This causes the
trust's income to be taxed to the grantor, rather than to the trust itself,
which in effect allows' the grantor to indirectly make an additional (but
gift tax free) gift to the trust when the grantor pays income taxes which
the trust would normally have to pay.

d
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Example: Grantor always makes $10,000 annual gifts to each of the
grantor's two children. Additionally, grantor gifts $600,000 to an
intentionally defective grantor trust for the benefit of grantor's children.
The trust invests in 8% taxable bonds and has $48,000 of taxable
income. Assume that the trust would normally pay combined state and
federal income taxes of 40%, or $19,200, per year. The grantor is
technically income taxed on the trust's income since the trust was
structured as a defective grantor trust. The grantor thus effectively
transfers $39,200 to his or her children each year (i.e., $20,000 of
annual exclusion gifts and the $19,200 of income taxes paid).

~
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6.

Qualified Disclaimers
It is possible to turn down an inheritance by making a qualified
disclaimer of it. Such a disclaimer must be made within nine months
of the decedent's death an before any benefits (such as income from
the gifted property) relating to the gift have been accepted. IRe
§2518. Disclaimed property automatically goes to the next beneficiary
as if the disclaiming beneficiary had already died.
Example: Sally is a wealthy 65 year old widow has been diligently
making $10,000 annual gifts to each of her two children in order to
minimize the estate taxes which will be due at her death. Sally's 90
year old mother dies leaving her entire $500,000 estate to Sally, if she
is alive, otherwise to Sally's children. Sally may wish to disclaim all (or
part) of the gift from her mother, as Sally doesn't need the money and
it will generate as much as $300,000 of additional estate taxes in Sally's
estate. It would take Sally 25 years to get $500,00 to he two children
via $10,000 annual gifts, but a disclaimer allows her to do it
immediately with no gift or estate tax due.

7.

Opportunity Shifting
An incredibly good business opportunity will sometimes arise. It may
make sense to cut the children or grandchildren (or trusts for their
benefit) in at the start. If a new business is being formed, why not give
away some of the stock (perhaps nonvoting stock or a minority
interest) before any significant value arises'?
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8.

Other Techniques
It may be possible to enhance the value of assets held by other family
members without making a taxable gift in the process.

~
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Example: A wealthy oil and gas investor has purchased the rights to
drill on a promising large tract of land. Perhaps he wants to assign his
drilling rights to the northern portion of the property to a trust for his
children prior to the commencement of any drilling. He will then drill
an exploratory well on his retained southern portion of the property
near the border with the children's portion of the property. If the
exploratory well is successful, the value of the children's property will
be enhanced. If unsuccessful, the children didn't spend any of their
money drilling a dry hole.

B.
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Methods To Effectuate Gifts

1.

Do Nothing At All During Life
The easiest method of gifting is to do nothing during lifetime, so that
the assets merely pass at death via will, the state intestate statute if no
will is in force, via joint tenancy survivorship, or via beneficiary
designation.

2.

a.

The advantage of doing nothing is that it easy to do.

b.

The disadvantage of doing nothing is that the tax benefits
associated with lifetime gifting will not be achieved.

Outright Gifts To Individuals
Outright gifts can be made directly to a responsible adult donee, which
is a very simplistic approach to gifting since no trusts need to be
created to hold such gifted assets.
a.

The advantages of outright gifting are many --- it's simple, the
donee has unrestricted access to the funds (also a possible
disadvantage), value is removed from the donor's estate (i.e.,
the amount of annual exclusion as well as the income and
appreciation subsequent to the gift), the income from the gifted
asset is shifted to the donee's return where it may be income
taxed at a lower rate, etc.

~
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b.

3.

The disadvantages of outright gifting are also many --- the
donee has unrestricted access to the funds (also a possible
advantage), the gifted assets will be at risk to the donee's
lawsuits and divorces, the limited benefits of having the trust as
a separate taxpaying entity will not exist, the assets will be
subject to estate taxation at the donee's death, etc.

Bargain Sale Transactions
If the client cannot afford to totally give an asset away, then
consideration should be given to making a bargain sale (i.e., part gift,
part sale) of the asset to the desired beneficiary.

4.

Net Gift Transactions
Gift tax is the legal liability of the donor. However, it is possible to
make a gift (called a "net gift") where the donee is required to pay the
gift tax as a condition of the gift. This may be useful where the older
family member has illiquid assets such as stock or land.

5.

Gifts To Custodianship
Gifts to a minor (21 in most states for this purpose) can be made to a
custodian for such minor under the Uniform Gifts to Minors Act or (if
enacted in your state) the Uniform Transfers to Minors Act.

6.

a.

The advantages of gifting to a custodianship are many --- such
an arrangement is easy to create (via signature card at a bank
or stock brokerage firm) and gifts to the custodian qualify for
the annual $10,000 gift tax exclusion as if made directly to the
minor beneficiary.

b.

The principal disadvantage of gifting to a custodianship is that
when the Income is reported in the minor's Form 1040. The
custodian can dole out the money to the minor as the custodian
sees fit until the minor turns 21, at which time the assets must
all be turned over the beneficiary.

Gifts To Conservatorships
A conservatorship (in some states called a "guardianship of the
property") is a court-supervised arrangement for running the assets of
a minor or incompetent. Gifts to such an arrangement will qualify for

~
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the annual exclusion and the income will generally be taxed on the
beneficiary'S Form 1040. The beneficiary becomes entitled to the
assets upon becoming an adult (usually age 18 for this purpose) or
regaining competency.
7.

Gifts To Section 2503(b) Trusts
Although rarely used, it would be possible to create a trust for a minor
beneficiary under IRC 2503(b). Such a trust need only mandate that
its net fiduciary accounting income be paid to its beneficiary, at least
annually. The net present value of the future income payments will
qualify for the annual gift tax exclusion. The trust will file a Form
1041. Payments to the minor could be made to a custodian under the
Uniform Gifts to Minors Act or Uniform Transfers to Minors Act, or
to a court appointed conservator for the minor.

8.

Gifts To Section 2503( c) Trusts
A trust for a minor beneficiary can be created under IRC §2503( c).
Such a trust must grant the trustee reasonable authority to expend
funds for the minor prior to the minor turning age 21. The beneficiary
must have the right (and actually be informed of such right) to take all
of the trust's assets at age 21 (although it can be a right for a limited
period of time, after which the funds can be mandated to stay in trust
until some later age chosen by the grantor of the trust). Gifts to the
trustee of such a trust qualify for the $10,000 gift tax exclusion as if
made directly to the minor beneficiary. Income is reported on the
trust's Form 1041.

9.

Gifts To Crummey Trusts
A more traditional long term "Crummey" trust could also be used for
a minor beneficiary. Such a trust could last past age 21 and not qualify
under the provisions of IRC §2503( c). Instead, gifts to it would be
subject to a so-called "Crummey" withdrawal right. This is a provision
in the trust that allows the trust's beneficiary or beneficiaries the right,
for a reasonable time (say 30 days) and after receiving notice of such
right, to withdraw gifts that have been made to the trust. Such a right
is given in order to qualify gifts to the trust for the $10,000 annual gift
tax exclusion, but generally with the expectation that such right will not
actually be exercised. A parent, guardian, or conservator can act under
most such clauses on behalf of a minor beneficiary.
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10.
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Gifts To Irrevocable Life Insurance Trusts

a.

Client Situation
Where the decedent (or if married and the unlimited marital
deduction is used, the decedent's surviving spouse) will have an
estate large enough to be subject to death taxes, it is desirable
to structure life insurance ownership so that the proceeds will
not be included in the insured's (nor in the surviving spouse's)
taxable estate.
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b.

Mechanics Of Arrangement
An irrevocable life insurance trust would be created, and would
be the owner and beneficiary of the insurance on the grantor's
life. The grantor's surviving spouse could be the trust beneficiary (and trustee if desired) for life, with the assets passing to
the grantor's descendants thereafter. The trust would be
carefully drafted so as to keep its contents from being taxed in
either the grantor's estate or in the grantor's surviving spouse's
estate. During his or her lifetime, the grantor can give the trust
money to pay the insurance premiums or, if arranged properly,
can pay the premiums directly. Estate liquidity is achieved by
empowering the trustee to buy assets from, or loan money to,
the insured's probate estate.

c.

Preserving Flexibility
The biggest drawback in using an irrevocable life insurance trust
is that the document, by its terms, must be irrevocable and
unamendable. Flexibility can be provided by:
(1)

Granting broad discretionary powers of distribution to
the trustee (including the right to cancel policies or
distribute policies to a beneficiary during the grantor's
life ).

(2)

Granting special powers of appointment to someone
other than the grantor, so as to allow for termination of
the trust during the grantor's life.

~
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Defining the term "spouse" generically, so as to provide
for the death or divorce of the spouse prior to the
insured's death.
Providing a means of qualifying the insurance proceeds
for the marital deduction if the grantor should die within
three years and have trust insurance proceeds included
in the grantor's gross estate for estate tax purposes.
d.

Post-ERTA "Crummey" Clauses
ERTA's increased annual gift tax exclusion (i.e., from $3,000 to
$10,000) does not necessarily mean that it is desirable to
increase the available "Crummey" clause exclusion to $10,000.
It may be better to limit any withdrawal rights to the 5 x 5
limitation imposed under IRC §§2041 and 2514 (usually $5,000
per year for each donee of an irrevocable life insurance trust)
to minimize the beneficiary's potential estate tax exposure.

e.

Newly-Acquired Insurance
It is essential that the trustee of the trust acquire (as the initial
owner, applicant, and beneficiary) any new policies. If the
insured bought the policy and assigned it to the trust there
would be a three year period during which the policy proceeds
would be included in the insured's estate for tax purposes. IRC
§2035( d)(2). However, if the trustee is the initial owner of the
policy, the insured's death within three years will not cause
estate taxability. Leder v. Commissioner, 893 F.2d 237 (10th
Cir. 1989); Chapman v. Commissioner, T.C Memo 1989-105;
Perry v. Commissioner, T. C Memo 1990-294; Headrick
v. Commissioner, 93 T.C 171 (1989).

f.

Generation-Skipping Tax Consequences
In order to get maximum leverage from the one million dollar
exemption available under the generation-skipping tax law, it is
desirable that an election should be made to use enough of such
exemption as will completely exempt the trust from generation-skipping tax consequences.
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11.

Gifts To Charitable Remainder Trusts
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Clients will often have stock or real estate that is highly appreciated in
value and produces little current income. One way to dispose of such
an asset without incurring capital gains taxes at the time of sale, so that
all of the net sales proceeds can be reinvested in· something else that
will produce more income, is to contribute such property to a
charitable remainder trust prior to its sale. A charitable remainder
trust is a special trust which property is gifted to and periodic
distributions are made to the donor and/or some other person( s),
either for life or for a preset number of years. When the trust
terminates, a charity is the beneficiary.
a.

Client Situation.
Assume $1,000,000 in properties with a zero cost basis and low
current yield are owned by a person desiring to convert them to
a high yield investment by (1) selling them and investing the net
sales proceeds, or (2) utilizing an inter vivos charitable
remainder trust. Assume the person is a female age 56, in good
health, in 50% death and 28% income tax brackets and that an
8% pre-tax yield will be earned on the sale proceeds.

b.

Situation If No Charitable Remainder Trust.
The $1,000,000 in assets would (after income tax on the gain)
leave $720,000 for investment. With an 8% pre-tax yield the
client would receive $57,600/year of income before taxes and
$41,472 after income taxes. At death, the client's family would
receive $360,000 after estate taxes.

c.

3

Situation With Use Charitable Remainder Trust.
The $1,000,000 property would be put into an inter vivos
charitable remainder unitrust with an 8% annual payment
retained by the client and the remainder to go to charity at the
client's death. This means that the client gets annual payments
equal to 8% of the trust's value, as redetermined each year (i.e.,
if the trust appreciates to $1,200,000, then the trust pays the
client $96,000 in the next year). The trust would sell the
property and not be liable for a capital gains tax. IRC §644,
which taxes certain gains recognized within two years of the
transfer of the property to the trust at the grantor's tax rates, is
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specifically not applicable to sales by charitable remainder
trusts.
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If the trust has an 8% pre-tax yield the client would receive
$80,000 per year of income before taxes and $57,600 per year
after income taxes. Additionally, the client will receive a
charitable income tax deduction of $243,610 to offset personal
income tax liability (which would result in income tax savings of
$68,211 if the charitable deductions were fully deductible).

~

At death, the client's family would not receive anything (as the
property goes to charity). However, at a cost of approximately
$9,000/year for ten years, $360,000 life insurance on the client's
life can be purchased for the children's benefit (through an
estate tax exempt irrevocable life insurance trust) to replace the
assets that would have gone to them in the absence of the
charitable trust.
d.

Summary If Use Charitable Remainder Trust.
(1)

The client gets an income tax charitable deduction of
$243,610 which saves $68,211 of income tax if the
deduction can be fully utilized;

(2)

$280,000 of capital gains taxes are avoided if the
property is put into a charitable remainder trust prior to
its being sold.

(3)

The client's ongoing annual after tax cash flow is
increased by $16,128 per year if no life insurance
premiums are paid and is increased by $7,128 per year
if life insurance premiums are paid.

(4)

Estate taxes at the client's death are reduced by $360,000
(assuming the client would make a lifetime sale of the
property) by reason of the property having been
transferred to the charitable remainder trust prior to
death.

(5)

The children get the same $360,000 after estate taxes (if
life insurance premiums are paid) that they would have
gotten if the property had been sold directly by the client
prior to death.
~
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(6)

Charity ultimately gets $1,000,000 at the client's death,
and the client will no doubt get the appropriate
recognition and perks while alive because of this
eventual gift.

(7)

This technique will only be used with a portion of the
client's assets since enhanced lifetime payments are
obtained only by giving up access to the underlying
assets.

~
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12.

Gifts To Charitable Lead Trusts
Clients will sometimes be making substantial charitable gifts on regular
annual basis. It may be possible to use a charitable lead trust to
combine charitable gifting with family gifting to achieve overall tax
savings. A charitable lead trust is a special trust which property is
gifted to and from which periodic distributions are made to charity for
a preset number of years. When the trust terminates, the grantor's
children (or trusts for the grantor's children or grandchildren) receive
.
the assets of the trust.
Example: Assume that the client has (among substantial other assets)
$500,000 worth of bonds or notes receivable which earn 8% (i.e.,
$40,000) per year, and that the client donates to charity (and is able
to deduct) the entire $40,000 each year. In 20 years the client will still
have the $500,000 worth of bonds and notes in his ot her estate.
Assume that a 50% gift or estate tax will have to be paid in order to
ultimately pass ownership of such bonds and notes to the children or
grandchildren.
Example: Alternatively, assume that the $500,000 worth of bonds and
notes were transferred to a charitable lead trust which would pay
$40,000 per year to a designated charity (perhaps even the client's own
family foundation).

~

a.

The $40,000 per year of income is no longer on the client's
. income tax return (as the charitable lead trust now has the
income and takes a deduction for it when it is paid to charity).

b.

If the client sets up a 20 year charitable lead trust (as either a

fixed 20 year term or for the grantor's lifetime, which happens
to be 20 years under the applicable IRS mortality tables), then
the IRS tables (using a 6.4% rate) say that the right of the
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children (or other beneficiaries) to get the bonds and notes in
20 years is worth 11.146% of it's current value. A gift tax
return would be filed reporting a $55,736 gift. No gift tax would
be due unless client had already used. up the $600,000
exemption equivalent.

c.

d.

13.

At the end of the 20 year term the children get the charitable
lead trust assets. If the client instead had kept the bonds and
died in 20 years, then making a $55,736 gift prevented $250,000
of death taxes at the client's death (i.e., $500,000 of bonds taxed
at a 50% rate). Setting up the trust used up tax credits that
would otherwise have been available at death and, in effect,
caused death taxes to be increased by $27,883 on the client's
remaining assets at death. Net tax savings are thus $223,117.
It is assumed that the assets actually yielded (i.e., had a total
return) of 8% per annum during such 20 year period.

~

~

~

Income tax savings result during the client's lifetime if the
grantor's income is such that up to 80% of the client's itemized
deductions are being disallowed pursuant to IRe §68. Absent
the use of the charitable lead trust as much as $32,000 per year
of charitable deductions could be wasted (i.e., 80% of $40,000
in deductions is disallowed), causing $12,672 per year of income
taxes (i.e., 39.6% tax rate on $32,000 of additional income since
that amount of charitable deductions would be disallowed) that
could be avoided if instead ownership of the income producing
assets could be shifted to the charitable lead trust (i.e., the
$40,000 of income is taken off of the grantor's return) where
the trust would be able to deduct them in full.

Gifts To Grantor Retained Income Trusts
a.

Prior to the enactment of IRe §2702, grantor retained income
trusts ("GRITS") were used to reduce the estate and gift tax
cost of transferring assets to family members.

b.

Property would be transferred to a trust wherein the grantor
retained the right to the trust's income (as defined for fiduciary
accounting purposes) for a fixed number of years, after which
the trust assets passed to the remainderman (usually the
children or a trust for the children. Only the present value of
the remainder interest constituted a taxable gift, and more funds
than were supposed to (based upon the actuarial assumptions
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required to be used) could pass to the remainderman if the
funds were invested so as to minimize current yield and
maximize growth in value. If the grantor outlived the retained
income term then significant savings would result, but if the
grantor died during the retained income term then the trust
would be included in the grantor's estate pursuant to IRe §2036
(with any gift tax credits used by the donor being restored).

;
;.=='!
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c.

Recently enacted IRe §2702 effectively eliminated GRITS as a
planning device when the remainder beneficiary is the grantor's
spouse, a lineal descendant of the grantor or the grantor's
spouse, or the spouse of any such descendant. However, they
are still a useful device for other beneficiaries, such as a niece
or nephew of the grantor.

Example: A 50 year old grantor transfers $100,000 to a trust which
provides for the grantor retain income payments for 15 years. If the
grantor dies within the 15 year period then the trust assets revert to the
grantor's estate. If the grantor outlives the 15 year term then the trust
assets go to the grantor's niece. Assume a 6.0% IRe §7520 rate, a
55% death tax rate, and that the trust assets will appreciate in value by
5% per year (after taxes). A $35,153 gift will be reported when the
trust is established, but $207,893 can be expected to pass to the niece
when the trust terminates, resulting in approximately $95,007 in
potential death tax savings.

14.

j

3

Gifts To Qualified Personal Residence Trusts
A relatively new tax planning vehicle authorized in IRe §2702 is the
qualified, personal residence trust. It involves transferring a principal
or second residence to a trust wherein the grantor retains the right to
live in the residence for a fixed number of years, after which such
rights terminate and the children (or some other designated
beneficiary, such as a trust for grandchildren) own the residence.
Significant estate tax savings can result if the grantor lives long enough
for his or her rights to use the residence to terminate. It's really better
than it sounds!
Example: Assume that a 55 year old client owns a $400,000 Snowmass
, vacation home and is in a 50% estate tax bracket. Assume that the
Snowmass home will appreciate at 4% per year. If the client does
nothing and lives until age 80, then the house will be worth $1,066,335
and $533,117 of death tax will be due.
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a.

If the client sets up a 15 year qualified personal residence trust,
then the IRS tables (using a 6.4% factor) say that the right of
the children (or other beneficiaries) to get the residence in 15
years is worth 30.4627% of it's current value. A gift tax return
would be filed reporting a $121,851 gift. No gift tax would be
due unless client had already used up the $600,000 exemption
equivalent.

~

~

i§!

=----=i

15.

b.

At the end of the 15 year term the children own the residence.
If the client dies at age 80 then making a $121,851 gift
prevented $533,117 of death taxes from being due (although
setting up the trust used up tax credits that would otherwise
have been available at death and, in effect, caused death taxes
to be increased by $60,926 on the client's remaining assets at
death). Net tax savings are thus $472,191.

c.

The client might die during the first 15 years. Because the
client would have died while still having the right to use the
residence the entire transaction is unwound (i.e., the residence
is included in the client's taxable estate, the tax credits used
when the trust was established are restored, and the death tax
result is as if no trust was setup). The client would,however, be
out the appraisal and legal fees incurred hen the trust was
established.

d.

The client may want to continue to use or own the residence
when the trust terminates at the end of 15 years. This could be
accomplished by renting the residence back from the children
at a fair rental rate (which would get more money out of client's
estate) or by repurchasing the residence from the trust at its
then fair market value (presumably $720,377 in 15 years if it
had appreciated at 4% per year). No capital gain will be
incurred by the trust if the repurchase takes place prior to the
end of the 15 year period (as the trust 'is deemed to be a
defective grantor trust for income tax purposes), as the client
would only be entitled to his or her original historic cost basis
in the residence.

Gifts To GRATs And GRUTs
Congress felt that the ability to establish a GRIT and engineer the
investments (so that there was no accounting "income" to pay to the
grantor and capital gains instead are generated to pass to the
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remainderman) was to good to allow. Except in the case of personal
'residence trusts, no interest in a trust retained by the grantor is
deductible in determining the gift tax value of the interests in the trust
which will pass to the remainderman unless the grantor has retained an
annuity interest (i.e., fixed periodic payments, which cause the trust to
be a grantor retained annuity trust or "GRAT") or a unitrust interest
(i.e., periodic payments equal to a fixed percentage of the trust's
annually redetermined fair market value, which cause the trust to be
a grantor retained unitrust or "GRUT"). IRe §2702.

~
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16.

Gifts To Near Zero Gift GRATs
Recently enacted IRe §2702 imposes actuarial assumptions for gift tax
purposes that can be used to the taxpayer's advantage (via a device
called a linear zero gift GRAT") if a higher rate of return than is
assumed earned can be actually be earned in a trust which ultimately
passes to children or grandchildren.
Example #1: Assume that the client has a hot investment that could

hit a real home run (perhaps a penny stock that might appreciate at
30% per year d:uring the next two years). If that month's 120% of midterm AFR rate (i.e., the IRS assumed trust investment return) is 6.4%
and gift taxes are determined based on that up front assumption, then
little or no gift tax will be due if the trust is intentionally structured to
have payments going to the grantor with net present value almost equal
to the entire initial value of the trust.
If the client creates a trust with $100,000 worth of the speculative

I
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investment and directs that the trust pay the grantor $55,000 per year
at the end of years one and two, the IRS assumes that at the end of
two years there will be almost nothing (i.e., less than $1,000.00) left in
the trust when whatever is left passes to the client's children.
However, if the trust earns more than a 6.4% return then the excess,
in effect, passes to the children in two years entirely gift tax free. For
example, a 30% annual return means that a taxable gift of $1,000 was
reported but approximately $42,00D is actually passing to the children
when the trust terminates in two years. But if less than 6.4% per year
is earned, then it was wasteful to report a $1,000 taxable gift because
there is less than that left in the trust for the children. Is it worth
taking a flyer and reporting a $1,000 taxable gift to possibly get $42,000
to the children? You won't know until two years later when the trust's
investment results are in. But this planning technique is basically a
heads, the taxpayer wins, tails, it didn't cost much Gust the attorney

~
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fees to establish the trust and the gift tax relating to a $1,000· taxable
gift), arrangement.
~

,~

The grantor retained annuity trust (i.e., "GRAT") can be a very useful
estate planning device if the client has an asset that generates a lot of
cash flow which can actually be distributed. Ideal vehicles would be S
corporation, limited partnership, and limited liability company interests.
Commercial real estate, alarm companies, and cable television
companies are examples of the types of assets that generate good cash
flow if not highly leveraged. The GRAT is a particularly viable
technique where the property gifted to the GRAT can be discounted
(for lack of marketability, minority interest, etc.).

~

~

~

Example #2: Assume that a 50 year old client owns 100% of an S
corporation which is valued at $1 million (i.e., ten times cash flow) and

which can distribute all of such cash flow in the form of dividends.
Also assume that 120% of the mid-term APR rate (i.e., the IRS
assumed investment return) is 6.4% and that a combined discount for
lack of marketability and minority interest of 40% would be
appropriate if less than 50% of the stock were gifted to a GRAT.
Assume that the client puts 40%' of the corporation's stock into a
GRAT which is to pay $40,000 per year (i.e., all of the cash flow
attributable to such interest) to the client for eight years and then go
to (or be held in trust for) the client's children. Such stock would be
valued at $240,000 (i.e., $400,000 less the discount of 40%) and would
have $40,000 per year of cash dividends. The remainder interest of the
children would be valued at about $6,040.65 for gift tax purposes at the
time of creation of the trust. The client may complain that the
business needs the cash. Inasmuch as all of the cash will be in client's·
hands individually, surely some method of getting the cash into the
business can be devised.

.

4

If the client lives for more than 8 years, the client's children end up
owning 40% of the corporation. The amount of assets subject to
transfer taxation will have been reduced by 98.49%. If the client dies

within such eight year period then the trust property reverts back to
the grantor's estate and the trust's assets will be included in the client's
taxable estate as if nothing had been done. According to Leimberg's
Number Cruncher software, a male age 50 has a 92.6% chance of
living to age 58 and a female age 50 has a 95.5% chance of living to
age 58.
-1
;::j
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Assume that the pre-discounted value of the client's
business interests was $80,000,000 in the above example, making the
value $48,000,000 after a 40% discount. The taxable gift at creation
would be $1,208,130.84, which means that a gift-splitting couple could
remove an asset worth $80,000,000 from their taxable estates in eight
years by utilizing their unified credits and reporting a taxable gift of
$8,131 (which involves paying gift tax of $3,008)!

Example #3:

~

~

C.

Other Value Shifting Techniques
1.

Loans To Family Members
It may be possible to loan funds to a family member at the lowest
interest rate possible under IRC§7872 and to shift value free of
transfer taxes if the borrower has investment opportunities that will
yield more than the interest that must be paid.

2.

Private Annuities
It may be possible to enter into a private annuity transaction with a
family member and shift value free of transfer taxes if the transferor
hasn't a life expectancy shorter than that contained in the IRS actuarial
tables or if the obligor on the annuity can obtain a higher yield than is
assumed by the IRS in valuing the annuity for gift tax purposes.

a.

General Overview
A private annuity usually involves the transfer of appreciated
property to a relative in exchange for an unsecured promise to
make payments to the annuitant.

b.

Tax Consequences To Annuitant
Where appreciated property is transferred in exchange for a
private annuity, a "capital gain element" is added to the usual
"recovery of basis" and "annuity element" which are relevant in
the case of annuities purchased by individuals from commercial
annuity issuers. Rev. Rul. 69-74, 1969-1 c.B. 43.

'I
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Example: A 65 year old owns property worth $100,000 having
a basis of $10,000 and wishes to engage in a private annuity
transaction at a time when the IRS table rate for such
transactions is 8.2% and life expectancy according to the IRS
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unisex mortality table is 20.0 years. The annuitant will receive
payments of $12,464 per year for life, of which $500.00 will be
a tax-free return of basis (until basis is fully recovered), $4,500
will be capital gain, and $7,464 will be ordinary income.
c.

Tax Consequences To Obligor
All annuity payments made by the obligor are treated as capital
expenditures and are nondeductible. Payments exceeding basis
are not deductible until the property is sold. Complex basis
determinations must be made if the property is sold prior to the
annuitant's death. Rev. Rul. 55-119, 1955-1 c.B. 352.

d.

Unrecovered Basis In Annuity At Death
The decedent's unrecovered investment in an annuity is
available as a deduction on the deceased annuitant's final Form
1040. IRC §72(b )(3)(A).

3.

Installment Sales
It may be possible to sell assets to a family member and achieve
transfer tax savings if the assets sold subsequently appreciate at a
higher rate than the interest rate that must be charged on the funds
borrowed to finance the purchase. The seller may choose to leaseback
the assets (but beware that a higher rate of interest may be required
on the financing), and the note might be setup to self-cancel at the
holder's death if not yet paid off (but see the Frane case concerning
the income tax consequences to the holder's estate).

4.

Arrangements Impacted By "Anti-Freeze" Rules
Beyond the scope of this outline are corporate and partnership
recapitalization techniques that have historically been used as estate
. freezing techniques. The goal of such arrangements (where, for
example, the older generation keeps preferred stock and the younger
generation gets the common stock) is to shift future growth to someone
else. See IRe §2701.
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D.

Dynastic Estate Planning Strategies

~

d
~

1.

Overview
The keys to GST tax planning are to take full advantage of those
transactions which are grandfathered and not subject to the GST tax
law, to maximize use of transfers which are excluded from being
subject to GST taxation, and to utilize all of the exemptions which are
available to shelter transfers which would otherwise be subject to GST
taxability. A thorough review of all existing wills, revocable trusts and
gifting strategies is necessitated, as estate planing strategies that might
have been appropriate under prior law may be detrimental, or without
effect, under the GST tax law.

2.

Drafting Exempt Trusts For Maximum Flexibility
Trust benefits which can be granted are so broad as to be tantamount
to ownership of the trust assets for most purposes. They include:
a.

The right to receive all trust income;

b.

The right to receive discretionary distributions of trust principal
(self-determination of needs was possible if the beneficiary was
acting as pursuant to an ascertainable standard;

c.

The right to exercise a five-by-five right of withdrawal (with
estate taxability only to the extent such right was unexercised in
the year of death);

d.

The right to possess a broad inter vivos and/or testamentary
special power of appointment (which must only exclude the
holder, the holder's creditors, the holder's estate, and the
creditor's of the holder's estate as objects of the power);

e.

The right to direct trust investments and vote trust securities;
and

f.

The right to hire and fire trustees (beware of the IRS position,
enunciated in Rev. Rul. 79-353 and later rulings but rejected by
the Tax Court in the Wall case, that the trustee's powers will be
attributed to the beneficiary if the beneficiary can hire and fire
trustees).

----j
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3.

Taking Advantage Of Grandfathering

a.

~

Overview
Trusts which are grandfathered from GST taxability by the
effective date provisions of TRA '86 are valuable tax planning
vehicles which should be perpetuated if at all possible. The
assets of a grandfathered trust should be invested for growth
and only distributed to non-skip persons if it is not possible to
make such distributions from a non-grandfathered trust.

=---.i
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b.

Utilize Annual Gift Tax Exclusion
In order to maintain their wholly exempt status, no additions to
a grandfathered trust should be made unless the addition qualifies under the $10,000 annual gift tax exclusion as a nontaxable
gift, or GST tax exemption equal to the value of the addition is
allocated to the trust. The lapse of a five-by-five right of withdrawal over a grandfathered trust will not constitute 'an addition
to that trust for GST tax purposes.

c.

Special Powers Of Appointment
The exercise of a special power of appointment over a grandfathered trust may allow the imposition of all transfer taxes to
be postponed if the power is exercised so as to cause the appointive property to be held in a new trust with an extended
termination date. There are many trusts that were irrevocable
on the effective date of the GST law and which will eventually
terminate in favor of the current income beneficiary's children
if an available special power of appointment is not so exercised.
Great care must be taken when a special power of appointment
is exercised in favor of a trust, as the maximum duration that
the new trust can last under the Rule Against Perpetuities will
be the same limitation imposed on the original trust.

d.

Continuous Mental Disability
Every effort should be made to document the continuous
mental disability of an individual who did not have the competence to change the disposition of his property on October 22,
1986, or at any time during his life thereafter. It is not neces-
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sary that the person be adjudged mentally incompetent, although it may be helpful.
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4.

Maximizing Excluded Transfers
a.

Gift Tax Exclusion Gifts
Annual exclusion gifts made to GST tax exempt trusts, rather
than outright, are less useful than prior to technical corrections,
as it is now necessary to either elect the use of GST exemption
or draft the trust in such a manner as will cause the "Crummey"
power holder to be subject to estate taxability on the trust assets
resulting from such lapsed "Crummey" power. Also, it may be
necessary to consider the timing of outright gifts and "Crummey"
gifts made to a beneficiary during a calendar year before any
outright gifts are made in order to avoid application of the rule
which states that it is the first $10,000 of gifts made to a donee
in a particular calendar year that qualify for the annual $10,000
gift tax exclusion.

b.

5.

Trusts should be drafted to allow direct payment of the tuition
and medical expenses of skip persons. If such items could be
paid from more than one trust, the trustee must ·consider the
potential transfer tax consequences when choosing the trust
from which payment is to be made.

Making Optimal Use Of Exemptions
a.

Overview
The GST exemption should be utilized as early as is possible in
order to cause the maximum amount of income and appreciation occurring after the transfer to escape gift, estate and
GST taxation. The benefit of the GST exemption can be maximized if it is used for assets with the most appreciation potential (i.e., the GST exemption could be leveraged and result in
the sheltering of significantly more than $1 million if allocated
to gifts made to an irrevocable life insurance trust). A mandated allocation of GST exemption should be avoided, as no
allowance will be made for the likelihood of various trusts
having differing potentials for appreciation or the occurrence of
generation-skipping transfers.
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Example: Client puts $1,000,000 of highly speculative stock into
a generation-skipping trust. During client's lifetime the stock
grows in value to $5,000,000. The $4,000,000 of appreciation is
not subject to gift tax, is not estate taxed in client's estate, and
is not subject to GST tax later when grandchildren or great
grandchildren receive distribution of the trust's assets.
Example: Assume a couple purchased $2 Million of survivorship
life insurance at a cost of $14,400 per year for 10 years. If that
insurance had been purchased via a generation-skipping trust
then' only $144,000 of GST exemption would need to be
allocated by each in order to get $2,000,000 down to
grandchildren or great grandchildren free of GST tax. It is thus
important to allocate GST exemption to those transfers having
the most potential leverage.

b.

Avoiding Gift Tax
A significant gift tax liability is possible if the GST exemption is
fully utilized during life, so most clients will postpone transfers
in excess of the $600,000 exemption equivalent until death.
However, IRC §2652( a) provides that split-gifts pursuant to IRC
§2513 of the gift tax law will be deemed to have been made
one-half by each spouse for GST tax purposes, so it is possible
for a married couple to make transfers of $1,200,000 without
incurring any gift tax or GST tax.

c.

Reverse QTIP Election
If the transferor is survived by a spouse, traditional marital
deduction estate planning will cause a $600,000 bypass trust to
be created, with the balance of the estate being paid to (or
placed in a marital deduction trust for the benefit of) the surviving spouse. It is usually desired to completely avoid transfer tax
at the death of the first spouse, which means that $400,000 of
the transferor's GST exemption may be wasted. IRC §2652(a)(3) permits the transferor to create a QTIP trust and elect to
be treated as its transferor for GST tax purposes. It is likely
that $400,000 QTIP trusts will now be established under circumstances where they would not otherwise be desired. Any marital
deduction gift in excess of $400,000 should be distributed outright or held in a separate marital trust.
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At the death of a surviving spouse no constructive addition will be
deemed made to a trust for which a reverse QTIP election was
made at the first spouse's death if the estate taxes attributable to
such trust are paid other than from such trust. Prop. Treas. Reg.
§26.2652-1 (a) (3).
Where a reverse QTIP election was made prior to December 24,
1992, and GST tax exemption has been allocated to a single QTIP
trust, such single QTIP trust may be treated as two separate tlusts
(for GST tax purposes only) by reason of a transitional Jules ij the
appropriate election is made on or before April 15, 1993. Prop.
Treas. Reg. §26.2652-2(c); 26.2654-1 (a).
6.

Other Planning Considerations
a.

Subject Assets To Estate Or Gift Tax
It may be advantageous to cause assets to be subject to estate
taxation rather than GST taxation. The value of the unified
credit and lower estate tax bracket of the beneficiary of a GST
trust will be wasted at the death of a beneficiary who has minimal personal assets. The GST tax is imposed at the top estate
tax bracket and significant transfer tax savings can result if some
assets are given outright to the beneficiary rather than placed
in a GST trust. It would also be possible to give the beneficiary
a general power of appointment over some portion of the GST
trust in order to cause trust assets to be subject to estate taxation rather than GST taxation.

b.

Use Of Disclaimers
Disclaimers will now potentially cause the imposition of GST
tax, as disclaimed property often passes from a child to a
grandchild of the transferor. The use of disclaimers will probably be reduced, although it is possible that no GST tax will be
due by reason of the grandfather rules, unused GST exemption
or the availability of the Gallo Amendment prior to 1990.

c.

Miscellaneous Considerations
Complexities introduced by the GST tax law will cause many
changes to be made in the way that wills and trusts are drafted.
It is likely that future administrative powers will routinely grant
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discretion to allocate GST exemption, to allow the final distribution of a trust to be postponed until the satisfaction of all
GST liability for which the trustee may be liable, and to allow
trustees to augment taxable distributions by an additional
amount to cover GST taxes due by the distributee. Issues such
as the apportionment of GST tax due, the allocation of GST
exemption between potentially adverse beneficiaries, multigenerational survivorship presumptions, the creation of both
GST tax exempt and GST taxable trusts where one trust would
have sufficed in the past, and the use of a special QTIP trust to
prevent a transferor's GST exemption from being wasted create
new and unresolved drafting problems.
E.

=

=
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Combining Various Gifting Techniques
Each of the lifetime gifting techniques discussed has its own pros and
cons. The typical client's estate planning objectives can usually be
achieved only by using a variety of techniques having a significant
combined tax impact.

I
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THE PENSION PLANNING!
ESTATE PLANNING PARADOX
~

PENSION PLANNING GOAL:

~

.......... Wealth Creation

~

ESTA1E PLANNING GOAL:

~

.......... WeaIth Transfer

PENSION PLANNING
~

To Accumulate Wealth

~

To Use for Retirement

~

Not to Use as a Tool
to Transfer the Wealth

PARADOX PLANNING
The Possible Solutions

=:1. -.

~

~

Timing of Distributions

~

Proper Beneficiary Designations

~

Pension Plan Alternatives
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PARADOX PLANNING
Everyone Says Defer, Defer, Defer

-'=='

• Accountants Say DEFER Plan Distributions

d

~

• Lawyers Say DEFER Plan Distributions
• Financial Planners Say DEFER Plan Distributions

:..........1

PARADOX PLANNING
Defer and Pay Dearly
• Defer and Pay Federal Estate Tax
• Defer and Pay State Death Tax
• Defer and Pay'Federal Income Tax
• Defer and Pay State Income Tax
• Defer and Pay Federal Excess
Retirement Accumulations Tax

THE LOST IRA/PENSION ACCOUNT
CURRENT VALUE
LESS:
LESS:
LESS:
LESS:
LESS:

$1,000,000

Federal Estate Taxes
Kentucky Inheritance Taxes
Federal Income Taxes
Kentucky Income Taxes
Excess Accumulation Tax

REMAINING BALANCE

$415,000
$135,000
$170,000
$30,000
$35,000
$215,000

PARADOX PLANNING
Using Plan Assets to Fund the Estate Plan

~

To Fund Annual Giving Plan

~

To Fund Charitable Giving Plan

~

To Fund Liquidity Protection Plan

3
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PARADOX PLANNING
Knowing When to Defer atul When to Distribute
If Estate Plan can be funded using
non-qualified assets, then fund it
with those assets.

i

If Estate Plan cannot be funded using
non-qualified assets, then fund it with
distributions from Qualified Plans or .IRAs.

PARADOX PLANNING
Minimizing the Five Taxes
~

Planning to Avoid
Excess Accumulation Tax

~

Planning to Defer
Income Taxes

~

Planning to Avoid
Death Taxes

"MRD"
Minimum Required Distribution

~

Determines when Distributions Begin (RBD)

~

"RBD" = Required Beginning Date

~

Plan or IRA may·be more Restrictive

j
"MRD"
Other Rules
~

I

~

Distributions Prior to RBD are NOT Credits

~

A MRD Payment CANNOT be "RoIled Over"

~

Failure to Comply with MRD = 50% Excise Tax

C-3

"MRD"
Effect on lRAs
E'3
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~

Generally Three Payout Options

~

Single Life Annuity (No Estate Thxes)

~

QJSA (Qualifies for QTIP - No Estate Thxes)

~

Installment Payments (May Generate Estate Thxes)

8
~

"RBD"
Required Beginning Date
~

Determines When Distributions Must Begin

~

April lst Following Age 70 1/2

~

Must be Distributed or Commenced by RBD

~

Exceptions:
.. .If Born Before 7/1/17 and < 5% Owner
...If Benefit & Bene. Designated b/f 1/1/84

"QJSA" .
Qualified Joint & Survivor Annuity
~

Single Ufe Annuity or QJSA Required

~

Unless:
....Plan Provides Other Options
.... AND ...Participant Elects Such Option
.... AND ... Spouse Consents

~

QJSA Qualifies for Marital Deduction as QTIP

~
I
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mE FIVE YEAR RULE
What is it?
~

GENERAL RULE: If death occurs before RBD
or start of distributions, then entire
interest must be paid out within 5 years

~

EXCEPTION 1: Paid over life of Designated
Beneficiary ("DB") over life expectancy of
DB or less

~

EXCEPTION 2: If Spouse is DB, paid over
his or her life but can wait until Spouse
reaches 70 1/2

-~
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THE FIVE YEAR RULE
Other Issues
~

~

The Plan Controls and Can Override 5-Yr Rule.

~

If spouse dies after Participant but b/f
payout begins and is the DB, then it will
be as if the spouse was the Participant.

BENEFICIARY DESIGNATIONS
The Spouse: Advantages

~

Continued Tax Deferral

~

Greater Flexibility to Spouse

BENEFICIARY DESIGNATIONS
The Spouse: Disadvantages

~

Loss of Control

~

Excess Accumulations Tax

BENEFICIARY DESIGNATIONS
Children: Advantages

~

Greater Tax Deferral

~

Protect Assets for Children

~

But.. .. Spousal Consent
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BENEFICIARY DESIGNATIONS
Children: Disadvantages
::::'!

~
.-

• Death Thx Sooner
• Pre/Postnuptial Agreements

~

• But.... Spousal Consent

BENEFIT DECISIONS
The Rights & Rules
• The RBD is Last Day to Select Benefit
• "At Least As Rapidly" Rule
.... After Participant's "Death
....Payout CANNOT be Lengthened
• H Participant Elects Installment Payout
....Will Not Qualify for Marital Deduction Uriless
....Spouse c·an Accelerate Payments

BENEFICIARY DESIGNATIONS
Watch Out For...

• Tax Allocation Clauses if
Beneficiary of Plan is Different
From Beneficiary of Residue
• Availability of Sufficient Cash to
Pay the Tax Under Current Designation

,

~

I

~

BENEFICIARY DESIGNATIONS
Review
• Who are the current beneficiary designations?

I

~
.-

• Are they valid under plan & current law?
• Is there a Pre/Postnuptial Agreement?
• Is there a Property Settlement Agreement?
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BENEFICIARY DESIGNATIONS
Spousal Consent
~

:J

§i

I

~ Must be Within 90 Days of When Payments

Are to Begin
~

Prenuptial Agreement NOT Valid Consent
(Treas. Reg. 1.401(a)-20, Q&A 28)

~

Not Required in IRA's and SEPP's

DESIGNATED BENEFICIARY
What Is It?
~

A Qualifying Beneficiary - Ufe Expectancy

~

Used in Calculating Retiree's Payments

~

Allows Longer Deferral of Taxes

~

Avoids 5-Year Rule

DESIGNATED BENEFICIARY
The DiJJerence it Makes

.
p,';".

. ; '.".;...

Shorter
Deferral

"'".' .•.•. , . , "

~

l

~

~

d

I

Longer

Deferral

DESIGNATED BENEFICIARY ("DB")
Other Rules
~

Determined at RBD or Death of Participant

~

New DB

~

Exception: If New DB b/c of Death of Old DB

~

If MUltiple DB's:
... A11 Must Qualify
... Take Shortest Life (Watch Qualified Trusts)

~

If DB Can Be Changed After Death, NO DB

= New Life Calculation if Shorter
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DESIGNATED BENEFICIARY
Who Can It Be?

~

General Rule: Individuals Only

~

Exception: "Qualified" Trusts

QUALIFIED TRUSTS
1jpes

~

Qualified Terminable Interest Property Trust
..... "QTIP" Trust

~

Exemption Equivalent ('EE") Trust

QUALIFIED TRUSTS
What Are They?
~

Must Be Valid Under Local Law

~

Must Be Irrevocable

~

Beneficiaries Must Be Identifiable

~

Copy of Instrument Must Go to Plan
- ii

~

QUALIFIED TRUSTS
Exemption Equivalent (EE) 1rust
~

Important When Non-plan Assets Are < $600,000

~

Accelerates Tax (Compared to Spouse as Bene.)

~

Always Fund EE Trust With Other Assets First

• Secondary Bene. Behind Spouse (Use Disclaimer)
~

WATCH our USING DISCLAIMER IF:
.... Payments have already started
.... Election is in effect to recalculate
Result is ALL assets in Plan are taxed

C-B

QUALIFIED TRUSTS
QTlP Trust
~

May Be of limited Value

~

Why QTIP in Finlt Place? CONTROL

~

nust = DB Status if Part. Dies Before RBD

~

nust = DB Status in All Cases if
Irrevocable at RBD or When It Is Named

~

Requires Plan Approval & Spousal Consent

~

j
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QUALIFIED TRUSTS
QTIP Trust Hazards

•

QTIP & Plan Must Both Pay "All Income" to Spouse

•

Check Defmition of "Income" in QTIP Trust

•

May Be Difficult for Large Corp. Plan to Assist

• Watch Out For Income in Respect of a Decedent if
Plan Benefits Are Used to Satisfy Pecuniary Bequest

DESIGNATED BENEFICIARY ("DB")
IRA Separate Account Planning

J

~

Allows Separate Accounts With
Different Beneficiaries

~

Some May Be DBs and Some May Not

~

MRD Determined for Each Account

~

Best to Divide Before RBD

~

May Result in Loss of Deferral
of Excess Accumulations Thx

EXCESS ACCUMULATIONS TAX
What is it?
• 15% tax

~

• Excess Retirement Accumulations Tax: 15%
•

$150,000 Annual Floor

~

$750,000 Lump Sum

• . Exceptions:
.....Death Benefit From Insurance
..... QDRO Payments
..... Spouse's Election to Defer
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EXCESS ACCUMULATIONS TAX
How

i

to A~oid or Minimize

j
I

~

~

Do Not Double Up Payment at 70 1/2

~

Take Distnbutions Before Age 70 1{2

~

Change Designated Beneficiary Designation

~

In Defined Contribution Plans
Consider the Purchase of Life Insurance

=::;

-~

~

~

;"".j

Ii
~

Take Advantage of QDRO

Avoiding Excess Accumulations Tax
(With the Use

0/ Life Insurance)

AT DEATH: Re...iDiAI Proceed. Paid

TRUST ASSETS TO JaDi OR

G~ltIDS

NO ImATH TAXU

Avoiding Excess Accumulations Tax
(W'uh the Use oj LiJe InsurGIICe)

I

ParticipaDt

I

AT DEATH: $1,250,000

iBR. INS. TRUST
H.D~ ';'Th,",~ih

S.wd ill Jia~e"Eseeu
:A~'" A'Death

.

:rue. :.

'TRUST ASSETS TO JaDS 01\ G.ElD,

o DUTH TAXES

=,
~

.J

SELECTING THE PAYOUT OPTION

-~

Do You Dare Advise?

~

Review Summary Plan Description

~

Review Disclosure Statement (IRA)

~

Investment Advisor? Financial Planner?

d
""'"
d
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QUALIFIED PLAN ALTERNATIVES

~

8

.. Non-Qualified Plans

.. Charitable Remainder 'Ihlsts

NON-QUALIFIED PLANS
Alternatives

.. Executive Bonus Retirement Plan
.. Split-Dollar Retirement Plan
.. Supplemental Employee Retirement Plan (SERP)
... Nonqualified Deferred Compensation plan

CHARITABLE REMAINDER TRUSTS
. A Creative Retire11Ulnt Alternative
~

No Limit on Amount Contributed

~

Participant Can Discriminate

~

Often Less Administrative/Legal Expense

~

Less Government Regulation

~

No 15% Excess Accumul~tioDs Tax

~

Avoidance of Estate Taxes if WRT Used

~

Creates Charitable $$ Where None Existed

~

"l
~

"CHARITABLE REMAINDER TRUST RETIREMENT PLAN

c - 11
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I.

SYSTEMS FOR CALCULATION.

The systems that lawyers most frequently use to calculate
their fees are relatively few and easy to describe.
Respectively, they are time-oriented, percentage-oriented
and product-oriented. However, the variations are numerous.
A.

Time-Oriented.
A time-oriented system has two components, (i)
units of time and (ii) rate per unit. The second
component varies among attorneys. Surprisingly,
the first component often varies as well.
Usually, but not always, it is a function of time.
The second component is a function of the market.
1.

"Straight" Time.
Example:

10 hours, multiplied by $250 per
hour = $2,500.

The first component of a "straight"-time
system is, simply, an amount of elapsed time,
measured on a clock. The starting point is
the commencement of the work. The ending
point is the cessation of the ~ork. Use of a
minimum unit, i.e., a tenth of an hour or a
quarter of an hour, causes some deviation
from a strict, straight-time system.
A straight-time system involves (i)
allocation directly to a client of only the
marginal (i.e., additional) time that the
attorney directly expends for the client,

j

~

*Copyright 1994. Jerold I. Horn. All rights
reserved. The author used a prior version of this outline
in conjunction with his presentation at the Philip E.
Heckerling University of Miami Estate Planning Institute in
January, 1990.
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(ii) allocation of other time (including
research and development work and preparation
of forms and systems) to office overhead and
(iii) calculation of the fee by mUltiplying
the marginal time that directly is expended
for the client by the hourly rate.

--j
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The first component of a straight-time system
also serves another function. Overhead, in
terms of dollars, divided by workable hours
produces the amount of dollar overhead per
workable hour. Dollar overhead per workable
hour multiplied by hours worked gives some
view of the amount of dollar overhead that a
particular matter consumes.
2.

Addition of Factor for Research and
Development.
Example:

(10 hours of marginal time plus
.5(10), i.e., a factor for research
and development), multiplied by
$200 per hour = $3,000.

The "time-expended" component of a timeoriented system can include an additional
factor for time expended upon research and
development. Direct time (i.e., marginal
time expended for a particular client) is
multiplied by a percentage. The resulting
number of hours is subtracted from those
hours of research and development that are
allocated to office overhead. The hours thus
subtracted from office overhead are
reallocated to the particular client.
Obviously, a given rate per hour will produce
a higher charge under this system than under
the straight-time system. Conversely, an
attorney who uses this system can announce an
hourly rate that nominally is less, but can
produce a fee that actually is more, than the
attorney who uses a straight-time system.
3.

Standard Units.
Example:

15 hours (the time that is deemed
required to prepare the work, even
though time actually expended is 10
hours), multiplied by $200 per hour
= $3,000.
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Some attorneys charge for "time" on the basis
of standard units, i.e., a particular number
of units for a particular task. The concept
is similar to the manner of charging for body
work on automobiles.
Obviously, the first component of this system
can deviate markedly from, or bear little
relation to, the first component of a
straight-time system. The name, "time," is
the only inherent similarity between the
units of time that are used in this system
and the units of time that are used in a
straight-time system.
This writer understands that some attorneys
who use this system charge for many more
"hours" than exist in a working day.
Obviously, a given rate per "hour" will
produce for these attorneys a higher charge
than the same rate will produce for any
attorney who uses a straight-time system.
B.

Percentage-Oriented.
Examples:

a)

Assets of $1,000,000, multiplied
by 3% = $30,000.

b)

Assets of $900,000 (consisting of
probate assets of $800,000
plus 50% of nonprobate assets of
$200,000), multiplied by 3% =
$27,000.

A percentage-oriented system also has two
components, (i) a value base and (ii) a
percentage. Often, the first component consists
solely of a number of dollars. However, it also
can include subjective elements. While the first
component might include all probate assets valued
at fair market value, it might include only a
percentage of nonprobate assets that are included
in one or more tax returns. These subjective
elements of the first component are functions of
the market. The second component always is a
function of the market.
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C.

Product-oriented.
Example:

$2,500.

A product-oriented system has one component, a

fixed fee for a particular item. This component
usually is a function of someone's judgment of
value. However, ultimately, it is a function of
the market.

D.

Hybrid Systems.
Some systems of fee determination combine two or
more of the orientations.
1.

Product-oriented and Time-oriented.
Examples: (a)

(b)

$1,250, plus (10 hours,
multiplied by $125 per
hour) = $2,500.
$2,500, plus (11 hours minus
10 hours, multiplied by $250
per hour, being $250 for each

hour in excess of ten)

=

$2,750.

hybrid system that is both product-oriented
and time-oriented includes a form of each of
the constituent systems. The productoriented portion compensates the lawyer for
his ability efficiently and expertly to
repeat what he has done before. Perhaps, it
is in the nature of a charge for a document
or for the lawyer's ability to perform a
series of procedures. The time-oriented
portion compensates the lawyer for marginal
effort that he expends for the particular
job.
A

The product-oriented portion provides
compensation for products, i.e., elaborate
procedures and documents based upon
accumulated expertise and research and
development. The time-oriented portion
provides compensation for services, ~,
time-consuming undertakings for single uses.
The hybrid arrangement depicted in the first
example causes a client always to pay both a
component that (given the nature of the work)
is fixed in advance and a component that is
variable. The hybrid system depicted in the
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second example imposes a variable charge only
if the expenditure of time exceeds a "normal"
amount. The system depicted in the second
example is in the nature of a fixed, minimum
charge plus a contingent, variable charge.

=d
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2.

Percentage-Oriented and Time-Oriented.
Example:

(a)

(Assets of $1,000,000,
multiplied by l~%), plus (120
hours, multiplied by $125 per
hour) = $30,000.

(b)

The greater of (i) (assets of
$1,000,000, multiplied by 3%)
and (ii) (130 hours,
multiplied by $250 per
hour) = $32,500.

A hybrid system that is both percentageoriented and time-oriented includes a form of
each of the constituent systems. The
percentage-oriented portion compensates the
attorney for his responsibility and for the
value that he tends to create or preserve.
The time-oriented portion compensates the
attorney for marginal effort that he expends
for the job.
The hybrid arrangement depicted in the first
example causes a client always to pay both a
component that (given the value base) is
fixed in advance and a component that is
variable. The hybrid system depicted in the
second example imposes a variable charge only
if the expenditure of time exceeds a "normal"
amount. The system depicted in the second
example is in the nature of a fixed, minimum
charge plus a contingent, variable charge.
3.
~

'I

J

Product-oriented and Percentage-Oriented.
Example:

$1,250 plus (assets of $1,000,000,
multiplied by .2%) = $3,250.

A hybrid system that is both product-oriented
and percentage-oriented includes a form of
each of the constituent systems. Given the
nature of the work and the value base, each.
portion is fixed in advance. The productoriented portion compensates the lawyer for
his ability efficiently and expertly to
repeat what he has done before. The
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percentage-oriented portion compensates the
attorney for his responsibility and for the
value that he tends to create or preserve.
4.

~.

Time-Oriented, Product-oriented and
Percentage-Oriented.
Example:

$1,250 plus (assets of $1,000,000,
multiplied by .2%), plus (11 hours
minus 10 hours, multiplied by $250
per hour, being $250 for each hour
in excess of ten) = $3,500.

A hybrid system that is time-oriented,
product-oriented and percentage-oriented
includes a form of each of the constituent
systems. Compared to the product-oriented,
percentage-oriented system discussed in the
preceding paragraph, it additionally imposes
a variable charge which compensates the
attorney for marginal effort if the
expenditure of time exceeds a "normal"
amount.
E.

::----==~

--~
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Evaluation.
1.

Time-Oriented.
Time-oriented systems tend to reward the
expenditure of time, per see Thus, they tend
to reward inefficiency and to disadvantage
efficiency.
Except to any extent that the value of a
product or service is directly proportional
to the lawyers' time that is spent to make or
render it, a time-oriented system tends to
produce a fee that has only a random
relationship to value. Increased use of
systems andtechnolog¥ to deliver a lawyer's
products additionally attenuates the
relationship between time and value.
An attenuated relationship between value, on
the one hand, and the marginal time that a
lawyer needs to perform a job, on the other,
particularly inheres in estate planning.
Systems, technology, research and nonlawyer
services are relatively important to, and
costly components of, the highest quality of
estate planning compared to the highest
quality of other types of legal work.
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Differences in reputation of individual
attorneys tend to cause courts, firms and
clients to countenance fees that are based on
different hourly rates. However, the
increments that the courts are approving,
that clients are paying and that firms are
charging fall within a range that is much
narrower than the range of value that one
attorney's work, compared to another
attorney's work, brings to a client.
Estate planning and estate administration are
more efficient, and provide better results,
when they include use of inputs other than
lawyers' time. These other inputs include
elaborate procedures that, themselves, are
the product of time and other inputs. Any
attorney who uses these procedures must avoid
using a straight-time system of charging if
he is to receive compensation commensurate
with his efficiency. This writer perceives
that the better attorneys indeed do tend to
use these procedures and do tend to avoid
straight-time charges for estate planning and
estate administration. He also perceives
that some attorneys who are unable to avoid
the straight-time system are falsifying the
hours they are expending or are expending
hours indiscriminately. Although the fees
that these attorneys charge are not
relatively low, their nominal rates are.
Among unknowledgeable consumers, and among
unknowledgeable courts, this, of course,
tends to disadvantage the expert who is
honest and efficient.
2.

Percentage and Product-oriented.
Percentage-oriented fees and product-oriented
fees reward efficiency directly.
If the value of a lawyer's work is a function
of the value of the property that the lawyer
is preserving or creating, a percentageoriented fee tends to bear a direct
relationship to the value that the client
receives. Similarly, if both consumers and
producers adequately are informed, the market
should tend to cause a product-oriented fee
to bear a direct relationship to the value
that the client receives.
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Malpractice insurers and the law of
professional responsibility indicate that
responsibility and compensation for breach of
responsibility are functions of the number of
dollars that are involved. The legal measure
of an attorney's responsibility seems also an
appropriate basis for an attorney's
calculation of his compensation. Regardless
of what some courts and some consumers may
think, the market is saying that, other
things being equal, an attorney should
receive more compensation for working with a
larger value than for working with a smaller
value.

---l
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Product-oriented fees and percentage-oriented
fees additionally have the advantage of
tending to provide certainty to both attorney
and client. Additionally, each tends to
avoid the significant vari~tions that appear
when fees are based solely upon time.
3.

Hybrid Systems.
The first version of the product-time hybrid
and the first version of the percentage-time
hybrid present the same disadvantages,
although diluted, that the time-oriented
systems present. However, the second version
of the product-time hybrid, the second
version of the percentage-time hybrid and the
time-product-percentage hybrid use the time
orientation only as a contingency. Thus,
they offer the advantage of assuring
compensation to the lawyer who must expend an
abnormally large amount of time.

1

The product-percentage hybrid blends the two
systems that reward efficiency. It directly
compensates for expertise, responsibility and
creation or preservation of value.
F.

Rules of Professional Conduct.
The Model Rules of Professional Conduct,
promulgated by the American Bar Association,
neither require nor prevent the use of any of the
systems. They direct only that, "A lawyer's fee
shall be reasonable."
"The factors to be considered in determining
the reasonableness of a fee include the
following:
D-8
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"(1) the time and labor required,
the novelty and difficulty of the
questions involved, and the skill
requisite to perform the legal service
properly;

~

~

'~

"(2) the likelihood, if apparent
to the client, that the acceptance of
the particular employment will preclude
other employment by the lawyer;
II (3)
the fee customarily charged
in the locality for similar legal
services;

"(4) the amount involved and the
results obtained;
"(5) the time limitations imposed
by the client or by the circumstances;
"(6) the nature and length of the
professional relationship with the
client;
"(7) the experience, reputation,
and ability of the lawyer or lawyers
performing the services;

:)

"(8)

contingent

whether the fee is fixed or
• • • • ft
Rule 1.5.

Although rule 1.5 imposes parameters that alter
the market, the rule itself recognizes that it
operates in the context of the market.
G.

~
j

::::l

Antitrust Laws.
Similarly, the anti trust laws do not requ.lre or.
prevent the use of any of the systems. The
collusive determination of fees, including by use
of a fee schedule, is illegal. Goldfarb v.
Virginia state Bar, 421 U.S. 773 (1975). However,
the noncollusive determination of fees, including
by use of a fee schedule, is not illegal.

:1
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II.

CONTROL BY A COURT.
A.

Right to Review.
When the personal representative and the
beneficiaries refuse to approve an attorney's fee
for probate work, the court clearly has the right
to review and to disallow the fee. Some courts
would argue that they also have this right even if
the fee is agreed and the administration is
unsupervised.

B.

Scope of Review.
Usually, the scope of appellate review of a
probate court's determination of the
reasonableness of an attorney's fee is narrow. If
the appellate court finds that the local court
applied the proper criteria, the appellate court
usually will not overturn the local court's
determination.

C.

Fee-For-Time Ceiling.
Some courts attempt to disallow all fees in excess
of a certain rate per hour. They determine the
maximum rate in advance, with little regard to the
lawyer's responsibility, competence, efficiency or
reputation and with little regard to the nature of
the work. An hourly rate ceiling compounds all of
the problems that inhere in a time-oriented
system. It often applies arbitrarily as well as
perversely. Whereas a time-oriented system, per
se, emphasizes the lawyer's expenditure of time,
the addition of a ceiling tends to prevent the
lawyer from using the other inputs that are
essential to production of work of the highest
quality.
An hourly rate ceiling ignores the one or more
bases upon which the attorney actually determines
the fee. It sUbstitutes time (i.e., a number of
hours) as the sole criterion. The use of time as
the sole criterion inherently presupposes, and the
use of time as a principal criterion tends to
presuppose, that time is fungible. However, one
attorney's time is not fungible qualitatively with
any other attorney's time. Indeed, the comparison
of the straight-time system and the standard-unit
system demonstrated that one attorney's "time" is
not necessarily fungible quantitatively with
another attorney's time.
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hourly limit will tend to affect most adversely
the most efficient lawyers. These are precisely
the lawyers that the system most should encourage.
Since a principal purpose of the system is to
promote efficient transmission of wealth at death,
a ceiling that undermines this purpose should be
unreasonable, per see
An

f'

A simple test can resolve many questions of
reasonableness without laborious analysis. A
ceiling is unreasonably low if the judge, himself,
would have to charge more in order personally to
generate his own salary, office costs, benefits
and emoluments.
Tests that directly use the concept of efficiency
are more difficult. However, they are no less
telling.
Efficiency is the rate of output per unit of
input. Input is measurable in terms of dollars as
a medium of exchange, regardless of whether the
input consists of dollars spent (i.e., out-ofpocket expenditures) or dollars foregone (i.e.,
opportunity costs incurred because of expenditure
of time in one manner rather than another).
Maximization of output per unit of input might or
might not occur within the limits of a fee-fortime ceiling that a court imposes. The lower the
ceiling, the less is the likelihood that the
maximization can occur within it. stated
differently, if (i) the cost or the composition of
input that maximizes efficiency is greater than
the cost or different from the composition of
input that maximizes the lawyer's net income when
the lawyer charges an hourly rate that is within
the ceiling and (ii) the lawyer attempts to
maximize net income, the ceiling impedes
efficiency. Accordingly, a judge who solely
determines whether a fee is less than a certain
number of dollars per hour will tend to harm the
very person, the lawyer's client, whom the. judge
professes to help.
A ceiling that is based upon lawyers' time tends
to inhibit the use of all inputs other than
lawyers' time. Since maximization of output per
unit of input requires use of inputs other than
lawyers' time, a time-based ceiling tends to
impede efficiency.

I
L
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since a lawyer's time is the only production
factor that is not expandable in relationship to a
unit of time, any effort to improve output per
unit of time must increase the use of one or more
production factors that are expandable in
relationship to a unit of time. This increase
will necessitate an increase in cost per unit of
time. Therefore, a fee-for-time ceiling will tend
to cause any increase in ratio of output to input
to decrease the lawyer's net income. Conversely,
it will tend to force a lawyer to decrease
efficiency in order to increase net income.
If two attorneys produce different outputs during
the same period of time, the better producer will
tend to use more input, ~, supplies, equipment,
office space, secretarial services, research and
development. Obviously, a system that compensates
each at the same rate per unit of time will
provide each with an identical amount of gross
income but will provide a greater amount of net
income to the lawyer who produces less.
The problem also is describable in terms of a
single lawyer. Assume that this lawyer's
preparation of an estate plan formerly consumed
$1,000 of expenses and ten hours of the lawyer's
time. He charged a fee of $2,500, or $250 per
hour, and he generated net income of $1,500, or
$150 per hour. This lawyer's infusion of
additional input other than his time permits him
now to prepare the plan for an expenditure of
$1,500 and five hours of his time. He uses the
five hours that he saves to prepare a second plan,
and the second plan also requires expenditures of
$1,500. If he charges the same fee, $2,500, for
each plan, he generates gross receipts of $5,000,
or $500 per hour, costs of $3,000 and ne.t income
of $2,000, or $200 per hour. The changed mix of
production factors does not increase the fee that
the client pays but does increase the lawyer's
output and does increase the lawyer's net income
even though the lawyer increased his costs both
absolutely and in relation to his time. Why
should a court complain?
Assume that the facts remain as described in the
preceding paragraph except that the lawyer reduced
his fee to $2,375 for each plan. He would
.
generate gross receipts of $4,750i or $475 per
hour, costs of $3,000 and net income of $1,750, or
$175 per hour. The changed mix of production
factors would have decreased the fee the client
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paid, increased the lawyer's output and increased
the lawyer's net income even though the lawyer
increased his costs both absolutely and in
relation to his time and even though the lawyer
reduced somewhat his fee per plan. The changes
would have benefitted both the consumer and the
lawyer. Again, why should a court complain?
Last, assume that the facts remain the same except
that the lawyer reduced his fee to $2,250 for each
plan. He would generate gross receipts of $4,500,
or $450 per hour, costs of $3,000 and net income
of $1,500, or $150, the same as before any change.
The changed mix of production factors increased
the lawyer's output and did not change the
lawyer's net income even though the lawyer
increased his costs both absolutely and in
relation to his time. If one lawyer prefers the
first method of operating and a second prefers
this method, why should a court permit the first
to operate as he wishes but prevent the second?
The same arguments apply to the administration of
a decedent's estate.
The market system can determine more efficiently
and less intrusively than the judicial system the
best mix of production factors and the best levels
of outputs and fees. Whereas the market can
accommodate two lawyers who produce different
outputs and use different production factors but
charge the same price, a fee-for-time ceiling that
a court imposes will tend to prefer the producer
who uses less cost per unit of his time or, stated
more simply, less cost and more of his time.
since neither method is better than the other,
the preference is arbitrary. Courts should not
indulge it.

"'"
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A legal fee that a court or an attorney decrees
but that ignores the market will produce,
ultimately, a misallocation of legal services
compared to those that consumers would purchase if
the edict did not exist. It also will produce a
misallocation of production factors compared to
those that lawyers would use if the edict did not
exist. Any system that focuses solely upon a
lawyer's time, the one input that the lawyer
cannot expand per unit of time, tends to distort
the lawyer's use of all production factors.
The market inexorably is present even if a court
or lawyer refuses to recognize it. Wise judges
realize that they should defer to it.
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"Proceeding presumptively with
the firm's own rates allows the
court to avoid the essentially
impossible task of selecting one
rate over another from a wide range
of 'market' rates, it limits the
power of the trial judge arbitrarily
to reward or punish attorneys by
setting rates virtually at will, and
it allows the parties and the court
to avoid a 'second major litigation'
over the rate-making process. The
marketplace best measures 'market
value'; appraisal by no other method
has as much claim to veracity and
objectivity." Laffey v. Northwest
Airlines. Inc., 746 F. 2d 4, 18
(D. C. Cir. 1984)
Courts should permit the compensation for legal
services to take into account the output as well as
the input. Only then will lawyers focus
principally upon expanding the expandable
production factors in order to enhance efficiency
and to increase value to the client and net income
to the lawyer.
The appropriate function of a court in reviewing a
fee is to prevent overreaching. Unless the lawyer
has agreed with the client to impose a ceiling upon
himself, no direct relationship is apparent between
a court's imposition of a fee-for~time ceiling and
its prevention of overreaching.
D.

Lawyer's Challenge.
A lawyer can accept a disallowance or can challenge
it. The only course that will produce greater
problems, with client and court, than to accept a
disallowance is to challenge a disallowance meekly
and to lose. Accordingly, a lawyer should have a
bias in favor of challenging and of attempting to
do whatever is necessary to win.
An attorney who is aware that a local court is
considering a disallowance should make a record
that both will tend to persuade the court not to
disallow and, if the court does disallow, will tend
to support a reversal. Arbitrariness is the basis
upon which local courts seem most vulnerable.
Therefore, if necessary, the record should include
testimony of experts concerning appropriate bases
and amounts of fees and testimony of local
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practitioners (subpoenaed, if necessary) that the
court generally uses an arbitrary ceiling. An
effective defense of an hourly charge by an
attorney who calculated a fee solely on the basis
of the time that he directly expended for the
client probably should include a disclosure of how
other attorneys charge rates that nominally are
lower but that actually are the same or higher.
Failure to disclose how other attorneys calculate a
fee for time permits the court to use a meaningless
comparison between things that inherently are
dissimilar, the proverbial apples and oranges.
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E.

Avoiding the System - and the Problems •.
Arguably, an attorney can avoid the problems by
avoiding the system. Avoidance of probate by means
ofa revocable, noncourt trust should avoid the
court's control. Similarly, the prompt movement of
all assets from the probate estate to a noncourt
trust might permit the attorney to render most of
his services for the trustee and not for the
personal representative and, therefore, might
permit the attorney to charge most of his services
to the trustee and to avoid the inspection of a
court.

F.

written Agreements.
As a practical matter, a written agreement between
lawyer and client, obtained before the services are
performed or in any event before the lawyer asks a
court to approve the fee, will tend to avoid a .
client's challenge and a court's disallowance.

~
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III.

CONTROL BY INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE:
DEDUCTIBILITY OF FEES FOR ESTATE PLANNING.
A.

Statutory Authority.
If a deduction is available for the cost of legal
services that consist of estate planning, the
statutory authority is section 212 of the Internal
Revenue Code:
"In the case of an individual, there
shall be allowed as a deduction all the
ordinary and necessary expenses paid or
incurred during the taxable year--"(1) for the production or collection of
income;
"(2) for the management, conservation or
maintenance of property held for the
production of income; or
"(3) in connection with the
determination, collection or refund of
any tax."
Portions (1) and (2) grant a deduction for the cost
of operating a revocable trust. Similarly, they
should grant a deduction for the cost of creating
the trust.
Portion (2) allows a deduction for expenses for the
management of income-producing property. How
portion (2) applies to an unfunded trust is
unclear. If a revocable trust is revoked, its
post-death dispositive provisions never will
operate. Therefore, arguably, all of the fee
attributable to the trust is described in portion
(2). The function of a power of attorney for
property management is to facilitate the management
of property. Therefore, arguably, all of the fee
for it is described in portion (2).
Portion (3) allows a deduction for expenses
incurred in connection with the determination of
any tax. Courts have held that portion (3)
provides a deduction for the cost of general tax
advice.
Carpenter v. united States, 64-2 USTC !9,
842 (ct. Cl. 1964); cf. Merians v. Commissioner, 60
T.e. 187 (1973), and reg. Sl.212-1. Accordingly,
portion (3) arguably permits a deduction for the
portion of the fee that is attributable to tax
advice and is not deducted under another portion of
section 212.

D - 16

~

B.
:-::t
~.

Merians.
Sidney Merians hired an attorney to prepare an
estate plan. The Internal Revenue Service assumed
that any portion of the fee that was attributable
to tax advice was deductible. Therefore, according
to the Tax Court, the only question was what
portion of the unitemized fee was attributable to
tax advice. Merians v. Commissi.oner, 60 T.C. 187
(1973). However, some of the judges disagreed with
the Service's assumption that portion (3) of
section 212 provided a deduction for general tax
advice.

C.

Code 567.
individual's "miscellaneous itemized deductions
for any taxable year [are] allowed only to the
extent that the aggregate of such deductions
exceeds 2 percent of adjusted gross income." Code
S67{a). "Miscellaneous itemized deductions"
includes deductions under section 212. Code S72{b)
and reg. S1.67-1T(a).

An
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IV.

CONTROL BY INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE:
DEDUCTIBILITY OF ADMINISTRATION EXPENSES CONSISTING OF
ATTORNEY'S FEES AND EXECUTOR'S COMMISSIONS
A.

~'

Choice Between Deduction for Estate Tax Purposes
and Deduction for Income Tax PurRoses.
1.

Attorney's fees and executor's commissions
that are administration expenses are
deductible either for estate tax purposes or
for estate or trust or individual income tax
purposes, but not for both estate tax purposes
and income tax purposes.
"(g) PISALLOWANCE OF DOUBLE DEDUCTIONS. Amounts allowable under section 2053 or 2054
as a deduction in computing the taxable estate
of a decedent shall not be allowed as a
deduction (or as an offset against the sales
price of property in determining gain or loss)
in computing the taxable income of the estate
or of any other person, unless there is filed,
within the time and in the manner and form
prescribed by the Secretary, a statement that
the amounts have not been allowed as
deductions under section 2053 or 2054 and a
waiver of the right to have such amounts
allowed at any time as deductions under
section 2053 or 2054. This sUbsection shall
not apply with respect to deductions allowed
under part II (relating to income in respect
of decedents)."
Code §642(g).

2.

The statutory authority for the deduction for
estate tax purposes is found in Code section
2053.

* * *
"Ca) GENERAL RULE. - For purposes of
the tax imposed by section 2001, the
value of the taxable estate shall be
determined by deducting from the value of
the gross estate such amounts -

* * *
"(2) for administration expenses,

* * *
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as are allowable by the laws of the
jurisdiction, whether within or without
the united states, under which the estate
is being administered."
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~
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3.

The statutory authority for the deduction for
income tax purposes is Code 5212, quoted above
in III.A.

4.

Generally, costs for the administration of an
estate or trust are subject to the twopercent-of-adjusted-gross-income limit of Code
section 67. However, these costs are fully
deductible in determining the adjusted gross
income of the estate or trust to the extent
the costs "would not have been incurred if the
property were not held in such trust or
estate • • • • " Code 567(e).

5.

Is an excess deduction, under Code section
642(h), on termination of an estate or trust
subject to the two-percent limitation of Code
section 67?
a.

A beneficiary, not the estate or trust,
claims the Code section 642(h) deduction.
However, if the estate or trust were in
existence, it, not the beneficiary, would
claim a deduction for these items.

b.

This formulation would seem to allow the
use of qualifying costs of
administration, without the limitation,
to reduce what, but for the termination,
would be the estate's or the trust's
adjusted gross income.

c.

However, does it impose the two-percent
limitation with respect to any costs of
administration that generate what, but
for Code section 67, is a deduction under
Code section 642(h)?

d.

An affirmative answer would seem to
create untenable differences.

i.

It would appear to impair the
deductibility of costs of informal
administration (i.e., administration
without probate) more than it would
impair the deductibility of costs of
probate administration.
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ii.

6.

It would appear to impair a
deduction under Code section 642(h)
and thus to tend to prolong the
administration of trusts and
estates.

'~
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Deduction for income tax purposes of items
that alternatively are deductible for estate
tax purposes as costs of administration
requires a statement that
(i)

the items have not been allowed as
deductions for estate tax purposes, and

(ii) the taxpayer waives the right to claim
the items at any time as deductions for
estate tax purposes.
Code 5642(g).
a.

The statement must be filed in duplicate.
Reg. 51.642(g)-1.

b.

It must be filed (i) with the return that
claims the deduction or (ii)
alternatively, with the district director
for the district in which the return was
filed, for association with the return.
Id.

c.

The statement is due before the
expiration of the statute of limitations
that applies to the taxable year for
which the deduction is sought. Id.

d.

Until a deduction is finally allowed for
estate tax purposes, the taxpayer may
claim the deduction for income tax
purposes even if a claim of it for estate
tax purposes is ~ending. Id.

e.

However, the filing of the statement that
is required to claim the item as a
deduction for income tax purposes does
preclude all claim of the item as a
deduction for estate tax purposes. Id.

f.

A taxpayer may claim some items as
deductions for income tax purposes and
others as deductions for estate tax
purposes and may claim part of an item
for one purpose and part of it for
another purpose. Reg. 51-642(g)-2.
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7.

other things being equal, the taxpayer should
select the deduction that will have the higher
present value •
a.

The present value of the deduction is the
same as the present value of the property
that the deduction can permit to inure to
the benefit of the beneficiaries of the
decedent rather than to the United
states.

b.

Two rules of thumb tend to facilitate the
choice.
i.

First, tend to claim the deduction
for the purpose that first will
produce a tax benefit.
(a)

If the decedent's spouse
survives the decedent and the
decedent gives to other than
the spouse a gift that is
defined in terms of the largest
amount that does not increase
estate tax, deduction of
administration expenses for
estate tax purposes will not
save any tax upon the
decedent's death.
(i)

i3
)

l

I
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However, it will exclude
from the decedent's
taxable estate the amount
thus deducted for estate
tax purposes and, compared
to a deduction of this
amount for income tax
purposes, will decrease
pro tanto the marital
disposition and increase
pro tanto the property
that is available to
benefit the family because
of the shelter of the
unified credit.

(ii) Accordingly, while this
deduction for estate tax
purposes will not produce
a tax benefit immediately
upon the death of the
predeceasing spouse, it
will produce a tax benefit
upon the death of the
surviving spouse.
(b)

It will include in the
taxable estate the amount
thus deducted for income
tax purposes and, compared
to a deduction of this
amount for estate tax
purposes, will reduce pro
tanto the property that is
available to benefit the
family because of the
shelter of the unified
credit and will increase
pro tanto the marital
disposition.

(ii) Accordingly, while this
deduction for income tax
purposes will produce a
tax benefit immediately
upon the death of the
predeceasing spouse, it
will produce a tax
detriment upon the death
of the surviving spouse.
Second, if both a deduction for
income tax purposes and a deduction
for estate tax purposes will produce
a benefit immediate~y upon the
decedent's death, claim the
deduction that will produce the
larger saving.
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A deduction for income tax
purposes can save tax upon the
decedent's death regardless of
whether the decedent's taxable
estate is sufficient to
generate liability for estate
tax.
(i)

ii.

-
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B.

Nature of the Inguiry.
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Regardless of how courts describe the process,
whether an expense is deductible for estate tax
purposes requires a two-part inquiry.
1.

First, is the expense of a type that is
deductible?

2.

Second, if the expense is of a proper type,
what amount of it is deductible?

3.

Circuit Courts of Appeal have disagreed about
how to determine whether particular expenses
are deductible.
a.

Some have said that an expense is
deductible if the expense is allowable
according solely to state law. Estate of
Park y. Commissioner, 475 F. 2d 673 (6th
Cir. 1973), 73-1 USTC !12,913; Jenner y.
Commissioner, 577 F. 2d 1100 (7th Cir.
1978), 78-2 USTC !13,251; and Ballance y.
Commissioner, 347 F. 2d 419 (7th Cir.
1965), 65-1 USTC !12,283.

b.

Others have said that an expense is
deductible only if the expense is
allowable according to both state law and
federal law. Love y. Commissioner, 91-1
USTC !60,056 (4th eire 1991); Hibernia
Bank y. united states, 581 F. 2d 741 (9th
Cir. 1978), 78-2 USTC !13,261; and Pitner
y. united states, 388 F. 2d 651 (5th cir.
1967), 68-1 USTC !12,499; see also Smith
y. Commissioner, 510 F. 2d 479 (2d Cir.
1975), 75-1 USTC !13,046, cert. denied,
423 U.S. 827 (1975).

c.

Some authority has held that this dispute
is material only to determining whether
the expense is of a type that is
deductible and is not material to
determining reasonableness (i.e., the
amount that is allowable). Bank of
Nevada y. united States, 80-2 USTC
!13,361 (D. Nev. 1980); see also
Hibernia, supra, at 85,933, fn. 6.
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However, other authority, discussed
below, has held that the dispute also is
material to determining reasonableness.
Pitner, supra; and united states y.
White, 853 F. 2d 107 (2d Cir. 1988), 88-2
USTC !13,777, certiorari granted,
u.s.
(1989), certiorari dismiS'Sed,
_ _ u.s. _ _ (1989).

~

~

t~
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What Types of ExPenses Are. Deductible?
Attorney's fees and executor's commissions are not
deductible for estate tax purposes unless they are
"administration expenses." Code S2053(a)(2); see
generally Dewitt y. Commissioner, 54 TCM 759
(1987).
1.

Expenses are not administration expenses
unless (i) they are incurred in the
administration of the estate and (ii) they are
not incurred for the personal benefit of
beneficiaries.
"(a) In general. The amounts
deductible from a decedent's gross estate
as 'administration expenses' of the first
category (see paragraphs (a) and (c) of
S20.2053-1) are limited to such expenses
as are actually and necessarily incurred
in the administration of the decedent's
estate; that is, in the collection of
assets, payment of debts, and
distribution of property to the persons
entitled to it. The expenses
contemplated in the law are such only as
attend the settlement of an estate and
the transfer of the property of the
estate to individual beneficiaries or to
a trustee, whether the trustee is the
executor or some. other person.
Expenditures not essential to the proper
settlement of the estate, but incurred
for the individual benefit of the heirs,
legatees, or devisees, may not be taken
as deductions. Administration expenses
include (1) executor's commissions;. (2)
attorney's fees; and (3) miscellaneous
expenses. Each of these classes is
considered separately in paragraphs (b)
through (d) of this section."
Reg. S20.2053-3(a).
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"(3) Attorney's fees incurred by
beneficiaries incident to litigation as
to their respective interests are not
deductible if the litigation is not
essential to the proper settlement of the
estate within the meaning of paragraph
(a) of this section. An attorney's fee
not meeting this test is not deductible
as an administration expense under
section 2053 and this section, even if it
is approved by a probate court as an
expense payable or reimbursable by the
estate."
Reg. §20.2053-3(c)(3).
2.

Fees that are billed after a client's death
for work performed during the client's life
are not administration expenses and,
therefore, are not reportable on Schedule J of
the United states estate tax return and are
not deductible under Code section 2053(a)(2).
a.

~

I

\
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b.
I

3

Rather, these items are reportable as
debts on Schedule K of the United states
estate tax return and, if all conditions
are satisfied, are deductible under Code
section 2053(a} (3).
i.

Such of these items as the decedent
could have deducted for income tax
purposes during his life if the
decedent had paid them are
deductions in respect of a decedent
by the party that pays them after
the decedent's death. Code §691(b}.

ii.

Accordingly, contrary to
administration expenses, these items
can produce a deduction for estate
tax purposes and also a deduction
for income tax purposes. See Code
S642(g}.

Upon disallowance of a deduction for an
attorney's fee as an administration
expense, the attorney might attempt to
justify the deduction by arguing that
part of the fee was for services rendered
during the client's life.
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i.

ii.

This type of argument presents a
trap in those jurisdictions in which
the Circuit Courts of Appeal have
said that consideration of postdeath events is appropriate and that
enforcement of a claim is a
prerequisite to the granting of a
deduction for it. United states v.
Jacobs, 34 F. 2d 233 (8th Cir.
1930), 1 USTC !380; Commissioner y.
Shively, 276 F. 2d 372(2d Cir.
1960), 60-1 USTC !11,940; Gowetz y.
Commissioner, 320 F. 2d 874 (1st
Cir. 1963), 63-2 USTC !12,165;
Estate of Hagmann, 492 F. 2d 796
(5th Cir. 1974), 74-1 USTC !12,996;
and Revenue Ruling 60-247, 1960-2
C.B. 272.
(a)

The timely filing of a claim
might be a precondition to its
deduction in these
jurisdictions.

(b)

Typically, any attempt of the
Internal Revenue Service to
disallow the deduction will
occur after the time has
expired for the filing of
claims.

(c)

However, if the jurisdiction
permits informal handling of
agreed claims, the attorney
might argue that the amount of
the fee was agreed within the
requisite time. See~,
Thompson y. Commissioner, 84-1
USTC !13,568 (7th Cir. 1983).

This problem does not exist in those
jurisdictions in which the Circuit
Courts of Appeal have said that
consideration of post-death events
is inappropriate and whether the
claim was enforceable at the time of
the decedent's death, not whether
the claim actually was enforced
after the death, determines whether
a deduction is available under Code
section 2053(a) (3). united States
v. Propstra, 680 F. 2d 1248 (9th
Cir. 1982), 82-2 USTC !13,475;
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commissioner y. strauss, 77 F. 2d
401 (7th Cir. 1935), 35-1 USTC
!9,266; and Russell y. United
states, 260 F. Supp. 493 (N.D. Ill.
1966), 66-2 USTC !12,418; ~ also
Ithaca Trust Company y. United
states, 279 U.S. 151 (1920), 1 USTC
!386; cf. Greene y. United states,
78-1 USTC !13,240 (N.D. Ill. 1978).

~

D.

What Amount Of An Expense of a Proper Type Is
D.eductible?
If an expense is of a proper type, such amount of
it is permitted as a deduction as is "allowable by
the laws of the jurisdiction, whether within or
without the United States, under which the estate
is being administered." Code S2053(a) (2).
1.

Deduction is authorized even if a local court
has not approved the commission or fee.
a.

"On the other hand, a deduction for the
amount of a bona fide indebtedness of the
decedent, or of a reasonable expense of
administration, will not be denied
because no court decree has been entered
if the amount would be allowable under
local law."
Reg. S20.2053-1(b) (2).

* * *
"Cb) Executor's commissions. (1)
The executor or administrator, in filing
the estate tax return, may deduct his
commissions in such an amount as has
actually been paid, or in an amount which
at the time of filing the estate tax
return may reasonably be expected to be
paid, but no deduction may be taken if no
commissions are to be collected. If the
amount of the commissions has not been
fixed by decree of the proper court, the
deduction will be allowed on the final
audit of the return, to the extent that
all three of the following conditions are
satisfied:
"(i) The district director is
reasonably satisfied that the
commissions claimed will be paid;
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"(ii) The amount claimed as a
deduction is within the amount
allowable by the laws of the
jurisdiction in which the estate is
being administered; and

;..:

"(iii) It is in accordance with
the usually accepted practice in the
jurisdiction to allow such an amount
in estates of similar size and
character.
"If the deduction is disallowed in whole
or in part on final audit, the
disallowance will be subject to
modification as the facts may later
require. If the deduction is allowed in
advance of payment and payment is
thereafter waived, it shall be the duty
of the executor to notify the district
director and to pay the resulting tax,
together with interest."
Reg. S20.2053-3(b)(1).

* * *
"(c) Attorney's fees. (1) The
executor or administrator, in filing the
estate tax return, may deduct such an
amount of attorney's fees as has
actually been paid, or an amount which at
the time of filing may reasonably be
expected to be paid. If on the final
audit of a return the fees claimed have
not been awarded by the proper court and
paid, the deduction will, nevertheless,
be allowed, if the district director is
reasonably satisfied that the amount
claimed will be paid and that it does not
exceed a reasonable remuneration for the
services rendered, taking into account
the size and character of the estate and
the local law and practice. If the
deduction is disallowed in whole or in
part on final audit, the disallowance
will be subject to modification as the
facts may later require."

~
--,

~

~----j

Reg. S20.2053-3(c)(1).
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b.

;
9

Whether the administration was formal or
informal does not affect the
deductibility of the fee or commission.
Pitner, supra.

do:-_~

2.

If a local court has not approved the
commission or fee, the Internal Revenue
Service has broad power to determine
deductibility. Reg. SS20.2053-1 (b) (2),
20.2053-3(b) (1) and 20.2053-3(c) (1).
a.

b.

3.

While section 2053(a) of the Code and the
regulations (see the last sentence of
regUlation section 20.2053-1(b) (2) and
all of regulation sections 20.2053-3
(b) (1) and 20.2053-3(c) (1» require the
Internal Revenue Service to defer to
local law for principles to determine
deductibility, the Internal Revenue
Service is required to defer only to the
pronouncement of those principles by the
highest court of the state.

i.

Commissioner y. Bosch, 387 U.S. 456
(1967), 67-2 USTC ,12,472, held
"that where the federal estate tax
liability turns upon the character
of a property interest held and
transferred by the decedent under
state law, federal authorities are
not bound by the determination of
such property interest by a state
trial court." Id. at 85,550.

ii.

While the Internal Revenue Service
must apply the law of the state, it
has considerable latitude to
formulate that law.

Additionally and.most importantly, the
Internal Revenue Service has exclusive
authority to determine the facts.

Arguably, if a local court has approved the
commission or fee, the Service's power to
determine deductibility is more limited.
a.

According to regulation section 20.2053l(b)

(2),

i~~'
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"(2) Effect of court decree.
The decision of a local court as to
the amount and allowability under
local law of a claim or
administration expense will
ordinarily be accepted if the court
passes upon the facts upon which
deductibility depends. If the court
does not pass upon those facts, its
decree will, of course, not be
followed. For example, if the
question before the court is whether
a claim should be allowed, the
decree allowing it will ordinarily
be accepted as establishing the
validity and amount of the claim.
However, the decree will not
necessarily be accepted even though
it purports to decide the facts upon
which deductibility depends. It
must appear that the court actually
passed upon the merits of the claim.
This will be presumed in all cases
of an active and genuine contest.
If the result reached appears to be
unreasonable, this is some evidence.
that there was not such a contest,
but it may be rebutted by proof to
the contrary. If the decree was
rendered by consent, it will be
accepted, provided the consent was a
bona fide recognition of the
validity of the claim (and not a
mere cloak for a gift) and was
accepted by the court as
satisfactory evidence upon the
merits. It will be presumed that
the consent was of this character,
and was so accepted, if given by all
parties having an interest adverse
to the claimant. The decree will
not be accepted if it is at variance
with the law of the state; as, for
example, an allowance made to an
executor in excess of that
prescribed by statute. •• n
b.

Regulation section 20.2053-1 (b)(2)
dissipates Bosch to such extent, if any,
as the regulation provides a result that
differs from that which Bosch, in the
absence of the regulation, would provide.
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~

i.

No regulation affected the result in
Bosch.

ii.

Here, on the other hand, regulation
section 20.2053-1 (b) (2)
specifically requires the Internal
Revenue Service to defer, in certain
circumstances, to the order of the
local court.

iii. The critical question, of course, is
whether, and to what extent,
regulation section 20.2053-1(b) (2)
provides a result that differs from
that which Bosch would provide if
the regulation did not exist.
c.

Regulation section 20.2053-1(b) (2)
forecloses Internal Revenue Service
inquiry only if certain criteria are met.
i.

The local court must pass upon the
facts upon which deductibility
depends.
(a)

This is presumed in a genuine
contest.

(b) A determination of the local
court that is procured by fraud
is not a determination on the
facts.
(c)

A consent decree is acceptable
if, according to the
regulation, "the consent was a
bona fide recognition of the
validity of the claim."
(i)

The consent of all parties
adverse to the claimant
creates a presumption that
the consent was a bona
fide recognition.

(ii) This requirement disallows
a deduction for what
essentially is a gift.
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ii.
'"""3'

~

~

The Internal Revenue Service will
not accept a decree that "is at
variance with the law of the State;
as, for example, an allowance made
to an executor in excess of that
prescribed by statute." Reg.
S20.2053-1(b) (2).

(a)

The scope of this exception is
uncertain.
(i)

Arguably, the exception
was intended to apply to a
commission that was
determined on a percentage
basis in excess of that
which a statute
prescribed.

(ii) The date of the
regulation, June 23, 1958,
lends credence to this
supposition.
(b)

If the exception also applies
to a commission that is not
percentage-determined, it
always permits the Internal
Revenue Service independently
to determine the applicable
law.

(c)

If the exception always permits
the Internal Revenue Service
independently to determine the
applicable law, what, if
anything, is the function of
the regulation?
(i)
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If the local court
properly has determined
and applied the law, the
regulation appears to
prevent the Internal
Revenue Service from
redetermining the facts.

~

(ii) This foreclosure, and,
indeed, whether or not a
local court order even
exists, seem unimportant
if the particular fee or
commission is determined
on a percentage basis
according to a statute.

-"

;;;;
==l

(iii) However, the foreclosure
is potentially significant
if the fee or commission
is not determined on a
percentage basis.
(d)

Most compensation that is not
determined on a percentage
basis is determined on the
basis of what is "reasonable."
(i)

Determination of
"reasonable" compensation
appears to present both
questions of law and
questions of fact.
(I)

(II) Additionally, the
court must determine,
as a matter of fact,
whether, based upon
the criteria thus
defined and
evaluated, the
compensation is
"reasonable."

~

""{

(ii) Stated differently, the
quest for "reasonableness"
seems inherently, and
uniquely, to involve a
tension between where, in
the contemplation of the
regulation, law ends and
facts begin.

~

~

,I
I

Arguably, "reasonableness" subsumes
various criteria that
the court must
identify, weigh and
apply as a matter of
law.
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(iii) The results, if not the
language, of many
decisions indicate that
courts of review often
have treated the inquiry
about reasonableness as
consisting more of a
determination of fact than
a determination of law
and, therefore, have
deferred to the orders of
the local courts. See,
~, Rev. Rul. 69-551,
1969-2 Cum. Bull. 177;
Bank of Nevada y. united
States, supra; Craft y.
United States, 80-1 USTC
!13,327 (5th Cir. 1979),
affirming per curiam, 68
T.C. 249; First National
Bank of Nevada y. United
States, 77-2 USTC !13,207
(D. Nev. 1977); .J.M.
Underwood v. united
states, 69-1 USTC !12,591
(6th Cir. 1969); Cadden y~
District Director, 62-1
USTC !12,058 (6thCir.
1962); Estate of S.E.
Bosworth, Executor y.
United states, 57-1 USTC
!11,662 (W.O. Wash. 1956);
Estate of Charles F.
Goodwin y. Commissioner,
53-1 USTC !10,886 (6th
Cir. 1953); Schmalstig y.
Collector, 42-2 USTC
!10,205 (W.D.S.D. Ohio
1942); Estate of William
~. Miller v. Commissioner,
21 T.C.M. 43 (1962);
Estate of Minnie S.
Pridmore, 20 T.C.M. 47
(1961); and Estate of
Reuben ~. Freed y.
Commissioner, 6 T.C.M. 216
(1947).
(1)

D - 34

Courts of review
often have asked
whether the trial
courts applied the
proper law, i.e., did

-:

:~

-=~

~

,J

-~

~

they determine
whether the
compensation was
"reasonable."

.~
-j'

';;;;;:$

(II) However, the
reviewing courts
generally have not
reviewed the legal
criteria that might
underlie
"reasonable."
(iv) One court of review
appears to have moved, at
least in its language if
not its holding, far in
the other direction. See
united states y. White,
supra.

(I)

The Second Circuit in
White stated that the
regulation did not
prevent the type of
inquiry that Bosch,
in the absence of the
regulation, would
permit.

(II) Expressed in the

parlance of a
bifurcation between
determinations of law
and determinations of
fact, the Second
Circuit appears to
have treated the
search for
"reasonableness" as
consisting more of a
determination of law
than a determination
of fact.

~

I.
-,
::;1

(III) Thus, it allowed the
Internal Revenue
Service to probe the
fact of reasonableness even though
the Service
apparently did not
demonstrate that the

I

, I

)
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local court misdetermined or misapplied
the appropriate
criteria.

~

~
d

d.

(e)

Treatment of reasonableness principally as a
question of law tends to
render regulation section
20.2053-1 (b) (2) a
nullity.

(f)

stated differently, if (i)
local law provides for
"reasonable" fees or
commissions and (ii) the
Internal Revenue Service
can ignore a local court's
determination of what is
reasonable, when, if ever,
will regulation section
20.2053-1(b) (2) require
the Service to defer to
the determination of a
local court?

The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals,
without mentioning or applying regulation
section 20.2053-1{b) (2), has said that
Code section 2053(a), per~, requires
deference to local court orders. Jenner,
supra.
i.

Jenner is among the cases that, in
the context of the conflict about
whether only state law or both state
and federal law determine whether a
particular expense is deductible,
looked only to state law.

ii.

The more important aspect of Jenner
for purposes of this part of the
discussion is that the Seventh
Circuit indicated that it generally
would determine the applicable law
of the state by deferring to the
decree of a local probate court if
such a decree existed.
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iii. According to Jenner,
~.
::::;

"As a general rule the decree
of a probate court approving
expenditures as proper
administrative expenses under state
law will control. This court held
in Ballance y. Commissioner [65-2
USTC !12,331], 347 F.2d 419, 423 (7
Cir. 1965), that to ascertain
whether a particular expenditure
'constitutes an allowable expense of
administration' 'recourse must be
had to [state] law • • • •
"The Sixth Circuit has also
concluded that the deductibility of
the expense is governed by state law
alone. Estate of Park y.
Commissioner [73-1 USTC !12,913],
475 F.2d 673, 676 (6 Cir.
1973)..
"78-2 USTC !13,251 at
85,879.
iv.

~
---,
===i:
9
.

j

E.

Since (i) the Seventh Circuit in
Jenner did npt mention or apply
regulation section 20.2053-1(b} (2)
and (ii) the action of the local
court in Jenner arguably was weaker
than that to which the regulation
would require deference, the Seventh
Circuit appears. inherently to have
said that (a) Code section 2053(a),
per se, countermanded Bosch and·
di'ssipated whatever effect Bosch
might have had in the absence of the
statute and (b) the Seventh Circuit
also would have required deference
to the order of a local court in
situation~ (including most
allowances of fees and commissions)
in which regulation section 20.20531(b) (2) clearly applied.

Internal Revenue Service Position.
The Internal Revenue Service has treated Code
section 2053(a) and regulation section 20.2053l(b) (2) as though they have not, or in some cases
have but should not have, impeded seriously the
Service's ability independently to determine the
deductibility of a fee or commission that a local
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court has approved.
is threefold.

The focus of the controversy

1.

First, the Service has rejected the Jenner
view of Code section 2053(a).

2.

Second, the Service has asserted that neither
Code section 2053(a) nor regulation section
20.2053-1(b) (2) has prevented it from
redetermining the ultimate conclusion about
whether a fee or commission was "reasonable."

3.

Third, the Service has asserted that both
state and federal law determine whether an
expense is of a proper type and, if it is, the
amount of it that is deductible and that, in
jurisdictions that accept this doctrine, a
determination of a local court concerning the
allowance of fees or commissions always is
subject to federal law.

4.

Perhaps the Service stated its position most
comprehensively in two technical advice
memoranda, 8636100 dated December 31, 1985,
and 8838009 dated June 17, 1988.
a.

The latter amplified the former.

b.

The Service's amplification of the prior
ruling was curious, since
(i)

the statute of limitations expired
in June of 1986,

(ii)

the prior pronouncement was merely a
private ruling and, thus, nominally
neither usable nor citable as
precedent and

(iii)

the latter ruling did not alter the
Service's conclusion about the
particular controversy.
~~

c.

Technical Advice Memorandum 8636100 held
that the Internal Revenue Service was
required to defer to the determination of
the local court.
i.

The Illinois Supreme Court had not
"established a definite standard as
to what constitutes reasonable
compensation generally in probate
matters."
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ii.
~'

a

d

Therefore, according to the Service,
Bosch permitted the Service
independently to determine the
applicable law.

~

~

iii. However, by noting that the Illinois
Supreme Court had "ruled • • • that,
in order to alter the amount of a
fee allowance, a reviewing court is
required to find that the trial
court's determination is manifestly
or palpably erroneous," the Service
indicated that Bosch required the
Service to defer to the local court
to the same extent that the Illinois
Supreme Court required appellate
courts in Illinois to defer to a
determination of a fee or commission
by a local court in Illinois.

e.

iv.

The Service in any event reviewed
Illinois law and was unable to
determine that the local court had
misconstrued it.

v.

Additionally, since the Seventh
Circuit in Jenner had indicated that
even without regard to regulation
section 20.2053-1(b) (2) it would
defer to a state court decision, the
Service believed that the Seventh
Circuit would refuse to redetermine
whether the fees and the commissions
were reasonable.

Technical Advice Memorandum 8838009
reached the same holding as 8636100, but·
it amplified the earlier ruling.
"Under section 20.2053-1 and section
20.2053-3 of the regulations, in
order for an administration expense
to be deductible, the expense must
be found to be reasonable both for
purposes of (1) state probate law,
and (2) federal estate tax law."
"The Internal Revenue Service may
. independently determine the
reasonableness of claims for
administration expenses for purposes
of section 2053·of the Code."
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iii. "However, where, as here, the
Seventh Circuit has ruled that
there is no separate federal
standard on the reasonableness of
claims for administration expenses
for purposes of section 2053, the
issue is to be resolved solely on
the basis of the state law standard
of reasonableness."
f.

,-

The Service, in TAM 8838009, relied for
its "amplification" on Pitner, supra,
Smith, supra, and Hibernia, supra.
i.

Pitner, supra, Smith, supra, and
Hibernia, supra, are within the line
of cases that refers both to state
and to federal law to determine
whether a particular expense is of a
type that is deductible according to
Code section 2053(a).

ii.

Park, supra,· Jenner, supra, and
Ballance, supra, are within the
opposite line of authority, i.e.,
the cases that hold that only state
law determines whether expenses are
deductible according to Code section
2053(a).

iii. In Hibernia, for example, the
administrator of a decedent's estate
borrowed funds to maintain the
decedent's mansion until the
administrator could sell it. The
administrator was unable to sell it
until seven years after the decedent
died. The probate court approved
the administrator's payment of
interest for this purpose. However,
the Internal Revenue Service
disallowed the administrator's
deduction of the interest for estate
tax purposes. The only question was
whether the interest payments were a
type of expense that properly was
deductible according to section
2053(a) of the Code and section
20.2053-3(a) of the regulations.
78-2 USTC 113,261 at 85,931. The
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
believed that deductibility of the
inter~st required that it be
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~

~
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allowable under state law and also
that it be an "administration
expense" under federal law. Id. at
85,932. The district court had
found that (i) the administrator had
kept the estate open much longer
than necessary, (ii) the
administrator's expenditure of
interest was largely for the
convenience and benefit of the
individual beneficiaries rather than
of the estate and (iii) therefore,
the expenditure was not an
"administration expense" under
section 2053(a) of the Code.

~

="

g.

~~

Some of the line of authority that refers
both to state and federal law to
determine whether an expense is of a type
that is deductible does not necessarily
hold that the Internal Revenue Service
independently can redetermine whether a
fee or commission is reasonable.
i.

Neither Love nor Hibernia, for
example, involved the question of
whether the reasonableness (as
opposed to the characterization) of
an expense was a matter only of
state law ora matter of both state
and federal law. See Love, 91-1
USTC 160,056 at 18,354; Hibernia,
78-2 USTC !13,261 at 85,933, fn. 6;
cf. Pitner, supra, and united States
y. White, supra.

ii.

Bank of Nevada, supra, clearly
addressed the question of what law
determined the reasonableness of
executor's ~ommissions and
attorney's fees.
(a)

The united states District
Court for Nevada, which decided
Bank of Nevada, is located in
the Ninth Circuit.

(b)

Thus, as the court properly
observed, Hibernia was binding
upon it.

(c)

According to the court,
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"Thus, the issue before the
Court as framed is: did the
District Director of Internal
Revenue have the power under
the facts of this case to go
behind the final order of the
[probate court] with respect to
the award of Plaintiff's
attorney's fees, either as a
matter of state or as a matter
of federal law?
"I must answer this twopart question in the negative
both times. Accordingly, I
grant Plaintiff's Motion for
Summary Judgment." 80-2 USTC
at 85,819.

* * *
"As I read [regulation section]
20.2053-3(C) (1), once an
executor or administrator is
awarded attorney's fees by the
probate court and those fees
are paid, and the executor or
administrator actually deducts
the amount on the Federal
Estate Tax Return, all further
inquiry by the Internal Revenue
Service as to those fees must
cease . • • • n Id. at 85,821.
5.

i

1

A recent authority with respect to the effect
of a local court decision concerning the
amount of the deduction (rather than only the
determination of whether the expense was an
administrative expense) is united States x.
White, 88-2 USTC ,13,777 (2d Cir. 1988),
certiorari granted,
U.S.
(1989),
certiorari dismissed-,--U.S-.--(1989),
. supra, reversing and remanding, unIted states
x. White, 87-1 USTC ,13,710 (W.D.N.Y. 1987).
a.

1
I

b..

The Second Circuit in White found that
the Internal Revenue Service issued
summons to the estate's attorney for a
legitimate purpose, and, therefore, it.
ordered enforcement of the summons.
The examiner had requested the attorney's
time records or other documentation of
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legal work undertaken for the estate and
had stated that the attorney was required
to justify his fees notwithstanding that
a local court had approved them.

~
.~

~

]
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I
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c.

The summons sought all records and
documents that related to the
administration of the estate, including
records of the respondent's activities as
attorney and as executor.

d.

When the respondent refused to comply,
the Service disallowed a deduction for
his attorney's fee and disallowed a
portion of the deduction the estate had
claimed for his executor's commission.

e.

Since the estate paid the deficiency and
brought a refund action that was pending
at the time that the Second Circuit
rendered its decision, it is unclear
whether the purpose of enforcement of the
summons was to facilitate determination
of the deductibility of the fees and
commissions or was to facilitate the
audit of the estate tax return generally.

f.

Contrary to the Seventh Circuit in
Jenner, the Second Circuit found that
Code section 2053(a) and regulation
section 20.2053-1(b) (2) merely indicated
that Congress (in the case of the
statute) and the Internal Revenue Service
(in the case of the regulation) intended
to absorb the state law into federal law
and that the principles of Bosch
permitted the Internal Revenue Service to
determine the state law.

g.

Perhaps most importantly, the Second
Circuit said that although the highest
court of the state had announced certain
criteria as the appropriate basis for
determining whether the fee was
reasonable and the Service had to accept
these criteria, Bosch permitted the·
Service to refuse to accept the manner in
which the local court had applied the
criteria.

~
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h.

stated in the parlance of the division
between questions of law and questions of
fact, the Second Circuit apparently was
saying that Bosch did not permit the
Service to disregard the holding of a
local court unless it disagreed with the
court's construction of the law but that
application of the law to the facts was
itself a question of law and not a
question of fact.

i.

The Second Circuit appears to have said
that regulation section 20.2053-1(b) (2)
independently permitted the same scope of
review as the statute and Bosch.

~

~~

(i)

Therefore, according to the Second
Circuit, the regulation did not
inhibit the Service from doing
whatever it could have done if the
regulation did not exist.

(ii) This interpretation, of course,
tended to render the regulation a
nullity.
j.

6.

As an independent basis for enforcement
of the summons, the Second Circuit said
that it believed that the Service had the
right to investigate the existence of
facts upon the basis of which, according
to the regulation, the Service ordinarily
would accept the decree of the local
court.

The Service revealed in its Action on Decision
for Bank of Nevada, supra, a different
position with respect to regulation section
20.2053-1(b) (2).
a.

Although the memorandum criticized the
ratio decidendi, it recommended that the
government not appeal.

h.

According to the Action on Decision,
"
neither do we read [the
regulations] to endorse an inquiry
under any and all instances of court
awarded fees. The provision in
Treas. Reg. S20.2053-1(b) (2) for
ordinarily accepting the probate
court's decree seems to require that.
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in the absence of unusual
circumstances, the decree be
followed."

* * *
"While we disagree with the
holding with respect to the scope of
the district director's discretion,
the outcome here is essentially
correct. A fee of five percent of
the estate is not unreasonable."
F.

Planning.
Regulation section 20.2053-1(b) (2) and the Jenner
interpretation of Code section 2053(a), where it
applies, have planning implications. Before or
when a dispute concerning deductibility arises, the
lawyer should attempt to foreclose the dispute by
obtaining the order of a local court.

v.

1.

If local law provides for "reasonable" fees,
the lawyer should ask the court to determine
that the fees are reasonable.

2.

The lawyer should ask the court to recite as
the basis for the determination such criteria
for reasonableness as clearly are known or are
unobjectionable.

3.

The lawyer should consider asking the court in
any event to recite that the fee is
"reasonable considering all appropriate
factors."

OTHER ISSUES.

attorney additionally might argue that (i) the
use of time (and time records) as the exclusive
basis or as a principal basis for determining
reasonableness is inappropriate, (ii) the system
fails to accommodate the court's or the Service's
right to obtain information and the attorney's duty
not to disclose it, (iii) percentage-oriented fees
and commissions are not illegal and (iv) an attack
on the percentage-oriented commission of a
particular executor requires an attack on the
commissions of most executors. Even if the court
or the Service is unwilling to say that it accedes
to any of these arguments, it might wish to avoid
the highly charged political issues that can reside
at the margins of a court's attempt to disallow a
An

=--:'1
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fee or the Service's attempt independently to
determine the deductibility of a fee or commission
that a local court has approved.
~
~~~

A.

Ethical Constraints.
Ethical constraints might prevent an attorney
from disclosing the requested information.

B.

1.

Almost every sizable estate involves
numerous tax questions and issues.

2.

Only some of the issues are disclosed in
tax returns.

3.

Divulgence of an attorney's time and
other records can divulge each and every
tax issue or question (whether or not
disclosed in a tax return) to which the
attorney has devoted any attention.

4.

Mandatory divulgence might lead to an
untenable situation or to a drastically
changed system of keeping of records.

5.

A court probably can disallow a fee if a
lawyer fails affirmatively to justify it.

6.

Similarly, since the taxpayer has the
burden of establishing entitlement to
deductions, an attorney's refusal to
comply with a request for information
concerning an item for which a deduction
is sought can lead to the denial of the
deduction.

Right to Information.
The Internal Revenue Service might have a
right to obtain some of the attorney's
records, and other information in the
attorney's hands, to enable it to audit the
return generally, even assuming that the
estate foregoes all deductions. See generally
United states y. Lawless, 83-1 USTC !13,527
(7th Cir. 1983); and White, 88-2 USTC 113,777,
supra; cf. United states y. Arthur Young k
Co., 84-1 USTC 19305 (Sup. ct. 1984).
1.

The Seventh Circuit in Lawless, supra,
for example, held that the attorneyclient privilege did not prevent the
Internal Revenue Service from obtaining
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the information that the client had
transmitted to the attorney to enable the
attorney to prepare the estate tax
return.

2.

C.

a.

Although a distinction exists
between (i) material that the
attorney prepared and (ii) material
that a client transmitted to the
attorney, an attorney's records and
files easily can integrate the two.

b.

The attorney should consider
preparing records and files so that
compliance with the rationale of
Lawless will not force the attorney
to disclose his work product even if
the estate is willing to forego a
deduction for the cost of its
preparation.

White, itself, is unclear about whether
it presented the situation in which the
Service's request for records was for the
purpose of undertaking a general audit.
a.

The estate had paid the deficiency
that resulted from the Service's
denial of deductions for a fee and a
commission, but the Second Circuit
nevertheless ordered enforcement of
the summons.

b.

The information that the Service had
requested was not limited to that
which might have justified the
deductions.

c.

Nevertheless, the Second Circuit's
opinion focused solely on the
Service's ability independently to
det~rmine the deductibility of the
attorney's fee and the executor's
commission.

Percentage-Based Fees.
Much of the support for imposition of timeoriented fees and some of the challenges to
deductions apparently are based partly upon an
erroneous assertion that percentage- oriented
fees are illegal or unreasonable, per se, as a
matter of federal law. Cf. Goldfarb y.
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Virginia state Bar, 421 U.S. 773 (1975). Any
implication that percentage fees are
unreasonable, per se, probably would be a
shock to the many fiduciaries and attorneys
that, consistently with the laws of the states
in which they operate, always or often charge
on this basis.
D.

Ad Hoc Challenges.
An effective attack against the disallowance

of an executor's.commission because it is
based on the size of the estate might include
a showing that most corporate fiduciaries
render a percentage-based charge for services,
that the disallowance solely of the commission
of the particular fiduciary is ad hoc and
unprincipled and that other corporate
fiduciaries might have a significant interest
in the dispute.
1.

The charge is based upon the rate
schedule of the particular bank.

2.

While each of the schedules is based upon
the size of the particular estate, each·
generally is somewhat different as to
amounts.

3.

Some banks consider other factors
including, without limitation,
complexity, special problems, expertise
and responsibility.

4.

Each bank charges (or reserves the right
to charge) additionally for any
extraordinary work.

5.

This writer's experience is that the
corporate fiduciaries with which he works
often maintain records of time expended,
but they generally use these records for
internal accounting rather than for
calculating a fee in a particular case.
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WORKSHOP
1.

X, a person who is unknown to the lawyer, telephones
the lawyer and says, solely, (i) (a) can the lawyer
write a "will", or, alternatively, (b) X needs two
wills, two living trusts, two powers of attorney for
property management, two living wills, and (ii) what
will it or they cost. How should ~he lawyer respond?

2.

Repeat #1, except X additionally asks if the lawyer
will meet with X for one hour at no charge. How should
the lawyer respond?

3.

Repeat #s 1 and 2, except X does not ask what the work
will cost. How should the lawyer respond?

4.

Repeat #s 1, 2 and 3, except X additionally says that
he has a "simple" situation and that his assets
approximate $80,000 including face value of life
insurance. How should the lawyer respond?

5.

X, a person who is unknown to the lawyer, telephones
the lawyer, says he would like to hire the lawyer to
plan his estate and wants to know the cost. How should
the lawyer respond?

6.

If the lawyer wishes to charge a particular rate per
hour for planning the estate of'a particular client but
believes that the fee will aggregate a particular
amount, how should the lawyer present the fee to the
client? Should the lawyer present the fee on the basis
of a number of dollars per hour or on the basis of the
total fee or on the basis of both?

QuestIons-similar to these were used for a workshop
conducted at the Philip E. Heckerling University of Miami
Estate Planning Institute in January, 1990.

7.

8.

If the lawyer wishes to charge a particular number of
dollars for planning the estate of a particular client,
how should the lawyer present the fee to the client?
(a)

Should the lawyer render separate charges (for
different services and documents) that aggregate
the amount?

(b)

Alternatively, should the lawyer render a single
charge for the amount and list (without separate
charges) the services and documents for which the
single charge is rendered?

(c)

If the former, should the lawyer (i) submit, in
advance, a menu of "unbundled" services and
products, and their costs, (ii) merely estimate,
in advance, the aggregate fee, or (iii) not give
any estimate in advance?

(d)

If the latter, should the lawyer estimate the fee
in advance?

Judge Y is known to limit lawyer fees for probate work
to $85 per hour. X wants to hire the lawyer to perform
probate work in Judge Y's jurisdiction and is willing
to pay the lawyer's charges of (i) $250 per hour or
(ii) Z percent of the estate's assets (which rate
aggregates more than $85 per hour). Can the lawyer
charge more than $85 per hour? Consider:
(a)

Agreement between X and the lawyer that the lawyer
will perform the work at a rate of (i) $250 per
hour or (ii) Z percent of the estate's assets
(which rate aggregates more than $85 per hour).

(b)

"Quick" probate.

(c)

Avoidance of probate.

(d)

Charge of (i) $250 per hour·or (ii) Z percent of
the estate's assets (which rate aggregates more
than $85 per hour), presentation of the fee for
approval, justification of the fee, appeal of
adverse decision.

9.

During the audit of an estate tax return, the Internal
Revenue Service tells the lawyer that it wishes to
review each of the following, in the alternative:
(a)

The lawyer's time records;

(b)

All material that the executor submitted to the
lawyer;

(c)

The lawyer's "matter" file; and

(d)

All of the lawyer's information concerning the
matter.

How should the lawyer respond?
10.

Repeat #9, except a probate court, not the Internal
Revenue Service, is making the inquiry.
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1.

Where To Begin.
As estate planners, we use tools of many different kinds to help our
a.
clients reach their estate planning goals. These tools include wills, trusts, and
direct interests such as life estates and remainder interests. Sometimes,
corporations have been employed when an entity was desired, often to allow
transfers of increments of value while retaining unity of title and management
control. But corporations tend to be somewhat rigid, and moving in and out
of a corporate vehicle can be both difficult and expensive, and the repeal of
the "General Utilities" doctrine in 1986 and resulting increase in tax cost of
transferring assets out of corporations has led to an increased interest in
partnerships for this purpose.

b.
Family estate planning often means dealing not only with an individual
but also with a spouse and other family members. When a closely held
business is a part of the picture, it is not unusual for other family members
to be involved. Often the level of participation varies substantially among
those family members who are involved in the family business. Sometimes,
their involvement is direct, in that there is active participation in the business
management or its operation. However, it is not unusual to find objects of
the client's bounty who are not involved in the business at all. This can lead
to a need to separate the value and benefit of assets from their management
or control. In such situations, an entity between the assets and owners is
necessary. Trusts are frequently employed, but their use is generally confined
to investment assets. Corporations, partnerships, and, now, limited liability
companies, are better suited to operating businesses than trusts.

;~",;::

c.
In determining whether an entity would be helpful in a given setting,
it is important to focus on the client's purposes, goals and abilities. The most
intricate and technically competent plan is useless if it does not help reach
the client's goals. Once it is determined that the estate plan could benefit by
the establishment of a new entity, the process of developing and implementing a plan should be systematic, with careful attention being given to the
selection of the entity, the structuring of the entity, and the implementation
of the plan.
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2.

Overview of Partnerships.
Partnerships are familiar organizations, with almost everyone being a partner
in some enterprise at some time. Partnerships fall into two broad categories,
general partnerships and limited partnerships. If the requisite formalities are
observed, some of the partners in the organization may have their exposure
to business risks limited in a limited partnership. If those steps are not taken,
. the result is a general partnership, and each of the partners will have full
responsibility for all of the obligations of the organization.
a.

~

~

General Partnerships.

(1) General. The Uniform Partnership Act defines a general
partnership as the association of two or more persons to carry on a business
as co-owners for profit. Joint ventures are sometimes described as partnerships with a singular purpose or activity, but they are, nevertheless,
partnerships .
.(a) For many purposes, a general partnership is treated as a
separate business entity; a general partnership may own its own property and
conduct its own business in its own name. However, for other purposes, the
partnership is treated as an aggregation of the individual partners rather than
an independent unit in and of itself.
(b) Due to the mixture of individual and aggregate characteristics associated with partnerships, partnership law can be described as a case
of multiple personalities.
(2) Formation. The formation of a general partnership is relatively
simple and often happens as a result of the conduct of the parties or other
informal arrangement rather than by written agreement. Because of the ease
and informality of formation, general partnerships are a popular form for
conducting business. Generally, except for any requirements for registration
of assumed or business names and local business licenses, no formal filing
with any public office is required and the arrangement among the partners
can be very simple. Partnership agreements need not be written, but written
partnership agreements are always recommended; a dear written record of
the arrangements between the partners is strongly suggested, so that the
rights and relationships of the partners among themselves are well defined.
Each partnership agreement should at least address issues as term, continuity,
management, contributions to capital, and sharing of profits and losses.

~
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(a) Under the Uniform Partnership Act, generous flexibility is
allowed in the development of the governing structure for a partnership.
Notwithstanding general rules requiring the agreement of all partners for
many important matters, the partners may agree that those general rules be
modified or customized to fit their particular needs. Partnership agreements
range from very short and simple arrangements to very lengthy and highly
technical agreements incorporating precise and detailed provisions dealing
with matters such as governance, delegation of authority, and other matters.
(b) Management and participation in control rights are often
addressed in great detail; in large partnerships, ,there is likely to be some
form of centralized management.
(3) Control. Management authority and control in a general
partnership is dispersed among the partners rather than centralized. Each
partner is treated as the agent of all other partners and the partnership.
(4) Fiduciary Duties. General partners have important duties to each
other in connection with their partnership activities. These fiduciary-like
obligations of good faith, loyalty, and fairness balance the broad authority
each individual partner has to bind the other partners. These responsibilities
also reflect the degree of trust required in order to create and operate an
effective partnership.
(5) Liability. A consequence of the mutual agency concept is
unlimited liability of all partners for partnership obligations and the acts of
the other partners. The impact of one partner's conduct on the treatment of
other partners can be both surprising and severe.
(6) Transferability. The interests of the partners in a general
pat;tnership are seldom transferable with any degree of freedom. Because of
the close relationship arising out of the mutual agency of partners, many
events, such as the admission of a new partner, occur only with the approval
of all partners. As a result, an interest in a general partnership is illiquid and
cannot be sold or transferred without the approval of the other partners.
Even in large partnerships where many management functions are centralized
by agreement, it is unusual for partners' interests to be freely transferable.
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(7) Continuity of Life. Although the life of a partnership may be
extended by agreement of remaining partners, it remains finite. Dissolution
of a partnership occurs in a variety of circumstances, such as a death of a
partner, but dissolution does not necessarily lead to a termination of a
partnership if the business is continued by the remaining partners. On the
death of a partner, the decedent's estate succeeds to the decedent's interests
in the partnership but does not become a partner. Of course, surviving
partners have a duty to account to the successors of the deceased partner.
Buy-sell arrangements can and are used to simplify this process and provide
for greater certainty.

~

(8) Income Taxation. Partnerships are largely transparent for federal
income tax purposes, in that partnership income or loss is passed through the
partnership to the respective partners based upon their agreement for sharing
such matters. Code § 702. As noted, substantial flexibility is allowed and the
partners may vary their respective interest in different items.
(a) The determination of whether a state law partnership will
be characterized as a partnership for income tax purposes is made under
Code § 7701. In general, finding an organization to have a majority of the
corporate characteristics set out in the Regulations results in the organization
being treated and taxed as a corporation, even though it is a partnership
under local law. The testing process examines the following characteristics:
(i) centralization of management, (ii) limited liability, (iii) continuity of life,
and (iv) free transferability of interests. Regulation § 301.7701-2.
(b) Ordinarily, there are no tax consequences in the contribution of property to a partnership or in the distribution of property by a
partnership to a partner. Code §§ 721 and 731. Special rules are provided
for contributions of appreciated property, so that the inherent gain or loss in
such property is allocated to the contributing partner, and for contributions
of encumbered property. Code §§ 704 and 752. Special rules for accounts
receivable and appreciated inventory are provided at Code § 751.
(c)
Their great flexibility makes partnerships a very common
form of business organization. In cases where one partner contributes capital
while another contributes services and the partners agree to share the income
or loss of their venture equally, the individual accounting for capital used in
partnerships rather than accounting for capital for the entity as a whole easily
accommodates the arrangement.
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(d) Within the framework of the extensive Treasury Regulations dealing with allocations among partners and whether the provisions
have substantial economic effect, profits and losses and other interests in the
partnership may be allocated and shared among the partners in a variety of
different ways within the same partnership. See Regulation § 1.704.
(e) Notwithstanding the general rules that gain or loss is not
recognized upon the contribution of property to a partnership, a shifting of
capital contributed by one partner to the credit of a partner providing
services looks like and is likely to be treated as compensation to the service
partner. Regulation §1.721-1(b)(1). On the other hand, in the context of
a family partnership, the shifting of a capital interest may be viewed as a gift.
(9) Raising Capital. Broad mutua.lity and joint and several liability
limit the ability of general partnerships to raise capital from unrelated
sources. By definition, ownership of an equity interest in a general
partnership equates with the status of a general partner. And outside
investors generally insist that their exposure to business risks be limited to
no more than their investment .
. (a) To the extent adequate capital cannot be borrowed by the
partnership, expansion of businesses organized as general partnerships must
rely upon the income generating power of the partnership or the ability of its
partners to fund such capital needs from personal assets or from personal
borrowings.
(b)

Capital needs may dictate a different form of organization.

(10) Securities. Ordinarily, securities law issues do not arise in the
context of general partnerships, as an interest in a general partnership does
not usually meet the tests for finding a security.
(a) The fundamental test of whether an interest is a security
is called the risk capital test; one statement of this definition is stated as an
"investment made in an enterprise with the expectation of making a profit
from the efforts of others".
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(b) As a result of the mutual agency and the rights of all
partners to be involved in management and control, and the resulting
absence of separation between capital from control, an interest in a general
partnership usually is not a security. Thus, the disclosure and registration
requfrements of state and federal securities laws do not generally apply to
interest in a general partnership. However, because of the broad flexibility
allowed in partnership agreements, it is possible to tum a general partnership
interest into a security governed by such law.

::3
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(c) When forming a partnership with centralized management
features and limited management participation by most partners, inclusion of
investment representations on the part of the capital partners is recommended.
b.

Limited Partnerships.

(1)
General. Limited partnerships are a form of partnership having
both general and limited partners. General partners retain the same mutual
agency and broad responsibility for partnership obligations 9iscussed in the
context of partners in general partnerships. On the other hand, limited
partners are prohibited from participation in the management of the business
and are not responsible for the obligations and debts of the business beyond
their agreement to contribute capital to the partnership.

(2) Formation. Formation of a limited partnership is more objective
and formal than with a general partnership; formation requires the preparation and filing/recording of a certificate of limited partnership with a
designated public office. Ordinary practice is to limit the certificate to the
elements required by statute and to gather the substantive provisions dealing
with the relationship among the partners, such as term, management,
capitalization, and sharing of profits and losses in a separate limited
partnership agreement which need not be filed or recorded.
-;

(3) Control. Management of a limited partnership is centralized in
the general partner or partners, and the limited partners are not permitted
to participate in the management of the partnership's business without losing
their protection as limited partners. This separation of ownership and
management is one of the principal differences between limited partnerships
and general partnerships. Some limited participation through voting on
major issues is generally permitted.

;jjr
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(4) Fiduciary Duties. As with general partnerships, the general
partners in a limited partnership have important duties to each other and to
their limited partners in connection with their partnership activities.
Fiduciary-like obligations of good faith, loyalty, and fairness balance the
broad authority of the general partners to bind the other partners. These
responsibilities also reflect the degree of trust required in order to create and
operate an effective partnership.
(5) Liability. While the general partners in a limited partnership
retain the same full responsibility for partnership obligations of partners in
a general partnership, limited partners ordinarily are at risk only to the extent
of their agreement to contribute to the partnership's capital.
(6) Transferability. While the interests of limited partners are more
readily transferred than is the case with general partners, free transferability
of those interests is seldom allowed in order to protect the income tax status
of the partnership. As is the case with general partnerships, free transferability of the interests of general partners in a limited partnership is rarely
provided.
(7) Continuity of Life. Although the life of a limited partnership may
be extended by agreement, its life remains finite. Continuation of a limited
partnership by the terms of the agreement does not necessarily indicate an
unlimited life.
(8) Income Taxation. Like general partnerships, limited partnerships
are largely transparent for federal income tax purposes.
(a) While most limited partnerships organized under local law
will be characterized as partnerships for income tax purposes, the characterization for tax purposes of a limited partnership can be a closer question than
with a general partnership and it is possible to be too clever in drafting.
(i)
Because only the general partners participate in
control, centralization of management is present in a limited partnership.
Regulation § 301.7701-2(c).
(ii) Limited liability for this purpose does not exist even
with a limited partnership if any partner is personally liable for the
partnership's obligations. Regulation § 301.7701-2(d). Use of a shell
corporation owned by the limited partners as the general partner in a limited
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partnership may change the result and yield a finding of limited liability.
Regulation § 301.7701-2(d)(2).
(iii) Limited partnerships formed under the Uniform
Limited Partnership Act generally lack continuity of life for these purposes.
Regulation § 301.7701-2(b).

(iv) Where the limited partnership agreement restricts
the transferability of limited partner interests by not allowing the transferee
the benefits of being a limited partner in the absence of the approval of the
other partners, free transferability of interests should not be found to exist.
Regulation § 301.77-1-2(e)
(b) Once characterized as a partnership, the tax attributes of
a limited partnership are much the same as for a general partnership.
(9) Raising Capital. The separation of ownership or capital interests
from management and liability works in favor of the limited partnership when
it comes to raising additional capital. The standard requirement of outside
investors that their risks be limited to their invested capital can generally be
met using a limited partnership.
(a) In some businesses, notably the operation of rental real
estate and others which can easily be operated through hired management,
the limited partnership form of conducting business has been used often due
to the transparency of the entity for income tax purposes while retaining
liability protection for investors uninvolved in management.
(b) However, excesses in earlier decades with syndicated real
estate limited partnerships have led many to dislike the limited partnership
form for doing business.
(10) Securities. At least as to the limited partners, the risk capital test
addressed earlier is met in the case of a limited partnership, as the limited
partners by definition make their investment seeking a profit through the
efforts of the general partners. As a result, federal and state securities laws
generally do apply to those interests and, unless an exemption is found,
limited partnership interests are required to be registered under applicable
securities laws before they are sold. Note that exemption from these
registration requirements is not an exemption from the disclosure and antifraud rules of state or federal securities laws.
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(a) The most often relied upon exemptions from the registration
requirements of federal securities laws include the intrastate exemption and
private placement exemption. State securities laws generally provide similar
exemptions from registration requirements.
For example, Tennessee
securities laws exempt placements involving $100,000 or less and placements
to 15 or fewer persons for investment purposes from the otherwise mandatory requirement for registration.
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(b) Inclusion of investment representations on the part of the
limited partners is· recommended.
(c) Once an interest is characterized as a security, the antifraud provisions of the various securities laws must also be addressed in
connection with the sale of any limited partnership interest, as there are no
exemptions from those requirements.
3.

Making the Choice.
a.
The decision to use an entity and the choice of which form of entity to
use in the context of estate planning is a highly subjective process. Some
considerations in selecting the entity are:
When the nature of the assets or business or other reasons
suggest a need for limited liability, use of an entity is indicated. If ownership
is already separated from management, a corporation may be suitable.
However, if the client and!or family members are directly involved in
operations, a partnership may also prove suitable. Low risk investment
activities and passive operations with readily insurable risks favor selection
of more flexible partnerships over corporations. When a trust is involved, a
limited partnership or corporation is generally indicated to separate the
fiduciary from operations. If the business is already operating in corporate
form, a limited partnership with the owner/donor as the general partner may
be indicated as a means of facilitating gifts without loss of control.
(1)

~
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(2) Separation of ownership from control can be achieved with trusts
and corporations as well as with limited partnerships. However, while trusts
are very effective when funded with investment assets, they tend to be
cumbersome vehicles for the operation of a business. Also, retention of
valuable interests by the donor yields adverse estate tax consequences. With
corporations, a shift in voting control can result from a systematic gift making
program involving the transfer of stock. Limited partnerships allow control
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to be lodged with the general partner(s) without regard to the amount of
value shifted through transfers of limited partner interests. A limited
partnership can also be useful where it is important to vest control of the
family business in one group or to isolate others from management while
providing them with the benefits of ownership.
(3) It may be necessary to fragment value in order to engage in a
regular gift making program. When a client's business is most of the client's
net worth, or when the growth of the business hampers available liquidity,
the ability to engage in a routine gift making program is reduced. Organization of the business into limited partnership form provides the means to make
gifts without impacting liquidity or control.
(4) Capital structure and income allocation goals of the client are
important factors to consider. Within a class, stockholder interests in a
corporation are necessarily uniform. However, the interests of each partner
in capital and income can be tailored to fit specific needs or circumstances.
Some limited shifting of income may be achieved within the limitations of the
family partnership rules; retention of income for the donor partner through
employment and similar arrangements can provide further benefit. The
flexibility of individual capital accounting in partnerships facilitates contributions and distributions of property by partners.
(5) Protecting operating assets from creditors of a participant can be
important. Creditors of a limited partner are in much the same position as
the creditors of a shareholder; distributions made can be reached but the
creditor generally has no ability to reach the assets and properties of the
entity. Limited partnership agreements typically place tight restrictions upon
the transfer of general partner interests, but the protection for assets of a
transferor general partner is not as complete.
(6) Basis and other income tax aspects on formation, operation, and
termination of an entity vary widely between corporations and partnerships.
Most important among those differences is the "inside tax" upon the
disposition of assets by a corporation, whether from a sale or upon a distribution to shareholders or at liquidation, without regard to the "outside" basis
of the equity owner in the shares. Upon the death of a partner, the step up
in the "outside" basis of the partner can be shifted to assets without an
"inside tax".
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(7) Without any doubt, the client's ability and willingness to observe
the requisite fonnalities and details of the recommended plan is an important
factor in selecting an entity. Some clients simply don't belong in the middle
of a complicated entity of any kind. Careful explanations can assist the
unfamiliar client and be the difference between success and failure. Licensing
requirements and the dictates of existing loan and other contracts should be
carefully reviewed to discern their impact on planning alternatives.
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(8) Reduction in estate settlement costs can be a significant benefit
of using an entity in estate planning. Bringing multiple assets under a single
umbrella can greatly relieve the executor. When a trUst is desirable for other
reasons, the use of a limited partnership for the ownership of an operating
business can separate the difficulties of managing that business from an
otherwise reluctant fiduciary.
.
(9) Obtaining discounts in valuing interests from the value of the
underlying assets is an important aspect of estate planning for clients.
Discounts increase the leverage of gift making, but don't forget they are
allowed because they are real. With the bunching of taxes at the second
death for a married couple, the ability to shift increments of ownership at
reduced value can result in significant tax savings even when the discount is
small.
b.
When considering use of a family partnership as an estate planning
tool, the basic characteristics of partnerships should be considered along with
these factors and more traditional estate planning goals in fonnulating a plan.

4.

~1

Selected Partnership Income Tax Issues.
a.
Family Partnership Rules. The provisions of Code § 704(e) were
originally intended to prevent the shifting of income among family members
at a time when income tax rates were substantially higher than today. These
rules are applied to detennine the validity of the partnership on a partner-bypartner basis for income tax purposes. The application of these requirements
and transactions among family members may receive close scrutiny.
Regulation § 1.704-1 (e) (1) (iii).
(1) While the transfer of a naked interest in the profits of a
partnership may not be respected, a person holding an interest in partnership
capital will~recognized as a partner for income tax purposes if capital is a
material factor in producing the partnership's income. Code § 704(e)(1).
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(2) Capital is a material factor in the production of a partnership's
income if a substantial part of the partnership's gross income is derived from
capital employed in the business, whether in the form of inventory, equipment, or plant. Regulation § 1.704-1(e)(1)(iv).
(3) When capital in not. a material factor in the production of the
partnership's income, allocation of partnership income to non-participants
may be challenged under the provision requiring income to be allocated to
those who earn it. Regulation § 1.704-1(e)(1)(i).
(4) Under the Regulations, separate capital accounts are established
for each of the partners. Beginning with a zero balance, these capital
accounts are then credited with contributions made by a partner to the
partnership's capital and with the partner's share of partnership profits; the
capital account is also debited with the amount of distributions made to the
partner and with the partner's share of partnership losses. Regulation §
1. 704-1 (b) (2) (iv) (b).
(a) By providing in the family partnership agreement for the
transfer of a proportionate amount of capital with any transfer of an interest
in the partnership, proportionality between interests in the partnership's
capital and its profits can be maintained.
(b) Purchases of partnership interests by one "family" member
from another are treated as if acquired by the purchaser by gift from the
seller. Code § 704(e)(3).
(c)
For these purposes, "family" includes a person's spouse,
ancestors, and lineal descendants. Code § 704(e)(3).
(5) Even if the foregoing tests are satisfied, a donor's retention of
excessive control can result in the partnership not being recognized as to the
affected partner. Regulation § 1.704-1(e)(2)(ii) provides a listing and
discussion of various factors to be considered in judging whether a donee is
to be recognized as a partner.
(6) When the subject of the gift is an interest in a limited partnership, restrictions and limitations consistent with those applicable to other
limited partners and with those found in ordinary business relationships
should not prevent recognition of the donee as a partner. Regulation §
1.704-1(e)(2)(ix).
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b.
Disguised Sales. Under Code § 707(a), a partner may engage in
transactions with a partnership and obtain the same tax treatment that would
be obtained without the relationship. Thus, a partner may sell or lease
property to his own partnership and be treated as a seller or landlord.
However, in the context of an estate planning partnership, properties are
usually contributed to the partnership and sale treatment is neither intended
nor desired. As noted earlier, contributions of property by a partner to a
partnership and the distribution of property by a partnership to a partner
generally are non-recognition transactions for income tax purposes.
(1) In general, Code § 704(c) directs that any unrealized appreciation at the time of the contribution of property to a partnership is to be
suspended and then in effect specially allocated to the contributing partner
when the partnership disposes of the property.
. (2) And, notwithstanding the general rule for non-recognition of
gain or loss on the contribution of property to a partnership, the distribution
of contributed property by a partnership within 5 years of its contribution to
a partner other than the partner who made the original contribution may be
treated as a sale of the property by the original contributing partner at its
then fair market value. Code § 704(c)(1).
c.
Investment Company.
The general rule of non-recognition of gain or
loss by a partner upon the contribution property to a partnership is also not
available where the transfer is to an investment company. Code § 721(b).
(1)
To be an investment company for these purposes, more than
80% of the partnership's non-cash and non-debt assets must be readily
marketable stocks or securities or interests in regulated investment companies
or REITs. Regulation §1.351-1(c)(1)(ii).
(2) To be a transfer to an investment company, the transfer must
also result in diversification of the transferring partner's interests to be denied
non-recognition treatment. Regulation §1.351-1(c)(1)(i). Transfers of
identical assets do not result in diversification. Regulation §1.351-1(c)(5).
This has led to the suggestion that when marketable securities are involved
in the formation of a family partnership, the diversification element can be
avoided by pre-contribution gifts of the same securities to the other partners,
who then contribute the securities to the partnership.
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d.
Taxable Year.
Special rules establishing the taxable year of a
partnership are set out in Code § 706.
(1) When planning for any transfer of an interest in a partnership,
careful attention must be paid to special rules for closing a partnership's
taxable year with respect to a partner and the rules for allocating partnership
items between the transferor and transferee. Code § 706(c).
(2)
Note that the taxable year of a partnership does not close due to
the death of a partner. Code § 706(c)(1). Thus, partnership income or loss
for the entire taxable year of the partner's death will be reflected on the
decedent's estate income tax return and not on the partner's final individual
return. Regulation § 1.706-1 (c) (3).
'
5.

The Special Valuation Rules of Chapter 14.
a.
Code § 2701.
Gifts are frequently contemplated as a part of an
estate plan. That is especially true in those estate plans which invoke the use
of a family partnership as a tool, as the reason for doing so is often to
facilitate making "gifts by the slice".
(1) Generally, whether a gift has been made is determined under
Code § 2511 and the value of a gift is determined under Code § 2512 by
reference to the value of the interest transferred to the donee. However,
when the subject of the gift is an interest in a partnership and the transfer
is to a "member of the family", the application of the special rules of Code §
2701 must be considered.
(2) The provisions of Code § 2701 are directed at partnerships which
have been structured to allow the shift of future growth while "freezing" the
value of the interest retained by the donor partner at a fixed amount.
Such "freeze" partnerships are structured with preferred
(a)
or senior interests and common interests. Like in the case of their corporate
counterparts, the preferred interests may provide for preferential distributions
in a fixed amount, which mayor may not be cumulative, and for a priority
claim on the distribution of assets at liquidation. Such interests may also
include the right to cause the interest to be redeemed upon certain events.
These "senior" interests tend to depress the current value of the junior or
common interests, allowing such junior interests to be given to other, usually
younger, family members at a reduced value.

E - 14

=

_'I

:=;
~

(b) The purposes of Code § 2701 are accomplished by
preventing the use of unreasonably low valuations of such transfers through
a mandated subtractive valuation methodology. Regulation § 25.2701-3(b).
In simplified form, the value of a gift subject to Code § 2701 is determined
. by first valuing the interests in the partnership held by the transferor and
then subtracting the value of certain qualified retained interests after the gift
is made; all retained interests other than certain qualified interests are valued
at zero, increasing the value of the interest transferred to the donee. Code
§ 2701(c)(3).
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(3) By using two distinct definitions of various family members, the
application of Code § 2701 is limited to transfers by the transferor to a
member of the same or a lower generation as the transferor, "member of the
family", in which a member of the same or a higher generation as the
transferor, "applicable family member", is left with an "applicable retained
interest".
(a) "Members of the family" includes the transferor's spouse,
lineal descendants of the transferor or the transferor's spouse, and the
spouses of such descendants. Code § 2701(e)(1).
(b) "Applicable family member" is separately defined to include
the transferor's spouse, ancestors of the transferor and transferor's spouse,
and the spouses of such ancestors. Code § 2701(e)(2).
(c)
In general terms, an "applicable retained interest" is a
senior equity interest, involving either a liquidation, put, call, or conversion
right or a distribution right.
(4) Notwithstanding the complexity of these prOVISIons, the
exceptions to the application of Code § 2701 provide relief to many family
partnerships.

~

~

(a) Though not usually of significance in the context of a
family partnership, exception is provided if either the transferred interest or
the retained interest is readily marketable on an established securities market.
Code § 2701(a)(2)(A).

-----j
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(b) Exception is made when the interest retained by the donor
partner is of the same class as the transferred interest. Code § 2701(a)(2)(B). Thus, gifts of limited partner interests by a partner who holds limited
partner interests after the transfer are excluded from Code § 2701.
(c)
Exception is also made when the interest retained by the
donor partner is proportionately the same as the interest transferred. Code
§ 2701(a)(2)(C). In applying this exception, the Code directs that nonlapsing differences in management and limitations on liability be ignored. As
the principal differences between general and limited partner interests are
their differing rights as to management and limitations on liability, the effect
is to except from the application of Code § 2701 those straight partnerships
having only general and ordinary limited partners. Regulation § 25.27011(c)(3).
(5) To balance the impact should Code § 2701 apply, provision is
made for appropriate adjustments to be made to prevent double taxation
upon the later transfer of a retained interest artificially valued at zero. Code
§ 2701(e)(6).
b.
Lapsing Rights. Prior to the enactment of Chapter 14, the Tax Court
allowed a substantial valuation discount for estate tax purposes of a
partnership interest where the partnership agreement provided that the
decedent's right to cause the liquidation of the partnership lapsed at his
death. Estate of Harrison, 52 TCM 1306 (1987).
Code § 2704 now directs that the lapse of voting or liquidation
rights is to be treated as a gift or transfer at death if the holder of the right
at the time of its lapse and such holder's family control the entity before and
after the lapse. Code § 2704(a)(1).
(1)

(a) In the case of a family-controlled partnership, the lapse of
voting or liquidation rights of one partner arising from an amendment to a
partnership agreement would be treated as a gift.
(b) Members of the family for this purpose are defined to
include the holder's spouse, ancestors and descendants of the holder or the
holder's spouse, siblings of the holder or the holder's spouse, and any spouse
of any such ancestor, descendant, or sibling. Code § 2704(c)(2).
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(c)
As under Code § 2701, control in the case of a partnership
is defined as a 50% or larger interest in partnership capital or profits or, in
the case of a limited partnership, any interest as a general partner.
(2) The value of the transfer is to be the value of the interest
immediately before the lapse reduced by its value immediately after the lapse.
Code § 2704(a)(2). As a result, a partnership agreement provision converting a general partner's interests in a partnership at death to a limited interest
with reduced voting and!or reduced liquidation rights, would not provide any
reduction in value for estate or generation-skipping transfer tax purposes.
(3) Note the grant of broad rule making authority to apply this
treatment to other restrictions. Code § 2704(a)(3).
c.
Valuation Adjustments. Transfer tax schemes are generally based upon
the application of a progressive rate structure to the fair market value of the
interests transferred. Code §§ 2512 and 2031. And, the valuation process
often relies upon comparisons to transfers of similar assets between other
persons, whether that marketplace is large, such as with listed stock, or much
smaller as with real estate.
(1) Discounts for minority interests are allowed in order to properly
reflect the impact of fragmenting ownership upon the value of an asset as a
whole.
(2) Premiums have been accorded to interests in corporations which,
even though representing less than 100%, constituted control. Estate of
Chenoweth v. Comm'r, 88 T.C. 1577 (1987).
(3) Discounts for lack of marketability are allowed in order to
properly reflect the impact upon the value of an asset of restricting the
marketplace for its disposition.
(4) Reversing a long held position, the IRS now allows minority
discounts in transfers without regard to the family relationship of the donees.
In a transaction where the donor gave a 20% interest in the entity to each of
his five children, the interests of the donees were not aggregated and a
minority discount was allowed for each of the five gifts. Rev. Rul. 93-12, IRB
1993-7, 13.

=
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(a)
Although Rev. Rul. 93-12 involved corporate shares, it
should apply equally well in the case of gifts of partnership interests.
(b) Note the Rev. Rul. 93-13 is also a two-edged sword,
effectively reducing the amount of a deductible transfer, such as a bequest
otherwise qualifying for a marital or charitable deduction, when the gift is
funded with a minority interest. TAM 9403005.
6.

Control Related Issues.
a.
Present Interest Exclusion. Concern has been expressed about whether
the gift of a limited interest in a limited partnership qualifies for the present
interest exclusion under Code § 2503 when the donor is a general partner.
(1) In LTR 9131006, the IRS held that when the donor does not
retain any dominion or control over the limited interest, the gift is complete
and qualifies for the annual exclusion even when the donor remains a general
partner.
(2)

The same result was reached in LTR 9415007.

b.
Retained Powers. Concern has also been expressed about whether a
transferred limited interest in. a limited partnership would be includible in the
donor general partner's estate under Code § 2036 or § 2038 on the basis of
retained control in the donor's capacity as general partner. Citing u.s. v.
Byrum, 408 U.S. 125 (1972), and referring to the fiduciary duties of a
general partner, in LTRs 9131006 and 9415007 the IRS held that the
interests transferred were not subject to Code § 2036 or § 2038 and, thus,
that the transferred limited partner interests remained outside the donor's
estate at death.
7.

The Family Partnership.
a.
Ethics.
As with any estate planning matter, careful attention
should be focused upon all applicable ethical considerations. By definition,
each situation where a partnership might be considered in the context of
estate planning will involve at least two partners. Identification of the client
can be difficult in these circumstances. While the difficulties may be no more
than ordinarily encountered as long as the only partners are husband and
wife, once interests are given to others, the complexities can escalate
dramatically. It is suggested that at a minimum each person involved should
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be provided with a written description of the plan and transactions and of the
potential for future conflict.
§

~

b.
Implementation. Once developed, implementation of the plan should
take into account the client's goals and the outcome of considering the
various planning factors noted earlier. Documentation should be complete
and all necessary formalities should be followed.
Exposition of the principle goals and purposes of the plan in the
preamble or recital portion of the partnership agreement will not only assist
the client to keep these factors in mind but also will help establish the
business purpose of the transaction.
(1)

(2) Structure the provisions for allocating income and loss among
the partners with a view to Code § 704, both as to "substantial economic
effect" and as to the family partnership rules of Code § 704(e).
Consider restrictions and other provisions needed to implement
the client's intent as to matters such as the circumstances and method for
removal of a partner, rights of first refusal and other restrictions on
disposition of interests in the partnership, and management.
(3)

(4) Determine to what extent outside appraisals are desirable and
make recommendations to client.
(5) Carefully review all documents for compliance with local
requirements and to assure that the entity created is indeed a partnership,
both under local rules and for income tax purposes.
c.
Follow-up. Once organized, follow through with all necessary
conveyances to the partnership. In the event of gifts, gift tax valuation and
return requirements should be addressed.

~
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d.· Caveat.
Family partnerships have received a great deal of attention
in recent years. Articles have appeared in Business Week, Forbes, and other
business publications in addition to increasing attention in professional
publications and programs. This atmosphere leads me to suggest that careful
attention be paid by the practitioner to basics in each family partnership,
because the Internal Revenue Service will be doing just that. For example,
remembering that partnerships are based upon business and profit purposes
and the recital of those purposes and generalized goals in the agreement may
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be wise steps in the event the client taxpayer is called upon to demonstrate
the business purpose behind formation of the entity. Such care should go far
in avoiding the result in Estate of Murphy where the Tax Court held that
transactions with no purpose or effect other than their tax impact should be
disregarded for those purposes. Estate of Mm:phy, 60 TCM 645 (1990).
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SECTIONF

FEDERAL INCOME TAX TREATMENT OF OPERATING AS A LIMITED
LIABILITY COMPANY

Charles J. Lavelle, Esq., Greenebaum Doll & McDonald and
Lady E. Booth, Esq., Ogden Newell & Welch

I.

INTRODUCTION TO CLASSIFICATION ISSUES

The

structure

Company ("LLC")

and usefulness

of

a

Limited Liability

is usually dependent upon the determination

that it will be treated as a partnership under federal tax
law.

Therefore,

a practitioner must be familiar with the

rules governing classification in order to structure an LLC
tha t

meets

the

needs

of

the

owners

without

unwittingly

triggering corporate taxation.
The

Internal

Revenue

Code

("I.R.C.")

recognizes

and

provides rule for the taxation of four general categories of
taxpayers:
a) Individuals;l
b) Corporations (which includes "associations taxable as
corporations") ; 2
c) Partnerships;3 and

I

1

I.R.C. Subchapters A and B.

2

I.R.C. Subchapter C.

3

loR.C. Subchapter K.

-
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Trusts and Estates. 4

Entities that do not clearly fall into one of these categories
are classified to fit within one of these categories and taxed

~

accordingly.
The classification rules are embodied in the "Kintner"
regulations. 5

These

distinguish

regulations

between

structures by reference to six characteristics:
1) Associates;
2) An objective to carryon a business and divide the
gains thereof;
3) Limited liability;
4)

Free transferability;

5) Continuity of life; and
6) Centralized management.
Under

the

Kintner

regulations,

corporations

and

partnerships are deemed to share two of these characteristics:
associates and an objective to carryon a business and divide
the gains thereof. 6

Thereafter,

in order to distinguish a

partnership from an association taxed as a corporation, the
structure is reviewed to determine the number of the four
remaining

characteristics

that

it

bears.

4

I.R.C. Subchapter J.

5

Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(a) (1)

6

Treas. Reg. § 301. 7701-2 (a) (2).
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In

a

purely

et seq.
~

mechanical test, if the structure bears more than two of these

3

four characteristics, it will be classified as an association

~

~
~

as

taxable

a

corporation. 7

on

If,

the

other

hand,

the

structure has two or fewer of these characteristics, it will
be classified as a partnership.8
characteristic

is

given

Under this formulation, no

greater

weight

than

any

other

characteristic in the classification process. 9
Within

these

broad

outlines,

it

is

necessary

to

understand what particular facts will and will not give rise
to

these

characteristics.

For

that understanding,

it

is

important to appreciate the environment in which the Kintner
regulations were drafted.
II.

THE BACKGROUND OF THE KINTNER REGULATIONS

Throughout
forbidden

by

incorporating.

the

1940's

statutes
However,

and
and

50's,

professionals

professional

during

this

same

rules
time

were
from
frame,

professionals sought to utilize tax favored employee benefit
plans

that

were

restricted

to

corporations .10

As

such,

7

Treas. Reg.

§

301.7701-2(a) (3).

8

Treas. Reg.

§

301. 7701-2 (a) (3).

9

Larson v. Comm'r, 66 T.C. 159 (1976), acq. 1979-1 C.B.

1.
10
"The urge to incorporate personal service enterprises
generally reflected the desire to take advantage of Code
provisions that granted more generous deductions or other tax
allowances for corporate employee benefit plans than for
similar plans created by self-employed individuals." BITTKER
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professionals

sought

to

create

structures

viewed as corporations for tax purposes,
state

law

corporations

professional

rules

which

and

would

which would be

but would not be

run

afoul

regulations.

unsuccessfully fought a series of

~ourt

of

The

a~

those
Service

battles to treat these
~~

structures as partnerships, eventually culminating in Uni ted

States v. Kintner.11

In Kintner, a group of physicians formed

an

association

unincorporated

with

sufficient

corporate

characteristics to, under the prevailing tax law, cause it to
be

classified

as

a

corporation.

The

Service

sought

to

classify the association as a partnership but was unsuccessful
at the trial and appellate levels.

Unwilling to accept this

loss and those which had preceded it,

the

IRS refused to

acquiesce in the Kintner ruling. 12
A year later, still without acquiescing in Kintner, the
Service stated that so-called "Kintner associations" would be
classified under

the

"usual

test,"

and that

a

subsequent

revenue ruling would further explain the "usual test.

&
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-=j

11
216 F.2d 4018 (9th Cir. 1954), aff'g, 107 F.Supp. 97
(D.Mont. 1952).

12
Rev. Rul. 56-23, 1956-1 C.B. 598,
Rul. 72-92, 1972-1 C.B. 407.
13

Rev. Rul. 57-546, 1957-2 C.B. 886.
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obsolete by Rev.

promised revenue ruling was never issued; rather, the Kintner
.;;;;;J

,~

"regulations were proposed. 14
Due to the environment in which they were drafted, these
regulations demonstrate a clear bias in favor of partnership
classification.

This bias is demonstrated by the.need for a

~

preponderance of the corporate characteristics in order for a
structure to be classified as an association taxable' as a
corpor a tion. 15
through
entity

a

As

limited liability can be obtained· only

state organizational

could obtain corporate

statute,

classification only

association had continuity of life,
interests

and

centralized

an unincorporated
if

the

free transferability of

management.

The

response

of

professionals seeking to be recognized as corporations was
largely

to

abandon

associations,"
authorize

the

instead

the

of

use

persuading

organization

of

so-called

state

"Kintner

legislatures

professional

to

service

corporations. 16

14

3
J

T.D. 6503, 1960-2 C.B. 409.

15
As observed by Judge Dawson in Larson, "I think the
current regulations were drafted for the purpose of limiting
the ability of a partnership or other entity to qualify as a
corporation for tax purposes. In fact, it might even be said
that
the
[Kintner]
regulations
are
weighed
against
qualification for corporate status." 66 T.C. at 187 (italics
in original) .
16
McKEE, NELSON & WHITMIRE,
PARTNERS <][ 3. 06 [ 1] .
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FEDERAL TAXATION OF PARTNERSHIPS AND

III.

LLCs.AND THE KINTNER REGULATIONS

The first LLC statute passed by Wyoming in 1977 with the

~

~I

express intention that LLCs be taxed as partnerships.
objective

was

dealt

Treasury

Department

a

near

death blow

proposed

revisions

in
to

1980

This

when

the

the

Kintner

regulations that would classify as a corporation any structure
that enjoyed limited liability.17
proposal,

DUring the pendency of this

Florida passed a second LLC statute in 1982.

In

1983 the Treasury Department withdrew the proposed amendments,
and announced a reexamination of the test used to classify
unincorporated businesses. 18

Further development of the LLC

languished until 1988 when the Service announced that it would
not revise the classification methodology,19 and issued Revenue
Ruling 88-76,20 confirming that Wyoming LLCs would be taxed as
partnerships.
For

several

years

thereafter,

the

Service

issued no

binding rulings on the tax classifications of LLCs.

Then,

beginning in early 1993, the Service began issuing a series of
addi tional revenue rulings addressing LLCs

formed under a

~

17 Prop. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(a), 45 Fed. Reg. 75,709
(Nov. 17, 1980).
18

Ann. 83-4, 1983-2 I.R.B. 31 (January 10, 1983).

19

Ann. 88-118, 1988-38 I.R.B. 26 (September 19, 1988).

20

1988-2 C.B. 360.
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~
~

variety of state statutes. 21
=cd

In addition, the Service has also

issued numerous private letter rulings on the issue of whether

~

~

or

not

a

particular

LLC

will

qualify

for

partnership

qualification.
Currently,

the classification dispute has shifted its

focus from whether an LLC can be taxed as a partnership to
what facts and circumstances will or will not give rise to the
existence of a particular Kintner characteristic.

A.

LIMITED LIABILITY
As

limited liability characteristic is the centerpiece of

each LLC statute, there is no question that it is present in
an LLC.
It should be noted that the personal liability of an
individual

for· his

or hers own acts

does

not

support an

argument that the LLC on whose behalf that individual was

Virginia, Rev. Rul. 93-5, 1993-1 C.B. 227 (January 19,
1993); Colorado, Rev. Rul. 93-6, 1993-1 C.B. 229 (January 19,
1993); Nevada, Rev. Rul. 93-30, 1993-1 C.B. 231 (April 19,
1993); Delaware, Rev. Rul. 93-:-38, 1993-1 C.B. 233 (May 24,
1993);
Illinois, Rev. Rul. 93-49, 1993-2 C.B. 308 CJuly ,
1993); West Virginia, Rev. Rul. 93-50, 1993-2 C.B. 310 (July
19, 1993); Florida, Rev. Rul. 93-53, 1993-2 C.B. 312 (August
2, 1993);
Rhode Island, Rev. Rul. 93-81, 1993-2 C.B. 314
(November 29, 1993); Utah, Rev. Rul. 93-91, 1993-2 C.B. 316
(December 20,1993); Oklahoma, Rev. Rul. 93-92, 1993-2 C.B.
318 (December 27, 1993); Arizona, Rev. Rul. 93-93, 1993-2 C.B.
321 (December 27, 1993);
Louisiana, Rev. Rul. 94-5, 1994-2
LR.B. 21 (January 10, 1994); Alabama, Rev. Rul. 94-6, 1994-3
I.R.B. 11 (January 18, 1994).
21

1

~
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acting lacks limited liability.

As defined in the Kiptner

regulations, limited liability exists when the personal assets
of the members are not liable to make up any shortfall of a
claim against the entity and its assets. 22
liability of the party whose actions or

d

=:i
=

The personal

inactions give rise

to a claim is separate and distinct from the liability of the
entity (and its owners) to the injured party.23
Contractual agreements, as contrasted with local law, to
limit a creditor's recourse to the assets of the entity or to
its insurance coverage do not give rise to limited liability.24

B.

FREE TRANSFERABILITY OF INTERESTS

Free. transferability of interests exists if a member,
without the consent of the other members, may transfer to a
non-member all of the attributes of ownership of an interest
in the entity.25
hand,

Free transferability is lacking, on the other

if a member may transfer to a non-member only the

22

Treas. Reg.

§

301.7701-2(d) (1).

23 Rev. Rul. 93-91 (personal liability of professional
for his or her own performance does not abrogate presence of
limited liability); Rev. Rul. 93-93 (personal liability of
professional for his or her own performance or of that of
those under his or her supervision or direction does not
abrogate presence of limited liability) .
24 Tech. Adv. Mem. 7951006 (August 21, 1979).
25

Treas. Reg.

§

301.7701-2
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(e)

(1).

~
~

prospective

::
-~~~~

economic

managerial rights.
may be

rights

of

membership,

but

not

the

If the transfer of such managerial rights

accomplished

~

with the

approval of

the other

members, free transferability is lacking.

1.

The "Separate Interest" Test

The separate interest test examines the degree to which
the owners of an entity are independent of one another, that
independence adding substance to the contingent nature of the
vote

o~

is

overlapping

transferability.
to

Where the relationship among members

the

degree

that

restrictions

on .

transferability are illusory, free transferability is deemed
to be present.
The separate interest test was first recognized in Rev.
77-214,26

Rul.

wherein

Service

the

considered

the

classification of a GmbH formed by two subsidiaries of a
single corporate parent.

The Service found that as one entity

controlled the

of

outcome

a

vote

on

transferability and

continuity, and as limited liability was indisputedly present,
the GmbH should be classified as corporation.
There
~
"j

is

some

question

as

to

interest test will be applied to LLCs.

whether

the

separate

Although the Service

has ruled that domestic and foreign entities are classified

26

1977-1 C.B. 408.
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under

the

same

rules,27

in

Private

Letter Ruling

9404021

(November 1, 1993), the Service held that an LLC lacks free
transferability

even

though

its

sole

members

are

two

corporations, one the wholly owned subsidiary of the other.
This ruling appears to conflict with Revenue Ruling 77-214.
Revenue Ruling 77-214 was modified in Revenue Ruling 934 28 to delete its application to continuity of life, and may
be further restricted by the Service.
2.

Restricting the Right to Deny Consent

The right to deny consent to a transfer may be restricted
only

at

the

risk

of

supporting

transferability of interests.
Court

found

free

a

finding

In Larson v. Comm'r,

transferability where

general partner to

the

transfer of a

the

of

free

the Tax

consent

of

a

limited partnership

interest could not be unreasonably withheld. 29
3.

Who Must Approve a Transfer

It is not necessary that the approval of a transfer be by
the entirety of the membership.
proper

to vest

the

authority to

Rather,
approve

it has been held
or disapprove a

transfer in a group smaller than the entire membership, such

27 Rev. Rul. 73-254, 1973-1 C.B. 613; Rev. Rul. 88-8,
1988-1 C.B. 40; Gen. Couns. Mem. 36910 (November 4, 1976).
28

1993-1 C.B. 225 (January 19, 1993).

29

66 T.C. at 183.
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as a majority in interest of the members. 30
:::::=--:;

disapproval must be by the members;

The approval or

this power may not be

delegated to non-members.
Rights of First Refusal

4•

A right of first refusal in either the entity or other
members to purchase an interest offered to a third party is
not in and of itself a sufficient restriction to avoid free
transferability.

Rather,

such a right of first refusal is

defined in the Kintner regulations as "a modified form of free
transferability. ,,31

Regardless of its "modified" form,

the

presence of this characteristic with two others will give rise
to

preponderance

treatment

of

of

the

the

LLC

characteristics,
as

an

association

leading
taxable

to
as

the
a

corporation. 32
Therefore, while a right of first refusal may exist in an
LLC, it must be structured so that the failure of the entity
or the other members to buy the interest will not authorize
the

current

member

to

transfer

anything

more

than

the

prospective economic rights of membership to the third party.
30

--

Rul.
31

Priv. Ltr. Rul. 9210019 (December 6, 1991); Priv. Ltr.
9218078 (January 31, 1992) .
Treas. Reg.

§§

301.7701-2(e) (2), -2(g) Examples 4, 5

and 6.
"------

~

32
Priv. Ltr. Rul. 8828022 (April 13, 1988) (right of
first refusal in other stake holder in foreign limited
liability company constituted a modified form of free
transferability) .
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5.

Transfers Pursuant to state Law

Depending on their nature, transfers pursuant to state

--,
==l
~-j

law mayor may not give rise

to

free

transferability of

~

;;-~

interests.

For example, transfers pursuant to the laws of

descent and distribution are permitted without giving rise to
free transferability. 33

However, a transfer of an interest

pursuant to a merger or consolidation of a

member to the

----j

entity surviving the merger or consolidation will give rise to
free transferability. 34
6.
In

What Interest Must be Restricted
order

to

necessary that

avoid

free

transferability,

every interest be restricted.

it

is

not

In Revenue

Procedure 92-33,35 the Service took the position that,

for

advance ·ruling purposes, free transferability is absent if at
least 20% of the interests are subject to restrictions on
transferability.

To date the Service is not responded to an

effort by an LLC to use this provision.

33

See, e.g.,

Priv. Ltr.

Rul.

9253013

(September 30,
~-

1992) •
34
Gen. Couns. Mem. 38012 (July 13, 1979) (the ability
of one corporate member of a business trust to substitute
another corporate member by merging the former into the latter
or consolidating the former with the latter will constitute a
modified form of free transferability.).
35

1992-1 C.B. 782.
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C.

CONTINUITY OF LIFE

For purposes of tax classification, continuity of life is

d
i
~

lacking if the structure is subject to dissolution upon a
"change in the relationship between its members as determined
under local law. ,,36

An

alteration in the relationship that the

members may come

about

==od

as

a

consequence

of

the

"death,

insanity, bankruptcy, retirement, resignation, or expUlsion of
any member. ,,37

While such a disassociation may bring about a

dissolution of the LLC, the LLC may be reconstituted with a
new member relationship, permitting it to continue to carryon
its

business.

The

contingent

nature

of

the

vote

to

reconstitute and continue the business is the cornerstone of
the continuity of life analysis.
1.

Maximum Duration

LLC organizational statutes either permit or require the
LLC to have a maximum period of duration.

In early LLC

statutes there is a mandatory durational limit of thirty
years.

It would appear these provisions were included as a

fail safe measure to insure that the LLC would lack continuity
of life.

However, such a provision is not necessary, and in

fact does not contribute to the argument that there is not
continuity of life.

An

organization that has a limited life,

9

d

.l

36

Treas. Reg.

§

301.7701-2 (b) (3).

37

Treas. Reg.

§

301. 7701-2 (b) (1) .
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but whose life may not be shortened by a dissolution brought
by a member, will have continuity of life. 38
~
~

2.

~

The "Separate Interest" Test

Under Rev. Rul. 77-214, the separate interest test was
applied

to

questions

of

continuity

transferability of interest.

of

life

and

o

free

However, in Rev. Rul. 93-4 39 the

Service amended Rev. Rul. 77-214 to provide that the separate
interest· test would not be applied to continuity of life.
3.

continuation Vote Requirements

It is clear that continuity of life can be avoided if the
LLC requires the unanimous vote of the non-disassociating
members

to

continue

the

LLC

after

a

dissolution. 40

Furthermore, the requirement of a majority of the members to
continue after dissolution is sufficient to avoid continuity
of life. 41
measured.

The question then becomes how the "majority" is
There is evidence, albeit no clear statement, that

the Service will require that the majority be of the total

38
Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2 (b) (3); Treas. Reg. §
301.7701-2(g) example (5); Gen. Couns. Mem. 36910 (November 4,
1976) .

39

1993-1 C.B. 225.

40
Rev. Rul.
1994-3 I.R.B. 11.

88-76,1988-2 C.B.

360; Rev. Rul.

94-6,

Rev. Rul. 93-91, 1993-2 C.B. 316; Rev. Rul. 93-92,
1993-2 C.B. 318.
41
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~

interests, and not merely a majority of the members measured
on a per capita basis, in order to avoid continuity of life. 42

4.

Limiting Events of Disassociation

In order to avoid continuity of life, it is not necessary
for the entity to undergo dissolution upon the occurrence of
any and all of the events of disassociation listed in the
Kintner regulations.

Rather, an entity may limit the possible

disruptive effects of a dissolution, and the consequent need
for

a

vote

on continuing

the business,

by making

itself

subject to dissolution only upon the occurrence of less than
all, or even only one, of the events of disassociation listed
in the Kintner regulations. 43

In the context of an LLC, the

Service has ruled that there would not be continuity of life
where

dissolution

is

restricted

to

the

disassociation by

bankruptcy of a corporate manager-member. 44
Another

possibility

disassociation

would

be

for
to

restricting
limit

the

events

dissolution

to

of
the

Maj ori ty in Interest, and Not Maj ori ty in Number, Must
Vote to Continue Partnership Business Under New Continuity of
Life Regulation, 34 TAX. MGMT. MEMo. (BNA) 241 at 242 (August 9,
42

1993) .

MCA, Inc. v. U.S., 502 F.Supp. 838 at 842 (C.D. Ca.
1980), rev'd on other grounds, 685 F.2d 1099 (9th Cir. 1982)
("if any one of these factors does cause dissolution of the
organization 'continuity of life' is not present.") (italics
43

in original, underline added) .
44

Priv. Ltr. Rul. 9210019 (December 6, 1991).
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disassociation

of

members

holding

a

certain

percentage

interest in the LLC. 45
~
~

5.

:~~

Business Continuation Agreements

;:---;

Another possible mechanism for limiting the potential
disruption associated with dissolution and the need for a
continuity vote is to contractually limit the member's freedom
to reject continuation.

Under such an agreement, the members

bind themselves, in the event
continue the LLC.

of a disassociation, to vote to

Breach of such

an agreement opens the

dissenting member to contractual damages, bpt the agreement
cannot be enforced by an award of specific performance.

Under

this rationale, despite the agreement of a member to vote to
continue the entity after dissolution, the power of the member
to breach that agreement, thereby bringing about a failed vote
to continue and the dissolution of the entity, is sufficient
to avoid continuity of life. 46
45
Priv. Ltr. Rul. 7812058 (December 20, 1977) (limited
liability partnership 'formed under Saudi Arabian law lacked
continuity of life when dissolution limited ,to insolvency,
dissolution or bankruptcy of a partner with at least a 50%
ownership interest).

46
Zuckman v. U.S., 524 F.2d 729 at 735 (U.S. Cl. ct.
1975) (no continuity of life even though general partners of
a limited partnership, as a condition to certain financing
arrangements, contracted to continue the limited partnership);
Foster v. Comm'r., 80 T.C. 34, 188 (1983), aff'd in part and
vacated in part on other grounds, 756 F.2d 1430 (9th Cir.
1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1055 (1986)
("[a]lthough a
partner who wrongfully dissolves a partnership may be
answerable in damages and may forfeit his right to wind up the
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~
9

----'

The Service has informally expressed reservations as to
whether an LLC with a business continuation agreement can lack
continuity of life. v

D.

CENTRALIZED MANAGEMENT

Centralized

management

if

exists

any

group

not

coextensive with the membership has the continuing exclusive
authority to make management decisions necessary to conduct of
the business. 48

Conversely, where all members of an entity act

as agents of and take part in the management of the business,
centralized management is lacking. 49
In

the

context

of

LLCs,

the

centralized management the least.
affirmed

the

regulations,

position,
that

already

centralized

Service

has

explained

One revenue ruling has
clear

from

management

is

the

Kintner

absent

when

partnership's affairs,
the fact remains that such a
partner has the power to dissolve the partnership. And it is
the power, not the right, to dissolve which is the touchstone
of the regulation.")
47
Letter from Paul E. Kugler, Assistant Chief Counsel,
Pass Throughs & Special Industries, Internal Revenue Service
to Edward 1. Cutler, Esq., Chair of the Uniform Limited
Liabili ty Company Act Drafting Committee of the National
Conference of Commissioners of Uniform State Laws (July 26,
1993) .
48

Treas. Reg.

§

301. 7701-2 (c) (1) .

49

Treas. Reg.

§

301.7701-2 (c) (4).
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management and agency authority are reserved to the members. 50
With only one exception, all other revenue rulings examine an
3
.;;.

~

LLC

in

which

three

of

twenty-five

members

are

elected

~

managers,

but

without

discussing

the

represented by those three members.
management

test

applied

to

percentage

interest

Under the centralized

limited

partnerships,

the

determination of whether there has been centralized management
has been dependent on the size of the interest held by the
general partners. 51
Procedure 89-12~

This analysis is carried over into Revenue
§

4.06,

which,

with respect to an advance

ruling on the existence of centralized management,

looks to

whether the general partners hold an interest of at least 20%
of the total interests in the limited partnership.

The only

other revenue ruling to examine a different fact situation was
Revenue

Ruling

93- 6. 53

There,

the

Service

reviewed

the

somewhat unique Colorado LLC statute which, by its structure,
does not permit management to be retained to the members.

50

Rev. Rul. 93-38.

51
Glensder Textile Co.
acq. 1942 -1 C.B. 8.

52

1989-1 C.B. 798.

53

1993-1 C.B. 229.

v.

Comm'r.,

46 BTA 176 (1942),

~
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IV.

ONE MEMBER LLCs
question currently under debate

A
----<

at

whether an LLC may have only one member.

the

Service

is

The basis of this

question is whether a one-member LLC can have "associates".
A

number

of

judicial

decisions

have

held that

an

entity

classified as a partnership must have at least two stake-

A one-member LLC would provide an alternative to

holders. 54

the S corporation for instances in which a limited liability,
pass-through structure is sought by a sole equity owner.

V.

REVENUE PROCEDURE 89-12

One of the principle challenges facing particular LLCs
seeking a private letter ruling on classifications has been
Rev.

. Proc.

89-12;

an

unincorporated

entity

seeking

classification as a partnership must comply with this revenue
procedure. 55

However,

this

revenue

procedure

was

drafted

primarily to address the classification of general and limited
partnerships, and contains only minimal direction with respect
to its application to other structures.

On the issue of

complying with Rev. Proc. 89-12, several requirements appear

54
Morrisseyv. Corron'r., 296 U.S. 344 (1935); Corron'r v.
Culbertson, 337 U.S. 733 (1949); Knoxville Trust Sales &
Service, Inc. v. Comm'r., 10 T.C. 616 (1948); Hynes v.

Corron

I

r.,
55

74 T. C. 1266

( 1980) .

Rev. Proc. 89-12 1989-1 C.B. 798, §1.02.
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inapplicable to LLCs.
respectively,
accounts

of

relate
the

For example, sections 4.01 and 4.03,
to

allocations

"general

to

partners. "

and

the

However,

capital
these

~

j

~

requirements are inapplicable at least to those LLCs which
have been chosen to be managed by a non-member.
The Service recognizes the problems involved in requiring
LLCs to comply with Revenue Procedure 89-12 and the need for
a classification procedure tailored to the structure of LLCs,
and is crafting a responsive Revenue Procedure. 56

VI •

ME THOD OF ACCOUNTING

One early, and to a certain extent still lingering,. cloud
over the use of LLCs has been whether such entities will be
forced to use accrual method, rather than the often preferred
cash method,

of accounting.

This issue arises due to the

question of whether certain LLCs will,

for purposes of this

analysis, be treated as "tax shelters."
As a general rule, taxpayers are permitted to calculate
their taxable income either under the cash or accrual method. 57
However,

C-corporations,

partnerships

which

have

a

C~

-J
IRS News Release NB 2142, Partnerships, item 6
(January 6, 1993); IRS Likely to Issue Limited Liability
Guidelines Early. This
Year, Official Says, DAILY TAX RPTR.
(BNA) January 11, 1994, G-3.
56

57

I

~

I.R.C. § 446(c).

=="
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corporation as a partner and tax shelters are
9

.....l
§

accrual method

requi~ed

to use

accounting.~

A "tax shelter" is defined 59 to include a "syndicate,

,,60

which in turn is defined. as a "partnership" or entity "other
than a corporation which is not an S corporation" if more than
thirty-five percent of the losses of such entity during the
taxable year are allocable· to limited partners or limited
entrepreneurs within the meaning of section 464(e) (2)

.61

A

"limited entrepreneur" is defined as "a person who has (A) an
interest in an enterprise other than as a limited partner and
(E)

does

not

enterprise. ,,62

participate

in

the

management

of

such

Alternately, an entity may be a "tax shelter"

if it meets the definition of that term. 63

~

I.R.C. § 448(a).
Professional service corporations
structured as C-corporations are exempt from the requirements
to use accrua~ method accounting (I.R.C. § 448(b) (2)), as are
partnerships having a C-corporation PSC as a partner (I.R.C.
§ 448 (a) (b) (2) ) .
~
I.R.C. § 448(d) (3) refers to the definition of a "tax
shelter" in I.R.C. § 461 (i) (3) •

~
~

60

I.R.C.

§

461 (i)

61

I.R.C.

§

1256(e)

62

I.R.C.

§

464 (e) (2) .

(3) (E) •

(3) (E).

.'.

I

§§l

63
I.R.C. § 6662(c) (ii)
(An entity, partnership, plan
or arrangement "if the principal purpose ... is the avoidance
or evasion of Federal income tax.")
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If LLC members are deemed equivalent to either limited
partners or limited entrepreneurs, these rules would compel
accrual method accounting by the LLC.

If the LLC is deemed

~

~

equivalent to a limited partnership lacking a general partner
"there being no entity or individual generally liable for the
obligations of the LLC," 100% of the losses would be allocated
to deemed limited partners.

Under this analysis an LLC would

be considered a syndicate, and in turn a tax shelter required
to use accrual method accounting.

I f the Service were to

analyze members under the limited entrepreneur provisions, it
would be necessary to review the allocation of losses between
tl~e

manager and non-member managersiif more than thirty-five

p~rcent

of the losses are to be allocated to non-manager

~embers,

and if these non-manager members are determined to be

"limited

entrepreneurs,"

the

LLC

could

be

viewed

as

a

applied,

a

syndicate.
Regardless

of

the

method

of

analysis

determination by the Service that accrual method accounting is
necessary would make an LLC a much less attractive vehicle for
operati~g

many types of businesses. 64
~

64
This issue is especially sensitive to those
professional practices which have sought to use the LLC rather
than the general partnership or, more recently, the registered
limi ted liability partnership.
Cash method accounting is
generally preferred by professional practices because of the
time lag in collections and a broad unwillingness to charge
and collect finance charges on late payments for professional
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~

Several

private

professional LLCs, have

letter
st~ted

all

rulings,

issued

to

that cash method accounting

~

----j

~

could continue to be used. 65

However, guidance with respect

to non-professional LLCs has not been forthcoming.

This issue

remains particularly troubling with respect to the application
of the

limited entrepreneur provisions

to manager-managed

LLCs.
VII. OPERATIONAL TAX ISSUES

If the LLC is properly structured to be classified as a
partnership for income tax purposes, it will be taxed under
Subchapter K·of the Internal Revenue Code.

services.
Upon conversion from a. general partnership
utilizing the cash method to an LLC required to use accrual
method, the entity would be forced to accelerate into current
taxable income all outstanding receivables, thereby giving
rise to an immediate tax liability without necessarily
receiving the funds with which to satisfy that liability. The
relief from accrual of amounts that experience indicates will
not be collected, while helpful,does not alleviate the tax
liabili ty . on the remaining outstanding receivables.
See
I.R.C. § 448 (d) (5); Treas. Reg. § 1. 44.8:-2T.
Priv. Ltr. Rul. 9321047 (issued February 25, 1993;
released May 28, 1993); Priv. Ltr. Rul. 9328005 (issued
December 21, 1992; released July 16, 1993); Priv. Ltr. Rul.
9350013 (issued September 15, 1993; released December 17,
1993); Priv. Ltr. Rul. 9407030 (issued November 24, 1.993;
released February 18, 1994); Priv. Ltr. Rul. 9415005 (April
15, 1994) (100-year old law firm with consistent record of
profitability
held
not
a
syndicate
under
loR.C.
§
1256(e) (3) (B) for any year in which it does not incur losses) .
See generally, Banoff, Sheldon I., New IRS Ruling Encourages
Professionals to Form Limited Liability Companies, 79 J. TAX'N
68 (August, 1993); Use of Cash Method by Limited Liability
Company Not Precluded by §448, 34 TAX MGMT. MEM. 242 (August 9,
1993) .
65

~

\

~

~
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A.

CONTRIBUTIONS
1.

Contributions of Money or Property

Generally,

LLC members will recognize no gain or loss

upon contributing cash or property to the LLC in exchange for
a capital interest. 66

Even if a member contributes property

encumbered with debt in excess of the property's basis, the
member will 'be entitled first to a increase in its outside
basis in the LLC to the extent of the member's share of the
debt transferred plus the property's basis; the member then
receives a deemed distribution, decreasing its outside basis,
by the amount of the debt encumbering the property.

Thus the

contributing member will recognize gain only to the extent
that the amount of the debt exceeds the member's share of the
debt

at

the

LLC

level

plus

the basis

of

the

contributed

property. 67

66
I.R.C. § 721. The basis of the contributing member's
interest in the LLC ("outside" basis) generally will be the
amount of cash and the adjusted basis of the property
contributed plus gain, if any, recognized under I.R.C. §
721 (b).
I.R.C. § 722.
But, beware of I.R.C. § 707(a) (2) (B) and the Treasury
Regulations thereunder, wherein deemed distributions from
contributions of encumbered property may trigger gain under
the "disguised sale" rules.

~

I.R.C. §§ 731(a) and 752(b); Treas. Reg. § 1.752-1(f).
Note that the LLC differs from the S Corporation in this
respect; shareholders contributing encumbered property to the
latter will recognize gain to the full extent that the
transferred debt exceeds the contributed property's basis. An
S corporation shareholder may not increase his or her outside
basis by an amount of debt assumed by the corporation.
See
67
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If a member contributes property with a fair market value
~

=i

in

excess

of

or

less

than

its

adjusted

basis

upon

:......!

a

contribution, the built-in gain or loss must be allocated back
to the contributing partner. 68
2.

--~

Contributions of Services

The Internal Revenue Service issued guidance last year,
in

Rev.

Proc.

93-27,69 providing

that

the

receipt

of

a

partnership profits interest in exchange for services to the
partnership

generally

does

not

trigger

recognition by the contributing partner. 70

ordinary

income

Prior case law had

established that the receipt of a partnership capital interest
in exchange for.services rendered to a partnership caused the
immediate recognition of ordinary income by the contributing
partner, and the case law had been somewhat divided over the
issue of the taxability of receipt of a profits interest. 71
These authorities should apply equally to LLCs.

68

I.R.C.

69

1993-2 C.B. 343 (June 9, 1993).

§

704 (c) .

~

Exceptions are for, inter alia, profits interests
relating to a "substantially certain and predictable stream of
income from partnership assets," or the receipt of a profits
interest by a partner who disposes of the interest within two
years -of receipt. Rev. Proc. '93-27.

I
~

See Diamond v. Commissioner, 492 F.2d 286 (7th Cir.
1974), Campbell v. Comrndssioner, 943 F.2d 815 (8th Cir. 1991),
St. John v. United States, 84-1 USTC i 9158 (C.D. Ill. 1983).

70

i3

]

_I

71
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B.

ALLOCATIONS

Like partnerships, LLCswi11 not be subject to tax at the
~

~

entity level.

Instead, each member of the LLC must recognize

on a current basis his or her distributive share of the LLC's
income,

gain,

loss,

deduction or

credit. 72

The member's

outside basis in the LLC is increased by income and gain
recognized and decreased by losses and deductions recognized. 73
Losses may not be recognized in excess of a member's outside
basis in the LLC. 74
The

LLC's

operating

agreement

may

provide

for

the

allocation of the LLC's profits and losses in accordance with
the wishes of the LLC members,
allocations

have

so long as the agreed upon
economic

substantial

effect. 75

The

substantial economic effect test applies to allocations that
are not attributable to nonrecourse deductions
discussed below),
members

and

maintain

generally

capital

requires

accounts;

that:
(2 )

(as will be
(1)

the

liquidating

distributions be made in accordance with positive capital
account balances; and

(3)

a member with a negative capital

72

I.R.C.§§ 701 and 702.

73

I.R.C. § 705.

74
I. R. C. § 704 (d). other limits on a member's ability
to recognize losses include the PAL (passive activity loss)
limitations and the at-risk rules, as will be discussed below.
75

I.R.C. § 704.
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g

account have an obligation to restore the deficit in his or
:::::I

ber capital account under certain circumstances specified in

...J

~

the Treasury Regulations. 76

If the allocations provided for

in the operating agreement do not have substantial economic

-

effect, the distributive shares will be reallocated among the
members according to their economic interests in the LLC. 77

A different set of rules applies to the allocation of
losses

and deductions

that

reduce

the

basis

of property

securing nonrecourse debt below the principal amount of the
nonrecourse

note

( "nonrecourse

deductions").

Because

no

member bears. the economic risk of loss if the LLC cannot pay
the

nonrecourse

liability,

the

allocation

of

nonrecourse

deductions cannot have "economic effect" under the prin"ciples
of the regulations as applied to other types of losses and
deductions.

Thus the regulations provide an alternative safe

harbor that deems allocations of nonrecourse deductions to be
according to the members' economic interests in the LLC if:
(1) the nonrecourse deductions are allocated among the members
in a manner that is reasonably consistent with allocations,
which

....

have

significant

substantial
distributive

economic

effect,

share" item

of

some

attributable

other
to

the

\

~

=f

J

76

See

I.R.C.

§

704(a)

1 (b) (2) (ii) .
77

loR.C. § 704 (d) .
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&

(b) ;

Treas.

Reg.

§

1.704-

property securing the nonrecourse debt; and (2) the operating
agreement provides

a minimum gain chargeback requirement,
-

which requires that income be allocated eventually to the

j.

8

members that were allocated the nonrecourse deductions.78
--i

Nonrecourse

debt of

an LLC

that

is

guaranteed by a

member, or someone related to a member, is treated as "partner
nonrecourse debt;" deductions attributable to such debt must
be allocated to the member who bears the economic burden if
the LLC cannot pay the liability.

Additionally, minimum gain

chargeback requirements must be imposed upon such member,

78
Treas. Reg. §§ 1.704-2(e) and 1.752~2. Because the
liability of all LLC members is limited under state law to the
members' capital contributions, it would appear that all LLC
debt is nonrecourse for purposes of the allocation r.ules,
absent a guarantee of the debt by an LLC member. Even debt
secured by all LLC assets should be considered nonrecourse
under the regulations, which distinguish between recourse and
nonrecourse debt according to whether any partner ultimately
bears the "economic risk of loss" with respect to partnership
debt. Treas. Reg. § 1.752-2. Contrast the debt of a limited
partnership that is secured by the general assets of the
partnership; in that case the debt is typically allocated to
the
general
partner
or partners,
who
bear ultimate
responsibili ty for repayment of the debt.
The general
partners only, and not the limited partners, may enjoy the
basis increase brought about by the allocation of this debt.
Similar debt of an LLC, treated as nonrecourse because all
members have limited liability, will be allocated, and permit
a basis increase, among all members according to their
interests in the LLC.
Although the IRS has not yet had occasion to rule on
the application of these regulations to the LLC, commentators
appear to concur in the appropriateness of this analysis as
applied to the LLC.
See, e. g., KEATINGE, ROBERT R. & RIBSTEIN,
LARRy E., RIBSTEIN AND KEATINGE ON LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANIES, Vol. 1,
Ch. 17.07 at 17-33 (1994).
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d

~

similar to the minimum gain chargeback rules applicable to
9

"nonrecourse debt. 79

~

c.

DISTRIBUTIONS

Liquidating

and

operating

distributions

of

property

usually do not result in recognition of gain to the members.
Instead, distributions reduce the member's outside basis by
the

amount

of

distributed. 8o

Utilities

money

and

the

inside

basis

of

property

Thus the LLC is not saddled with the General

repeal

tax

burden

that

S

corporations

and

C

corporations must bear upon the distribution of appreciated
property. 81

79

Treas. Reg. § 1.704-2 (b) (4)

&

-2 (i).

LR.C. § 733. Exceptions are: (1) distributions of
proceeds from a "disguised sale" of contributed property under
I.R.C. § 707(a) (2) (B), which trigger gain; (2) distributions
that represent a disguised fee for services performed in a
third party capacity rather than a member capacity, taxed as
ordinary compensation income under LR.C. § 707 (a) (2) (A) ;(3)
certain distributions that alter the member's interest in the
LLC's ordinary or capital assets, which trigger gain under the
cjisproportionate distribution rules, I.R.C~ § 751(b); and (4)
distributions that trigger built-in gain recognition with
respect to contributed property under I.R.C. §§ 704(c) (1) (B)
and 737.
80

j

81
See I.R.C. § 331(b).
The so-called General
Utili ties doctrine allowed the corporate level tax on the

appreciation in the value of property to be avoided by the
distribution of the asset in kind (see I.R.C. §§ 311(a), 333,
336 (1954)), or when the gain was realized by a sale incident
to a 12-month plan of complete liquidation (see I.R.C. § 337
(1954)). See General Utilities & Operating Co. v. Helvering,
296 U.S. 200 (1935), which gave its name to the non-
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D.

PASSIVE ACTIVITY LOSS LIMITATIONS

For LLC members that are individuals, trusts, estates, or
personal service corporations,

a distributive share of the

LLC's

activity"

losses

from

a

"passive

that

exceeds

the

member's income from the passive activity will be suspended
until the member has passive income to offset the 10ss.82
passive activity loss
using net
taxable

losses

(PAL)

rules prohibit taxpayers

from passive activities

income,

specifically,

portfolio

to

The
from

offset other

income

(e.g.,

interest, dividends, and certain royalties) and active income

(e.g., salary, and wages).
activities

Passive activities include rental

(except certain real estate rental activities in

which a member "actively participates") and trade or business
acti vi ties

in

participate. ,,83

which

the

member

does

not

"materially

Material participation is generally defined

as active involvement in the operations of the business on a
regular,

continuous

and· substantial

basis. 84

Treasury

recognition rules even though the Court had refused to rule on
The General
the issue of corporate gain recognition.
Utilities doctrine, which had begun to erode years earlier,
was finally eliminated by legislation in 1986. Tax Reform Act
of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, § 331, 100 stat. 2085 (1986).
82
I.R.C. § 469.
The passive loss rules also apply,
but in a less restrictive way, to certain closely held C
corporations.
83

I.R.C.

§

469(c).
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Regulations set out seven brightline, alternative tests that
2j

......l
.~

a

taxpayer

may

use

generally

to

establish

material

participation.
However, the regulations apply a more stringent material
participation test to limited partners than is applied to
general partners and S corporation shareholders;

the test

requires that the partner participate in the activity for more
than 500 hours during the year or during a certain minimum
number of prior years. 85

The regulations broadly define

limited partner to include all holders that are not personally
liable for the entity's debts, even if the entity is not a
state law limited partnership.86

Thus the question is raised

whether this more stringent material participation test will
apply to an LLC member by virtue of the broad regulatory
definition of a limited partner.

strong policy arguments can

be made that the LLC member is more analogous fo a ge1.1eral
partner or an S corporation shareholder than a limited partner
for this purpose -- because the LLC permits active involvement
by

L~C

members in the management of the business.

Until the

IRS addresses the issue, however, LLC members should plan to
....,;j

""'i

meet the stricter material participation test applicable to

I

---J

84

I.R.C.

85

Temp. Treas. Reg.

§

1.469-1T(e) (2)

86

Temp. Treas. Reg.

§

1.469-5T(e).

§

469(h).
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limited partners to ensure that the losses flowing through the
LLC are not subject to the PAL limitations.

~

~

The Revenue Reconciliation Act of 1993 liberalized the

"~:C0:--'ji

;;;;;

passive activity loss rules as applied to rental real estate.
Rental real estate will no longer be a passive activity, per

se, if the taxpayer satisfies two tests:

(1) more than one-

half of the taxpayer's services must be performed in real
property trades or businesses in which the taxpayer materially
participates and (2) the taxpayer must perform more than 750
hours of service during the taxable year in real property
trades

or

businesses

participates. 87
of

personal

in

which

the

taxpayer

To be considered for the 750 hour and one-half
services

requirements,

participation

activity must be material participation.
must

materially

materially

participate

under

the

in

an

Thus, an LLC member
restrictive· rules

discussed above in each rental real estate activity that is to
be

counted

toward

the

rental

real

estate

material

participation test. 88

~

LR.C. § 469(c) (7) (B).
Real property trades or
87
businesses include development, redevelopment, construction,
reconstruction, acquisition, conversion, rental, operation,
management, leasing, or brokerage businesses.
LR.C. §
469(c) (7) (C).
88

I . R. C.

§

469 (c) (7) (A) .
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E.

Another limitation on the ability of individuals and

~

9

THE AT-RISK RULES

certain closely held C corporations that are members of an LLC
to deduct losses

flowing from the LLC is the limitation

--"'

imposed by the "at-risk" rules. 89

Losses may be deducted by

such a member of an LLC only to the' extent that the member is
"at-risk" with respect
entity.

to each separate acti vi ty of the

A member is considered at-risk to the extent of money

and the adjusted basis of property contributed to the LLC, as
well as any share of the LLC's debt for which the member is
personally

liable.~

Thus, a member will be at-risk with respect to its share
of LLC debt that it guarantee·s. 91

The LLC member will not be

at-risk, however, with respect to LLC debt that is nonrecourse
and for which he or she is not personally liable unless the
debt

is

attributable

"qualified nonrecourse

j
~

to

a

real

estate

financing."~

89

loR.C.

§

465.

90

I.R.C.

§

465 (b) .

activity

and

is

Qualified nonrecourse

91
The LLC member will be at risk with respect to such
guaranteed debt only i:e the guarantee renders the member
personally liable under state law and there are no
contribution or subrogation rights to inherit from others. See
Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.465-24(a) (2); see also Edwin D. Abramson
v. Comrn'r, 86 T.C. 360 (1986) (limited partner is at risk with
respect to nonrecourse debt that he guaranteed) .
~

loR.C.

§

465(b) (6) (C).
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financing

is

financing

borrowed

from

a

qualified

person

(generally a person in the business of lending money) for the
.-~

::::l

i

activity of holding real property.

Except as provided in

regulations, no 'person can be personally liable for the loan.
Thus,

an

LLC

member

will

be

at-risk

with

respect

to

a

traditional nonrecourse loan secured by a particular piece of
property, used for the activity of holding the real property.
Note that it is unclear, however, whether a loan secured by
all of the LLC's assets would qualify under these rules, given
that no "person" can be personally liable for the debt (which
person may include the LLC).

This is another area in which

many practitioners are eagerly awaiting IRS guidance on how
these rules will be applied explicitly to the LLC.
meantime,
general

however,
at-risk

it

rules

appears

that

should make

this
the

In the

exception to
LLC

an

the

attractive

vehicle for real estate ventures.

F.

SELF-EMPLOYMENT TAXES AND OTHER ISSUES

A limited partner's distributive share of income or loss
from a limited partnership, other than a guaranteed payment,
is excluded from earnings for self-employment tax purposes.g 3
The

effect

of

this

provision

of

the

Code

is

that

self-

employment tax is generally not owed by limited partners with
93

I.R.C.

§

1402 (a) (13) .
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~

respect to income of the partnership that is not a guaranteed
. payment;

such income is also not included for purposes of

determining the amount of contributions to or benefit from a
qualified retirement plan, however.
It

is unclear how this provision will be applied to

members of an LLC.

The recurring issue is again revisited:

whether a member of an LLC should be treated as a limited
partner

or

a

general

partner

for

purposes

of

the

self-

The provision was designed to prevent passive

employment tax.

investors from including investment income in earnings on
which

social

security benefits

are

based.

Thus,

an

LLC

member, particularly an active member of a professional LLC,
does not fall within the rationale of this rule. 94
has as yet been issued by the IRS on this issue.

No guidance
The recently

proposed Clinton Health Security Act contains modifications to
the definition of net income from self-employment that will
affect

both

corporations.

limited

partners

and

shareholders

in

S

Thus IRS guidance will likely await action on

the Health Security Act.
Other issues to be considered in planning or structuring
~

an LLC are the following rules that currently are applicable
to·partnerships:

(1)

a member may deduct one-half of self-

An LLC could avoid application of this rule by making
guaranteed payments to its LLC members, as do limited
partnerships.
94
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employment· taxes paid;95 (2) members may not participate in
'~

~

cafeteria plans;96

(3)

a member may deduct

25%

of health

insurance benefits paid prior to January 1, 1994;97 and (4) a
member

will

insurance

G.

not

be

entitled

to

exclude

group

term

life

benefits.~

MERGERS AND CONVERSIONS
1.

Partnership to LLC

The IRS has ruled privately that the conversion of a
partnership to an LLC will be analyzed as a partnership to
partnership transaction. 99

The Service has recognized that

general and limited partnerships can convert from one form to
the

other

without

causing

a

termination,

if

the

old

partnership's business is continued after the conversion .100
The partners are deemed to exchange their interest in the
partnership

for

a

new

interest

transaction covered by I.R.C.

95
96

I.R.C.

§

§

721.

in

a

partnership

in

a

If the partners' shares

164 (f) .

Prop. Reg.

§

1.125-1 (a) (4).

97 See Section 13174 of the Revenue Reconciliation Act
of 1993.
98

I.R.C.

99

See, e.g., PLRs 9029019 and 9010027.

100

§

79.

Rev. Rul. 84-52, 1984-1 C.B. 157.
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in the new partnership's liabilities are the same as their

;

shares

in

the

previous

partnership's

liabilities,

their

outside bases will not change and there will be no gain
recognition.

A reduction

partnership's

liabilities,

in

a

partner,' s

however,

is

share
treated

of
as

the

a

distribution of cash, and will trigger taxable income to the
partner if the release from liabilities is larger than the
partner's basis in his or her partnership interest. 101
The IRS has ruled that partnerships converting to LLCs do
not terminate if the above rules are met.

Thus, a simple

conversion of a partnership to an LLC should not result in the
recognition of gain or loss to the LLC or its members unless
a former partner's share of partnership debt is reduced beyond
the partner's adjusted basis in his or her LLC membership
interest as a result of the conversion.

Note that this may

happen to general partners to whom all recourse debt has been
allocated, if the debt is converted to nonrecourse debt upon
conversion of the entity to an LLC (pursuant to creditors'
approval) .

Assuming

the

former

general partner

re'mains

personally liable for the debt after the conversion, however,
iii:iiI

I
---'

the gain recognition can be avoided.

101

I.R.C.

§

752(b).
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2.
:.l
d
~

Corporation to LLC

The conversion of a corporation to an LLC and the merger
of corporations into LLCs are taxable events.

Whether the

transaction is structured as a merger under state law, or as
a liquidation of the corporation followed by a contribution of
assets to an LLC, gain will be recognized on the disposition
of any appreciated assets. 102

The corporation must recognize

gain or loss on the distribution of corporate assets as if it
had sold such property and the shareholders of a C corporation
must recognize gain to the extent of the excess of the fair
market value of the assets (or LLC interest) they receive over
their bases in the stock.

If an S corporation is converted to

or merged with

the

an LLC,

corporation's

gain

is

passed

through to its shareholders who recognize their pro rata share
of the gain and receive a corresponding basis increase in
their stock.

This prevents additional gain when the stock is

exchanged for an interest in the LLC.
conversions

will

incur

only

one

level

Thus,
of

S corporation
tax

whereas

C

corporations could potentially incur two levels of tax upon
the conversion or merger.

Again, this tax burden is incurred

only if the converting entity in fact has appreciated assets

102
I.R.C. § 336. Alternatively, the transaction can be
structured as a contribution of assets from the corporation to
the LLC in exchange for LLC interests which are then
distributed to the shareholders. The tax analysis is the same
under this structure as that described above.
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(or assets that have been depreciated) .

For professional

. service corporations converting to LLCs,

appreciated assets

~

~

will likely include accounts receivable and goodwill.

H.

=

SELLING AN LLC INTEREST - 754 ELECTION

If an interest in an LLC with appreciated assets is sold,
exchanged or passed by inheritance, the transferee may make an
election

under

I.R.C.

§

754,

which

election

gives

transferee a stepped-up basis (to fair market value)
LLC's assets .103
incoming

the

in the

The purpose of this election is to prev.ent an

member

from

recognizing

taxable

gain

due

to

appreciation that occurred before its interest was acquired.

I.

CONTRAST OF TRANSFER OF A CORPORATE INTEREST VS.
INTEREST ON DEATH

LLC

I

.1

1.

Corporation

The estate of a decedent obtains a basis equal to the
fair market value of the stock of the corporation on the date
of· death

(or

alternate valuation

date).

The

corporation

continues to have its same basis in its assets.

See I.R.C. § 743(b). This step-up in basis applied
only to purchasing member's share of the assets' inside basis,
of course.
103

~
!

I
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2.

LLC Treated as Partnership

The estate of a decedent obtains a basis equal to the
fair market lJalue of an interest in an LLC,

LLP,

limited

partnership or general partnership on the date of death (or
alternate valuation date)
entity's liabilities.

plus the decedent's share. of the

If a decedent holds an interest in an

LLC treated as a partnership, the LLC may make a section 754
election which will permit it to step up

(to fair market

value) the basis of its assets attributable to the decedent's
interest.

Thus,

assume such an LLC has depreciable assets

with a zero basis; further assume that decedent's interest had
a fair market value of 100.

If the LLC made a section 754

election, then the LLC's basis attributable to the estate's
share of such assets is 100; and such basis in such assets may
be depreciated.
the estate.
interest

transferee

The same would apply if the decedent had an

in

partnership.

The depreciation will be allocated 100% to

an
The

LLP,
same

limi ted

partnership

applies

to

(except for a redemption)

make the section 754 election.
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any

or

transfer

general
to

any

The partnership may

J.

CONTRAST OF CORPORATION VS. LLC ON PAYMENTS TO RETIRING
EQUITY HOLDERS
1.

Corpora tion

A payment by a corporation to a retiring shareholder iIi-- ,exchange for his or her stock will normally be treated as a
capital gain to the recipient and not be deductible to the
A payment

corporation.

by

a

corporation

to

a

retiring

shareholder as reasonable compensation for services previously
rendered is ordinary income to the shareholder and deductible
by the corporation.
2.

LLC Treated as a Partnership

A payment by a partnership to a
traditionally
guaranteed

been

treated

payment,

thus

as

a

retiring partner had

distributive

effectively

deductible

share

or

to

the

partnership, unless it was for partnership property.

Payments

for

by

partnership

partnership.

property

are

not

deductible

the

Previously, unrealized receivables and goodwill

were not treated as partnership property for this purpose,
unless the partnership agreement provided for a payment for
goodwill.
I.R.C.

§

736 was amended by the 1993 Tax Act to provide

that payments for unrealized receivables and goodwill would
generally be

treated as

payments

for

property:

payments would be nondeductible to the partnership.
the

amended I. R. C.

§

736 will

;;;;;.l
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not

apply i f

thus,

the

However,

capital

is

a

material income producing factor and the retiring partner is

1

J

~

=------;ii

Thus,

.a general partner.

payments to a departing general

partner should be deductible by a professional partnersbip.
It is unresolved whether a member of an LLC will be treated as

~

i

J

a general partner for this purpose.

This is one area where

there is a decided advantage to the LLP rather than the LLC in
terms of certainty.

K.

USE OF LIFE INSURANCE

Life

insurance proceeds paid to

a

C corporation are

generally not taxable under I.R.C. § 101.

However, they are

generally included in adjusted current earnings
alternative minimum tax computations.
l(c) (5).

(ACE)

for

Treas. Reg. §1.S6(g)-

Life insurance proceeds paid, to an LLCtreated as a,

partnership

or

LLP

are

generally

not

taxable

for

either

regular tax purposes (I.R.C. § 101) or for alternative minimum
tax purposes

(because ACE only applies to C corporations.)

Life insurance proceeds lose some of their tax-free status if
the policy has been transferred for value to an impermissible
transferee.
proceeds
premiums.

It

will

exceed the

be

taxable

to

transfer price

the
and

extent

that

the

subsequently paid

Permissible transferees include partners of the

insured, but not co-shareholders.

Accordingly, using an LLC

treated as a partnership permits more flexibility ,than using
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;3

~

---'

a.corporation.

Such an LLC permits an insurance policy which

. would fund a buy-sell agreement to be transferred to the
=
=sl

:;;t

~

members

so

that

it

can

be

used

for

a

cross

purchase

arrangement.

L.

ADDITIONAL CONSIDERATIONS IN SELECTING AN LLC

LLCs,
di vision

like most
of

the

other business

ownership

among

entities,

various

permit

entities.

the
This

permits the ability to transfer a portion of the ownership to
family members.
discounts

in

transferor's

Fractional ownership interests are subject to
valuation

life

or

at

upon

transfer,

death.

either

Available

during

the

discounts

may

include a minority interest discount and a discount for lack
of marketability.
There is a broad ability to allocate income and expense,
and determine distributions, among the different. classes of
owners of LLCs that are treated as partnerships for federal
income tax purposes.

The limited liability of all members

makes the LLC a superior vehicle to the general and limited
partnerships and its ability for all members to participate in
management make the LLC a superior vehicle to the limited
partnership.

After· the 1993 Tax Act,

the desirability of

accumulating funds in a trust is significantly reduced because
the top marginal tax rate of 39.6% is imposed upon all taxable

d
F - 43

income beginning at $7,500.
would be

subject

to

requirements of I.R.C.

the
§

LLCs treated as tax partnerships
fami+y partnership
704(e)

are met.

rules

if

Similarly,

the
they

would also be subject to I.R.C. Chapter 14 (I.R.C. § 2701, et .
.§..§iL..) •

----'

'~
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Found
pursuant to
statute

Centralized
management found
where all members
were elected
managers as
management
carried on "in
their capacity as
managers rather
than as members."
Centralized
management found
where management
vested in 3 of 25
members, no
reference to the
size of their
s
III
No free transferability
of interests - un~nimous
consent of members
required to admit
transferee as a member

No continuity of life unanimous consent of
members required to
continue after
dissolution event

Centralized
management found
where management
vested in 3 of 25
members, no
reference to the
size of their
interests

Centralized
management found
where management
vested in 3 of 25
members, no
reference to the
size of their
interests

No free transferability
of interests - unanimous
consent of members
required to admit
transferee as a member

No free transferability
of interests - unanimous
consent of members
required to admit
transferee as a member

No free transferability
of interests ~ unanimous
consent of members
required to admit
transferee as a member

No continuity of life unanimous consent of
members required to
continue after
dissolution event

No continuity of life unanimous consent of
members required to
continue after
dissolution event

No continuity of life unanimous consent of
members required to
continue after
dissolution event

the LLC Operating Agreement does not differ from statutory defaults.

* statute is flexible; Revenue Ruling conclusion on partnership classification is binding only to the extent

93-30
1993-1 C.B. 231
(4/19/93)
Nevada

Found
pursuant to
statute

Found
pursuant to
statute

93-5
1993-1 C.B~ 227
(1/19/93)
Virginia

93 - 6
1111993-1 C. B. 229
(1/19/93)
Colorado

111

Found
pursuant to
statute

88-76
1988-2 C.B. 360
(9/19/88)
Wyoming

Satisfaction of Kintner Characteristics

COMPARISON OF LLC RBVERUB RULINGS

>

~

~
~

00

~

"%j

No continuity of life
unanimous consent of
members required to
continue after
dissolution event

No free transferability
of interests -- unanimous
consent of membe~s
required to admit a
transferee as a member

No free transferability
of interests -- unanimous
consent of members
required to admit a
transferee as a member

In second fact situation,
free transferability of
interests present -transferee admitted as
member by his or her
unilateral act without
the need for approval or
consent of the other
members

In second fact
situation, continuity of
life present -- LLC to
continue following
dissolution event
without the need for
approval or consent of
the members

No continuity of life
unanimous consent of
members required to
continue after
dissolution event

In first fact situation,
no free transferability
of interests -- unanimous
vote of members required
to admit transferee as a
member

In first fact situation,
no continuity of life
unanimous consent of
members required to
continue after
dissolution event

Centralized
management found
where management
vested in 3 of 25
members, no
reference to the
size of their

Centralized
management found
where management
vested in 3 of 25
members, no
reference to the
size of their
interests

In second fact
situation,
centralized
management found
here management
vested in 3 of 25
members, no
reference to the
size of their
interests

In first fact
situation, no
centralized
management where
management
authority.
reserved to the
members

c

tl

"

I,

UIllU.:.:

* statute is flexible; Revenue Ruling conclusion on partnership classification is binding only to the extent
the LLC Operating Agreement does not differ from statutory defaults.

Found
pursuant to
statute

Found
pursuant to
statute

93-49*
1111993-2 C.B. 308
III Illinois
(1/19/93)

93-50
1993-2 C.B. 310
(7/19/93)
West Virginia

Found
pursuant to
statute

93-38*
1993-1 C.B. 233
(5/4/93)
Delaware

1:.0

,.p...

~

Found
pursuant to
statute

93-93
1993-2 C.B. 321
(12/27/93)
Arizona

Centralized
management found
where management
vested in 3 of 25
members, no
reference to the
size of their
interests

Centralized
management found
where management
vested in 3 of 25
members, no
reference to the
size of their
interests

Centralized
management found
where management
vested in 3 of 25
members, no
reference to the
size of their
interests
Centralized
management found
where management
vested in .3 of 25
members, no
reference to the
size of their
interests

No free transferability
of interests - consent of
the members holding a
majority of the nontransferring interest
required to approve a
transfer
No free transferability
of interests - unanimous
consent of members
required to approve a
transfer

No continuity of life consent of the members
holding a majority of
the interests required
to continue after
dissolution event

No free transferability
Centralized
of interests - consent of . management found
the members holding a
where management
vested in 3 of 25
majority of the nonmembers, no
transferring interest
reference to the
required to approve a
size of their
transfer
interests

No free transferability
of interests - unanimous
consent of members
required to approve a
transfer

No free transferability
of interests -- unanimous
consent of members
required to admit a
transferee as a member

No continuity of life unanimous consent of
members required to
continue after
dissolution event

No continuity of life .consent of the members
holding a majority of
the interests required
to continue after
dissolution event

No continuity of life unanimous consent of
members required to
continue after
dissolution event

No continuity of life
unanimous consent of
members required to
continue after
dissolution event

,.,I

I II I

* statute is flexible; Revenue Ruling conclusion on partnership classification is binding only to the extent
the LLC Operating Agreement does not differ from statutory defaults.
3

Found
pursuant to
statute

Found
pursuant to
statute

93-91*
1993-2 C.B. 316
III (12/20/93)
Utah

93-92*
1993-2 C.B. 318
(12/27/93)
Oklahoma

Found
pursuant to
statute

93-81*
1993-2 C.B. 314
(11/29/93)
Rhode Island

III

Found
pursuant to
statute

93-53
1993-2 C.B. 312
(8/2/93)
Florida

iH·

o

01

t-zj

Found
pursuant to
statute

Found
pursuant to
statute

No continuity of life unanimous consent of
members required to
continue after
dissolution event

No continuity of life unanimous consent of
members required to
continue after
dissolution event

Centralized
management found
where management
vested in 3 of 25
members, no
reference to
their interests

centralized
management found'
where management
vested in 3 of 25
members, no
reference to the
size of their
interests

II.

lilll:

* Statute is flexible; Revenue Ruling conclusion on partnership classification is binding only to the extent
the LLC Operating Agreement does not differ from statutory defaults.
4

(502)582-1601

No free transferability
of interests - unanimous
consent of members
required to approve a
transfer

No free transferability
of interests - unanimous
consent of members
required to approve a
transfer

~ Thomas E. Rutledge, Esq., OGDEN NEWELL & WELCH, 1200 One Riverfront Plaza, Louisville, Kentucky, 40202
All Rights Reserved. April 14, 1994.

94-6*
1994-3 I.R.B. 11
(1/18/94)
Alabama

94-30
1994-30 I.R.B.6
(5/9/94)
Kansas

94-5*
1994-2 I.R.B.21
(1/10/94)
Louisiana

.

I-'

01

~

3

2

1

8937010
(Florida)
(6/16/89)
(9/15/89)

(NA)

No free
transferability of
interests unanimous vote of .
members required to
a transfer

of
life - unanimous
vote of members
required to
continue after

Noconti~uity

No free
transferability of
interests unanimous vote of
members required to
a transfer

No dissolution
I Not discussed
events continuity of life
found

No continuity of
life - unanimous
vote of members
required to
continue after
dissolution event

Not discussed

Centralized
management
found where
one member was
manager, no
discussion of
his interest

Not discussed

Yes

Not discussed
(pre-dates Rev •
Proc. 89-12)

Not discussed
(pre-dates Rev.
Proc. 89-12)

tl]lL;

This is the only PLR released to date in which an LLC did not receive partnership classification.

Release Date

Letter Date

Not
discussed in
PLR but
provided for
by statute

Found
pursuant to
statute

8304138 3
. (no state
specified)
(10/29/82)

(NA)

Not
discussed in
PLR but
provided for
by statute

iiiiiiif:irfi:tJtiii:iiiiii:

unincorporated entity may have up to two of the characteristics and be
classified as a partnership

8106082
(Wyoming)
(11/~8/80)1

An

Satisfaction of Xintner Characteristics

OOKPARISOR OF LLC PLRs

111,

---------------------------------------~-----'".,~-~~-y"",~--..,"-''''''''~'"~,'"'''_"'''.,.._'''''"''~~_~_."'=_k"'"'',,,4.,,,,,." ".''''!.hl,J''''~~...L''''IIl46~w''''".,~I''''~~~~.'''',#Alklb~~_='''''jb''' __ .'''.'~'e_"",,-"x.

~

~
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01

"%j

Not
discussed in
PLR but
provided for
by statute

9052039
(no state
specified)
(10/2/90)
(12/28/90)

,Ill

No continuity of
life - unanimous
vote of members
required to
continue after
dissolution event

Not
discussed in
PLR but
provided for
by statute

" 9029019
(no state
II specified internal
references
would
indicate
Florida)
(4/19/90)
(7/20/90)

No continuity of
life - unanimous
vote of members
required to
continue after

No continuity of
life - unanimous
vote of members
required to
continue after
dissolution event

Not
discussed in
PLR but
provided for
by statute

9030013
(Florida)
(4/5/90)
(7/27/90)

Continuity of life
found - majority
vote of members
required to
continue after
dissolution event

Found
pursuant to
statute

9010027
(No state
specified)
(12/7/89)
(3/9/90)

Not discussed

Not discussed
(managed by
non-member
managers)

No centralized
management
where
management
reserved to
members in
proportion to
their
interests

2

'II, I~,.'
,~I,

No free
I Not discussed
transferability of
interests unanimous vote of
members required to

No free
transferability of
interests unanimous vote of
members required to
approve a transfer

No free
transferability of
interests unanimous vote of
members required to
approve a transfer

No free
transferability of
interests unanimous vote of
members required to
approve a transfer

I,

____
'~Il=k'''''''''''.''''-'~''''-'''"'~'.~'~

except S 4

LlOtl:J

I Not discussed

Yes, in
particular SS
4.01 and 4.03
(PLR also
addresses
division of
general
partnership,
conversion of
one segment
into LLC; IRC
SS 708, 721)

I Yes,

Yes
(PLR also
addresses
conversion of
limited
partnership
into LLC; IRC
SS 708, 721)

,=---=~_~

___ "'_' __~~m~_.

,.~>u

CJ.:)

01

I'Xj

Not
discussed in
PLR but
provided for
by statute

Not
discussed in
PLR but
provided for
by statute

9218078
(Texas)
(1/31/92)
(5/1/92)

Not
discussed in
PLR but
provided for
by statute

9147017
(no state
specified)
(8/12/91)
(11/22/91)

9210019
II (Texas)
(12/6/91)
II (3/6/92)

Not
discussed in
PLR but
provided for
by statute

9119029
(no state
specified)
(2/7/91)
(5/10/91)

No continuity of
life - unanimous
vote of members
reqUired to
continue after
dissolution event

No continuity of
life - dissolution
restricted to
bankruptcy of
corporate manager,
unanimol,ls vote of
members to
continue after
dissolution event

No continuity of
life - unanimous
vote of members
required to
continue after
dissolution event

No continuity of
life - unanimous
vote of members
required to
continue after
dissolution event

3

No free
transferability of
interests approval of
member/manager or
2/3rds of interest
of members required
to approve a
transfer

No free
transferability of
interests - consent
of Manager or, i f
manager not a
member, majority
interest of members
required to approve
a transfer

No free
transferability of
interests.unanimous vote of
members required to
approve a transfer

No free
transferability of
interests unanimous vote of
members required to
approve a transfer

Yes
(PLR also
addresses
conversion of
general
partnership
into LLC; IRC 5
721

Not discussed

Not discussed

I

Yes, in
particular
55 4.01 and
4.03

Not discussed

I

I Not discussed I Yes

Not discussed

tlmlL
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II

01

~

II

~

i.~1Jll

Not
discussed in
PLR but
provided for
by statute

9242025
(TexaS)
(7/22/92)
(10/16/92)

,..

Not
. discussed in
PLR but
provided for
by statute

Not
discussed in
'PLR but
provided for
by statute

9226035
(no state
specified)
(3/26/92 )
(6/26/92)

9227033
(Nevada)
(4/8/92)
(7/3/92)

Not
discussed in
PLR but
provided for
by statute

9219022
(utah)
(2/6/92)
(5/8/92)

No continuity of
life - unanimous
vote of members
required to
continue after
dissolution event

No continuity of
life - unanimous
vote of members
required to
continue after
dissolution event

No continuity of
life -.unanimous
consent of all
managers and
majority consent,
by number and
voting interest,
of members to
continue after
dissolution event

No continuity of
life - unanimous
vote of members
required to
continue after
dissolution event

i.

I

4

No free
transferability of
interests unanimous vote of
members required to
approve a transfer

No free
transferability of
interests unanimous vote of
members required to
a rove a transfer

No free
transferability of
interests interests are not
transferable

J.I

~.

Not discussed

Not discussed
(managed by
non-member
managers)

Not discussed

No free
I Not discussed
transferability of
interests majority interest
of members required
to approve a
transfer

:

11.i..

ml:.;

Not discussed

I Yes, except S 4

Yes
(PLR also
addresses
conversion of
general
partnership
into LLC; IRC
S 721)

-

I Not discussed

-----------------------"""'~--
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0')

01

~

(3/3/93)
(5/28/93)

(Utah)

9321070

" (2/18/93)
(5/21/93)

II 9320019
(Utah)

(2/3/93)
(5/7/93)

(no state
specified)

9318011

(12/2/92)
(2/26/93)

(West
Virginia)

9308039

No continuity of
life - acceptance
of transferee as a
substitute member
and unanimous vote
of all members
required to
continue after

Not
discussed in
PLR but
provided for
by statute

, 1111.

No continuity of
life - acceptance
of transferee as a
substitute member
and unanimous vote
of all members
required to
continue after
dissolution event

No continuity of
life - unanimous
vote of members
required to
continue after
dissolution event

Not
discussed in
PLR but
provided for
by statute

Not
discussed in
PLR but
provided for
·by statute

No continuity of
life - unanimous
vote of members
required to
continue after
dissolution event

Not
discussed in
PLR but
provided for
by statute

L

6

Not discussed

Not discussed

Not discussed

No free
transferability of
interests unanimous vote of
members required to
approve a transfer

t.

No centralized
management
where
management
reserved to
members in
proportion to
their

No centralized
management
where
management
reserved to
members in
proportion to
their
interests

No centralized
management
where
management
reserved to
members in
proportion to
their
interests

Not discussed

I

IltmlUi

I Yes, except S 4

I Yes, except S 4

Yes, "to the
extent
applicable"

Yes, "to the
extent
applicable"

II

-:]

01

II

~

7

No discussion of vote, if any, necessary to approve admission of transferee as a member.

5

Yes, "to the
extent
applicable"

I Yes, except S 4

Yes, "to the
extent
applicable"

This PLR has been revoked

Not discussed

No centralized
management
where
management
reserved to
members in
proportion to
their
interests

Not discussed

I

4

No free
transferability of
interests unanimous vote of
members required to
approve a transfer

Not discussed

No free
transferability unanimous consent
of Executive
committee required
before interest
could be made
subject to
voluntary or
involuntgry
transfer

pending reconsideration of the issue.

No continuity of
life - majority
interest of
members required
to continue after
dissolution event

Not
discussed in
PLR but
provided for
by statute

9331010
(no state
specified)
(5/5/93)
(8/6/93)

No continuity of
life - acceptance
of transferee as a
substitute member
and unanimous vote
of all members
required to
continue after
dissolution event

Not
discussed in
PLR but
provided for
by statute

9325048
(Utah)
(3/30/93)
(6/25/93)

No continuity of
life - written
consent of 2/3rds
of members, by
number, required
to continue after
dissolution event

Not
discussed in
PLR but
provided for
by statute

9325039 4
(Illinois)
(3/26/93)
(6/25/93)

,~: i

II

01

00

II

~

.H"

Not
discussed in
PLR but
provided for
by statute

9335063
(no state
specified)
(6/11/93)
(9/3/93)

i

Not
discussed
in PLR but
provided for
by statute

Not
discussed in
PLR but
provided for
by statute

9335032
(Delaware)
(6/4/93)
(9/3/93)

9335062
(no state
specified)
(6/11/93 )
(9/3/93)

Not
discussed in
PLR but
provided for
by statute

9333032
(Illinois)
(5/24/93)
(8/20/93)

No continuity of
life - unanimous
vote of members
required to
continue after
dissolution event

No continuity of
life - unanimous
vote of members
required to
continue after
dissolution event

No continuity of
life - majority
interest of
members required
to continue after
dissolution event

No continuity of
life - affirmative
vote of 2/3rds of
members by number,
which must also
represent majority
in interest,
required to
continue after
dissolution event

I

8

No free
transferability of
interest unanimous vote of
members required to
approve a transfer

No free
transferability of
interest unanimous vote of
members required to
approve a transfer

Not discussed

No free
transferability
unanimous consent
of Executive
Committee required
before interest
could be made
subject to
voluntary or
involuntary
transfer

I,L,

"J

Not discussed

Not discussed

No centralized
management
where
management
reserved to
members in
proportion to
their
interests

Not discussed

I

I J,

Yes, "to the
extent
applicable"

Yes, "to the
extent
applicable"

I Yes, except

Yes, "to the
extent
applicable"

illbl[JnLIJI,L

§

4

~

01

I"Ij

J1 ,~

No continuity of
life-unanimous
vote of members to
continue after
dissolution

No continuity of
life-unanimous
vote of members to
continue after
dissolution event

No continuity of
life-unanimous
vote of members to
continue after
dissolution event

No continuity of
life - majority
interest of
members required
to continue after
dissolution event

yes, subject to
compliance
Not discussed
No free
transferabilityunanimous vote of
members required to
be admitted as
member

9

"'''I' If I

yes to "extent
applicable"
Not discussed

Yes, subject to
compliance

No free
I Not discussed
transferability of
interests-must have
consent of the
managing members to
transfer
No free
transferabilitymust have consent
of managing members

Yes, "to the
extent
applicable"
(PLR also
addresses
conversion of
general
partnership
into an LLC;
IRC SS 708,721
and method of
accounting; IRC
S 448)

i,

Centralized
management
stipulated to
by LLC

No free
transferability of
interests majority interest
of members required
to approve a
transfer

This PLR was sought by a Minnesota organized LLC.

Not
discussed in
PLR but
provided for
by statute.

9416025
(Delaware)
(1/18/94)
(4/22/94)

6

Not
discussed in
PLR but
provided for
by statute.

Not
discussed in
PLR but
provided for
by statute

Not
discussed in
PLR but
provided for
by statute,
limited
liability
stipulated
to by LLC

9416028
(no state
specified)
(1/18/94)
(4/22/94)

9417009
(no state
specified)
I (1/17/94)
(4/29/94)

9350013
(no state
specified) 6
(9/15/93)
(12/17/93)

III:

0

0')

~

(11/30/93)
(3/4/94 )

(Louisiana)

9409016

(11/29/93)
(3/4/94 )

(Louisiana)

9409014

(12/2/93)
(3/25/94)

(no state
specified)

9412030

(1/10/94)
(4/15/94)

(Delaware)

9415005

No continuity of
life-majority vote
of members
required to
continue after
dissolution event

No continuity of
life-unanimous
vote by remaining
members with
majority interest
to continue after
dissolution event
No continuity of
life-unanimous
vote by remaining
members to
continue after
dissolution event
and if membership
reduced to 1 - the
admission of one
or more members
No continuity of
life-unanimous
vote by remaining
members to
continue after
dissolution event
and if membership
reduced to 1 - the
admission of one
or more members

Not
discussed in
PLR but
provided for
in statute.

Not
discussed in
PLR but
provided for
in statute.

Not
discussed in
PLR but
provided for
in statute

Not
discussed in
PLR but
provided for
in statute

10

No free
transferability
no member may
assign, attempt to
do so will result
in dissolution

No free
transferability
no member may
assign, attempt to
do so will result
in dissolution

No free
transferabilityunanimous approval
by members for
transfer.

No free
transferabilityunanimous approval
by members for
transfer or
compliance with any
procedure provided
for in LLC
agreement

Not discussed

Not discussed

I

Not discussed

I Not discussed

; I

I

1III

Yes to "extent
applicable"

Yes to "extent
applicable"

I Not discussed

I Not discussed

iI.

II

en
......

9416026
(Delaware LCC
Act)
(1/18/94 )
(4/22/94)

Not
discussed in
PLR but
provided for
in statute

Not
discussed in
PLR but
provided for
in statute

9404021
(Louisiana)
(11/1/93)
(1/28/94)

No continuity of
life-unanimous
vote of members
required to
continue after
dissolution event.

No continuity of
life-unanimous
vote by remaining
members .to
continue after
dissolution event
and if membership
reduced to one the admission of
one or more
members

No continuity of
life-must have at
least 2 remaining
members and
majority vote of
members required
to continue after
dissolution event

11

Not discussed

""

"II"I"HII'"

Yes to "extent
applicable"

Yes to "extent
applicable"

I Not discussed

Ph. (502) 582-1601

Not discussed

I

I Not discussed

40202

No free
transferability
unanimous vote of
members required to
approve a transfer

No free
transferability-no
member may assign,
attempt to do so
will result in
dissolution

No free
transferabilityunanimous approval
by members for
transfer (complete
restriction of
membership to
certain relatives
of members)

OThomas E. Rutledge, January 13, 1994
OGDEN NEWELL & WELCH, 1200 One Riverfront Plaza, Louisville, Kentucky

II

I'%j

Not
discussed in
PLR but
provided for
in statute

9407030
(no state
specified)
(11/24/93)
(2/18/94)

m.mw

!I

1.11 •. 1..".

i[:~

Continuity of Life

"KINTNER" CORPORATE CHAAACTERISTICS

Limited Liability

:.L

"1 11[['.

Centralized Management

An LLC, which has limited liability, must avoid two of the remaining
three corporate characteristics in order to be taxed as a partnership.

Free Transferability of
Interests

i ~"

:11'

~

C'f:)

~

, I JI.,L"",

Sole
Proprietorship
, General
Partnership

some

J

Limited Liability Limited Liability
Limited Liability, Pass
and Pass Through Through and Avoid
Limited Partnership and
S Corp Restrictions

some

J

J

J

J

C Corp

S Corp

J

Limited
Partnership

Limited Liability
Comp~ny

,

LC
to

~
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APPENDIX E

MAY AN LLC USE THE CASH ME THOD OF ACCOUNTING?
3

~

Code §448 (a) :
These taxpayeJ:s cannot use cash method
(must use the accJ:Ual method):
1) C COl:poJ:ation (except certain PSC's)
2} PaItLeIships with a C corpcration partner
3) 'i!ax Shel tar

I

-d

I

Q: Is an LLC.a Tax Shelter?

"Tax Shelter" (Code §461(i) (3»
1) A J:egistered offeJ:ing entel:prise
2) A §6662 (d) (2) (C) tax shelter (principal
pUl:pose = tax avoidance or evasion)
(PLR 9415005 held: an LLC is not a S 6662 (d) (2) (c)
tax shelter solely by virtue of its LLC stJ:Ucture)
3)

(Q:

or

:Any ayndi.ca t8

I
Is an LLC a syndicate?

"Syndicate" (Code S1256 (e) (3) (B»
any for.m of business in which more
than 35% of losses are allocable to:
limi ted partnex.

(Q:

or

limi ted entrepreneur.

l-

I
Is an LLC membeJ: a "limited partneJ:-?

Q:. Is an LLC member a limited entrepJ:eneur?

PJ:obably Not.

"Limited Entrepreneur" (Code S464)

peJ:son who:
1) Is not a limited paJ:tner and
2) Does not actively participate in
managementl

Q: Are·> 35% of LLC losses allocable to

non-manager members? If so, ~t the LLC
use the accJ:Ual method of accounting?

;3

l

See PLRS:

l 9415005
.9321047
.9328005
9350013
9407030

1

~
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ASSET PROTECTION PLANNING
A.

Charging Order
1.

KRS Chapter 275, Section 52
"On application to a court of competent jurisdiction by any judgment
creditor of a member, the court may charge the member's limited
liability company interest with payment of the unsatisfied amount of
judgment with interest thereon. To the extent so charged, the
judgment creditor shall have only the rights of an assignee of the
member's limited liability company interest. This chapter shall not
deprive any member of the benefit of any exemption laws applicable
to the member's limited liability company interest."

2.

Analysis
An unsecured creditor can obtain from a court a "charging order"
which is similar to an attachment or garnishment against a member's
interest. A charging creditor has the rights of an assignee.

B.

Other Statutory Provisions
1.

Member's interest in the LLC is personal property, not an interest in·
specific LLC assets. KRS Chapter 275, Section 50.

2.

Member's interest is assignable. The assignee will not become a
member of the LLC without the unanimous consent of all other
members. KRS Chapter 275, Section 53.

3.

The assignee is entitled to receive distributions to which the assignor
would be entitled. An assignment of an LLC interest does not allow
the assignee to participate in the management of the LLC. KRS
Chapter 275, Section 51.

-,~
C.

Analysis
1.

Adequate statutory foundation exists for use of LLC as an asset
protection devise.

2.

Body of case law to be developed.

G -1

D.

E.

Comparison to Limited Partnership
1.

LLC member is not exposed to the internal liabilities of the LLC.

2.

However, the LLC may hold assets that are capable of generating
their own liabilities.

Current Drawbacks to Use of LLC as an Asset Protection Devise
1.

LLC statutes have not been adopted in all states.

2.

No uniform LLC statute.

3.

Limited operational experiences.

4.

Result: uncertainty.

~

d
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II.

CHOICE OF BUSINESS ENTITY
A.

B.

The Essence of LLC
1.

Provides insulation from liability to the same extend as a
corporation.

2.

Is treated as a partnership for tax purposes.

3.

Provides members the option of participating directly in management
or electing other members or non-members as managers.

Comparison to S Corporation
S Corp.

LLC

one class

unlimited

2. Subsidiaries

no

yes

3. Investors

35

unlimited

1. Ownership interest

4. Types of investors

limited

unlimited

NOTE: LLC avoids the possibly burdensome requirements·
of a subchapter S trust (QSST). All income of a QSST
must be distributed.
5. Basis for deducting losses

stock
plus debt

6. Contributions of property

potential
taxable event

no gam
or loss

corporate
taxation

no gam
or loss

7. Distribution of appreciated
assets

Conclusion: LLC is more flexible than S corporation.

G-3

investment
plus liabilities

C.

Comparison to Family Limited Partnership
1.

IRC Section 2704(b)(1).

§

Any applicable restriction is ignored in determining the estate or gift
tax value of an interest in a corporation or a partnership transferred
to, or for the benefit of, a member of the transferor's family.

3
~

2.

Applicable restriction is a limitation on the ability to liquidate the
entity, in whole or in part, that is more restrictive than the limitation
that would apply under state law generally applicable to the entity in
the absence of the restriction. IRC Section 2704(b)(3)(B) and Reg.
2S.2704-2(b).

3.

State law contains significant limitations on the transfer of a general
or limited partner's interest absent a contary provision in the
partnership agreement.
The limitations may be more restrictive than the limits imposed on
LLC's.

4.

The flexibility of LLC may create an applicable restriction under
IRC Section 2704(b).

G-4

III.

BUSINESS APPLICATIONS FOR LLC
A.

In General
The investor who wants more flexibility than what is available with an S
corporation and who wants more control than what is available with a
limited partnership.

B.

Businesses that Require Active Management
1.

All members can actively participate in the management of the LLC
without loss of limited liability protection.

2.

Examples
a.
b.

c.
d.

C.

start-up businesses
entrepreneurial businesses
professional service firms
joint ventures

Businesses that Need to Accommodate Passive Investors
1.

LLC can be structured with centralized management.

2.

Examples.
a.
b.
c.

3.

investment partnerships
real estate investments
theatrical and entertainment investments

Consider passive activity loss limits.

~
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D.

Businesses where Retaining Control is Important.
1.

LLC member may not transfer membership interest without consent
of a significant percentage interest of the remaining members, unless
otherwise provided for in the operating agreement.

2.

Member rights to profits are generally freely transferable which
provides some degree of liquidity.

3.

Examples.
a.
b.

E.

Situations that Cannot Accommodate the S corporation
1.

See IT B.

2.

Examples.
a.
b.
c.

F.

family businesses
professional service firms .

use of trusts as LLC members
multi -tiered corporate structure
foreign investors

Real estate transactions
1.

Investor objectives
a.
b.
c.

2.

limited liability
management control
non-recourse debt

Consider at-risk rules

G-6

IV.

CONVERSION TO LLC
A.

Partnership to LLC
1.

IRS Ltr. Rill. 9210019.
a.
b.

c.
d.
2.

Conversion of partnership to LLC is treated like conversion of
general partnership to limited partnership. Rev. Rill. 84-52.
a.
b.

3.

Partnership ceases to exist
LLC succeeds to all of the partners' assets and liabilities
Partners become members of the LLC
Conversion is tax free

IRC Section 721 exchange treatment
IRC Section 708 no partnership termination

Tax impact on partners/members
a.
b.
c.

If LLC classified as a partnership for tax purposes, and
no change in partners'/members' shares of the entity's
liabilities as a resillt of the conversion, then
no gain or loss to
(1 )

(2)
(3)

B.

partnershi p
LLC
partners/members

Corporation to LLC
1.

Requires a liquidation of the C or S corporation.

2.

Gain or loss
a.
b.

shareholders. IRC Section 331
corporation. IRC Section 336

G -7

C.

Merger of Subsidiary into LLC
1.

Facts
Parent owns all outstanding stock of Subsidiary, which Parent wants
to convert to LLC.

~
9

Parent forms Newco and contributes assets for Newco stock
Parent and Newco form LLC.
Subsidiary is merged into LLC in a statutory merger.
2.

IRS Ltr. Rul. 9409014
a.
b.
c.

3.

LLC taxed as a partnership
No gain or loss to either Subsidiary or LLC under IRC
Section 721
No gain or loss to Parent under IRC Section 332

Result is the merger is treaded as
a.
b.

contribution of capital to partnership, followed by
distribution of a partnership interest to Parent in complete
liquidation of Subsidiary

3
-,

~
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PROFESSIONALS AND SERVICE ORGANIZATIONS
A

The problem

~
~

The operation of a service organization as a general partnership results in
unlimited liability.
Owners/professionals want protection from contractual and malpractice
related liabilities.
No form of business entity will protect the owner/professional from his or
her own mistakes, negligence or malpractice.
Professional corporations and partnerships of professional corporations
have been used as a shield against potential legal liabilities and to create
opportunities for settlements. The conversion from general partnership to
professional corporation can be achieved without significant adverse tax
consequences.

B.

The LLC solution ofLtr. Rul. 9350013
1.

Facts
Law firm partners exchanged general partnership interest for LLC
interest equal in value.
LLC operating agreement requires written majority in interest
approval for any transfer to a non-member.
State law restricts transfer of ownership interests to lawyers.

LLC operating agreement is specific about continuing the "practice" by majority
in interest of the remaining lawyers.

d

Death
Insanity
Bankruptcy
Retirement
Resignation
Expulsion
Liquidation
Dissolution
Termination
Fail Safe Continuation
G-9

2.
~
a~

Results
a.

Partnership under Rev. Rul. 88-76

1

1.

No continuity of life
Death of a member results in dissolution of LLC unless
majority in interest of. surviving lawyers agree to
continue the practice.

2.

Ownership interest not fully transferable
Transfer of LLC interest to a non-member (new lawyer
owners) required the approval of majority in interest
(existing lawyer owners).

b.

No gain or loss on conversions from general partnership to
LLC.
See IV A 2

3.

Accounting method
a.

The typical law firm partnership is not
1.

2.
3.
b.

C corporation
partnership with a C corporation partner
tax shelter

So the cash method used by the law firm partnership can be
continued by the law firm LLC.

G - 10

VI.
Ej

A PUNCTURE PROOF CORPORATE VEIL?
A

:.,;;j

E3

B.

To what extent will courts pierce the corporate veil ofLLe limited
liability?
1.

New statute

2.

No case law experience

3.

Injured and aggressive plaintiffs

Will evidence of professional liability insurance be a requirement for
continuing state registration and licensing?

~j
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PROCEDURE FOR CONTESTING A WILL: In circuit court, within
two years of district court's probate action; must name
all beneficiaries who are "necessary parties"; may
restrain further distributions
A.

=--.Ji

--:::Y

Filing The Will Contest

KRS 394.240(1):
"Any person aggrieved by the action of the
district court in admitting a will to record or rejecting it
may bring an original action in the circuit court of the
same county to contest the action of the district court.
Such action shall be brought within two (2) years after the
decision of the district court."
A person is "aggrieved" so as to create standing
only if the will deprives the person of some benefit
the person would otherwise receive, such as by
intestacy or under a previous will. Wells v. Salyers,
Ky., 452 S.W.2d 392 (1970); Egbert v. Egbert, Ky., 217
S.W. 365 (1920).
Although Kentucky law formerly required that all
beneficiaries must be named as parties in a will
contest, that is no longer required under KRS 394.260.
West v. Goldstein, Ky.,. 830 S.W.2d 379 (1992)
(contestant must only name a beneficiary who is a
"necessary party" within meaning of CR 19.01).
Statute further provides that "The parties may, in
the same action, or in a separate action if the
validity of the will is not in issue, seek
construction, interpretation or reformation of a will."
Thus, unlike previous statutory framework before
Judicial Article was passed, a will contest suit is "no
longer strictly limited to whether the particular
instrument probated or rejected in the district court
is the will of the testator." West.v. Goldstein, Ky.,
830 S.W.2d 379, 381 (1992).
Cf. Mullins v. First American Bank, Ky. App.,
781 S.W.2d 527, 528 (1989) (upholding circuit
court decision that it lacked jurisdiction to rule
on validity of codicil neither admitted nor
rejected by district court; "it should be clear
that the statutes, read together, require (1) that
all proceedings for the admission to probate of a
will or codicil be commenced in the district
court; (2) that the district court must either
admit or reject the instrument; and (3) that the
district court retains jurisdiction over the
matter until such time as a will contest, or

H -1
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adversary proceeding, is commenced in the circuit
court."
Pursuant to KRS 394.240, contestant should lodge
notice of the action "in the office of the county clerk
of the county in which the will was admitted to probate
or rejected," although failure to do so will not
justify dismissal, Justice v. Conn, Ky. App., 724
S.W.2d 227 (1987), discussed in West v. Goldstein, Ky.,
830 S.W.2d 379, 381 (1992).
B.

Restraining Further Distributions

KRS 394.250: "An Action filed in the circuit court, pursuant
to KRS 394.240, shall not, unless taken within twelve (12)
months from the entry of the district court's order, prevent
the appointment of an administrator or executor by the
district court or the settlement, distribution, and division
of the decedent's estate. The circuit court in which
proceedings are pending may make an order restraining the
further distribution and division of the estate.
"
II.

CUSTOMARY GROUNDS FOR CONTESTING A WILL: Especially lack of
testamentary capacity and undue influence
A.

Insufficient Age, Improper Execution or Revocation

B.

Lack of Capacity
"The right of a testator to make a will according
to his own wishes is jealously guarded by the courts,
regardless of a court's view of the justice of the
chosen disposition." Fischer v. Heckerman, Ky. App.,
772 S.W.2d 642, 645 (1989), citing New v. Creamer, Ky.,
275 S.W.2d 918, 920 (1955).
"The inquiry as to capacity is three-fold. First,
did the testator know the natural objects of his
bounty, and his obligations to them. Second, could he
make a rational survey of his estate. Third, did he
dispose of that estate according to a fixed plan of his
own. " Fischer v. Heckerman, Ky. App., 772 S. W. 2d 642,
..

......,,;.-
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645 (1989), citing Bennett v. Kissinger, 231 S.W.2d 74,
75 (1950).
"Testamentary capacity requires a lower degree of
mental capacity than contractual or business capacity,
especially so where the plan of the testamentary
disposition in the will and codicil at hand was so
simple and uncomplicated. [Citations omitted.] And
mere weakness of mental power will not prevent a person
from making a valid will."
Warren v. Sanders, Ky.,
287 S.W.2d 146, 149 (1956)
Evidence of "lucid interval" may permit probate of
will by otherwise incapable testator; however,
"evidence of the testator's mental status both before
and after the execution of the will are admissible so
long as they have a reasonable tendency to indicate his
mental condition at the time of the execution of the
will." Pardue v. Pardue, Ky., 227 S.W.2d 403, 405
(1950), cited in Hendren v. Brown, Ky., 364 S.W.2d 329,
331 (1962)

c.

Undue Influence
"Undue influence is influence such that the
testator's free agency is destroyed." ... It is not
influence derived merely from acts of kindness, appeals
to feeling, or arguments addressed to the
understanding." Fischer v. Heckerman, Ky. App., 772
S.W.2d 642, 645 (1989)
[T]he undue influence must be exercised at the
time of the will's execution." Fischer v. Heckerman,
Ky. App., 772 S.W.2d 642, 645 (1989), citing Williams
v. Vollman, Ky. App., 738 S.W.2d 849, 850 (1987).
"There have been listed certain so-called 'badges'
of undue influence. They include[:]
a physically weak and mentally impaired testator,
a will unnatural in its provisions,

--J
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a lately developed and comparatively short period
of close relationship between the testator and the
principal beneficiary,

~

participation by the beneficiary in the physical
preparation of the will,
the possession of the will by the beneficiary
after it was written,

----'

efforts by the beneficiary to restrict contacts
between the testator and the natural objects of
his bounty and
absolute control of testator's business affairs by
a beneficiary. II
Fischer v. Heckerman, Ky. App., 772 S.W.2d 642, 645
(1989), citing Belcher v. Somerville, Ky., 413 S.W.2d
620 (1967) i Golladay v.Golladay, Ky., 287 S.W.2d 904,
906 . (1955) .
"Undue influence is a subtle thing and can rarely
be shown by direct proof.
In many instances the facts
and circumstances leading up to the execution of the
desired instrument must be relied upon to establi~h its
existence. II Creason v. Creason, Ky., 392 S.W.2d 69, 74
(1965), quoting McKinney v .. Montgomery, Ky., 248 S.W.2d
719 (1952).
On the other hand, "Mere opportunity of the
wife, even though coupled, as here, with an aged
and physically weak condition of the testator, is
not sufficient to establish undue influence."
Golladay v. Golladay, Ky., 287 S.W.2d 904, 906
(1955) (noting "There was no evidence of keeping
the testator in seclusion, or of restriction of
his contacts with his sons, such as to permit
exercise of constant and undisturbed influence by
the wife or to isolate him from the normal
influences resulting from contact with this
children. II )

~

d
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III. RELATED PRACTICE ISSUES: Burdens of proof; lay and expert
testimony
A.

Burden Of Proof
1.

Initial Burden of Establishing Due Execution and
Rationality of Disposition is on Proponent

Proponent of the will must establish due execution
of the will. Williams v. Vollman, Ky. App., 738 S.W.2d
849, 850 (1987).
"If a will (or, in this case, a codicil) appears
rational, proof of proper execution creates a
presumption of its legality." Cruse v. Leary, Ky.
App., 727 S.W.2d 408, 411 (1987), citing Simpson v.
Sexton, Ky., 311 S.W.2d 803 (1958).
2.

When Distribution Appears "Unnatural"

"The burden of proof is on appellees, as
proponents of the will, to explain the disposition.
Gibson v. Gipson, Ky., 426S.W.2d 927, 929 (1968); and
Sutton v. Combs, Ky., 419 S.W.2d 775, 776 (1976).
There is not, however, a per se unnatural will.
Clark
v. Johnson, 268 Ky. 591, 105 S.W.2d 576, 580 (1937).
Instead, it is a factual issue which can be explained
satisfactorily by proponents. Nunn [v. Williams, Ky.,]
254 S.W.2d [698,] at 700 [(1953)]." Fischer v.
Heckerman, Ky. App., 772 S.W.2d 642, 646 (1989).
3.

~-

Contestants Next Bear Burden of Challenging Will

The burden of proof is on contestants to overcome
the presumption of capacity by substantial evidence.
Wallace v. Scott, Ky. App., 844 S.W.2d 439 (1992);
Fischer v. Heckerman, Ky. App., 772 S.W.2d 642, 645
(1989), citing New v. Creamer, Ky., 275 S.W.2d 918, 920
(1955); Cruse v. Leary, Ky. App., 727 S.W.2d 408, 411
(1987) ("A testator is presumed to possess the
requisite capacity, it being the burden of the
challenging party to prove otherwise.").
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"Again, the burden of proof is on appellants
[contestants] to establish undue influence with
evidence of substance. That proof must go beyond mere
opportunity." Fischer v. Heckerman, Ky. App., 772
S.W.2d 642, 645 (1989), citing Nunn v. Williams, Ky.,
254 S.W.2d 698, 700 (1953).
4.

Burden Easier to Carry When There is Evidence of
Multiple Grounds for Contesting Will

"There is authority for the proposition that mere
assertion of challenges based upon both undue influence
and lack of capacity makes it easier for contestants to
get to the jury. Creason v. Creason, Ky., 392 S.W.2d
69 (1965) i and Gibson [v. Gipson, Ky.,] 426 S.W.2d
[927,] at 928 [(1968)]. But the evidence presented
must not merely be a scintilla.
It must be of
sufficient character, substance, and weight to furnish
a firm foundation for a jury's verdict." Fischer v.
Heckerman, Ky. App., 772 S.W.2d 642, 646 (1989)
"When a contest is pitched on both mental
incapacity and undue influence, evidence that tends to
show both need not be as convincing as would be
essential to prove one or the other alone." Creason v.
Creason, Ky., 392 S.W.2d 69, 74 n.1 (1965), quoting
Roland v. Eibeck, Ky., 385 S.W.2d 37 (1964).
"[A]n unequal or unnatural disposition by itself
is not enough to show undue influence, but when coupled
with slight evidence of the exercise of undue influence
... it is sufficient to take the case to the jury."
Williams v. Vollman, Ky. App., 738 S.W.2d 849, 851
(1987), quoting Bennett v. Bennett, Ky., 455 S.W.2d
580, 582 (1970).
"[W]here there is gross inequality in the
disposition of the estate among the natural objects of
testator's bounty, or where the will is unnatural, such
facts, when unexplained and when corroborated by even
slight evidence of want of testamentary capacity, or of
undue influence, are sufficient to take the case to the
jury." Pardue v. Pardue, Ky., 227 S.W.2d 403, 406
(1950), quoting Allen v. Henderson, Ky., 184 S.W.2d
885, 886 (1945).
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B.

Lay Witnesses And Expert Testimony
1.

Lay Testimony

Declarations of the testator are generally
admissible. Atherton v. Goslin, Ky., 239 S.W. 771
(1922). The Dead Man's Statute, KRS 421.210(2), does
not apply to will contest cases, so the parties may
freely testify about their relations, conversations and
transactions with the testator. Gay v. Gay, Ky., 215
S.W.2d 92 (1948).
Opinion testimony about capacity from lay
witnesses is admissible so long as opinions are based
on facts which themselves are both admissible and
sufficient to support finding of capacity or
incapacity.
See Hendren v. Brown, Ky., 364 S.W.2d 329,
332 (1962) ("opinion testimony as to the mental
capacity of [the testator] is admissible to the extent
it is based upon observable conditions"); Warren v.
Sanders, Ky., 287 S.W.2d 146, 148 (1956) ("Opinions of
witnesses are insufficient to take a will contest case
to the jury, unless the facts upon which the opinions
are based tend to establish lack of mental capacity."),
quoting Tate v. Tate's Executor, Ky., 275 S.W.2d 597,
600 (1955).
A wide range of proof involving the testator's
background and relations with the parties is allowed in
undue influence cases. Welch's Administrator v.
Clifton, Ky., 172 S.W.2d 221 (1943).
2.

Expert Testimony

Johnson v. Liberty National Bank & Trust Co., Ky.
App., 1994 Ky. App. LEXIS 48 (May 6, 1994) (not final),
petition for discr. rev. filed (May 26, 1994) (Expert
testimony not sufficient to sustain burden of proof
where foundation facts not present; "the contestors
place a lot of stock on the testimony of their expert
witness; however, expert opinion testimony cannot by
itself sustain the burden of proof required.
There
must be other probative facts conjunctive with expert
opinion to satisfy the burden of proof to reform the
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instrument. See Sloan v. Sloan, 303 Ky. 180, 197
S . W. 2d 77 (1946).").
Fischer v. Heckerman, Ky. App., 772 S.W.2d 642
(1989) (testator suffered heart attack and stroke on
February 7, 1986, and executed will during hospital
stay on February 14, 1986. He died on April 8, 1986,
leaving none of $1 million estate to his two surviving
relatives, who challenged will based on lack of mental
capacity and undue influence by one or more of the
beneficiaries.
Court of Appeals ruled that expert
testimony should have been permitted to address effects
of medical developments on testator's capacity because
those effects "are beyond the pale of common
knowledge.") .
IV.

RELATED ISSUES INVOLVING ATTORNEYS' FEES AND DISTRIBUTIONS
A.

Who Pays Attorneys' Fees In will Contest
1.

Executor's fees

a).

Where executor retains counsel to defend will:

"[I]t is the duty of an executor to defend any
suit contesting the validity of the instrument he has
been appointed to execute and .,. the expense of such a
defense is a proper charge against the whole estate,"
Harrell v. Westover, Ky., 283 S.W.2d 197, 200 (1955)
except: "(1) Where the executor was the sole
beneficiary under the will or (2) where the
executor acted in bad faith," Harrell v. Westover,
Ky., 283 S.W.2d 197, 200 (1955) i accord, Creason
v. Creason, Ky., 392 S.W.2d 69, 75-76 (1965)
(" [C]osts and attorney fees of the executor's
attorneys ... are proper charges against the
estate when incurred in good faith for the purpose
of upholding a will.
The fact that [the testator]
was either mentally incompetent or that the will
was caused to be executed by undue influence of
the appellant, or both, indicates that appellant
acted in bad faith from the beginning in obtaining
execution of the will and deed. Under these
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circumstances coupled with the fact that appellant
was the principal beneficiary and the only one who
stood to gain if the will was upheld, the
appellant is not entitled to have the fees and
costs charged against the estate.") i see also Clay
v. Eager, Ky., 444 S.W.2d 124, 128 (1969)
(executor/attorney may be individually charged
with court costs if court determines that no suit
should have been necessary) (settlement suit)
(citing Hill v. Roberts, Ky., 311 S.W.2d 569, 572
(1958) )
By contrast, in suit by executor to obtain
declaration of meaning of will, executor's costs
are chargeable to estate, even if executor would
personally benefit from one interpretation of
will, under theory that expenses were incurred to
guide executor in final disposition of estate,
Harrell v. Westover, Ky., 283 S.W.2d 197, 199
(1955) .
b).
legal fees probably may be charged to heirs in
different proportions than their actual beneficial
shares: "There is authority for the proposition that
one who involves an estate in unnecessary litigation
should pay the attorney fees and costs incurred by the
personal representative." Skinner v. Morrow, Ky., 318
S.W.2d 419, 425-26 (1958) (involving settlement suit)
2.

Beneficiary's fees

Beneficiaries may be required to pay proportionate
share of attorneys' fees incurred by other beneficiary
who obtains relief for all, Clay v. Eager, Ky., 444
S.W.2d 124, 128 (1969) (citing KRS 412.070) i Skinner v.
Morrow, Ky., 318 S.W.2d 419, 426-27 (1958) (in
settlement suit, attorney for certain heirs awarded
fees assessed against entire estate where he provided
services that "benefited the entire estate, as
distinguished from the personal interests of his own
clients," even though fees limited because settlement
suit by heirs "did accomplish very little that could
not have been accomplished satisfactorily by the
administrator"; court also indicates that in
appropriate circumstances, fee award could have been
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made against other heirs in different proportions than
their distributive shares); Harrell v. Westover, Ky.,
283 S.W.2d 197, 200 (1955) (estate required to pay
attorneys' fees incurred by beneficiaries in settlement
suit) .
Compare Johnson v. Ducobu, Ky., 258 S.W.2d 509,
510 (1953) (no fee awarded where no showing of
unreasonable delay by the administrator in the
settlement of the estate, and it appeared that the
settlement suit was fruitless and unnecessary)
(discussed in Skinner v. Morrow, Ky., 318 S.W.2d 419,
427 (1958))

B.

---4

Amount of Compensation for Counsel
1.

If counsel is not also serving as
executor/personal representative:

Attorney should be allowed "reasonable
compensation," Morgan v. Meacham, Ky., 130 S.W.2d 992
(1939); Harding's Administrator v. Harding, 116 S.W.
305 (1909); see also Skinner v. Morrow, Ky., 318 S.W.2d
419, 425 (1958) (fee of more than four percent
permitted in addition to five percent for
administrator; "It is true,as stated by the trial
judge in his findings and conclusions, that much of the
litigation was needless and useless, and that an
unnecessarily large and invo.lved record was built up.
However, this was not the fault of the administrator or
its attorney.
[I]t was necessary that the
administrator participate in the proceedings through
its attorney. The administrator had the duty to see
that the estate was properly administered and
distributed, and could not simply stand back and let
the heirs conduct the litigation to suit themselves.")
However, attorney's compensation not fixed by
executor, but rather is subject to court review,
Robinson's Executors v. Robinson, 179 S.W.2d 886 (1944)
(executor does not have the authority to fix amount due
to attorney he employs; instead, fee fixed by court in
making a reasonable allowance to the executor to cover
the attorney's fee)
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2.

If counsel is also serving as executor/personal
representative:
a). An attorney providing legal services for an
estate may be limited to only one fee when he or
she also provides services as administrator and
executor, Clay v. Eager, Ky., 444 S.W.2d 124, 127
(1969) i Slusher v. Weller, Ky., 151 S.W. 685 (--)
unless: "the testatrix had designated
[counsel] as attorney and executor and therefore
contemplated that he would be reimbursed for his
services in both capacities, 11 Clay v .. Eager, Ky.,
444 S.W.2d 124, 127 (1969) (distinguishing Morgan
v. Meacham, Ky., 130 S.W.2d 992 (1939))
or possibly unless: the attorney who defends
the will contest is deemed to have performed
llspecial legal services" in addition to customary
legal services performed for an estate, Clay v.
Eager, Ky., 444 S.W.2d 124, 127 (1969)
see KRS 395.150(2): 11 [T]he court may allow to
the executor, administrator or curator such
additional compensation as would be fair and
reasonable for the additional services rendered,
if the additional services were: (a) Unusual or
extraordinary and not normally incident to the
administration of a decedent 1 s estate...
"

~~~

b). An attorney providing legal services for an
estate and also serving as executor and
administrator is subject to the statutory maximum
for fee, KRS 395.150, of five percent of estate
plus five percent of the income collected by the
executor, Clay v. Eager, Ky., 444 S.W.2d 124, 127
(1969)
liThe statute in other words establishes a
ceiling, not a base," Clay v. Eager, Ky., 444
S.W.2d 124, 127 (1969)
11 [W]hen an administrator delays or neglects
the settlement of an estate or the payment or
distribution of funds in his hands when same
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becomes payable, or otherwise neglects his duty,
the Courts may disallow any commission or
compensation, or allow a less compensation than
would or should have been allowed if the
administrator had properly administered his
duties," Clay v. Eager, Ky., 444 S.W.2d 124, 127
(1969) (attorney/executor allowed commission of
three percent where "he made efforts to locate the
beneficiaries under the will and also collected
the sums owing to the estate ... [although] no
unusual or extraordinary labors were imposed upon
[him] in collecting the note"), citing Greenway's
Administrator v. Greenway, 98 S.W.2d 283 (1936)
(administrator allowed commission of one percent) ;
see also Skinner v. Morrow, Ky., 318 S.W.2d 419
(1958), award slightly in excess of five percent
disallowed where estate consisted mainly of
securities, and no extraordinary trouble or effort
involved in handling of estate; only five percent
permitted
V.

RECENT CASES INVOLVING WILL CONTESTS
A.

Wallace v. Scott, Ky. App., 844 S.W.2d 439 (1992)
Widow involved in litigation beginning in 1955
with her two children after she paid half of the
purchase price but was made only one-third owner
under the deed. Upon resolution of that
litigation, she stated "That's the last they'll
ever get off me." Shortly afterwards, man began
working on the farm, and ten years later he moved
into the house with her.
In 1973, widow prepared
will, and prepared codicil in 1975, leaving life
estate to man, with remainder to Methodist Horne.
After she died in 1988, two children challenged
will based upon lack of mental capacity and
exercise of undue influence. Trial court granted
summary judgment and Court of Appeals affirmed
(even after Steelvest, Inc. v. Scansteel Service
Center, Inc., Ky., 807 S.W.2d 476 (1991)).
Court noted "appellants were unable to discover
any evidence of sufficient probative value to
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demonstrate even the slightest indication of lack
of mental capacity." Court emphasized that "The
burden of proof is on contestants ... to overcome
the presumption of capacity by substantial
evidence." Likewise r reviewing the "badges" of
undue influence enumerated in Golladay v.
GolladaYr KY.r 287 S.W.2d 904 (1955) r Court again
noted that "the burden of proof is on appellants
to establish undue influence with evidence of
substance r " and found no basis for such a finding.
B.

Burke v. Burke, Ky. App., 801 S.W.2d 691 (1991)
Husband widowed after 53 years of marriage in
February 1985 r moved from Ohio to Pike County in
June 1985 r and decided to remarry several weeks
later to woman he had not known previously.
Remarried on July 20; executed new will on July 27
leaving everything to her; died August 17. Two
children challenged new will on grounds of undue
influence and lack of testamentary capacity;
conflicting evidence concerning whether testator
began drinking heavily and was incapacitated by
grief after first wife's death.
Jury found "the
document probated was not the will of" the
decedent. Widow appealed that there was a
"complete lack" of evidence of either undue
influence or incapacity.
Court of Appeals
affirmed r although acknowledging that "we are not
unmindful of the possibility that the jury
invalidated this will simply because it seemed
unfair. "

~

Court candidly notes "A survey of the law on this
subject yields a series of contradictory
statements and policies. On the one hand courts
stoutly proclaim the policy of carrying out the
wishes of the deceased r even if they are arbitrary
or unfair . . . . The testator must have sufficient
mind to know his propertYr the objects of his
bounty and his duties to them .,.
but he is
perfectly free to ignore the latter if he is
otherwise of sound mind. 'Every man possessing the
requisite mental powers may dispose of his
property by will in any way he may desire r and a
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jury will not be permitted to overthrow it, and to
make a will for him to accord with their ideas of
justice and propriety. I .. , There must be some
specific evidence of circumstances from which it
can be reasonably inferred that undue influence
was in fact exercised. . .. To justify setting
aside a will the influence exercised must be such
that it lobtains dominion over the mind of the
testator to such an extent as to destroy his free
agency in the disposal of his estate, and
constrains him to do that which he would not have
done if left to the free exercise of his
judgment. I

----'

"After issuing these stern admonitions,
however, the law reverses itself somewhat to lower
the contestantls burden of proof when allegations
of undue influence are coupled with an unequal or
unnatural disposition, allegations of mental
incapacity, or both.
I [W]hen slight evidence
of the exercise of undue influence and the lack of
mental capacity is coupled with evidence of an
unequal or unnatural disposition, it is enough to
take the case to the jury. III (Citations omitted.)
C.

Fischer v. Heckerman, Ky. App., 772 S.W.2d 642 (1989)
Decedent suffered heart attack and stroke on
February 7, 1986, and executed will during
hospital stay on February 14, 1986. He died on
April 8, 1986, leaving none of $1 million estate
to his two surviving relatives, who challenged
will based on lack of mental capacity and undue
influence by one or more of the beneficiaries.
After trial court granted summary judgment to
beneficiaries, Court of Appeals reversed on both
grounds.
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As to lack of capacity, Court ruled that
expert testimony should have been permitted to
address effects of medical developments on
testatorIs capacity because those effects "are
beyond the pale of common knowledge. II Moreover,
Court held that there was a genuine issue of fact
about capacity presented by lay testimony.
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D.

Williams v. Vollman, Ky. App., 738 S.W.2d 849 (1987).
Testator died at 91 on February 19 1985.
Both testator's wife and one daughter had died in
May 1984 and testator had never been told.
Appellant a granddaughter challenged the will
prepared four or five months before testator's
death by her cousin a grandson t on grounds of
lack of mental capacity and undue influence.
The
will disinherited the testator's only living child
and all of his grandchildren except one to whom
the testator left his house and an adjoining lot
to the grandson. After trial court granted
directed verdict to grandson on grounds that there
was no evidence of probative value of mental
incapacity or undue influence Court of Appeals
reversed on grounds that there was evidence of
undue influence.
t

t

t

t

t

t

t

Mere fact that testator did not know his wife
and daughter had predeceased him -- which arguably
showed he did not know the natural objects of his
bounty -- was not adequate he did not have
capacity to know the objects of his bounty.
Otherwise evidence showed his mental faculties
were intact.
t

"It is not sufficient that it be shown that
there was merely an opportunity to exercise undue
influence t but some evidence must be adduced
showing circumstances from which it can reasonably
be inferred that undue influence was exerted."
Williams v. Vollman Ky. App.t 738 S.W.2d 849 t 850
(1987) t quoting Copley v. Craft
KY.t 312 S.W.2d
899
900 (1958) (emphasis added in Williams) .
t

t

t

VI.

SAMPLE JURy INSTRUCTIONS: Taken from West v. Goldstein KY.t
830 S.W.2d 379 (1992) (Westerfield Jeff. Cir. Ct~) t
which are evidently drawn from 2 J. S. Palmore & R. W.
Eades Kentucky Instructions to Juries § 50.01-.03 at
393-95 (4th ed. 1989).
t

t

t

t
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Instruction No.1:

For purposes of these instructions:

1)
A person has testamentary capacity in making a
will if at the time of its execution she has such
mental capacity as to enable her to know the natural
objects of her bounty, her obligation to them, the
character and value of her estate, and to dispose of it
according to a fixed purpose of her own.
2)
Undue influence is any influence obtained over the
mind of the deceased to such an extent as to destroy
her free agency and lead her to do against her will
what she would otherwise refuse to do, whether exerted
at one time or another, directly or indirectly, if it
so operated upon her mind at the time she signed the
paper. [But any reasonable influence resulting from
acts of kindness or from appelas to the feeling or
understanding, and not destroying free agency, is not
undue influence.]
Instruction No.3:
Do you believe from the evidence that [testator] lacked
testamentary capacity at the time she executed the
Codicil dated January 5, 1984 or that she was induced
by undue influence exerted upon her by [executor] to
sign said codicil? YES/NO
Instruction No.4:
Only if you have answered "yes" to anyone of the
questions set forth in the Instructions above, you are
further instructed to determine whether you believe, by
clear and convincing evidence, that the transfers to
[executor] and her family as set forth below were each
fair and were freely and voluntarily entered into by
[testator].
If you so believe, you shall answer the
following questions Yes, otherwise you shall answer No.

--±

The check from [testator] 's Trust Account,
ultimately used for the purchase of a certificate
of deposit in the amount of $10,000 on December
II, 1986. YES/NO

~
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INTRODUCTION

Until recently, choosing among life insurance companies or products was like putting
together a child's puzzle with big pieces. Advisors merely put together the same puzzle with
the same pieces for each client. For many, the decision was narrowed to which company a
participating whole life policy wO.uld be placed.
Today all that has changed with company failures such as Executive Life, Mutual Benefit
and of course Kentucky Central, great emphasis is being placed on due diligence. Not only on
the company, but the products, marketing and proposals of those companies. The effects of
Prudential Securities' limited partnerships and Metropolitan Life's Tampa, Florida office selling
whole life insurance disguised as retirement accounts are only starting to be felt.
Add to this the history insurers' have had with investments in long-term bonds in the
early 1980's, junk bonds in ·the late 1980's and commercial mortgages and real eState in the
early 1990's. Recent developments in CMOs and derivatives are equally disturbing and will
almost surely bring more federal oversight to the industry.
Combine the above with Risk Based Capital requirements, higher corporate income taxes (DAC)
and the sharp drop in long-term interest and inflation rates over the past several years and you
begin to realize the necessity for new and improved products. But these products are like new
puzzles, much harder to put together with many smaller pieces and sometimes an unknown
picture.
This outline will attempt to help advisors review proposals using concepts and techniques
quite peculiar in some instances and routine in others. Caution is urged for the inexperienced
advisor using yesterday's guides in evaluating proposals and conducting due diligence on current
products and company financials. Today it is possible to be sued over life insurance advise you
didn't provide and considering the leveraged nature of insurance; where a small premium
provides substantial coverage, the stakes are high.
TI.

. LIFE INSURANCE BASICS
A.

Proposalsvs Policy

Relying on a policy illustration is an extremely hazardous way to buy life
insurance. The most powerful sales tool an agent has is an illustration of future values or ledger
statement. It shows how a policy is supposed to perform over a 20, 30 or 40 year time period.
Suppose to, but almost certainly will not. Nothing obligates the insurer to deliver on the
projected values, and almost nothing inhibits the imagination in making them.

J

~

Suppose you'.re thinking of buying 1,000 shares of General Electric, and your
stockbroker hands you a computer generated printout showing what the investment will be worth
in 30 years. Ridiculous, right? Yet that's precisely how life insurance is sold.
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There are three items a company may use to create or alter cash value and death
benefits. These are; expenses, mortality and interest rate (investments) each will be covered in
detail later. For now, it is only neCessary to know these items can be anything an agent or
company wants them to be in an illustration - not what they actually are.

o~:

~

The policy itself, on the other hand, is the contract and therefore will spell out
in specific terms which elements are indeed factual. Comparing the differences between the
proposal and policy will shed light on the vast discrepancies and provides an excellent beginning
to explore them.
B.

Assumptions in Illustrations

Small adjustments in assumptions can magnify into large numbers, particularly
in the later years of a policy proposal. The magic of compound interest works well for a ledger
statement as it will project values out 30 to 40 years. Advisors should instruct clients to pay no
attention at all to far-out projections as they are at best, a guess.
As an example, a 1 % interest rate increase assumed on an illustration would show
a 30% increase in cash value in 40 years. For someone age 45 buying a permanent life
insurance policy, this one percent would artificially create a 41 % increase in cash value at age
95 on a ledger statement.
Assumptions in interest rates, mortality and expense charges in illustrations need
not be based on any actual expectation or reality. In cases where all three components have
been artificially manufactured the results, although actuarially feasible, are mathematically
impossible. This is not suggesting all illustrations are inherently skewed, but both agents and
actuaries get caught up in a vicious cycle trying to make their policies look better than the
competition's.
Agents are competing, so they go back to their companies' marketing department,
which then puts pressure on actuaries to build a better illustrating policy. Every few months the
process starts over again as everyone is leapfrogging everyone else. In response to this
gamesmanship, the National Association of Insurance Commissioners (NAIC) in April decided
to move ahead with a proposal to prohibit showing any future projections not guaranteed.
Regulators voted to allow companies to illustrate past performance, but only by using a common
index (yet to be developed) for comparison purposes.
.~
~

If regulators succeed in passing these changes it would mean a radical departure
from current practice. At first glance, this appears to be beneficial - but some additional
concerns soon surface. The common index to be developed may be as meaningless as the
existing net payment cost and surrender cost indexes. Would current scales be allowed so
consumers will not confuse past with future performance? What will showing the past
performance - during a bull market offering rates of 10%-15 % - due to consumers
expectations? Focusing all attention on illustration guarantees might well lead to companies
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raising guaranteed values to a point where it is not fiscally prudent. illustration reform is needed
but unlikely to be resolved soon. And while the current system makes it difficult for individuals
to judge on their own, simply being aware of the problems may help you avoid the most obvious
situations.

c.

Persistency From a Historical View

The average life of a life insurance policy is between 5-7 years. A Life Insurance
Marketing and Research Association (LIMRA) study of Whole Life policies revealed that after
10 years, only 27% of those policies were still in force. (See Exhibit 1.)
The late 1970s and early 1980s was the beginning of the "replacement era" and
led to a phenomenal increase in lapses of low yielding Whole Life policies. Universal Life was
much more attractive as the high current interest rates projected much higher values over an
extended time period. This has obviously skewed the persistency statistics, but perhaps not as
much as one might originally believe.
Let's imagine a typical insurance sale to a 35 year old head of the household and
follow an imaginary trail of subsequent events. P.J. was approached in 1975 by a friendly
insurance agent and purchased a participating Whole Life policy. In 1982, P.J. was revisited
and shown the benefits of replacing that policy with a high interest Universal Life policy. In
August 1987,· the same agent returned to explain an even better opportunity - replace the U.L.
policy with a Variable Universal Life contract. Then in 1993, our agent returns with the college
funding concept of borrowing from the life insurance. P.J. is now 53, facing another child
going to college in two years and is unsure of the market. Wisely, the friendly insurance agent
suggests the safety of a participating Whole Life policy and completes the paperwork.
Although fictional this is not an unrealistic picture of an event seen all too often.
While the agents feel they have done a service for their client, in reality, after surrender charges
and the foregone future dividends of the original policy, P.J. is actually worse off than staying
in the first policy. The agent however is planning to send a postcard from his vacation home
in Hawaii. Over the long run there should be little investment differences between whole and
universal life, and therefore no significant advantages for the different types of cash value
policies. Whole life policies may have higher dividend scales (compared to universal life) when
interest rates are heading down, but the opposite is probably true when rates are heading up.
~

i

Jumping from one type of policy to another due to presumed interest or dividend
crediting advantages is not a good idea. Insurance, though illustrated for the long-term
accumulation features for the consumer, is adversely affected by the short-term (first year)
commission incentives for an agent. As long as current commission scales are used, with yield
hungry consumers scrambling for high returns in a low interest rate environment, persistency
will remain an issue for insurance companies.
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PIECES OF THE PUZZLE
A.

Expenses

~

~
~

~

The actual cost of owning a policy over a period of time is made up of expenses,
including commissions and home office overhead - plus the mortality charges (cost of insurance
protection). These costs are offset to some extent by the policy's investment return. These
elements - expenses, mortality and investment are the primary components of all cash value
policies and referred to as the "EMI" factors.
1.

Acquisition Costs

Commissions make up the largest part of expense for insurance and include
the selling agent and his general agent. Although these vary widely by the type of policy and
company, first year commissions average from 55%-110% of the first year premium for cash
value policies. Renewal commissions are typically much less and can be a flat percentage (5 %)
of the policy life or graded - 10% years 2-5, 8% years 5-10 and 2% after 10 years. Another
form of commission called expense reimbursement or allowance is in addition to the first year
commission.

~

Besides commlSSlOns, policies include marketing expenses - which
basically are all costs of selling, excepting commissions, and include fringe benefits,
underwriting, accounting and actuarial expenses. Office overhead, recruiting and training,
advertising and investment management are also factors of the expense equation and affect policy
performance. Policy expenses are usually 150%-200% of the first year premium and explains
why there is little or no cash value in the early years. (See Exhibit 2.)
2.

Lapses

A major indirect expense and a determinant of a policy's ultimate cost is
policy lapses. It can take up to 20 years for an insurance company to recover the cost of issuing
a policy, and when they terminate early, the remaining policyholders bear the cost of
unrecovered expenses on those policies. Lapse rates vary dramatically among companies. Some
encourage replacement - while others discourage it. Surrender charges are applied in an
attempt to control the adverse financial repercussions.
When evaluating proposals complications often arise in this area.
Surrender charges result in no actual cash values for several years after issue. This may be due
to high expenses that must be recovered, but it may also be a deliberate strategy to justify higher
illustrated values in later years. In effect, the company withholds money from policyholders
who surrender early to be distributed later to those who remain - a sort of sinking fund. If
fewer people surrender then the company anticipates, there is less money to be distributed later
to those who remain. Although the policy illustration may show higher long-term values, this
only works if enough policies lapse in early years.
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3.

Policy Reserves

Another indirect pricing factor (expense) is policy reserves, the minimum
amount a company must keep on hand to cover future claims, and is mandated by state law. An
average of 34 cents of each income dollar goes to reserves. Since these are not currently paid
out to policyholders, it is important to know what the company's reserves are and what the
minimum reserve requirement is. This isn't always easy to find out. Most of the home office
personnel won't know what you're talking about and of those that do (or should) - many won't
want to divulge the information.
4.

Expense Assumptions in Proposals

Improvements in future expenses are often assumed in proposals and
therefore it is necessary to determine what this assumption is based upon. One is to assume that
economies of scale (more policies) will in the future reduce each policy's burden of overhead
expense. Another is re-organization or re-engineering of a part of the field sales force or home
office. The important thing to remember is this is an assumption only and can be made even
in the face of rising expenses. Again, these assumptions are an attempt to reflect future
expectations - but overly optimistic assumptions are usually the result of competitive pressures
and future cash values or death benefits are then distorted.
B.

Mortality

Current and guaranteed mortality charges are based on insurance company's own
experience and mortality tables which estimate the cost of paying death claims for all
policyholders of all ages for the same type of policy. The actuaries who devise these tables
make certain statistical assumptions about death rates which allows the company to develop
pricing that will, if accurate or conservative, bring in more revenue than paid out in death
benefits.
The table being used as the basis for a particular policy is paramount to predicting
the future cash value. If the company has used an optimistic table, therefore underestimating
costs, there is a chance more policyholders will die than expected. As a result, policyholders
still living will have to make up the deficit resulting in lower cash values. This situation is quite
common. Life expectancy increased steadily after WW II, but the rate of improvement has
slowed to where it is almost flat on a graph and its future course is unknowable. Mortality
charges are probably as low as they're going to be for the foreseeable future, yet proposals may,
and do, illustrate the same rate of mortality improvement from the past 50 years for the next 50
years.
1.

Financial Effects of Table Use

There are various mortality tables used in the insurance industry today and
their costs per $1,000 of coverage vary widely. One version is the non-smoker/smoker version
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of the 1975-80 Select and Ultimate Basic Table NAB which is derived from actual industry
experience and is a standard pricing table used by actuaries. The most common is the 1980 CSO
table, which replaced the 1958 CSO table. A derivative of the 1980 CSO table is the 1980 CSO
Basic Table, which is based on the same mortality experience but does not include the safety
margins. Another table is the 1980 U.S. Life Table, which reflects the actual mortality
experience of the entire U.S. population.

~

For illustrative purposes, a quick calculation shows just how variable the
costs in a policy can be, based solely on mortality tables. The cost per $1,000 for a 55 year old
male using the 1980 CSO Basic Table is $8.28. The U.S. Life Table rate for the same person
is $12.18 per $1,000. For a $1 million policy that is a difference of $3,900 which could be used
to show a substantial (20%-25%) reduction in premium over a competing product. Or it could
be used to inflate the cash values illustrated. The $3,900 could be assumed to be included in
the cash value (as additional premium) and compounded at 8.5% would show an additional
$1,251,181 at age 95.
2.

Rating Classifications
a.

Select. Super Select. Preferred

Enhancements to the mortality tables or assumptions used by
various carriers include rating classifications such as: select, super select and preferred. These
are based on the assumption that recent insurance buyers are healthier than the rest of the
population of the same age, because the rest of the population did not have to pass the
company's medical exam or questionnaire. Proposals using a table with select or preferred
factors will produce a less expensive premium, high cash values or both.
Often agents will quote using only the best rating classification
however unlikely the proposed insured is to actually receive the rating. The older the client the
more likely the highest (best) classifications will fail to be achieved. Examples of some
requirements are: no family deaths (parents or siblings) prior to age 60; no blood pressure or
cholesterol history; strict height and weight guidelines; no more than two moving vehicle
violations and the typical no-smoking, no alcohol and standard underwriting criteria.
b.

~

~

Non-Tobacco, Non-Smoking and No Cigarettes

These are other rating classifications used by actuaries to further
define risks for pricing of insurance costs. Note that each are separate and distinct from each
other in that someone who smokes a pipe or cigars may qualify for the best rate in one company
but not for another. Care must be taken in reviewing proposals to determine which company
rating is being used vs another.
The non-smoker/preferred risk classification is a relatively new
category and no experience is available from any company over a 10 year period. This results
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in the assumptions being more aggressive from a pricing standpoint and will have a tendency
to increase the risk of future cash values not being attained or of higher premiums should actual
experience be less than expected experience.
3.

Gender

Another mortality issue that can affect the price of a policy is gender
difference. Based on mortality experience which indicates women live longer than men, women
would pay less for life insurance than men. Some states however consider it discriminatory to
charge premiums based on gender. The issue is legislated by state, so it is critical for an advisor
evaluating life insurance proposals to know whether mortality charges are based on a unisex or
sex distinct table. Some states offer the choice of using either. Careful attention to this factor
will sometimes expose a situation where one proposal using unisex rates is being compared to
another using sex distinct rates. The effect will be to increase cash values or decrease the
premium amount for a male using the lower unisex tables.
C.

Investments Qnterest)
1.

Portfolio Composition

Assets in the portfolio of an insurer help to determine the interest rate or
dividend scale declared for allocation to policy cash values or policyholders. Advisors must
realize however that a company's net rate of investment income is NOT the rate that is credited
to a policy. Nor is a company likely to have just one investment portfolio for all products.
When a company offers multiple lines of product, investments are usually allocated to each line.
Various products then have various portfolios which in turn will produce different rates of
return. You could buy two products from the same company and get very different results.
To understand the investment performance of a single company, it maybe
helpful to begin with information about the industry as a whole. Although the specific asset mix
in investment portfolios vary greatly among companies, the trends are clear. In 1975
government securities made up 5 % of the typical portfolio, by 1985 this was up to 15 % and in
1993 was 20%. At the same time, long-term mortgages dropped from 31 % in 1975 to 21 % in
1985 to 17 % in 1993. Corporate bonds continue to be the largest single asset group with 34 %
in 1975, 37% in 1985 and 45% in 1993. Stocks declined from 10% to 9% to 5% in 1993
according to the American Council of Life Insunince and the 1993 Life Insurance Facts Book.
The difference between portfolios of yesteryear and those of today reflect
significant changes in the returns as well as for the mix. From 1950 to 1985, the net rate of
investment income - gross income minus expenses - increased steadily from 3.13 % to 9.63 %.
Net investment yield on mean invested assets in 1993 however was 8.04% as reported by the
Townsend & Schupp Co. composite of 130 major companies. This reduction in net investment
yield is explained by several factors: less junk bonds, less real estate investments and
mortgages; the calling of high rate bonds and their replacement by much lower yielding ones;
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increased capital requirements and higher corporate income taxes. Yet little change has been
seen to date in the dividend projections of participating companies.
-;
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We saw earlier the effect mortality alone could have on future projections
in a policy illustration. Million Dollar Round Table magazine published a chart showing the
effects interest rates and mortality have on a Universal Life policy, assuming all other factors
being equal. These are illustrated in Exhibit 3 and are based upon four illustrations. Two
assumed a credited interest rate of 9.5% and two assumed 8.5%. One of the 9.5% and 8.5%
policies assumed a projected mortality table, where the other two assumed current mortality
figures. Under the best assumption, 9.5% interest rate and projected mortality, the 40 year cash
value was $525,000. Lowering the interest rate one percent, cash value dropped to $300,000
close to a 43% reduction. The 9.5% interest rate and current mortality illustration produced
$150,000 cash value, a 71 % decrease while the 8.5 % and current mortality generated less than
$1,000 - a startling 99.8% reduction from the best assumption. Even seemingly minor
differences among companies in the level of expenses, mortality tables or assumptions and
investment returns on credited interest rates or dividend scales - become critical factors when
they are.projected over a long period of time.
2.

Portfolio Changes

As the composite of insurers' portfolios have changed over time, the
effects of these changes must be viewed as to the results they have on policyholders and of
course, the projections used in a policy illustration. The most obvious and somewhat recent
example is the junk bond escapade of insurers and the financial impact on Executive Life, First
Capital and Fidelity Bankers among others. These changes occurred as the marketplace became
more focused on returns and companies responded by. seeking higher yields than available in the
traditional bond market. The effects of this particular strategy on the industry in general and
policyholders especially needs no more discussion. But what are some other areas which should
be viewed with an equally jaundiced eye and grave concerns for similar, if not more sever,
consequences?
a.

Real Estate

Perhaps the Travelers Life story is best used as an example of how
real estate and mortgage loan problems can impact a company. The ratio of problem mortgages
and foreclosed real estate to total surplus for Travelers in 1992 was 151 %, as compared to a
23 % composite of 30 companies. Travelers was taken over by Primerica as liquidity was
impacted, asset values declined, vacancies rose and contract holders surrendered policies.
Exhibit 4 shows the 10 companies with the largest dollar increase
in holdings of foreclosed real estate in the first nine months of 1993 and their percentage change.
The four largest dollar increases were by major insurers Metropolitan, Prudential, Principal and
Teachers - but their percent changes were enormous - ranging to as high as 77 % by Met.
This compared to an 11 % gain for the composite group. These 10 companies total holdings rose

1-8

$1.5 billion for the first nine months of 1993, while the other 120 companies in the Life
Insurance Business Risk Analysis review had a $0.3 billion decrease.
Foreclosed and delinquent real estate, and restructured and
delinquent mortgages, result in lost investment income. This depresses investment yields,
operating earnings and policyholder returns. Net investment yield for the life insurance industry
dropped from 8.44% in 1992 to 8.04% in 1993. Of the top 10 companies in 1990, ranked by
the ratio of mortgages and real estate to total surplus, (six with such assets equal to 8 to 10 times
surplus) two are in conservation, one merged, one demutualized, one restructured and one
received a $700 million surplus infusion.
b.

CMOs/Derivatives

While junk bonds and mortgages have decreased as a percentage
of surplus for the insurance industry, CMOs are the fastest growing area of new investments in
the industry today and it has been predicted that they will present the next problem asset class
for insurers. The General Accounting Office (GAO) has just issued a report, two years in the
making, which calls for Congress to "bring the currently unregulated OTC derivatives activities
of securities firm and insurance company affiliates under the purview of one or more of the
existing federal financial regulators and to ensure that derivatives regulation is consistent and
comprehensive across regulatory agencies." The report also found the growth rate of OTC and
exchange-traded derivatives for insurance firms from 1990-1992 was 100 % and expected to rise.
CMOs are a package of mortgage loans which have either been
divided into tranches or where principal and interest payments have been stripped from the
package and marketed as separate bond issues. If mortgage loans are split into components, a
CMO may be an Interest-Only strip (10), a Principal-Only strip (PO), or a Residual strip.
Although simplified, this definition will suffice for the purpose of a basic understanding of the
concept.
How great of a risk do CMOs poise to life insurers and/or their
policyholders? An interesting comparison can be made between CMOs as a percentage of total
surplus to the historical percentage to total surplus for junk bonds, and for mortgages and real
estate. As of 12/31/93, the top 10 companies of CMOs with the highest percentage to total
surplus, such assets equaling 5 to 8 times surplus, included some well known carriers as Aetna,
Transamerica and IDS Life. Thirteen major life insurers had CMO bonds exceeding 472 % of
total surplus or higher. In comparison, 12/31/90 figures for junk bonds and mortgage/real estate
ratios to total surplus, shows that of the 4 junk bond holders and 2 mortgage loan holders that
went into conservatorship, each had such assets equal to 9 times surplus. Whether or not a
leverage ratio of CMO bonds equal to 5 times surplus is risky or sound will depend on the types
of CMOs and remains to be seen. By any standard, it certainly raises an issue for concerned
advisors providing insurance analysis or advice.
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New Money or Portfolio Rates

The traditional method of crediting interest on whole life and many
universal life policies is the portfolio average. Under this method, new and old policyholders
of a particular product line share one portfolio regardless of when their premiums were paid and
investments were purchased. With this method, investments are not assigned to policyholders
or tracked by investments made in any year. Someone purchasing a policy in 1994 will receive
credited interest this year from investments made in 1990, 1991 and any other year the
investment remains in the portfolio. The insurer using the portfolio average method will usually
invest longer term than an insurer using another method.
In some situations, the portfolio average method can be seen as a benefit
for the insurance buyer. This is true when the average return on a company's investment
portfolio is 10%, but new investments in 1994 are only paying 7.5%. When all previous and
current investments are commingled, the portfolio average rate may be close to 9.5% - much
higher than the rate on new investments.

--]

The other method of crediting interest to policyholders is called the new
money method, which came into vogue with Universal Life - even though some Universal Life
policies use the portfolio average method. With this method, many portfolios are created as
policyholders who pay premiums in 1994 for example, receive interest based upon the
investments made in that year. New policyholders do not receive returns on old investments.
The new money portfolios are typically weighted towards sorter term investments.
Which method is best? Obviously, the new money method will look better
in an illustration when market rates are higher than the portfolio yield. As an example,
remember in the mid-1980s when interest rates on U.L. contracts were being illustrated at 12 %
and higher, but Whole Life credited rates or dividends were only 6-8 %? Now we see the
opposite situation as interest rates have dropped from 9% to 5 % and lower on shorter maturities,
the portfolio average rate will illustrate a much higher dividend or interest rate. Over a period
of time there should be no significant advantage to either method as they will tend to average
themselves. Illustrations however will not assume this and project the current economics (high
interest or portfolio rate) over the next 30-40 years.
IV.

,.
,.~

WHICH TYPE OF COMPANY

A.

Mutual or Stock

a

After an insurance company receives income from portfolio returns, premiums
and other sources, it pays its costs, takes a profit for itself and then credits the rest as interest
or dividends. In a nonparticipating policy, after interest is credited to policy cash values, profits
are sent to the company's shareholders as dividends. If the insurer is a mutual (participating)
company the policyholders receive dividends.
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1.

Dividends vs Interest Rates

Historically mutual companies have increased dividends regularly based
primarily on the uninterrupted rise in portfolio yields. Portfolio yields are now decreasing based
upon several factors, many of which have been discussed. Some others are risk based capital
requirements, higher taxes, interest sensitive products, increasing expenses and decreasing profit
margins. Based on these factors dividend scales will be reduced and some companies are doing
so. Many others however are still illustrating in proposals, assumed continued increases as in
the past or projecting current portfolio returns over the next several decades. This is no
different than the assumption of 12 % interest rates over the life of a policy in U.L. proposals
a few years ago.
Questions which need to be addressed in this area are whether dividends
or interest rates are based on gross or net returns; before or after deduction for taxes; before
expenses or net of expenses, and of course if the portfolio average or new money methodology
is used.
2.

Tax Status of Dividends

Dividends are defined by IRe Section 72; "Dividends on a participating
life insurance policy are tax exempt as return of investment. Dividends are considered to be a
partial return of basis; hence they reduce the cost basis of the contract. This reduction in cost
must be taken into account in computing gain or loss. upon sale, surrender, exchange or
maturity. "
Dividends to policyholders almost always are illustrated as purchasing paidup additions. This strategy has been shown to support the increase in cash values for illustrative
purposes and face amounts for inflation purposes. It is often necessary for this technique to be
used to substantiate the borrowing/loan scenarios as it obviously increases the cost basis of the
policyholder and therefore reduces or eliminates any taxable event resulting from this practice.
In contrast, dividends used to reduce premiums or paid in cash reduce the policyholders basis
and using the illustration figures, could result in a taxable event. This strategy can negate the
benefits of banding, as the purchase of additional coverage is at an older age and higher dollar
amounts.
Dividends can be compared to the overpayment of income taxes. Many
individuals have more tax withheld than necessary in order to receive a "refund." Dividends
paid to policyholders are tax exempt as return of investment - meaning policyholders have
overpaid their premiums and have given the insurer an interest-free loan similar to the
overpayment of withholding taxes. The insurer keeps the interest earned on this excess amount
and returns, via a dividend, only the excess premium. The "dividend" would be reported as
taxable income if it represented a return on capital vs a return of capital.
~

~
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3.

Dividend/Interest Payment History

Mutual insurers have increased policy dividend scales since 1950 during
uninterrupted increases in aggregate portfolio yields. They now are being faced with reducing
dividends scales to reflect the need to build surplus to support sales growth and meet RBC
requirements. Home office expenses have increased and interest-sensitive products require
investments with much shorter durations than traditional products. These shorter time
investments followed by the decline in interest rates, inflationary expenses in the group health
business, AIDS and higher taxes are all causes for recent dividend reductions.
Dividend scales rise by policy duration (as aggregate interest earnings
grow) and by calendar year (if portfolio yields rise). But net investment yield for the life
industry has fallen from almost 10% in 1985 to 8.04% in 1993. Net yield for the industry is
expected to fall as investment income is lost on non-performing mortgage loans and bonds are
acquired at much lower rates. Dividends peaked in 1990 but fell in 1992 and 1993 below the
level paid in 1989 as interest rates (the key component of dividend scales) continued their
downward mood.
4.

Dividends/Interest Determined by Marketing Strategy

Most industries are finding the current economic environment difficult.
Rising costs and an increased demand for quality have reduced profit margins. Consumers are
looking for the best bargain and rarely abide to brand loyalty. The life industry is no exception
to this reality, and because of the downturn in new sales, it may face worse than other
businesses. Adjusted for inflation, new life premiums have decreased 23.7% since 1987 - a
record period of decline.
In an era of declining interest rates, such as we now face, some insurers
will take discretions in setting interest rates or dividend scales. The effect is to temporarily
subsidize new policyholders with interest earned on existing policyholders' money. This
assumed rate is projected for the life of the policy - even though it is destined to average down
over time. Assume an insurer sold many policies years ago when Treasuries were yielding 10%.
Now rates have fallen to 8 %; causing old bonds to increase in value. In a mutual fund, old
policyholders would get the higher rate and a windfall capital gain. But using the portfolio
average method for a product the carrier wants to sell, the insurer blends the new 8 % bonds
with the old 10% bonds and illustrates a 9.5% dividend rate. If a company wants to make a
whole life product more attractive to potential customers, the carrier can simply assume and
illustrate a higher dividend scale using the portfolio average.
Another approach, used primarily with U.L policies, is to assume an
interest rate bonus to be credited at certain stages in a policy. Interest rate bonuses of 112 %,
1 % and 1.25% may be credited at the tenth, fifteenth and twentieth years, respectively. When
it comes time to pay, the company may drop its current interest rate or raise mortality charges
or increase the expense deduction. But some companies guarantee this bonus rate in their
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contract, right? Well, imagine an employment contract that works like this: First year you get
a salary of $100,000. Second year you are guaranteed a bonus of $50,000, but the salary is not
guaranteed. So your employer could cut your base pay in half the second year at the same time
it gives you a "bonus." What kind of guarantee is that?
5.

Dividends/Interest Paid from Earnings or Surplus

In 1992, for the first time in eight years, every major mutual life insurance
company earned its policyholder dividend payments based on information in The Mutual Life
Insurance Industry Handbook. Each of 78 mutual life insurers with more than $100 million in
assets had operating earnings (before dividends, income taxes and interest maintenance reserves)
which exceeded their policy dividends paid in 1992. This score (78-0) benefited from excluding
companies in conservation (Mutual Benefit & Fidelity Mutual) and by the conversion of
Equitable Life from a mutual to a stock company.
These facts give insight that dividends are sometimes not currently
"earned" but nonetheless may still be used as assumptions in an illustration. The payment of
dividends may indeed come from surplus, if investment or portfolio income is inadequate to
sustain a high projected scale. Capital gains are often used to support dividend scales and the
recent interest rate decline and corresponding call of high rate bonds has been used to prolong
a dividend rate which is higher than the portfolio return. This explains why some companies
have dividend or interest rates that make no sense in today's interest rate environment. Net
capital gains of 6.1 billion were reported in 1993 up from 2.2 billion in 1992.
B.

Capital Structure
1.

Access to Capital

Mutuals lack parent companies and access to capital markets to solve
liquidity problems. Compared to stock life insurers, mutuals have a lower net investment yield
rate, lower asset mix in investment grade bonds, higher asset mix in junk bonds, real estate and
mortgages and lower net cash flow ratios - according to Townsend & Schupp, an investment
banking and credit research firm specializing in the insurance industry. Poor liquidity
exacerbated runs on the bank at both Mutual Benefit and Fidelity Mutual. From 1989-1992, the
100 largest stock life insurers received surplus infusions of $.9, $1. 9, $3.8 and $3.7 billion
respectively. Mutual companies conceptually have a large margin to absorb contingencies
because policy dividend scales may be reduced, although companies are reluctant to do so.
Policyholders then represent, at least from a historical perspective, the only access to capital for
mutual insurers.
2.

Demutualization or Surplus Notes

The lack of access to capital markets and poor liquidity spurred Equitable
to demutualize and become a stock company. The need to raise capital is partly caused by the
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RBC standards and can only be accomplished by mutuals by (1) demutualizing, which is
expensive and slow or (2) issuing surplus notes.
Surplus notes are unsecured debt securities approved as surplus in an
issuer's state of domicile. Surplus notes, offer the advantage of being capital even though they
are also debt - and people wonder why insurance is difficult to understand! Insurers pay
interest on these notes only if the company has earnings, as well. Surplus notes enable mutual
companies to access cheap money as current interest rates are low and the spreads are good.
The issuance of surplus notes is not yet a trend but there has been
increased activity. In 1993, Mass. Mutual, Prudential and Metropolitan issued notes for $250
million, $300 million and $700 million, respectively. Reasons cited for the issues include
raising capital at favorable rates, preparing for health care reform and in Prudential's case, for
post-retirement employee benefit obligations. In the first quarter of 1994, six mutual insurers
have issued surplus notes totaling $1.163 billion and two companies, Midland Mutual and State
Mutual, are seeking to demutualize. The number of mutual life insurers has fallen 39 %, from
171 in 1953 to 105 in 1993, according to American Council of Life Insurance data. This
number is even less now due to recent demutualizations and to mutual failures and mergers. A
June 6, 1994 editorial by National Underwriter editor, Stephen Pointek, raises the question of
an outmoded mutual structure and exploring the idea of establishing stock companies as the
industry norm.
3.

Risk Based Capital Requirements

The RBC requirements are just being felt as the filing of 1993 statutory
statements has just passed. The National Association of Insurance Commissioners' (NAIC)
model law requires the filing of an RBC Report by all domestic life insurers before March 15.
While only a few states have actually passed the modellaw, the law does provide any foreign
insurer must provide the report to the insurance commissioner upon request. In the simplest of
terms, RBC requires insurers to keep minimum levels of capital based on a formula that takes
into account the amount of risk each company faces on its products and investments.
Policy designs will be and have been impacted by RBC as well as new
product offerings. Variable annuities and variable U.L. have experienced growth rates of grand
proportions partly for tax deferral and partly because of potential increased returns in a low
interest environment. Another cause is the planned marketing of these products by insurers
because there are virtually no effects on RBC capital ratios. Since liabilities in the separate
account exactly offset assets in the separate account, the only impact would be to the extent the
company maintained surplus, which under normal circumstances is nominal. Fixed products
would reduce the ratio by requiring higher capital levels.
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V.
~

~

~

WHICH TYPE OF POLICY

A.

Permanent. Term. Blended. Load or No-Load
~

Once the decision is made on a stock or mutual company the selection of the right
policy to use is next. With the myriad of products available today and the variety of client
circumstances, what kind of policy should be purchased? Should the advisor use current
assumption whole life, a convertible term policy with a disability waiver, variable (D.L. or
whole life) or one of the no-load (no commission) products? The key to matching clients with
policies is understanding the options, features, costs and benefits of each contract. Basic policy
characteristics are outlined in this table:

aoMost

Least
Cost

Universal

Whole Life

Variable

Cash Value Risk

Whole Life

Universal

Variable

Death Benefits Risk

Whole Life

Universal

Variable

Client Involvement

Whole Life

Universal

Variable

Policy Modifications

Whole Life

Universal

Variable

I

1.

Whole Life

These policies may be either participating or non-participating as well as
interest sensitive or non-interest sensitive; .that is, returns which are either directly tied to
fluctuating interest rates (n~w m,oney method) or not (portfolio average). The most popular
today are interest sensitive par and stock company fixed premium. With a non-participating
policy, the owner will receive no more than the guaranteed cash value specified in the contract.
The participating policy generally requires higher premiums, the diffe(ence used purely for
investment purposes. The annual dividends are considered a return of premium and a reduction
of basis, for tax purposes. Par products set the dividend scale retrospectively at the end of the
policy year, while stock company products set interest rate and risk charges prospectively for
the upcoming year. The "EMI" factors· are bundled in this type of policy and therefore
impossible to determine separate costs.
2.

J

Universal Life

U.L. policies are separated into the "EMI" elements with each easily
measured and identified. This design allows the insured to vary the death benefit or premiums
according to current needs. It is only necessary to pay enough premium to cover mortality and
expense charges, if so desired. U.L. products have two death benefit alternatives - level
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(Option A) or increasing (Option B). The Option B provides the cash value in addition to the
face amount of the policy as a death benefit.
The policy has guaranteed death benefits and cash values so long as a
minimum premium is paid. The guarantees are typically much shorter, such as 5 years, and are
referred to as no lapse guarantees. Investments made within the portfolio for U.L. products are
more short-term than under the portfolio average method. This is necessary because the
policyholder may vary premium payments, skip, or even stop them. The insurance carrier then
must keep a larger portion of its investments liquid to be prepared for an unpredictable premium
stream. The advisor must remember this factor and review the advantages or disadvantages of
the new money method of interest crediting in a proposal. In times of low interest rates, this
method may illustrate lower cash values than the higher portfolio average return assumed in a
.
whole life proposal.
3.

Variable Life

In contrast to the other products discussed, where investment performance
is a function of the company's general investment account, variable life allows the policyholder
to choose from a menu of investments. The cash value is generally not guaranteed in that the
values are tied to the performance of a particular investment fund which operates essentially as
a mutual fund. They generally do offer some minimum guaranteed death benefit. Variable
insurance can be Whole Life (either participating or non-participating) or Universal Life.
Changes in policy values are directly a result of the performance of the
fund into which premiums are directed, therefore transferring risk from the carrier to the
policyholder. Fund performance then will determine the amount of cash values and of the death
benefit. Wide fluctuations in returns can result in early lapse of a policy jf fund performance
is inadequate or if a loss is sustained, especially in the early years. (See Exhibit 5 for VUL
Analysis.)
4.

~

Survivorship or Second to Die Policies

These contracts cover two insureds and mature at the death of the last
survivor. They are most commonly used in estate planning situations where the proceeds are
not needed until the later of the two deaths; are usually between a husband and wife, and used
for payment of federal estate taxes. Survivorship policies place little to no emphasis on early
cash values since the policy is intended to be held until the second death. The policies are
usually less expensive than two individual policies as the expenses of the carrier are reduced by
issuing only one contract. Mortality charges are often much less because of delaying the death
claim until later. Some caution is urged in the assumption of mortality rates used by some
companies. Second to die policies are generally larger policies, $1 million usually the starting
point, and because of the purpose for which they are bought, have a low lapse rate.
:.:.;
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In evaluating these contracts, some additional concerns are raised which
must be addressed by the advisor. For instance, if the tax laws change - does the carrier allow
or the contract permit the coverage to be split into two policies? Is there a charge for this option
(rider) and is this charge reflected in the proposal? What if there is a divorce - can the policy
be split? Is evidence of insurability required on a split for tax purposes, divorce or both? What
is the chance of the client passing insurability standards at an advanced age? What is the
carrier's history on this? Are there new commissions earned? Are mortality charges increased?
Based on what table or assumption? What changes are assumed in the contract after the first
death? Answers to many of these questions will disclose both interesting differences and
additional issues for an advisor.
5.

10-20-30 Year Term

Originally, term policies were offered for a specified period of time, with
annual renewable term the distinct leader in the sales mix. Convertible term policies were
introduced which gave more flexibility and allowed for conversion to a permanent policy when
desired or appropriate. Since then, the name "term" has become a bit of an anachronism with
products that provide coverage to age 100. These products are usually term insurance in a
Universal Life chassis, utilizing the same averaging of premium assumption of whole life, but
paying only the mortality and expense charges. Because it eliminates the investment aspect, it
results in lower costs ..
This is soon to change as the long-anticipated "Triple X" regulations move
closer to becoming reality. The National Association of Insurance Commissioners (NArC) is
expected to adopt Triple X and go into effect January 1, 1995. It changes the reserving
requirements for term products with long-term guarantees and so-called "U.L. term." Products
with premium guarantees of more than 5 years will have higher gross premium deficiency
reserve requirements. Companies are preparing to redesign their products and 5 year guarantees
will most likely become the norm for long-term policies.

6.

Blended Policies

The cost of whole life can be reduced by using term insurance to make up
part of the face amount. For example, a policy consisting of 80% Whole Life and 20% term
insurance would be less than a "pure" Whole Life policy. The approach used with a blended
policy is using the dividends from the Whole Life portion to buy paid-up additions to replace
the term portion of the coverage. The larger the term amount or percentage, the longer this
process takes.
The use of term insurance or term riders to increase the Whole Life face
amount or reduce premiums for an equal face amount adds substantial risks to the policyholder.
The entire concept is dependent upon the use of projected and non-guaranteed dividends. The
larger the percentage mix of term insurance - the longer it takes to convert and the greater the
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risk of dividend reductions. The time involved also will affect the pricing of the paid up
additions as the insured is getting older each year. The other major risk is non-guaranteed
mortality charges. Any increase in mortality charges in the future may require additional
premiums - which, in effect, negates the original purpose of this concept. Term riders should
not be more than 20 % of the face amount as the sensitivity to interest rate or dividend changes
becomes problematic.
7.

No-Load or Low-Load Contracts

The most dynamic change in insurance today is the development and
marketing of "No Commission" life insurance, disability and annuity products. The term "lowload is generally used if at least 88 % of premium goes toward cash value right away according
to LIMRA. A "no-load" product has only a service fee and no separate charges for
administrative or monthly fees.
No-load and low-load are both no commission products generally described
as traditional products which have stripped out commissions and bonuses, home office and
agency expenses, recruiting and training cots,' as well as long surrender charges. These costs
typically will make up 150%-200% of the first year premium. (See Exhibit 2). Since these
products remove the traditional costs of cash value insurance policies, it results in immediate
cash values of up to 97 % of premiums. Some contracts even provide guaranteed cash surrender
values equal to the sum of premiums paid.

---'

These products are available in Kentucky only through Licensed Insurance
Consultants (LIC) who charge a fee for their services. This fee must be included in the total
cost for coverage, but virtually always represents substantially less than comparable commissions
on a similar product. Several advantages to the buyer are presented by this approach; fees for
this service can be deductible, insurance is bought directly from the insurance company and
possible conflicts of interest are eliminated because commission scales of various products are
not a consideration. The other advisors; attorney, trust officer or CPA can reduce or eliminate
their liability exposure to either product selection or performance by transferring it to the
independent LIC, who contracts directly with the client.
B.

Costs vs Benefits of Policy Selection
1.

r=:ll

~

Guarantees

We reviewed a situation where a carrier guaranteed the bonus rate in 10,
15 or 20 years but in reality, nothing prevented this company from dropping their credited rate
to do so. Other situations exist similar to this which many agents, buyers and advisors assume
to be guaranteed, but indeed are not. Today many mutual companies' dividend scales are higher
than they will be next year, and yet many provide proposal illustrations assuming these larger
dividends for 20 or 30 years.
~
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Another assumption, which deceptively hides policy expenses, in a
proposal includes a column referred to as the" Account Value." This account value cannot be
borrowed, used as collateral or even obtained by surrendering the policy. This fictional account
value shows the policy's value if there hadn't been any commissions paid to the agent and
general agent. But there were. Therefore, the true value of a policy is the surrender value.
For example, a proposal may indicate an annual premium of $10,000, first year account value
of $8,000, and surrender value of O. The $8,000 account value only exists as ink on the
proposal.
It often is claimed that whole life has greater policy guarantees than
universal life. This simply is not true. While it is true that whole life has guaranteed
premiums, guaranteed cash values, and guaranteed death benefits, in order to be competitive
these whole life policies depend on non-guaranteed dividends to enhance the policy values. The
level of dividends enhancing the policy depends on the "EMI" factors discussed earlier.
Therefore, whole life policies have the single mechanism (dividends) to adjust expense, mortality
and investment experience. Universal life and interest sensitive whole life, on the other hand,
have two mechanisms to adjust: mortality charges and interest rates. Whether a policy has only
one mechanism (dividends) or two (mortality and interest) to adjust - they both depend on the
same major pricing components. The element which U.L does not have is a guaranteed
premium.

A very large drop in projected values due to a change in policy pricing
factors occurred in 1988 with a participating whole life policy from a major Connecticut based
life insurer. In 1988, this insurer had a dividend scale of 10.75 %. By the end of the year the
rate, without warning, dropped to 9.05 %. This 170 basis point drop resulted in a projected
decrease in death benefits of 29 % and cash value decrease of 31 %, after 20 years, compared to
the proposal of just one year earlier. This case is illustrative for two reasons: first, it indicates
that participating whole life is as vulnerable to projected price changes as Universal Life and,
second, it is dramatic evidence that policy pricing assumptions (dividends) must be carefully
scrutinized .
2.

Flexibility or Liability

Circumstances and needs of a policyholder vary over time and often this
is the reason for life insurance being purchased to begin with. Yet invariably individuals end
up with a policy with higher costs and least flexibility - severely limiting the options available
for the inevitable changes which will occur. When asked to evaluate or approve a policy for a
client this factor is most often overlooked.
Whole life provides guaranteed premiums also meaning no flexibility to
reduce or skip premiums. Whole life is also unable to reduce the face amount should this
become a factor in the future, excepting a reduced paid-up policy option which also is fixed.
These factors can pose dangers from a liability standpoint, especially to the trustee of a life
insurance trust. On one hand, the guaranteed factors are attractive to the grantor - but the
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inability to change or alter many aspects of coverage presents a dilemma for the trust on the
other hand. As owner of the policy, is there a fiduciary duty required of the trust for the future
interests of beneficiaries?

_ _ -.2

Is the higher premium required by Whole Life worth the perceived benefits
of the "guarantees" and to what extent is the fiduciary responsible for possible future needs?
An interesting comparison is made between this choice and the investments a trustee would
purchase for a client. Would it be prudent to invest 100% of a clients assets in guaranteed
investments, i.e. government bonds, or is diversification and asset allocation of funds the
fiduciary's primary responsibility?
At the other end of the spectrum is Variable U.L. which allows complete
flexibility on the cash value, death benefits and premiums. For this flexibility, the policyholder
gives up the guaranteed aspects and transfers these risks to him or herself. In this case, are the
benefits of the flexibility, lack of guarantees and potential investment returns worth the risk?
What are the upfront costs and expenses incurred in a Variable Universal Life? Exhibit 5
presents a diagram depicting the charges on a variable U.L. policy issued by one of the top three
companies (in size) with the highest ratings. The costs break out as follows:
Premium Tax Deduction
Mgt. Fees & Expenses
Mortality & Expense Risk
Sales Charge
Admin., Risk & Premium Charges
TOTAL DEDUCTIONS

3.25%
.65%
.90%
6.00%
.50%
11.30%

The 11.30 % is deducted from gross returns to determine the net rate illustrated in a proposal.
In other words, a 20.30% gross annual return would be required in order to show a 9% net
return in a proposal. It becomes apparent the need for detailed analysis of the prospectus to
determine the feasibility of projected returns. With this example, a government bond fund
selected as the investment vehicle earning 8.30% would actually net the policyholder a negative
3% return.
VI.

DUE DILIGENCE PROCESS
A.

~

Company Information and Sources

Research on the background of an insurance company should include an analytical
methodology not unlike the due diligence performed in evaluating a limited partnership and
includes some basic questions. How well has the company's portfolios performed in the past?
How stable is the company? What are the expenses of the company in relation to other carriers
or industry norms? Answers to these questions can be found through two A.M. Best Co.
publications. Best Insurance Reports and the Trend Report. The first gives comprehensive
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statistical reports on the financial history and operating results of legal reserve life insurance
companies. The Trend Report has 5 year results of profitability, leverage and liquidity tests.
This may provide a better sense of where the company is going with past performance as a
indication of future expectations.
Information may also be obtained by consulting the Convention Statements (or
"blue books") which are the annual reports filed with the insurance commissioner by all
companies doing business in the state. These provide very detailed analysis of assets , liabilities,
surplus, cash flow, income, expenses, reserves, claims and operations by lines of business.
Companies are also required to include Schedule M in these reports, which applies to interest
sensitive policies and provides answers to a series of disclosure questions about dividends and
illustrations. Advisors may want or need to consult as well with other professionals who have
done this· type of work or have knowledge about a particular company. When conducting due
diligence on a company, remember that no one can guarantee a company's performance years
from now. Other sources for determining the financial strength and claims paying abilities of
a carrier are Moody's Investor Services, Standard & Poor's and Duff & Phelps.
B.

Product and Policy Comparison
1.

Statistical Measures

Although we live in the age of information we remain mired in the Stone
Age when it comes to obtaining data about insurers' practices so that policies may be understood
and compared. Because of the compelling need to improve this, a new policy-disclosure and
cost-measurement approach has been submitted to the NAIC and the Society of Actuaries. A
Society of Actuaries task force investigating illustrations confirmed the need for improved
information and comparison standards. The industry's primary tool for policy information interest adjusted index - is not only inadequate, but also regularly misused and misunderstood.
For instance, comparisons of interest-adjusted indexes of dissimilar insurance plans are invalid
and therefore a limited tool in today's times of policy diversity. This index is used as a
comparison but is derived from illustrations that are not required to be reliable or even
reasonable. As you have seen, there is little relevant information provided to facilitate an
evaluation.
Internal rate of return (IRR) calculations have also been used as a measure
to compare policies in situations where premiums differed from one proposal to another. The
IRR is the interest rate which, if credited to the annual premiums, would yield the cash
surrender value at various points in time. Sometimes it is also used to calculate the return on
death benefits although this produces a figure with no particular meaning, it merely depicts the
leveraged nature of life insurance where small premiums provide substantial amounts of
coverage. Since IRR calculations are based upon the cash values projected in an illustration, the
underlying assumptions again, must be evaluated. The IRR method of evaluating life insurance
proposals can be compared to evaluating the yield of a one-year CD projected over 20, 30 or
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40 years - hardly an accurate procedure and dependent entirely on the assumptions made in the
annual interest rate.
~

Currently another approach, quite unique in many ways, is attempting to
bring a new way to analyze proposals. Fungible present-value analysis begins with the
observation that if the same stream of premium dollars invested in a life insurance policy were
put into an investment vehicle earning the same annual compounding rate and tax advantages,
the cash value in the alternative investment would exceed the policy's cash value because of the
cost of life insurance components. Life insurance, after all, requires annual mortality charges
to cover death claims, underwriting expenses and larger sales loads (commissions). Fungible
present-value analysis states that these total costs are best understood by examining the difference
between these future cash values - the policy's and the alternative investment - and
expressing it as a present-value by using the compounding rate as a discount rate.
This approach is called fungible present-value analysis because the use of
the same rate for both compounding and discounting preserves the interchangability or fungibility
of dollars at different times within the "investment/cost system." This fungibility is critical to
the accuracy arid completeness of the approach. The system's compounding/discounting rate is
defmed as the rate of return on the insurer's net interest or dividend rate credited on cash values.
In essence, these figures show the present sacrifice - the policy's internal economic opportunity
cost - that a policyholder would make for the insurance protection in the illustration.
2.

Sources for Proposal Information

There are firms which have sprung up across the country that provide
specific policy analysis. This can be useful but rather late for many policyholders who find out
after their purchase the value of the policy. The service is also available from a number of feebased or fee-only insurance advisors although there are not many as this area is relatively new.
It would be beneficial for this advisor to be a Licensed Insurance Consultant, a Registered
Investment Advisor and not a captive or general agent of an insurance company. Actuarial firms .
will often perform an audit concerning a policy or proposal and the Society of Actuaries can
provide names of firms in your area. Either of these sources will be somewhat expensive; plan
on spending $500 or more. For smaller face amounts and an inexpensive review the National
Insurance Consumer Organization will provide one for approximately $40. Beacon Co. in
Michigan uses a policy's values to compare with "benchmark" industry values for approximately
$100.

-~

~
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The American Bar Association - Real Property, Probate and Trust Law
Section, publishes "The Life Insurance Counselor" and is an excellent source of information on
life insurance products, illustrations and due diligence. Basic knowledge is provided as a guide
to the elements of an insurance proposal and due diligence questions necessary for analyzing
projections.
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The American Society of CLU's and ChFC's has developed an illustration
Questionnaire (IQ) as an analytical tool for its members. The IQ has 25 questions which can
be sent to an insurer requesting detailed information on the assumptions behind the illustrations.
The questions cover five areas: general, expenses, mortality, interest rate and policy persistency
assumptions. This provides an interesting approach and results in agents rating the relative
effectiveness of illustrations and assumes their credibility and capability to do so. Interpreting
company responses to the IQ can be difficult without an actuarial background or experience in
pricing policies. Approximately half of the major life insurers have agreed to answer the
questions, leaving many unanswered. Mass Mutual is one carrier refusing to comply with the
request for additional information stating, among other concerns, "One important point to keep
in mind about dividends is that the choice of a dividend schedule is strongly influenced by shortterm considerations. There is no commitment or expectation that the given dividend schedule
will remain in place indefinitely. The dividend schedule is not a prediction nor an estimation
of future dividends. This is the major reason why illustrations should not be viewed as longterm projections." These considerations are, of course, not unique to Mass Mutual but apply
to all companies.
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EXHIBIT 1

Life Insurance Marketing and Research Association
(LIMRA) Study Of Whole Life Policies
Statistics Regarding Persistency

Year

2

Policies in Force

83%
I

"

~~ _o~

3

64%

5

50%

10

27%

20

13%

"But to make their policies look as attractive as possible,
some companies design them so that the cash surrender
value by the 20th or 25th year will be immense. Agents
sell life insurance on the basis of the 20th or 25th year
numbers - which few policyholders will ever collect."
Consumer Reports
August 1993
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EXHIBIT 2

Ea
~

d\sd

II

Percentage of First Year's Premium Paid in Acquisition
Cost for Traditional Cash Value Life Policies

II

-~

~--

~

~

Range
~

II

From

To

Agent Commission

55%

60%

General Agent Override

30%

40%

Bonus

10%

15%

Trips/Meetings/Gift

2%

4%

Fringe Benefits

5%

9%

10%

20%

. Expense Allowance
Home Office:

Recruiting, Training, Promotions/Advertising
Advanced Sales Department, Underwriting
Actuarial & Accounting Depts.

20%

30%

Medical, Investment Mgt., Legal

18%

22%

Total

150%

~

I _I

II

Other Home Office:

II

d

II
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200%

II
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EXHIBIT

$500,000 Universal Life Policy
Male - 40 Nonsmoker $3400.00 Premium for 20 years

Projected Mortality Table

Current Mortality Table

This illustrates how powerful changes in just two of the
variables (mortality and investment) can be on the policyholders cash values overtime.
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361
229
191
141
140
131
116
100
48

47

1,205

I

10 Companies With Largestlnc'rease
In' Holdings Of Foreclosed He'al' Estate' '",.
Sorted By Net SAmount Change .
. .: .•
(12131/92- 9130193) (Data In Millions) " .'." . ,'.

464
539
" 416
423
483 '
555
405
486
168

160

11.3% ' I

77.7%
42.6%
46.0%
33.3%
28.9%
23.6%
28.7%
20.7%
28.7%
. 42.0%

Net $ Amount
R.E. Holdings Acquired
Change For
Foreclosure
9 Month
9 Months
% Change
9/30/93
12/31/92

Metropolitan Life NY
Prudential Ins. Co.
Principal Mutual '
Teachers Ins. And Ann.
Equitable Life Assur.
Connecticut General
John Hancock Mutual
Mutual Life Of NY
Phoenix Home Life

113

Company

Northwestern Mutual

11,865

825
768
607
564
623
686
522
,
586
' 217

130 Company Composite 10,660
timrlTIl
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EXHIBIT 5

I

Premium Payment

I
•
•

I

less charge for taxes
attributable to premiums
less $2 processing fee

I
•

Invested Premium Amount
To be invested in one or a combination of:
• The Investment Portfolios of the Series Fund described below
• The Fixed-Rate Option
• The Real Property Account

I
•
•

Daily Charges
Management fees and expenses are deducted from the assets of the Series Fund.
A daily charge equivalent to an annual rate of up to 0.9% is deducted from the assets of the variable
investment options for mortality and expense risks.

I
•

•
•
•

•

•

•

•

Monthly Charges
A sales charge is currently deducted from the Contract Fund in the amount of VI ofl % 'of the primary
annual premium.
The Contract Fund is reduced by a' guaranteed minimum death benefit risk charge of not more than
$0.01 per $1,000 of the face amount of insurance.
The Contract Fund is reduced by an administrative charge of up to $3 per Contract and $0.03 per
$1,000 of face amount of insurance; if the face amount of the Contract is greater than $100,000, the
charge is reduced.
A charge for anticipated mortality is deducted, with the maximum charge based on the
Non-Smoker/Smoker 1980 CSO Tables.
If the Contract includes riders, a deduction from the Contract Fund will be made for charges applicable
to those riders; a deduction will also be made if the rating class of the insured results In an extra
charge.

Possible Additional Charges
If the Contract lapses or is surrendered during the first 10 years, a contingent deferred sales charge is
assessed; the maximum contingent deferred sales charge during the first 5 years is 50% of the first
year's primary annual premium but this charge is both subject to other important limitations and
reduced for Contracts that have been in force for more than 5 years.
If the Contract lapses or is surrendered during the first 10 years, a contingent deferred administrative
charge is assessed; during the first 5 years, this charge equals $ 5 per $1,000 of face amount and it
begins to decline uniformly after the fifth Contract year so that it disappears on the tenth Contract
anniversary.
An administrative processing charge of up to $15 will be made in connection with each withdrawal of
excess cash surrender value or a decrease in face amour'lt.

~
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SECTIONJ

ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS
IN ESTATE PLANNING
Wiley Dinsmore

I.

OVERVIEW OF ETHICS
A

History:
1.

Canons - adopted by AB.A in 1908 - 47 Canons

2.

Code of Professional Responsibility - AB.A approved 1970

3.

4.

a.

Lawyers in Kentucky formerly were governed by the Code.
Lawyers in Ohio still are governed by the Code of Professional
Responsibility.

b.

The Code has a three part format. First, there are nine canons.
After each canon, there are ethical considerations and after
ethical considerations ('IECs") for each canon are disciplinary
rules (IDRs").

c.

ECs. Ethical Considerations are aspirational in character and
represent the objectives toward which every member of the
profession should strive. They constitute a body of principles
upon which the lawyer can rely for guidance in many specific
situations.

d.

DRs. Disciplinary Rules are mandatory in character. They state
the minimum level of conduct below which no lawyer can fall
without being subject to disciplinary action.

e.

In Ohio, liThe code has the force of law ..." Kirschbaumv.
Dillon (1991) 58 Ohio St. 3d 58, 567 N.E. 2d 1291.

Rules of Professional Conduct - AB.A approved 1983.
a.

Adopted by Kentucky effective January 1, 1990 as S.C.R. 3.130.

b.

The Rules have a two-part format. First, there is a rule that
usually begins with "a lawyer shall", "a lawyer may" or "a lawyer
shall not." Each rule is followed by a commentary.

Restatement of the Law of Lawyering - Currently being written by ALL
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B.

Relationship Between Code, Rules and Restatement
Professor Jeffrey N. Pennell has written:

--~

"A practioner in a state that embraces the Model Code standards will
benefit from a consideration of the more recently developed Model
Rules, which establish minimum standards rather than the
"aspirationar' goals of the Model Code. In this respect, the Model
Rules should be regarded as a lesser obligation than the Model Code's
Disciplinary Rules and Ethical Considerations, although many attorneys
would like to believe it is otherwise. Moreover, as rules of ethics, the
professional is subject to being judged in the harshest possible light.
consistent with preserving the profession's responsibility -- and
opportunity -- to govern itself. More importantly, notwithstanding
perceptions that self-governance has become ineffective, no responsible'
attorney will rely on the "audit lottery" of ethics enforcement."
Hess Lecture, October, 1990, The Record of the Association of the Bar
of the City of New York, Vol. 45, No.6, pages 716 and 717.
<;~

II.

REASONS TO COMPLY

A

To Avoid Liability for Malpractice
"While the failure to comply with general rules of conduct, like
the rules of conduct involved in the case before us (DR 5101(A), 5-104(A) and EC (5-5)), will not ordinarily constitute
negligence per ~ it is a circumstance that can be considered,
along with other facts and circumstances, in determining
whether the actor has acted with reasonable concern for the
safety and welfare of others - that is with due care.

~

Because the norms of behavior expressed in the Code of
Professional Responsibility are directly relevant to the issue of
what a reasonable person in Dillon's (the attorney) position
would have done, we conclude that they are relevant to the
issue of whether Dillon brought undue influence to bear upon
Krischbaum (a client for whom Dillon was preparing a will from
which Dillon would receive one-half the residue)."

.~

Krischbaum v. Dillon, 58 Ohio St. 3d 58, 567, N.E.2d 1291 (1991).
~,
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Comment: This case in the ethics and malpractice areas seems to stand for
two important propositions.
S3

J

1.

g

2.

Even though Ethical Consideration are merely aspirational, the jury
may consider them in determining whether a lawyer acted with due
care.
Undue influence by an attorney can be found from the failure by the
attorney to comply with the Code of Professional Responsibility."
But see Lazy Seven Coal States, Inc. v. Stone & Hinds, P.C. (1991) 813
S.W.2d 400 holding the Tennessee Code does not establish a standard'
of c a r e . '

ID.

B.

To Avoid Disciplinary Action

C.

To Avoid Loss of a Gift or Bequest

D.

To Avoid Being Disqualified or Conflicted Out

COMPETENCE

A

Ru1es
1.

A lawyer shall provide competent representation to a client.
Competent representation requires the legal knowledge, skill,
thoroughness and preparation reasonably necessary for the
representation.
See Canon 6 of the Code.

B.

Comments
1.

~

i

~

1

In determining whether a lawyer employs the requisite knowledge and
skill in a particular matter, relevant factors include the relative
complexity and specialized nature of the matter, the lawyer's general
experience, the lawyer's training and experience in the field in question,
the preparation and study the .lawyer is able to give the matter and
whether it is feasible to refer the matter to, or associate or consult
with, a lawyer of established competence in the field in question. In
many instances, the required proficiency is that of a general
practitioner. Expertise in a particular field of law may be required on
some circumstances.
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~

C.

Discussion
1.

Attorneys' Liability Assurance Society, Inc. ("ALAS"), a malpractice
insurance company that insures medium to large non-New York City
law firms reported in the fall of 1991 that the trusts and estates area
was the third most dangerous area for malpractice claims. It stated
that their most common claim of negligence involved an estate tax
issue.

2.

Although every lawyer feels competent to prepare a will, the tax impact
of the provisions of the will are often not considered or understood.
As a result Estate Planning and probate administration may be a
particular field of law requiring expertise and not just the proficiency
of a general practitioner.

~

IV.

DILIGENCE
A

Rule 1.3
1.

B.

Comments
1.

C.

~

j

~

v.

Perhaps no professional shortcoming is more widely resented than
procrastination. A client's interests often can be adversely affected by
the passage of time or the change of conditions; in extreme instances,
as when a lawyer overlooks a statute of limitations, the client's legal
position may be destroyed. Even when the client's interests are not
affected in substance, however, unreasonable delay can cause a client
needless anxiety and undermine confidence in the lawyer'S
trustworthiness.

Discussion
1.

~

A lawyer shall act with reasonable diligence and promptness in
representing a client.

This rule really is self-explanatory, but the comment points out a
problem with regard to estate planning documents. What is a
reasonable time for the preparation of a set of estate planning of
documents? Two weeks? One month?

COMMUNICATIONS

A

Rule 1.4
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B.

1.

A lawyer should keep a client reasonably informed about the status of
a matter and promptly comply with reasonable requests for
information.

2.

A lawyer should explain a matter to the extent reasonably necessary to
permit the client to make informed decisions regarding the
representation.

Discussion
1.

VI.

Again this Rule should not cause any substantial difficulty in the estate
planning and probate areas.

SECRETS AND CONFIDENCES

A

Rule 1.6
1.

B.

A lawyer shall not reveal information relating to the representation of
a client.

Discussion
1.

The commentary to the Rules makes it clear that the Rule relates to
information whatever its source. The Code required the information
to be acquired during representation.

2.

The Rules require the information to "relate to the representation".
The Code is broader.

3.

Note that the information is did not come from the client.

4.

The Rules state that the lawyer should not "disclose" the information
but he can "use" the information unless its use is to the disadvantage
of his client (see Rule 1.8(b)).

See discussions under conflict of interest below.
VII.

CONFLICTS OF INTEREST
A

Rules of Professional Conduct.
1.

Rule 1.7
a.

The Rule
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1.

ii.

b.

A lawyer shall not represent a client if the representation
of that client will be directly adverse to another client,
unless:
(a)

the lawyer reasonably believes the representation
will not adversely affect the relationship with the
other client; and

(b)

each client consents after consultation.

A lawyer shall not represent a client if the representation
of that client may be materially limited by the lawyer's
responsibilities to another client or to a third person, or
by the lawyer's own interests, unless.
(a)

the lawyer reasonably believes the representation
will not be adversely affected; and

(b)

the client consents after consultation.
When
representation of multiple clients in a single matter
is undertaken, the consultation shall include
explanation of the implications of the common
representation and the advantages and risks
involved.

Comments
i.

.~.;\;.

ii.

Loyalty is an essential element in the lawyer's relationship
to a client. An impermissible conflict of interest may exist
before representation is undertaken, in which event the
representation should be declined. If such a conflict
arises after representation has been undertaken, the
lawyer should withdraw from the representation. See
Rule 1.16. Where more than one client is involved and
the lawyer withdraws because a conflict arises after
representation, whether the lawyer may continue to
represent any of the clients is determined by Rule 1.9.
See also Rule 2.2(c). As to whether a client-lawyer
relationship exists or, having once been established, is
continuing, see Comment to Rule 1.3 and Scope .
A lawyer may be paid from a source other than the client,
if the client is informed of that fact and consents and the
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arrangement does not compromise the lawyer's duty of
loyalty to the client. See Rule 1.8(f).
S3

~

iii.

iv.

2.

1

~

~

A lawyer for a corporation or other organization who is·
.also a member of its board of directors should determine
whether the responsibilities of the two roles may conflict.
The lawyer may be called on to advise the corporation in
matters involving actions of the directors. Consideration
should be given to the frequency with which such
situations may arise, the potential intensity of the conflict,
the effect of the lawyer's resignation from the board and
the possibility of the corporation's obtaining legal advice
from another lawyer in· such situations. If there is
material risk that the dual role will compromise the
lawyer's independence of professional judgment, the
lawyer should not serve as a director.

DRS-107 provides in part:
a.

~

Conflict questions may also arise in estate planning and
estate administration. A lawyer may be called upon to.
prepare wills for several family members, such as husband
and wife, and depending upon the circumstances, a
conflict of interest may arise. In estate administration the
identity of the client may be unclear under the law of a
particular jurisdiction. Under one view, the client is the
fiduciary; under another view the client is the estate or
trust, including its beneficiaries. The lawyer should make
clear the relationship to the parties involved.

Except with the consent of his client after full disclosure,
a lawyer shall not:
i.

Accept compensation for his
legal services from one other
than his client.

ii.

Accept from one other than
his client anythiIig of value
related to his representation
of or his employment by his
client.

3.

Rule 1.8 provides in part that ---

4.

Rule 1.10 disqualifies a firm, its partners, associates, shareholders or
employees if one of its lawyers is conflicted out of a matter.
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a.

b.

A lawyer shall not accept compensation for representing a client
from one other than the client unless:
i.

such compensation is in accordance with an agreement
between the client and the third party or the client
consents after consultation;

n.

there is no interference with the lawyer'S independence of
professional judgment or with the client-lawyer
relationship; and

iii.

information relating to representation of a client is
protected as required by Rule 1.6.

Comments
Person Paying for Lawyer's Services
Paragraph (f) requires disclosure of the fact that the lawyer's
services are being paid for by a third party unless such payment
is provided for in an agreement between the client and the third
party.
Such an arrangement must also conform to the
requirements of Rule 1.6 concerning confidentiality and Rule 1.7
concerning conflict of interest. Where the client is a class,
consent may be obtained on behalf of the court-supervised
procedure.

B.

Discussion
Kentucky seems to follow that in transactions between a lawyer and a client,
the burden of proof as to the fairness of the transaction shifts to the lawyer.
Morgan v. Hibbard (1944) 299 Ky. 57, 184 S.W.2d 218.
1.

Rule 2.2.
a.

A lawyer may only act as intermediary between clients if:
i.

the lawyer consults with each client concerning the
implications of the common representation, including the
advantages and risks involved, and the effect on the
attorney-client privileges, and obtains each client's consent
to the common representation;
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C.

ii.

the lawyer reasonably believes that the matter can be
resolved on terms compatible with the clients' best
interests, that each client will be able to make adequately
informed decisions in the matter and that there is little
risk of material prejudice to the interests of any of the
clients if the contemplated resolution is unsuccessful; and

iii.

the lawyer reasonably believes that the common
representation can be undertaken impartially and without
improper effect on other responsibilities the lawyer has to
any of the clients.

b.

While acting as intermediary, the lawyer shall consult with each
client concerning the decisions to be made and the
considerations relevant in making them, so that each client can
make adequately informed decisions.

c.

A lawyer shall withdraw as intermediary if any of the clients so
requests, or if any of the conditions stated in paragraph (a) is no
longer satisfied. Upon withdrawal, the lawyer shall not continue
to represent any of the clients in the matter that was the subject
of the intermediation.

Code of Professional Responsibility
1.

Canon 5 requires a lawyer to exercise independent professional
judgment solely for the benefit of a client, free of compromising
influences and legalities. Neither his personal interest, interests of
other clients, nor desires of third parties should be permitted to dilute
his loyalty. EC5-1.

2.

The ethical considerations are divided into three parts:

3.

a.

Interests of a lawyer that may affect his judgment.

b.

Interests of multiple clients.

c~

Desires of third persons.

Interests of a lawyer that may affect his judgment. Interests that are
particular to estate planning and probate lawyers are dealt with.
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a.
!

EC5-5 provides:

1
"A lawyer should not suggest to his client that a gift be
made to himself or for his benefit. IT a lawyer accepts a
gift from his client, he is peculiarly susceptible to the
charge that he unduly influenced or overreached the
client. IT a client voluntarily offers to make a gift to his
lawyer, the lawyer may accept the gift, but before doing
so, . he should urge that his client secure disinterested
advice from an independent, competent person who is
cognizant of all the circumstances. Other than in
exceptional circumstances, a lawyer should insist that an
instrument in which his client desires to name him
beneficially be prepared by another lawyer selected by the
client."

~

~9
~1

-oj

b.

EC5-6 provides:
A lawyer should notco:nsciously influence a client to
name him as executor, trustee, or lawyer in an instrument.
In those cases where a client wishes to name his lawyer as
such, care should be taken by the lawyer to avoid even
the appearance of impropriety.

4.

Interests of Multiple Clients:
a.

Ethical Considerations
EC5-14 provides:
Maintaining the independence of professional judgment
required of a lawyer precludes his acceptance or
continuation of employment that will adversely affect his
judgment on behalf of or dilute his loyalty to a client.
This problem arises whenever a lawyer is asked to
represent two or more clients who may have differing
interests, whether such interests be conflicting,
inconsistent, diverse, or other discordant.
EC5-15 provides in part:
IT a lawyer is requested to undertake or to continue
representation of multiple clients having potentially
differing interests, he must weight carefully the possibility
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"1

that his judgment may be impaired or his loyalty divided
if he accepts or continues the employment.... If a lawyer

accepted such employment and the interests did become
actually differing, he would have to withdraw from
employment with the likelihood of resulting hardship on
the clients; and for this reason it is preferable that he
refuse the employment initially....

=.-=----J

ECS-16 provides in part:

In those instances in which a lawyer is justified in
representing two or more clients having differing interests,
it is nevertheless essential that each client be given the
opportunity to evaluate his need for representation free
of any potential conflict and to obtain other counsel if he .
so desires. Thus before a lawyer may represent multiple
clients, he should explain fully to each client the
implications of the common representation and should
accept or continue employment only if the clients consent.
b.

Disciplinary Rules
DRS-lOS provides:
(A) A lawyer shall decline proffered employment if the
exercise of his independent professional judgment in
behalf of a client will be or is likely to be adversely
affected by the acceptance of the proffered employment,
except to the extent permitted under DRS-IOS(C).
(B) A lawyer shall not continue multiple employment if
the exercise of his independent professional judgment in
behalf of a client will be or likely to be adversely affected
by his representation of another client, except to the
extent permitted under DRS-lOS(C).
(C) In the situations covered by DR5-10S(A) and (B), a
lawyer may represent multiple clients if it is obvious that
he can adequately represent the interest of each and if
each consents to the representation after full disclosure of
the possible effect of such representation on the exercise
of his independent professional judgment on behalf of
each.
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(D) If a lawyer is required to decline employment or to
withdraw from employment under DR 5-105, no partner
or associate of his or his firm may accept or continue such
employment.

~

VIII. CANON 5 - INDEPENDENT JUDGMENT - CONFLICTS OF INTEREST
A

General
Canon 5 covers several areas. The first area is where the representation of
a client is "directly adverse" to another client. The second area is where the
lawyer'S representation may be materially limited because of the lawyer's
responsibility (1) to another client or (2) to a third party or (3) by the lawyer's
own interest.
DR 5-105 provides:
(A) A lawyer shall decline proffered employment if the exercise of his
independent professional judgment in behalf of a client will be or is
likely to be adversely affected by the acceptance of the proffered
employment, except the extent permitted under DR 5-105(C).
(B) A lawyer shall not continue multiple employment if the exercise of
his independent professional judgment in behalf of a client will be or
is likely to be adversely affected by his representation of another client,
except to the extent permitted under DR 5-105(C).
(C) In the situations covered by DR 5-105(A) and (B), a lawyer may
represent multiple clients if it is obvious that he can adequately
represent the interest of each and if each consents to the
representation after full disclosure of the possible effect of such
representation on the exercise of his independent professional
judgment on behalf of each.

(D) If a lawyer is required to decline employment or to withdraw from
employment under DR 5-105, no partner or associate of his or his firm
may accept or continue such employment.
B.

Multiple Representations - Rules 1.7, 1.8 and 2.2, D.R. 5-105 and E.C. 5-2,

E.c. 5-5
1.

Husband and Wife Wills, Asset Transfers, Divorce and Marriage
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See the New Section Recommendations of the Real Property, Probate
and Trust Law Section, ABA published in Probate and Property, JulyAugust, 1993, page 26.
These recommendations state that the representation of spouses
without any agreement is a joint representation and that Rille 1.7 the
Model Rille dealing with Conflicts of Interests does not apply until
facts come to the attention of the lawyer that indicate to the lawyer a
conflict is arising. If those facts do arise, the lawyer must obtain
informed consent from both spouses. "Mere difference in objectives .
. . are not necessarily conflicts that require a Rule 1.7(a) waiver." DR
5-105 of the Code also requires obtaining of such consent but such
consent should not be required until the lawyers feels a conflict
developing.
The Conference on Ethical Responsibilities of Serving Older Client
held at Fordham University School of Law on December 3, 4 and 5,
1993 (The Fordham Conference") concluded differently.
"In order to undertake joint representation, the lawyer must reasonably
believe that the husband and wife both understand the implications of
joint representation. To accomplish this, the lawyer should review the
terms and implications of the representation with the husband and
wife, preferably in writing."

At the Fordham Conference seven of the ten members of the
Committee that made the recommendations of the Real Property,
Probate and Trust Law Section were present.
In October, 1993 the Board of Regents of the American College of
Trust and Estate Counsel adopted ACTEC Commentaries on the
Model Rules of Professional Conduct C'ACTEC Commentaries").
These ACTEC Commentaries are very similar in this area to the
conclusions of the Fordham Conference.
The writer has great difficulty with the Committee's recommendations
because it only focuses on when the joint representation is "directly
adverse" as required by Rule 1.7(a). The recommendation does not
deal with the representation being limited by lithe lawyer's responsibility
to another client" or to a "third party" or by the 11awyer's own interest"
as required by Rille 1.7(b) and Canon 5. An opinion of the Allegheny
County, Pennsylvania Bar Association Professional Ethics Committee
dated March 1, 1983 is widely cited as permitting a lawyer to represent
both husband and wife in estate planning.
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The Real Property, Probate and Trust Laws Section of the AB.A has
recently issued Comments and Recommendations on the lawyers'
duties in representing husband and wives. 24 Real Property, Probate
and Trust Journal 765 (Winter, 1994). These comments and
recommendations are a prescriptive guide prepared by trusts and
estates lawyers experienced in the area. The articles suggests that
representation may be "joint" or "separate". (Separate means separate
simultaneous representation.)
The comments state representation is joint unless made otherwise by
the parties. There is no conflict until the lawyers discerns conflict.
Once conflict is discerned, the lawyer consent should be obtained
preferably in writing. The mere fact husband and wife want to
distribute their assets differently is not a per se conflict. Confidences·
disclosed must be evaluated.
If a confidence is communicated by one spouse, the report suggests

that the lawyer must determine "how best to handle the situation
between two spouses at the time the confidence is imparted. 1I Id. at 29.
According to the report the lawyer must lIinquire into the nature of the
confidence to permit the lawyer to determine whether the couple's
differences that caused the information to be secret constitutes either
a material potential for conflict or a true adversity. II Id. at 28. The
report goes on to describe three broad types of confidences that may
cause the lawyer to conclude that the differences between the spouses
make the spouses' interests truly adverse: (1) Action-related
confidences, in which the lawyer is asked to give advice or prepare
documents without the knowledge of the other spouse, that would
reduce or defeat the other spouse's interest in the confiding spouse's
property or pass the confiding spouse's property to another person; (2)
Prejudicial confidences, which seek no action by the lawyer, but
nonetheless indicate a substantial potential of material harm to the
interest of the other spouse; and (3) Factual confidences which indicate
that the expectations of one spouse with respect to an estate plan, or
the spouse's understanding of the plan, are not true. Because an
unexpected letter of withdrawal may not protect a confidence from
disclosure, the ABA Committee concluded that "the lawyer must
balance the potential for material harm arising from an unexpected
withdrawal against the potential for material harm arising from the
failure to disclose the confidence to the other spouse. 1I Id. at 30.
If lawyer withdraws he can convert the representation into a separate

representation but only with full disclosure and the consent of both.
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The Real Property, Probate and Trust Journal articles argues that
separate simultaneous representation is permitted under the Rules.
This representation must be by specific agreement. However, the
article points out the "overriding ethics" duty to provide independent
judgment and the difficulty separate representation causes in exercising
independent. Most persons who have examined this issue carefully
have concluded that separate representation while theoretically possible
in practically impossible. Teresa Stanton Collett has argue that -

~

No lawyer can serve two masters, for the lawyer will either love the
first (preserving the client's confidences), and hate the second
(betraying the other client's trusts), or hate the fist (disclosing the
~lient's confidences), and love the second (protecting the other client's·
ability to make informed decisions. This inherent conflict compels the
rejection of separate simultaneous representation as a professional·
norm. As reflected by the initial recommendation of the Professional
Standards Committee of the American College of Probate Counsel, this
model of representation should be permitted only on the rare occasions
when exceptional circumstances require the heroic effort of building
and maintaining a Chinese Wall within the lawyer's mind.
Collett, "And the Two Shall Become One ... Until the Lawyers Are
Done" 7 Notre Dame Journal of Law, Ethics & Public Policy 101, 143.
The Fordham Conference concluded that in the initial conferences, the
lawyer and the client should agree on the confidentiality of disclosures.
The Conference set forth only two options: (1) the lawyer, in the
lawyer's discretion, may disclose all information even if a client does
not want it disclosed, or (2) the lawyer must disclose such information.
The Conference felt the first option was preferred. The Conference
rejected an option that the lawyer will hold the information to the
lawyer alone .
2.

Parent-Child - Intergenerational Representation.

a.
~

:-;--::-~

The Fordham Conference also discussed the ethical concerns in
representing multiple generations, e.g., father-daughter or
mother-son. The Conference could not agree that a lawyer may
represent a family group if there was a clear identification of the
persons who would become clients if there was a splintering of
the group and the persons to whom the duties of loyalty and
confidentiality were owed.

~
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b.

3.

Haynes v. First National State Bank, 87 N.J. 163, 432, A, 2d 890
(1981). This case involved a will contest. The lawyer who
prepared the will and trust of the decedent was also the attorney
for the decedent's daughter who was the principal beneficiary of
the estate. The court held that there was a presumption of
undue influence by the daughter's attorney which could be
rebutted by clear and convincing evidence. Did the daughter
have a malpractice claim against the lawyer?

Corporation and Shareholder, Officer or Director
The law firm of Kirkland & Ellis sought attorneys fees in the Estate of .
George Halas. The beneficiaries objected. The firm represented the
fiduciary as fiduciary, the fiduciary individually, the fiduciary as CEO
of the Chicago Bears corporation, the corporation, the sister of the·
decedent, and her family. The court determined the firm's conduct
representing so many interests showed an absence of good faith which
resulted in a reduction in the fee. Estate of Halas, 159 lli. App. 3d
818, 512 N.E.2d 1276 (1987). See also the ABA Informal Decision
564 (1962) in which the attorney who represented the estate of a
decedent was conflicted out because he also represented the
corporation.

~

4.

Corporate Fiduciary & Client. An attorney who represents a bank
should disclose this representation to a client thinking of naming the
bank executor in the client's will. ID. State Bar Association Opn. 90-2.

5.

Insurance Agent & Client - Neb. St. Bar Assn. Opn. 81-10; Wisc. Prof.
Ethics Com. 392-2. An attorney to whom clients are referred by an
insurance agent should disclose that relationship to any clients who
purchase insurance from the agent. Neb. State Bar Assn. 81-10.

6.

Fiduciaries and Beneficiaries.
The Concept of Derivative Liability. The Fordham Conference was
clear in its determination that the client of an attorney who represents
a fiduciary is the fiduciary and not the beneficiaries of the estate or
trust. Nevertheless, the Fordham Conference did decide that the
lawyer for a fiduciary owes a derivative duty to the. beneficiaries.
Case law supports this decision. Estate of Halas; Elam v. Hyatt Legal
Services, 44 Ohio St. 3d 175, 541 N.E.2d 616 (1989); Fickett v. Sup. Ct.,
27 Ariz. App. 793, 558 P.2d 988 (1976) (Guardianship)
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The Fordham Conference concluded that the lawyer for a fiduciary
may, but is not obligated to, disclose secrets and confidences of his
fiduciary to the beneficiaries of the fiduciary relationship.

=

On May 9, 1994, the AB.A Standing Committee on Ethics issued
Opinion 94-380 which clearly states that a lawyer who represents a
fiduciary represents the fiduciary and has no obligation under Model
Rule 1.6 to disclose to beneficiaries a breach of fiduciary obligations
including fraud and other wrongdoing. But in Kentucky a lawyer may
disclose confidential information to the extent necessary to prevent
criminal conduct likely to result in imminent death or substantial bodily
injury. KB.A Opinion E-360 (9/11/93). See Rule 1.6(b)(2)(3). (The-crimes/fraud exception). This version of the Rules would seem to
mean that a lawyer for a fiduciary who is stealing from an estate ortrust should not disclose the information because the client's criminalconduct does not relate to death or injury. Under Ohio DR4101(C)(3) the lawyer may realize the intention of his client to commit
a crime and the information necessary to prevent the crime.
The opinion, however, does not address the other problem of the trust
and estates lawyer. If the lawyer represents the trustee and the trustee..
is an individual, the other beneficiaries of the trust are likely to be .
related to the trustee and either present or past clients of the lawyer.As a result, Rule 1.6(a) on information may apply requiring present
client consent or Rule 1.9(a) requiring former client consent.

C.

7.

Charity and Client

8.

Dual Representation Letter

Pecuniary Interest
1.

Rule 1.8(a) - Draftsperson as Beneficiary: Also EC 5-5
EC5-5 provides:

~J

I

"A lawyer should not suggest to his client that a gift be
made to himself or for his benefit. If a lawyer accepts a
gift from his client, he is peculiarly susceptible to the
charge that he unduly influenced or overreached the
client. If a client voluntarily offers to make a gift to his
lawyer, the lawyer may accept the gift, but before doing
so, he should urge that his client secure disinterested
advice from an independent, competent person who is

J
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cognizant of all the circumstances. Other than in
exceptional circumstances, a lawyer should insist that an
instrument in which his client desires to name him
beneficially be prepared by another lawyer selected by
the client."
But Rule lo8(c) permits a lawyer to prepare giving the lawyer or a
person related to the lawyer as a parent, child, sibling or spouse a
substantial gift unless the client is related to the donee.
2.

Designation of Attorney Draftsperson as Executor or Trustee; E.C. 5-6

EC5-6 provides:
"A lawyer should not consciously· influence a client to
name his as executor, trustee, or lawyer in an instrument.
In those cases where a client wishes to name his lawyer
as such, care should be taken by the lawyer to avoid
even the appearance of impropriety."
A lawyer should not consciously influence a client to name him
executor or trustee. State v. Gulbankian. 196 N.W.2d 733 (1972).
Nevertheless, the Fordham Conference determined ...
a.

A lawyer is not be precluded from serving as a fiduciary.

b.

A lawyer may draft an instrument in which the client names the
lawyer fiduciary. The client should be adequately informed by
the lawyer. If the client is not adequately informed, the
appointment will be denied. Estate of DeMarco, N.Y. L.J.
3/1/88.

c.

If the lawyer fiduciary has represented another interested party

in a substantially related matter, the lawyer can be forced to
withdraw.
The AcrEC Commentaries have similar conclusions.
28 Real Property, Probate & Trust Journal (Winter 1994) contains a
report on the "Preparation of Wills and Trusts that name Drafting
Lawyer as Fiduciary." The report emphasizes Rule 1l.8(a) requiring (1)
that the transaction be fair and reasonable as fully disclosed in a
~
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writing that is reasonably understandable, (2) the client is given
reasonable opportunity to seek independent advice and (3) the client
consents in writing. The report concludes that Rule 1.8 does not apply
to the draftsman. The report also mentions Rul 2.1 requiring the
lawyer to exercise independent professional judgment and render
candid advice. The report continues by saying disclosure is a good idea
and the lawyer disclose the role and function of the fiduciary,
alternative persons or institutions who could act; conflicts,
compensation issues and arguments of undue influence, conflicts with
other clients and competency. Also, the lawyer should not limit the
liability of the fiduciary.

::=!
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3.

Corporate Fiduciaries Policy of Using Draftsperson as Attorney for
Estate - Rule 2.1 discussed above.

4.

Naming Draftsperson in Will as Attorney for Estate
This does not mean the lawyer does not need to withdraw, he must
withdraw!

5.

Clients of Diminished Capacity.
The Fordham Conference concluded:
IIWhere a client has diminished capacity to make decisions and
lawyer believes client is at risk of harm, lawyer may disclose
confidential information obtained in the course of the
representation without client consent with the goal of protecting
the client from harm. In determining whether to make such
disclosures, lawyer must consider the following factors:
i.

Harm to the client that is likely to result if the lawyer
does not disclosure the confidences. Harm may include
damage to the physical, mental or financial well being of
the client, or to a clearly stated interest of the client, or
to the client's dispositive plan or to the client.

ii.

The degree to which the lawyer has knowledge of the
situation.

iii.

The potential for harm to third parties, in so far as the
client's interests are adversely affected.
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IV.

The nature of the confidence and the potential for
embarrassing or stigmatizing the client in light of the
client's personal values.

-. .;'-
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RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT
Kentucky Excerpts With Commentaries

Rule 1.3
Ru1e 1.4
Rule 1.6
Ru1e 1.7
Rule 1.8
Rule 1.10
Rule 2.2

Diligence
Communication
Confidentiality Of Information
Conflict Of Interest - General Rule
Conflict Of Interest - Prohibited Transactions
Imputed Disqualification - General Rule
Intermediary

~
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RUU: 1.3

DILIGENCE

A lawyer.h.aIl act with reuonable dUlgence and promptneu in representing a
client.
Comment

(1)

(2)

(3)

A lawyer should pursue a matter on behalf of a client despite opposition,
obstruction or personal inconvenience to the lawyer, and may take whatever
lawful and ethical measures are reqtiired to vindicate a client's cause or
endeavor. A lawyer should act with commitment and dedication to the
interests of the client and with zeal in advocacy upon the client's behalf.
However, a lawyer is not bound to press for every advantage that might be
realized for a client. A lawyer has a professional discretion in determining the
means by which a matter should be pursued. See Rule 1.2. A lawyer's
W'Orkload should be controlled so that each matter can be handled adequately.
Perhaps no professional shortCOming is more widely resented than procrastination. A client's interests often can be adversely affected by the passage
of time or the change of conditions: in extreme instances, as when a lawyer
overlooks a statute of limitations, the client's legal position may be destroyed. Even when the client's interests are not affected in substance,
however, unreasonable delay can cause a client needless anxiety and
undermine confidence in the lawyer's trustworthiness.
Unless the relationship is terminated as provided in Rule 1.16, a lawyer
should carty through to conclusion all matters undertaken for a client. If a
lawyer's employment is limited to a specific mattei, the relationship terminates when the matter has been resolved. If a lawyer has served a client over
a substantial period in a variety of matters, the client sometimes may
assume that the lawyer will continue to serve on a continuing basis unless
the lawyer gives notice of withdrawal. Doubt about whether a client-lawyer
relationship still exists should be clarified by the lawyer, preferably in
writing. so that the client will not mistakenly suppose the lawyer is looking
after the client's affairs when the lawyer has ceased to do so. For example,
if a lawyer has handled a judicial or administrative proceeding that produced
a result adverse to the client but has not been specifically instructed
concemlng pursuit of an appeal, the lawyer should advise the client of the
. possibility of appeal before relinquishing responsibility for the matter.

~
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RULE 1.4

(a)

(b)

COMMUNICATION

A lawyer .hoWd keep a client reuoaably informed about the .tatWi of
• matter and promptly comply with reasonable requeau for informatioa.
A lawyer .hoWd explain a matter to tbe erteat reuoaably aece..ary to
permit the cHeat to make infonned deci.ioaa regarding the repreaeatatioa.
Comment

(1)

(2)

" ~!

(3)

The client should have s..illkient information to participate intelligently in
decisions concerning the objectives of the representation and the means by
which they are to be pursued, to the extent the client is willing and able to
do so. For example, a laVi)"er negotiating on behalf of a client should provide
the client with facts rele<.-ant to the matter, iniOrm the client of communications from another party and take other reasonable steps that permit the
client to make a decision regarding a serious offer from another party. A
lawyer who receives from opposing counsel an offer of settlement in a cMl
controversy or a proffere:i plea bargain in a criminal case should promptly
inform the client of its substance unless prior discussions with the client
have left it clear that the proposal will be unacceptable. See Rule 1. 2(al. Even
when a client delegates authority to the lawyer. the client should be kept
advised of the status of the matter.
Adequacy of communication depends in part on the kind of advice or
assistance involved. For exam.ple. in negotiations where there is time to
explain a proposal, the lawyer should re<.iew ail important provisions with
the client before proceed:i..."'lg to an agreement. In litigation a lawyer should
explain the general strategy and prospects of success and ordinarily should
consult the client on tactics that might injure or coerce others. On the other
hand, a lawyer ordinarily cannot be expected to describe trial or negotiation
strategy in detail. The gUiding principle is that the lawyer should fulfill
reasonable client expectations ill' information consistent with the duty to
act in the cl1ent's best interests, and the client's overall requirements as to
the character of representation.
Ordinarily. the informa.tnl to be provided is that appropriate for a client who
is a comprehending and respoDSible adult. However. fully informing the
client according to this standard may be impracticable. for exam.ple. where
the client is a child or suffers from mental disability. See Rule 1.14. When
the client is an organ1za.t!<:m or group, it is often imposSible or inappropriate
to inform ~ry one of its members about its legal affairs; ordinarily. the
lawyer should address co=.un.ications to the appropriate officials of the
organization. See Rule 1.13. Where many routine matters are involved. a
sys tern of limited or QCCa;5ional reporting may be arranged with the client.
Practical exigency may a1so require a lawyer to act for a client without prior
consultation.

Withhol~

(4)

Ia!ormatioD

In some very unusual cl'"CUIllSt.ances.. a lawyer may be justified in delaying
transmission of information when the client would be likely to react
imprudently to an imme::!me communication. Thus. a lawyer might withhold a psychiatric diagoosts of a client when the examining psychiatrist
1ndicates that disclosure would harm the client. A lawyer may not withhold
infonnation to serve the lawyer's own interest or convenience. Rules or court
orders goven1inglittgation may provide that infonnation supplied to a lawyer
may not be disclosed to t."le client. Rule 3.4(c) directs compliance with such
rules or orders.
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RULE 1.6

(a)

(b)

CONFIDENTIALITY OF INFORMATION

A lawyer .ball not reveal information relating to representation of ..
client unless the client consents after consultation, except for di.closures that are lmpHedly autborUed in order to carry out the representation. and except as .tated in paragraph (b).
A lawyer may reveal .uch information to the extent the lawyer
reasonabl, beHeves neceauy:
(1)
to preYeDt the client from committing a crlmlna1 act that the
lawyer beHe~ ill Ukely to result. in Lmminent death or
.uktantial bodily harm; or
.
to establiah a claim or defense on behalf of the lawyer in a
(2)
contro-nny between the lawyer and the cHent, to estabH.h a
defense to a crimJ.n.al charge or civil cWm against the lawyer
based upon conduct in which the cHent was involved, or to
respond to aIlegatioDiin any proceeding concemiDg the
lawyer's repl"esentatioD of the cHent; or
(3)
to comply with other law or court order.
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CoDUDeDt

(1)
(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

The lawyer is part of a judicial system charged with upholding the law. One
of the lawyer's functions is to advise clients so that they avoid any violation
of the law in the proper exercise of their rights.
.
The observance of the ethical obligation of a lawyer to hold inviolate
confidential information of the client not only facilitates the full development
of facts essential to proper representation of the client but also encourages
people to seek early legal assistance.
Almost without exception. clients come to lawyers in order to detenninewhat
their rights are and what is. in the maze oflaws and regulations. deemed to
be legal and correct. The common la,w recognizes that the client's confidences must be protected from disclosure. Based upon experience. lawyers
know that almost all clients follow the advice given. and the law is upheld.
A fundamental principle in the client-lawyer relationship is that the lawyer
maintain confidentlality of information relating to the representation. The
client is thereby encouraged to communicate fully and frankly with the
lawyer even as to embarrasSing or legally damaging subject matter.
The principle of confidentlality is given effect in two related bodies of law. the
attorney-client privilege (which includes the work product doctrine) in the
law of evidence and the rule of confidentiality established in professional
ethics. The attorney-client privilege applies in judicial and other proceedings
in which a lawyer maybe called as a witness orotheIWise required to produce
evidence concerning aclient. The rule of client-lawyer confidentlality applies
in situations other than those where evidence is sought from the lawyer
through compulsion of law. The confidentiality rule applies not merely to
matters communicated in confidence by the client but also to all information
relating to the representation. whatever its source. A lawyer may not disclose
such information except as authorized or required by the Ru1es of Professional Conduct or other law. See also Scope.
The requirement of maintaining confidentiality of information relating to
representation applies to government lawyers who may disagree with the
policy goals that their representation is designed to advance.

Authorized Dbclonre
(7)

(8)

A lawyer is impliedly authorized to make disclosures about a client when
appropriate in canying out the representation. except to the extent that the
client's instructions or special circumstances limit that authority. In litigation. for example, a lawyer may disclose information by admitting a fact that
cannot properly be disputed, or in negotiation by making a disclosure that
facilitates a satisfactoxy conclusion.
Lawyers in a firm may, in the course of the firm's practice, disclose to each
other information relating to a client of the firm. unless the client has
instructed that partlcu1ar information be confined to specified lawyers.

Di.cloaure Advene to CUcnt
(9)

(10)

The confidentlality rule is subject to limited exceptions. In becoming privy
to information about a client, a lawyer may foresee that the client intends
serious harm to another person. However. to the extent a lawyer is required
or permitted to disclose a client's purposes, the client will be inhibited from
revealing facts which would enable the lawyer to counsel against a wrongful
course of action. The public is better protected iffull and open communication by the client is encouraged than if it is inhibited.
Several situations must be distinguished.

3
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(11)

(12)

(13)

(14)

F1rst, the lawyer may not counselor assist a client in conduct that is crtm1nal
or fraudulent. See Rule 1.2!d1. Similarly, a lawyer has a duty under Rule
3.3(a)(4) not to use false evidence. This duty is essentially a special instance
of the duty prescribed in Rule 1.2(d) to avoid assisting a client in crtm1nal or
fraudu1entconduct.
Second, the lawyer may have been innocently involved in past conduct by
the client that was crtm1nal or fraudulent. In such a situation the lawyer has
not violated Rule 1. 2(d) , because to 'counselor assist" criminal or fraudulent
conduct requires knowing that the conduct is of that character.
Third, the lawyer may learn that a client intends prospective conduct that
is criminal and likely to result in imminent death or substantial bodily hann.
As stated in paragraph (b)(l), the lawyer has professional discretion to reveal
information in order to prevent such consequences. The lawyer may make
a disclosure in order to prevent homicide or serious bodily injury which the
lawyer reasonably believes is intended by a client. It is very difficult for a
lawyer to "know" when such a heinous purpose will actually be carried out,
for the client may have a change of mind.
The lawyer's exercise of discretion requires consideration of such factors as
the nature of the lawyer's relationship with the client and with those who
might be injured by the client, the lawyer's own involvement in the
transaction and factors that may extenuate the conduct in question. Where
practical, the lawyer should seek to persuade the client to take suitable
action. In any case, a disclosure adverse to the client's interest should be no
greater than the lawyer reasonably believes is necessary to the purpose. A
lawyer's decision not to take preventive action permitted by paragraph (b)(1)
does not violate this Rule.

Withdrawal
(15)
(16)

(17)

If the lawyer's services will be used by the client in materlally furthering a
course: of crlrninal or fraudulent conduct, the lawyer must withdraw, as
stated in Rule 1.16(a)(l).
After withdrawal the lawyer is required to refrain from making disclosure of
the clients' confidences, except, as otherwise provided in Rule 1.6. Neither
this rule nor Rule 1.8(b) nor Rule 1. 16(d) prevents the lawyer from giving
notice of the fact of withdrawal, and upon withdrawal the lawyer may also
withdraw or disaffirm any opinion, document, affirmation, or the like.
Where the client is an organization, the lawyer may be in doubt whether
contemplated conduct will actually be carried out by the orgarilzation.
Where necessary to guide conduct in connection with this Rule, the lawyer
may make inquiry within the organization as indicated in Rule 1. 13(b).

Dispute Concernint Lawyer's Conduct
(18)

Where a legal claim or disciplinaty charge alleges complicity of the lawyer in
a client's conduct, or other misconduct of the lawyer involving representation of the client, the lawyer may respond to the extent the lawyer reasonable
believes necessary to establish a defense. The same is true with respect to
a claim involving the conduct or representation of a former client. The
lawyer's right to respond arises when an assertion of such complicity has
been made. Paragraph (b)(2) does not require the lawyer to await the
commencement of an action or proceeding that charges such complicity, so
that the defense may be established by responding directly to a third party
who has made such an assertion. The right to defend, of course, applies
where a proceeding has been commenced. Where practicable and not
prejudicial to the lawyer's ability to establish the defense, the lawyer should
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(19)

advise the cJ:i.ent of the third party's assertion and request that the client
respond appropriately. In any event, disclosure should be no greater than
the lawyer reasonably believes is necessary to vindicate innocence, the
disclosure should be made in a manner which limits access to the information to the tribunal or other persons having a need to know it, and
appropriate protective orders or other arrangements should be sought by the
lawyer to the fullest extent practicable.
If the lawyer is charged with wrongdoing in which the client's conduct is
implicated, the rule of confidentiality should not prevent the lawyer from
defending against the charge. Such a charge can arise in a civil, criminal or
professional disciplinary proceeding, and can be based on a wrong allegedly
committed by the lawyer against the client, or on a wrong alleged by a third
person; for example, a person claiming to have been defrauded by the lawyer
and client acting together. A lawyer entitled to a fee is permitted by
paragraph (b) (2) to prove the setvices rendered in an action to collect it. This
aspect of the rule expresses the principle that the beneficiary of a fiduciary
relationship may not exploit it to the detriment of the fiduciary. As stated
above, the lawyer must make every effort practicable to avoid unnecessary
disclosure of information relating to a representation, to limit disclosure to
those having the need to know it, and to obtain protective orders or make
other arrangements minimizing the risk of disclosure.

Dis<:losures Othenris-e Required or Authorized
(20)

(21)

(22)

TIle attorney--client privilege is differently defined in various jurisdictions. If
a lawyer is called as a witness to give testimony concerning a client, absent
waiver by the client, paragraph (aj requires the lawyer to invoke the privilege
when it is applicable. The lawyer must comply with the final orders of a court
or other tribunal of competent jurisdiction requiring the lawyer to give
information about the client.
TIle Rules of Professional Conduct in various circumstances permit or
require a lawyer to disclose information relating to the representation. See
Rules 2.2.2.3.3.3 and 4.1. In addition to these provisions, a lawyer maybe
obligated or permitted by other provisions of law to give information about
a client. Whether another proviSion of law supersedes Rule 1.6 is a matter
ofinterpretatton beyond the scope of these Relies, but a presumption should
exist against such a supersession.
Paragraph (b)(4) gtves the lawyer profesSional discretion to reveal such
-information as the lawyer reasonably believes is necessary to comply with
a court order.

Former Client
(23)

The duty of confidentiality continues after the client-lawyer relationship has
terminated.
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RULE 1.7

(a)

CONFLICT OF INTEREST: GENERAL RULE

A lawyer shall not represent a cUent If the representation of that cUent

will be directly adnrse to another cUent, unle..;
(1)
the lawyer reasonably beUeves the representation will not
adTeBeIy affect the relationship with the other cUent; and
(2)
each client consents after consultation.
(b)

A lawyer shaD not represent a cUent If the repi'esentation of that cUent

may be materially Umlted by the lawyer's responsibilities to another
client or to a third penon., or by the lawyer's own interests, unle..:
(1)
the lawyer reasonably beUeves the representation will not be
adTCnelyaffected;aDd
(2)
the client consents after consultation. When representation of
multiple clients in a single matter Is undertaken, the consultation shall lDclude ezplanation of theimpUcatioDS of the
common representation and the advantages and risks InTOlved.
CollUDent
Loyalty to a CUent

(1)

(2)

(3)

Loyalty is an essential element in the lawyer's relationship to a client. An
impermissible conflict of Interest may exist before representation is undertaken, in which event the representation should be declined. If such a
conflict arises after representation has been undertaken, the lawyer should
withdraw from the representation. See Rule 1.16. Where more than one
client is involved and the lawyer withdraws because a conflict arises after
representation, whether the lawyer may continue to represent any of the
clients is determined by Rule 1.9. See also Rule 2.2(cl. As to whether a clientlawyer relationship exists, or having once been established, is continuing,
see Co=ent to Rule 1.3 and Scope.
As a general proposition, loyalty to a client prohibits undertaking representation directly adverse to that client without that client's consent. Paragraph
(aJ expresses that general rule. Thus, a lawyer ordinarily may not act as
advocate against a person the lawyer represents in some other matter, even
if it is wholly unrelated. On the other hand, simultaneous representation in
unrelated matters of clients whose interests are only generally adverse, such
as competing economic enterprises, does not require consent of the respective clients. Paragraph (a) applies only when the representation of one client
would be directly adverse to the other.
Loyalty to a client is also impaired when a lawyer cannot consider,
recommend or carry out an appropriate course of action for the client
because of the lawyer's other responsibilities or interests. The conflict in
effect forecloses alternatives that would otherwise be available to the client.
Paragraph (b) addresses such situations. A possible conflict does not itself
preclude the representation. The critical questions are the likelihood that a
conflict will eventuate and, ifit does, whether it will materially interfere with
thclawyer's independent professional judgment in considering alternatives
or foreclose courses of action that reasonably should be pursued on behalf
of the client. Consideration should be given to whether the client wishes to
accommodate the other interest involved.

Consultation and Consent
(4)

Ac1ient may consent to representation notwithstanding a conflict. However,
as indicated in paragraph (aJ(l) with respect to representation directly
adverse to a client, and paragraph (b)(l) with respect to material limitations
on representation of a client, when a disinterested lawyer would conclude
that the client should not agree to the representation under the circumstances, the lawyer Involved cannot properly ask for such agreement, or
provide representation on the basis of the client's consent. When more than

J - 29

one client is lm'01ved, the question of conflict must be resolved as to each
client. Moreover, there may be circumstances where it is impossible to make
the disclosure necessmy to obtain consent. For example, when the lawyer
represents different clients in related matters and one of the clients refuses
to consent to the disclosure necessary to permit the other client to make an
informed decision, the lawyer cannot properly ask the latter to consent.
Lawyer" lDtereats

(5)

The lawyer's own interests should not be permitted to have adverse effect on
representation. of a client. For example, a lawyer's need for income should
not lead the lawyer to undertake matters that cannot be handled competently and at a reasonable fee. See Rules 1.1 and 1.5. If the probity of a
lawyer's own conduct in a transaction is in serious question, it may be
difficult or impossible for the lawyer to give a client detached advice. Alawyer
may not allow related business interests to affect representation, for
example, by referring clients to an enterprise in which the lawyer has an
undisclosed interest.

CoDflictlm UtitatioD
(6)

(7)

(8)

Paragraph (a) prohibits representation of opposing partisan litigation.
Simultaneous representation of parties whose interests in litigation may
conflict. such as copla1ntlffs or codefendants, is governed by paragraph (b).
An impermissible conflict may exist by reason of substantial discrepancy in
the parties' testlmony,incompatibillty in positions in relation to an opposing
party or the fact that there are substantially d1fIerent possibillties of
settlement of the claims or l1abillties in question. Such conflicts can arise in
cr1minal cases as well as ctvU. The potential for conflict of interest in
representing multiple defendants in a· cr1minal case is so grave that
ord1na.r1ly a lawyer should decline to represent more than one codefendant.
On the other hand. common representation of persons having s1m1lar
interests is proper if the risk of adverse effect is m1n1mal and the requirements of paragraph (b) are met. Compare Rule 2.2 involving intermediation
between clients.
0rdinar1ly. a lawyer may not act as advocate against a client the lawyer
represents in some other matter, even ifthe other matter is wholly unrelated.
However, there are circumstances in which a lawyer may act as advocate
against a client. For example. a lawyer representing an enterprise wf,th
diverse operations may accept employment as an advocate against the
enterprise in an unrelated matter if doing so will not adversely affect the
1awyer's relationship with the enterprise or conduct of the suit and if both
clients consent upon consultation. By the same token, government lawyers
. in some c1rcumstances may represent government employees in proceeding
in which a government agency is the opposing party. The propriety of
concurrent representation can depend on the nature of the litigation. For
example, a suit charging fraud entails conflict to a degree not involved in a
suit for a declaratory Judgment concerning statutory interpretation.
A lawyer may represent parties having antagonistic positions on a legal
question that has arisen in d1fIerent cases, unless representation of either
client would be adversely affected. Thus, it is ord1nar1ly not improper to
assert such positions in cases pending in different trial courts, may it may
be improper to do so in cases pending at the same time in an appellate court.
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(9)

A lawyer may be paid from a source other than the client, if the client is '
Informed of that faCt and consents and the arrangement does not compromise the lawyer's duty ofloyalty to the client. See Rule 1.8!fl. For example,
when an insurer and Its insured have conflicting interests in a matter arising
from a llabtllty insurance agreement, and the insurer is required to provide
special counsel for the insured, the arrangement should assure the special
counsel's professional Independence. So also, when a corporation and its
directors or employees are involved In a controversy In which they have
conflicting interests, the corporation may provide funds for separate legal
representation of the directors or employees. if the clients consent after
consultation apd the arrangement ensures the lawyer's professionalindependence.
.

Other Coafllct SltuatloDi
(10)

(11)

(12)

(13)

Conflicts of interest In contexts other than litigation sometimes may be
difficult to assess. Relevant factors in determfnfng whether there is potential
for adverse effect Include the duration and Intimacy of the lawyer's relationship with the client or clients involved, the functions being performed by the
lawyer, the llkellhood that actual conflict will arise and the likely prejudice
to the client from the conflict if it does arise. The question is often one of
proximity and degree.
For example. a lawyer may not represent mUltiple parties to a negotiation
whose interests are fundamentally antagonistic to each other, but common
representation is permissible where the clients are generally aligned in
Interest even though there is some difference of Interest among them.
Conflict questions may also arise In estate planning and estate administration. A lawyer may be called upon to prepare wills for several family
members, such as husband and wife, and, depending upon the circumstances,.a conflict ofInterest may arise. In estate administration the identity
of the client maybe unclear under the law ofa partlcularjurisdictton. Under
one view, the client is the ftduciaIy: under another view the client is the
estate or trust, including its beneftciartes. The lawyer should make clear the
relationship to the parties Involved.
A lawyer for a corporation or other organization who is also a member of its
board of directors should determine whether the responsibtllties of the two
roles may conflict. The lawyer may be called on to advise the corporation In .
matters involving actions of the directors. Consideration should be given to
the frequency with which such situations may arise. the potential Intensity
of the conflict, the effect of the lawyer's resignation from the board and the
possibility of the corporation's obtaining legal advice from another lawyer in
such situations. If there is material risk that the dual role will compromise
the lawyer's independence of professional judgment, the lawyer should not
serve as a director.

Coaflict Charged by aa Oppollag PU'tJ'
(14)

~

I

Resolving questions of conflict of Interest is primarily the responsibtllty of
the lawyer undertaking the representation. In litigation, a court may raise
the question when there is reason to Infer that the lawyer has neglected the
responsibtllty. In a crtminal case, inquiIy by the court is generally required
when a lawyer represents multiple defendants. Where the conflict is such as
clearly to call in question the fair or efficient administration of justice,
opposing counsel may properly raise the question. Such an objection should
be vie\1l'ed with caution, however, for it can be misused as a technique of
harassment See Scope.
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(I)

(J)

client without flnt admint that penon in writloi that independent
repreaentation ls appropriate in connection therewith.
A lawyer related to auother lawyer .. parent, ch1ld, aibling or apouse
ahall not repreaent a cUent in a repreaentation directly adveraeto a
penon who the lawyer knowsls repreaented by the other lawyer except
upon consent by the client after conaultation reauding the relationahip.
A lawyer ahaIl not acquire a proprietary intereat in the cauae of action
or aubJect matter of Utigation the lawyer ls conductint for a client,
except that the lawyer may:
(1)
acquire a Uen aranted by law to aecure the lawyer'a fee or
ezpenaea: and
(2)
contract with a cUent for a reaaonable contingent fee in a civil
caae..
Comment

Tranaactiona Between CHeat aDd Lawyer
(1)

(2)

As a general principle, all transactions between client and lawyer should be

fair and reasonable to the client. In such transactions a review by independent counsel on behalf of the client is often advisable. Furthermore, alawyer
may not exploit information relating to the representation to the client's
disadvantage. For example, a lawyer who has learned that the client is
investing in specific real estate may not, without the client's consent, seek
to acquire nearby property where doing so would adversely affect the client's
plan for investment. Paragraph (a) does not, however, apply to standard
commercial transactions between the lawyer and the client for products or
services that the client generally markets to others, for example, banking or
brokerage services, medical services, products manufactured or distributed
by the client, and utilities' services. In such transactions, the lawyer has no
advantage in deaIingwith the client, and the restrictions in paragraph (a) are
unnecessruy and impracticable.
A lawyer may accept a gift from a client, if the transaction meets general
standards of fairness. For example, a simple gift such as a present given at
a holiday or as a token of appreciation is pennitted. If effectuation of a
substantial gift requires preparing a legal instnunent such as a will or other
conveyance, however, the client should have the detached advice that
another lawyer can provide. Paragraph (c) recognizes an exception where the
client is a relative of the donee or the gift is not substantial.

Literary Right.

(3)

An agreement by which a lawyer acquires literary or media rights concerning
the conduct of the representation creates a conflict between the interests of
the client and the personal interests of the lawyer. Measures suitable in the
representation of the client may detract from the publication value of an
account of the representation. Paragraph (d) does not prohibit a lawyer
representing a client in a transaction concerning literary property from
agreeing that the lawyer's fee shall consist of a share in ownership in the
property, if the arrangement conforms to Rule 1.5 and paragraph UJ.

Peraon Paylnf for Lawyera Servicea

(4)

-.- ---

Paragraph (f) requires disclosure of the fact that the lawyer's services are
being paid for by a third party unless such payment is provided for in an

~

J - 33

::::':'

agreement between the client and the third party. Such an arrangement
must also confonn to the requirements of Rule 1.6 concerning confidentiality and Rule 1.7 concerning conflict of interest. Where the client is a class,
consent may be obtained on behalf of the class by court-supervised
procedure.

Umitini Liability
(5J

Paragraph (h) is not intended to apply to customary qualifications and
limitations in legal opinions and memoranda

Family Relatiooabi~ Between Lawyers
(6J

Paragraph (1) applies to related lawyers who are in different firms. Related
lawyers in the same firm are governed by Rules 1. 7, 1.9, and 1. 10. The
disqualification stated in paragraph (iJ is personal and not imputed to
members of firms with whom the lawyers are associated.

Acqui.ition of Jntere.t in Litigation
(7)

Paragraph OJ states the traditional general rule that lawyers are prohibited
from acquiring a proprietaly interest in litigation. This general rule, which
has its basis in common-law champerty and maintenance, is subject to
specific exceptions developed in decisional law and continued in these
Rules, such as the exception for reasonable contingent fees set forth in Rule
1.5 and the exception for certain advances of the costs oflitlgation set forth
in paragraph (eJ.
.
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RULE 1.10
(a)

(b)

(c)

(d)

IMPCTED DISQUALlFICAll0N: GENERAL RULE

While lawyers are associated in a firm. none of them shall knowingly
represent a client when anyone ofthem practicing alone would be prohibited
from doing so by Rules 1.7, l.B(c), 1.9 or 2.2.
When a lawyer becomes associated with a firm. the firm may not knowingly
represent a Person in the same or a substantially related matter in which
that lawyer, or a firm with which the lawyer was associated, had previously
represented a client whose interests are materially adverse to. that person
and about whom the lawyer had acquired information protected by Rules 1.6
and 1.9(b) that is material to the matter.
When a lawyer has terminated an association with a firm, the firm is not
prohibited from thereafter representing a person with interests materially
adverse to those of a client represented by the formerly associated lawyer
unless:
(1)
the matter is the same or substantially related to that in which the
formerly associated lawyer represented the client; and
(2)
any lawyer remaJn1ng in the firm has information protected by
Rules 1.6 and 1.9(b) that is material to the matter.
A disqualification prescribed by this rule may be waived by the affected client
under the conditions stated in Rule 1. 7
Commeat

DefiDitiOD of "FinD"
(1)

For purposes of the Rules of Professional Conduct, the term "firm" includes
lawyers in a private firm. and lawyers employed in the legal department of
a corporation or other organization, or in a legal services organization.
Whether two or more lawyers constitute a firm within this definition can
depend on the spec1flc facts. For example, two practitioners who share office
space and occasionally consult or assist each other ordinarily would not be
regarded as constituting a firm. However, if they present themselves to the
public in a way suggesting that they are a firm or conduct themselves as a
firm, they should be regarded as a firm for the purposes of the Rules. The
terms of any formal agreement between associated lawyers are relevant in
determining whether they are a firm. as is the fact that they have mutual
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(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

access to confldentlal infonnation concerning the clients they serve. Furthennore. it is relevant in doubtful cases to consider the underlying purpose
of the rule that is involved. A group of lawyers could be regarded as a firm
for purposes of the rule that the same lawyer should not represent opposing
parties in Htlgation. while it might not be so regarded for purposes of the rule
that information acquired by one lawyer is attributed to another.
With respect to the law department of an organization. there is ordinarily no
question that the members of the department constitute a firm within the
meaning of the Rules of Professional Conduct. However. there can be
uncertainty as to the identity of the cHent. For example. it may not be clear
whether the law department of a corporation represents a subsidUuy-or an
afilliated corporation. as well as the corporation by which the members ofthe
department are directly employed. A s1m1lar question can arise concerning
an unincorporatc!d association and its local afilliates.
Similar questions can also arise with respect to lawyers in legal aid. Lawyers
employed in the same unit of a legal service organization constitute a firm.
but not necessarily those employed in separate units. As in the case of
independent practitioners. whether the lawyers should be treated as associated with~hothercandependon the particular rule that is inVOlved. and
on the specific facts of the situation.
Where a lawyer has joined a private firm after h;ivtng represented the
government, the situation is governed by Rule 1.11(a) and (b); whereaIawyer
represents the government after having served private cl1ents. the situation
is governed by Rule 1.11 (c)(l). The indMduallawyerinvolved is bound by the
Rules generally. including Rules 1.6. 1. 7 and 1.9.
Different provisions are thus made for movement of a lawyer from one prtvate
firm to another and for movement of a lawyer betWeen a private firm and the
government. The government is entitled to protection of its cHent confidences. and therefore to the protections provided in Rules 1.6. 1.9. and 1.11.
However. if the more extensive disqualiflcation in Rule 1.10 were appHed to
former government lawyers. the potentlal effeCt on the government would be
unduly burdensome. The government deals with all private citizens and
orgaruzations. and thus has a much wider circle of adverse lega1interests
than does any private law firm. In these circumstances. the government's
recruitment oflawyers would be seriously impaired if Rule 1. 10 were applied
to the government. On balance. therefore. the government is better served
in the long run by the protections stated in Rule 1. 11.

~

Principles of Imputed DisquaUficatloD
(6)

The rule of imputed disqualification stated in paragraph (~) gives effect to the
principle ofloyalty to the client as it applies to lawyers who practice in a law
firm. Such situations can be considered from the premise that a firm of
lawyers is essentially one lawyer for purposes of the rules governing loyalty
to the cl1ent, or from the premise that each lawyer is vicariously bound by
the obHgation of loyalty owed by each lawyer with whom the lawyer is
associated. Paragraph (a) operates only among the lawyers currently associated in a firm. When a lawyer moves from one firm to another. the situation
is governed by paragraphs (b) and (c).

;a
.....,

Lawyers Moving BetweeD Firms

j

j

(7)

When lawyers have been associated in a firm but then end their association.
however. the problem is more complicated. The fiction that the law firm is
the same as a single lawyer is no longer wholly realistic. There are several'
competing considerations. First, the cHent previously represented must be
reasonably assured that the principle of loyalty to the cHent is not compro-
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(8)

(9)

(10)

m1sed. Second, the rule of disqualification should not be so broadly cast as
to preclude other persons from having reasonable choice of legal counsel.
Third, the rule of disqualification should not unreasonably hamper lawyers
from fOrming new associations and taking on new clients after having left a
previous association. In this connection, it should be recognized that today
many lawyers practice in firms, that many to some degree ltmtt their practice
to one field or another, and that many move from one association to another
several times in thetrcareers. Ifthe concept of imputed disqualification were
defined with unqualified rigor, the result would be radical curtaUment of the
opportunity of lawyers to move from one practice setting to another and of
the opportunity of clients to change counsel.
Reconciliation of these competing principles in the past has been attempted
under two rubrics. One approach has been to seek per se rules of disqualification. For example, it has been held that a partner in a law firm ts
conclusively presumed to have access to all confidences concerning.all
clients of the firm. Under this analysts, if a lawyer has been a partner in one
law firm and then becomes a partner in another law fIrm, there is a
presumption that all confidences known by a partner in the first firm are
known to all partners in the second fum. This presumption might properly
be applied in some circumstances, espectally where the client has been
extensively represented, but may be unrealistic where the client was
represented only for ltmtted purposes. Furthermore, such a rigid rule
exaggerates the difference between a partner and an associate in modern law
firms.
The other rubric formerlyused for dealing with vicarious disqualifIcations
is the appearance of impropriety proscribed in Canon 9 of the ABA Model
Code of Professional Responsibility. This rubric has a twofold problem. First,
the appearance of impropriety can be taken to include any new client-lawyer
relationship that might make a former client feel anxious. If that meaning
were adopted, disqualification would become little more that a question of
subjective judgment by the former client &!mnd, since "impropriety" is
undefined, the term "appearance of impropriety" is question-begging. It
therefore has to be recognized that the problem of imputed disqualification
cannot be properly resolved either by simple analogy to a lawyer practicing
alone or by the vexy general concept of appearance of impropriety.
A rule based on a functional analysis is more appropriate for determining the
question of vicarious disqualification. Two functions are involved: preserving confidentiality and avoiding positions adverse to a client.

ConfidentiaUty
(11)

(12)

Preserving confidentialtty is a question of access to information. Access to
information, in turn, ts essentially a question of fact in particular circumstances, aided by inferences, deductions or working presumptions that
reasonably may be made about the way in which lawyers work together. A
lawyer may have general access to rues of all clients of a law firm and may
regularly participate in discussions of their affairs; it should be inferred that
such a lawyer in fact is privy to all information about all the firm's clients.
In contrast, another lawyer may have access to the rues of only a ltmtted
number of clients and participate in discussion of the affairs of no other
clients; in the absence of information to the contraxy, it should be inferred
that such a lawyer in fact is privy to information about the clients actually
served but not those of other clients.
Application of paragraphs (b) and (c) depends on a situation's particular
facts. In any such inquixy, the burden of proof should rest upon the fum
whose disqualifIcation is sought.
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(13)

(14)

Paragraphs (b) and (c) operate to disq~ the firm only when the lawyer
involved has actual knowledge of information protected by Rules 1.6 and
1.9(b). Thus, if a lawyer while with one firm acquired no knowledge of
information relating to a particular client of the firm. and that lawyer later
joined another firm. rieither the lawyer IndMdually nor the second firm is
disqualified from representing another client in the same or a related matter
even though the interests of the two clientS conflict.
Independent of the question of disqualification of a firm. a lawyer changing
professional association has a continuing duty to preserve confidentiality of
information about a client fonnerly represented. See Rules 1.6 and 1.9.

Adverse PositiolUl
(15)

The second aspect of loyalty to client is the lawyers obligation to decline
subsequent representations InvoMng positions adverse to a fonner client
arising in substantially related matters. This obligation requires abstention
from adverse representation by the indMduallawyer involved, but does not
properly entail abstention of other lawyers through imputed disqualiflcation. Hence, this aspect of 1;he problem is governed by Rule 1.9(a). Thus, if
a lawyer left one firm for another, the new afllliation would not preclude the
firms involved from continuing to represent clients with adverse interests in
the same or related matters, so long as the conditions of paragraphs (b) and
(c) concerning confidentiality have been met.
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RULE 2.2
(a)

(b)

(c)

Iln"ERMED1ARY

A lawyer may oal,. act u intermedluy betweeD cHeDts If:
(1)
the lawyer cODsu1ts with each c1leDt coucerDiDI the lmpHcatiou of the CODlmOD repreHDtatioD, includm, the adV&Dtaaa
aud risb involved~ aud the· effect OD the attomey-cHeat
pri'ri1eta, aDd obtains each c1leDt's CODRDt to the commOD
repre.eutatioD;
(2)
the lawyer reuoDably beHeva that the matter caD be re.olved
OD term. compatible with the clleDts' best intere.ts, that each
c1leat wlll be able to make· adequately Informed declslou in
the matter iUad that there h Httle risk of material prejudice to
the interau of auy of the c1leDulf the coDiemplated raolutiOD h uuucceuful; auel
(3)
the lawyer re..ouably beHeva that the commOD repre.eDtatiOD CaD be uudertakeD lmpartlaUy aud without lmproper
effect OD other re.poulbWties the lawyer h .. to au,. of the
c1leats.
While actiut u intermediary, the lawyer shall cODsu1t with each cHeat
CODceJ'DlDC the elec:bloDa to be made &Del the coDsleleratloDs releV&Dt
in making them, so that each cHeDt CaD make adequately lDformed
dec:bloDa.
Alawyer shall withdraw uintermedluy If&Dyofthe cHeDts so requats,
or If au,. of the coDditioDa stateclin paragraph (a) h DO louger satisfieel.
UPOD withclrawal, the lawyer shaJ1llOt CoDtiDue to repreRDt auy of the
c1leats in the matter that .... the subject of the intermedlatloD.
Commeut

This Rule explidtlyrecogruzes the specta1 role of the lawyer acting as an intermedla1y.
to be dist:tngu1shed from joint representation as an advocate.
(1)
A la-wyer acts as intermedla1y under this Rule when the lawyer represents
two or more parties with potentially conflicting interests. A key factor in
deftn1ng the relationship is whether the parties share responsibility for the
la-wyer's fee. but the common representation may be inferred from other
circumstances. Because confusion can arise as to the la-wyer's role where
each party is not separately represented. itis important that the lawyer make
clear the relationship. and obtain the cl1ent's consent, preferably in writing.
(2)
This Rule does not apply to a lawyer acting as arbitrator or mediator between
oramongpartteswhoarenotclientsofthelawyer.even.wherethelawyerhas
been appointed with the concurrence of the parties. In performing such a
role the lawyer may be subject to applicable codes of ethics, such as the Code
of Ethics for Arbitration in Commercial Disputes prepared by a joint
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(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

Committee of the American Bar Association and the American Arbitration
Association.
A lawyer acts as intermediaty in seeking to establish or adjust a relationship
between clients on an amicable and mutually advantageous basis; for
example, in helping to organize a business in which two or more clients are
entrepreneurs, working out the financial reorganization of an enterprise in
which two or more clients have an interest, arranging a property distribution
in settlement of an estate or a marital division or mediating a dispute
between clients. The lawyer seeks to resolve potentially conflicting interests
by developing the parties' mutual interests. The alternative can be that each
party may have to obtain separate representation, with the possibility in
some situatioQS of 1ncurr1ng additional cost, complication or even litigation.
Given these and other relevant factors, all the clients may prefer that the
lawyer act as intermediaty.
.
In considering whether to act as intermediary between clients, a lawyer
should be mindful that if the intermediation fails the result can be additional
cost, embarrassment and recrimination. In some situations the risk of
failure is so great that intermediation is plainly impossible. For example, a
lawyer cannot undertake common representation of clients between whom
contentious litigation is imminent or who contemplate contentious negotiations. More generally, if the relationship between the parties has already
assumed definite antagonism, the possibility that the clients' interests can
be adjusted by intermediation ordinarily is not very good..
The appropriateness of intermediation can depend on its form. Forms of
intermediation range from informal arbitration, where each client's case is
presented by the respective client and the lawyer decides the outcome, to
mediation, to common representation where the clients' interests are
substantially though not entirely compatible. One form may be appropriate
in circumstances where another would not. Other relevant factors are
whether the lawyer subsequently will represent both parties on a continuing
basis and whether the situation involves creating a relationship between the
parties or tenninating one.
In some circumstances a lawyer will undertake representation of a party in
litigation or negotiation, and be forced to deal with an unrepresented party.
For example, the lawyer representing a spouse in a divorce case may deal
with the unrepresented spouse within the limits of Rule 4.3. The fact that the
lawyer negotiates with the unrepresented spouse does not make the lawyer
an intermediary, or subject the lawyer to the special rule of disqualification
contained in Rule 2.2(c).

CoofidentlaHty and Privil.
(7)

(8)

it.

particularly important factor in determining the appropriateness of
intermediation is the effect on client-lawyer confidentiality and the attorneyclient privilege. In a common representation, the lawyer is still required both
to keep each client adequately informed and to maintain confidentiality of
information relating to the representation. See Rules 1.4and 1.6. Complying
with both requirements while acting as intermediary requires a delicate
balance. If the balance cannot be maintained, the common representation
is improper. With regard to the attorney~lient privilege, the prevailing rule
is that as between commonly represented clients the privilege does not
attach. Hence, it must be assumed that if litigation eventuates between the
clients, the privilege will not protect any such communications, and the
clients should be so advised.
Since the lawyer is required to be impartial between commonly represented
clients, intermediation is improper when that impartiality cannot be
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maintained. For example, a lawyer who has represented one of the clients
for a long period and In a variety of matters might have difficulty being
impartial between that client and one. to whom the lawyer has only recently
been Introduced.
CoDau1tatloD

(9)

In. acting as intermeclliuy between clients, the lawyer is required to consult
with the clients on the implications of doing 80, and proceed only upon
consent based on such a consultation. The consultation should make clear
that the lawyer's role is not that of partisanship normally expected in other
ctrcums~.

(10)

Paragraph (b) is an application of the principle expressed In Rule 1.4. Where
the lawyer is intermediary, the clients ordtnarily must assume greater
responsibility for decisions than when each client is independently represented.

Withdrawal

(11)

Common representation does not diminish the rights of each client in the
client-lawyer relationship. Each has the right to loyal and diligent representation, the right to discharge the lawyer as stated in Rule 1. 16, and the
protection of Rule 1.9 concerning obligations to a fonner client.
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